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Abstract. The mimicry of Europe and United States of America (US) in South African 
psychology in the early 1900s and the continual presence of Euroamericanised psychology 
continues to marginalise Black, poor, and working-class people. In this dissertation, I investigated 
the misalignment of counselling and clinical psychologists’ professional training, specifically the 
first-year Masters psychology training programme with the South African socio-political context. 
To counter the usual reliance on hegemonic Euroamerican-centric approaches I elaborated on an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective so as to make sense of the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists in the South African context. I argued that the Africa(n)-centred perspective was 
pluriversal (accepting of multiple epistemologies), endogenous (developing from within), and 
focuses on Africans not as the excluded Other but rather as the Subject at the centre of their 
lifeworlds. I elucidated curriculum practices within the professional training programmes as part 
of the investigation into the intransigence of Euroamerican-centric epistemologies in the 
professional training curriculum. I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 23 people, 
8 of whom were course coordinators and 15 intern psychologists. The participants were from 5 
universities falling into the 4 generic categories: Historically Black University (HBU), Historically 
White Afrikaans-speaking University (HWASU), merged university (MU), and Historically White 
English-speaking University (HWESU). For my analysis, I employed what I termed an Africa(n)-
centred critical discourse analysis, which builds on the discursive turn in psychology, taking 
seriously the talk of people in the reproduction of socially unjust practices. All the interviews with 
the course coordinators and intern psychologists were dominated by talk of race and the 
Professional Board for Psychology. The interviews yielded a number of discourses, namely: 1) 
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meritocracy, 2) diversity (which referenced issues of race, gender, and curriculum), 3) access, 
exclusion and privilege as related to language, 4) class, and 5) relevance (including social, market, 
and cultural relevance, with cultural relevance spoken about in relation to the curriculum). I 
conclude the dissertation by gesturing towards a constructive engagement (by which I mean a 
building) of an Africa(n)-centred professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
Keywords: Africa(n)-centred psychology; Professional training; Curriculum; Masters selection; 
Counselling and clinical psychologists; Race and racialisation; Discursive psychology; 
Decoloniality; History of psychology
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, in The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of 
Knowledge, argues that “…the colonizing structure [is] responsible for producing marginal 
societies, cultures, and human beings” (1988, p. 17). By the ‘colonising structure’ he is referring 
to the relationship of domination-oppression between the colonies and the metropole. The 
colonising structure was created through Eurocentrism. Tsenay Serequeberhan understands 
Eurocentrism as “a pervasive bias located in [Euro] modernity’s self-consciousness of itself. It is 
grounded at its core in the metaphysical belief or idea (Idee) that European existence is 
qualitatively superior to other forms of human life” (1997, p. 142). Eurocentrism points to how, at 
the centre of colonial and ex-colonial societies (e.g. in Africa, the New World, and Asia Pacific), 
exists the idea that Europe, including its people, cultures, and epistemologies, is superior to those 
of the latter societies.   
Eurocentrism became Euroamerican-centrism following the ascendancy of the United States of 
America (US) in the world economy after World War II (Danziger, 2006). Perhaps even more so 
than Europe, the rise of the US as both an economic and military power has enabled it to export 
its beliefs, culture, and institutions, thereby exercising what is called ‘soft power’ (Nye Jr., 2008), 
to all parts of the world, including Europe. In ex-colonised societies, Euroamerican-centrism is 
pervasive in all areas of life, which has led to a continuous marginalision of Othered forms of 
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cultures, beliefs, epistemologies, and peoples (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2015). Euroamerican-centrism is linked to White, Western, middle-class lifeworlds (German: 
Lebenswelt). In this study, I take on the term lifeworlds as used by the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas, who notes that “we can think of the lifeworld as represented by a culturally transmitted 
and linguistically organized [sic.] stock of interpretive patterns” (1985, p. 124). Habermas goes on 
to say that “[l]anguage and culture are constitutive for the lifeworld itself” (1985, p. 125).  
It should be noted, at this point, that in respect to quoting Habermas and other European and US 
scholars in this study does not undermine the work of building an Africa(n)-centred approach; 
indeed, Africa(n)-centric development does not preclude borrowing useful ideas, approaches, 
and/or theories that do not necessarily focus on Africa. There is nothing inherently wrong with 
White, Western, middle-class lifeworlds. The trouble emerges when white, western, middle-class 
lifeworlds are centralised in contexts outside of Europe and the US, which leads to the 
peripheralisation of the lifeworlds of, for example, Black, non-Western, working-class, and poor 
people (Mudimbe, 1988). In the next section, I introduce the concepts of Black and White 
lifeworlds, as well as Euroamerican-centric and Africa(n)-centred lifeworlds, in order to articulate 
the colonisation and racialisation of lifeworlds. It is against the backdrop of the idea of a colonising 
structure that the current thesis focusses on Africa as a centre in the epistemological and 
ideological domains of the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
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1.1 How to (re)centre Africa in the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists? 
This thesis aims not only to challenge the established Euroamerican-centric psychology, but also 
advance a more Africa(n)-centred practice in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
The main research question for which the study seeks an answer is how to (re)centre Africa in the 
training of clinical and counselling psychologists. I accept the premise that psychology in South 
Africa is dominated by Euroamerican-centric psychology and, as such, has continued to be 
marginalising, exclusionary, and de-contextualised within contemporary South Africa. The main 
objectives of the study are, therefore, to engage with what is currently being taught in psychology 
classes, who is being trained, who is doing the training, and to what end. In order to achieve the 
(re)centring of Africa in the training of clinical and counselling psychologists, I will elaborate on 
and argue for utilising what Serequeberhan (2009) called the de-struction of Eurocentrism as well 
as the construction of an Africa(n)-centred perspective or approach.  
An Africa(n)-centred perspective is understood in this study as being an endogenous approach that 
accepts the pluriversal nature of human life in Africa and focusses on Africans not as the excluded 
Other but rather as the Subjects at the centre of their lifeworlds. An Africa(n)-centred approach in 
training clinical and counselling psychologists is contrasted with the hegemonic Euroamerican-
centric knowledge and practices found within current professional psychology training. The goal 
of elaborating on and using an Africa(n)-centred perspective is to work towards de-centring white, 
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middle-class and Euroamerican lifeworlds in Africa, and (re)centring African lifeworlds. 
Importantly, this de-centring should be understood within the context of Africa, as it is necessarily 
entangled with the European histories. The thesis title is also an acknowledgment of the history of 
the continent, namely that there existed a period (i.e. the colonial era) in Africa’s past were 
Africa(ns) was (were) central to conceptions of the world. However, the parenthetical ‘re’ in the 
title also signals that we can never truly return to a pre-colonial Africa, and the aim is, instead, to 
filter through those appropriate forms of knowledge that identify with Africa and situate Africa at 
the centre.  
Psychology, as with all social sciences, is a product of and mutually influences the socio-cultural 
context in which it exists. However, African Psychology has remained a colonial-apartheid, 
Euroamerican-centric discipline in both theory and practice. Psychology is a socio-cultural and 
ideologically-laden discipline. Throughout history, psychology has played a role in culturally and 
ideologically shaping the lifeworlds of societies (Danziger, 1994). The development of psychology 
in South Africa, for example, has mirrored, in many ways, the development of the discipline as it 
emerged in Europe and the US; this development has, thus, established the promotion of mainly 
racist and classist tropes of Blacks, Western ideas, and the supremacy of Whites (Seedat & 
MacKenzie, 2008; Suffla, Stevens, & Seedat, 2001).  
It is important to note that psychology, when understood as a socio-cultural endeavour, cannot be 
divorced from the reality of the historical period under investigation, namely from the early 20th 
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century, through apartheid, to the present-day democratic South Africa. As such, the present thesis 
begins from the early years of psychology to interrogate the re-production of racist dogma and 
their entrenchment during the early 20th century and apartheid rule. Additionally, focus is placed 
on how the dominant ideology of the 1900s and apartheid remains foundational to much of 
contemporary South African psychology. I further argue that the contemporary articulation of 
psychology in the democratic era has been unable to change the trajectory of psychology in any 
significant way.  
Discussion on the role and relevance of the discipline in society has been taking place since the 
inception of the psy-disciplines in (South) Africa; specifically, these discussions have revolved 
around psychiatry, practiced first in asylums around 1899, and psychology, as from around 1917 
(Long & Foster, 2013; Nicholas, 2014; Swartz, 2008). Within psychology, these discussions in the 
early years focussed mainly on what has become known as ‘the poor White problem’ (Wilcocks, 
1932). Whilst Black people were a topic discussed within psychology, these discussions concerned 
how best to understand those variously referred to as ‘natives’, ‘bantus’, ‘Blacks’, and ‘Africans’, 
so as to subordinate them, as well as to control the interaction between poor Blacks and poor 
Whites (Legassick & Wolpe, 1974; Louw & Foster, 1991).  
From the 1970s, but mostly from the 1980s onwards, these discussions on the place and 
appropriateness of psychology expanded to include Black people (Anon., 1986) and women (de la 
Rey & Ipser, 2004) as active participants in the body of scholarship (see also Couve, 1986; Dawes, 
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1985). Catriona Macleod (2004) notes that ‘relevance’, as a debate, became commonplace between 
the 1980s and the early 2000s. More recent discussions on the relevance of psychology have also 
begun to span issues of class, race, and gender bias (see Long, 2013; Long, 2016a). The 2015 and 
2016 student protests reignited the need to reimagine, transform, Africanise, and decolonise 
academic disciplines, which some had seen as bearing the oppressive and exclusionary ideological 
markers of colonialism and apartheid (see Pillay, 2016). (I shall return in Chapter 2 to a more 
detailed discussion of the concepts of Africanisation, decoloniality and decolonisation). Calls for 
the transformation, decolonisation, and Africanisation of universities reached a tipping point with 
the #RhodesMustFall, #OpenStellenbosch, and #FeesMustFall movements that galvanised the 
country’s higher education sector (see Naicker, 2016). These student-led movements also 
revitalised discussions around the need for the transformation of university curricula, pedagogy, 
and representation; particularly in terms of issues of racial, gender, and class representations, as 
well as against exclusionary practices within universities (see Pillay, 2016).   
The question of how to (re)centre Africa in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists 
presented in this study is investigated using five universities. Each university is treated as a case 
study, but comparisons are made across the cases. The five universities were selected by using the 
following categories: historically Black; historically White, English speaking; historically White, 
Afrikaans-speaking; and what is called a ‘merged university’. Although I explore these generic 
categories in detail later, it is worth noting that a merged university is a university that came into 
existence following the amalgamation of universities to reduce them from 36 to 21 to combat some 
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of the apartheid segregation policies (Baloyi & Naidoo, 2016). Two universities were selected 
from the historically White English-speaking category, because the one university teaches a 
traditional psychology Masters programme, while the other purports to teach a community-
oriented programme. I argue that the historical context of each of the selected universities shapes 
the contemporary epistemological orientation of potential trainees as well as their access to the 
university in question.  
1.2 Semantic slippage in the use of the word Black: The paradoxical role of race 
in society 
In engaging with questions of redress and equality in access to professions such as psychology, 
there are multiple inherent paradoxes that often need addressing. One such paradox is that people 
have been excluded from full participation in society, such as work and school, on the basis of 
their race (i.e. on the basis of their skin color, hair texture, and some other biological markers that 
render them as belonging at a level of ‘sub-human’) (Stevens, 2003). Race, in this regard, is 
understood as biological. Simultaneously, race does not exist as a biological construct; rather, it is 
a social construct that was created and reinforced to serve those who are racialised as White – on 
the basis of biology – to ascend to a level of ‘human’. However, although race does not exist as a 
biological construct, there are substantive effects of being raced, which are a mainstay for those 
subjected to it.  
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In order to correct the deleterious effects of race and racialisation, redress based on racial 
categories is the most appropriate approach, which then inherently re-inscribes race as a defining 
social factor (Kessi & Cornell, 2015). Many higher education institutions have grappled with this 
paradox and have settled, as Zimitri Erasmus has noted in the context of admissions policies of the 
University of Cape Town, “to situate the meaning of academic merit within the history of 
education under apartheid” (2012, p. 1). This is to say that entry into academic institutions should 
take into consideration those who have been racialised as Black and how they have been excluded 
from participation in society as a result of colonialism and apartheid.  
Due to the paradox created by race in ex-colonised nations, the sematic slippage then comes about 
when race is reified rather than attempting to understand the ways in which people have been 
racialised historically. A distinction can be made between race and racialisation (yet these two 
concepts are often conflated) where the concepts can be understood as interdependent but distinct 
in their inference (Foster, 1991). Race denotes the colonial and apartheid biological hierarchical 
inscriptions of people (Seekings, 2008). Racialisation, as Foster argues, ought to be understood as 
synonymous with (racial) categorisation; that implies, “social psychological processes, which 
delineate group boundaries and allocate persons within such boundaries on the basis of supposed 
inherent characteristics” (1991, p. 203). The distinction and preference for the use of racialisation 
is in line with the critique mounted by Stevens (2003) in contestation of the uncritical use of racial 
categories in South African psychological studies. Stevens (2003) argues that these categories 
unhelpfully reinforce apartheid-era differences amongst the South African population.  
9 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
Although race and racialisation are related concepts, it may be useful to use racialisation to refer 
to the socio-psychological process through which constructions of identity position certain people 
(i.e. White) as superior to others (i.e. in the South African context, black, coloured, and Indian). 
The use of the term race, rather than racialisation, risks mistaking a person’s social positioning 
with his or her biological predispositions. To be black, Indian or coloured is to be positioned 
through various social mechanisms, such as the The Bantu Education Act No. 47 of 1953, as 
inferior to those who are considered White. The African-American author and political 
commentator, Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015, p. 8), fully captures how I, and many others, understand 
social racialisation:  
[T]he elevation of the belief in being white, was not achieved through wine tastings and 
ice cream socials, but rather through the pillaging of life, liberty, labor [sic.], and land; 
through the flaying of backs and; the chaining of limbs; the strangling of dissidents; the 
destruction of families; the rape of mothers; the sale of children; and various other acts 
meant, first and foremost to deny [those described as black] the right to secure and govern 
our own bodies. 
Racialisation makes it possible to see how some people ‘come to be’ White, whilst others ‘come 
to be’ black, Indian, or coloured. A comprehensive understanding of racialisation underscores the 
socio-political ideologies that place, as central, White lifeworlds (i.e. White, middle-class, 
European, and American cultures, languages, and beliefs). The centrality of White lifeworlds can 
10 
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be understood as an extension of Euroamerican-centrism, which manifests in the Americas, Africa, 
and Asia Pacific. Cooper and Ratele attest to the centrality of White lifeworlds when they say 
“[t]he main problem blacks face in a world of white hegemony is that the norm is unashamedly 
white” (2018, p. 251). Through colonisation, variations of these White-normative foundations 
were freighted to the Global South and are continuously maintained through multifarious modes 
of coloniality (Dladla, 2017; Maldonado-Torres, 2007). 
The challenge of including a question on race is that there is a reinforcement of race as tangible, 
and/or discernable, through the skin. The now-retracted article by Nieuwoudt, Dickie, Coetsee, 
Engelbrecht, and Terblanche entitled Age- and Education-related Effects on Cognitive 
Functioning in Coloured South African Women published in 2019 in Aging, Neuropsychology, and 
Cognition: A Journal on Normal and Dysfunctional Development, exposes a continued reliance 
on Euroamerican-centric mechanisms according to which race is inscribed and treated within 
academic research. This article is but one way in which the effects of apartheid race 
characterisations haunt academic institutions and society in general. Frantz Fanon (1967/2008) 
maintains that the reliance on the outward features of a people make it possible for judgements 
about them to be made based on whatever historical knowledge we claim to have of those people 
who look like them. Such knowledge claims, as exhibited in colonial and ex-colonised nations, 
come about through the dichotomy created by colonisation and its aftermath coloniality, namely 
that those that come to be White are positioned as superior, while those that come to be Black are 
regarded as inferior. The article by Nieuwoudt et al. (2019) exposes the ‘cracks in the floor’, where 
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scientific research regards the use of race as a legitimate variable for analysis (Hendricks, Kramer 
& Ratele, 2019).  
Stevens (2003) asserts that the ways in which race is used in psychological research reveals that 
research in psychology ascribes race as a biological construct. Race, when understood in this way, 
is reified as real, as belonging to the ‘realm of things’, and, in some instances, as non-discursive 
(Erasmus, 2006). The use of race in this way denigrates peoples’ experiences of being racialised 
in particular ways to observable features of a person’s skin colour, hair texture, the size of a 
person’s nose, and other discernable features (see Erasmus, 2017). These arguments by Stevens 
(2003) and Erasmus (2006, 2017) constitute an often-uncritical engagement with what it means to 
be a racialised subject in formerly-colonised South Africa.  
In order to contest the racialised nature of people’s lifeworlds, I take on the use of ‘Black’ as 
opposed to the raced categories that have come to dominate society. Fanon explained that to be 
racialised as Black is to be “sealed [within a] crushing objecthood” (1967/2004, p. 82). The use of 
the term Black, therefore, makes it possible to conceive of resistances to the White-centric notion 
of the races (e.g. White, coloured, and Indian). Stephen Bantu Biko and others in the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM), initiated in the 1960s, highlight that Black becomes positive 
when it is understood as “not a matter of pigmentation… [but a] reflection of a mental attitude” 
(1978/2004, p. 48). It is a turn towards deliberately looking to understand the social conditions that 
affect the lives of those designated as ‘inferior’. The use of the term Black in this study, thus, refers 
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to not only people classified during apartheid as ‘black African’, but also those of Indian descent, 
and people who are often referred to and self-identify as coloured. I deploy the term Black to refer 
to people who have been excluded, marginalised, and subjugated by and from psychological 
knowledge production and knowledge dissemination. Moreover, Black, as it is used in this study, 
should be understood as related to the materiality of racialisation in contemporary South Africa, 
as critical race theorists have rightly argued that we cannot theorise race without class, and class 
without race (Young & Braziel, 2006).  
It should be noted, however, that the term Black may also not sufficiently capture the full body of 
Black people’s lives, where it may be more accurate to think about Black lifeworlds. I am also 
aware that Black has come to mean various things across time, and that the conception of Black 
as I am currently using the term is relatively new. Blackness is an emergent descriptor, which has 
come about in a negative way through colonialism and apartheid, and in a positive way through 
the civil rights movement in the US and the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa. I use the 
term Black lifeworlds to describe how people who are racialised as African – in contemporary 
times as black-African – Indian, and coloured are rendered invisible; where their lifeworlds are 
taken not to be legitimate sites of knowledge creation, but rather as sites of extraction for the 
continued domination of Euroamerican-centric psychology. The use of the term Black lifeworlds 
explicates the importance of how people make meaning of their internal and external worlds in 
order to achieve particular goals for both/either the collective and/or the individual. Black 
lifeworlds, and its counterpart term White lifeworlds, connote separate lifeworlds that mutually 
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reinforce one another (see Bhabha, 1994), and are not necessarily derivatives of the racial 
categories black and White.  
According to Stevens, Bell, Sonn, Canham, and Clennon (2017), it is important to note that 
although there are differences in the experiential and historical nature of Blackness, there are 
global similarities in how Blackness is constituted. Cooper and Ratele (2018, p. 252) elucidate that  
[B]lackness emerges out of conditions in which people defined as Black find themselves, 
shaped by all the extant forces in a particularly society, as well as what occurs elsewhere in 
the world. Thus, what it means changes from one place to another, from one historical era to 
the next. Simultaneously, Blackness itself is one of those forces that shape the world.  
This conception of Blackness connects and concurrently illustrates the differences of Black people 
across the ex-colonised world. I will return to these differences and similarities of Blackness, 
extending to Black lifeworlds, in Chapter 2.  
The idea of race leads to the concept of racial diversity. Michael Cross (2004) notes how ‘diversity’ 
has become part of the lexicon of South African higher education following as a way to indicate 
the inclusion of Black people. Moreover, the use of the term diversity gained popularity in South 
Africa following the concept’s popularity in the US. Goduka argues that diversity refers to “[t]he 
state or fact of being diverse; different; unlike; variety; multiformity; and a point of difference. 
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The state or fact of being diverse may be based on ethnicity/race, gender, age, sexual orientation, 
ability, religion, or class” (1996, p. 30). Racial diversity does not equate to colour blindness “which 
minimizes [sic.] the use and significance of racial group membership and suggests that race should 
not and does not matter” (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018, p. 1). In actuality, racial diversity 
accentuates the importance of recognising race as an important constitute of societies, particularly 
societies that have long histories of racialisation, such as South Africa. However, as Plaut et al. 
(2018) have argued, diversity is often associated with Black people, and not with White 
populations, with racial diversity efforts often meaning the inclusion of Black people within 
dominant structures.  
Due to the current dominant use of diversity, particularly racial diversity, in thinking about race 
and racialisation, it is important to consider how diversity is often deployed in contemporary South 
Africa. Bentley and Habib (2008) argue that there are different forms of diversity within any 
society, which includes racial and cultural diversity. This thesis focusses on the meanings of racial 
diversity in South African society and, as such, I will not indulge in making extended 
differentiations between first-level diversity and second-level diversity, as articulated by 
Baumeister (2003). Due in part for the need to upend the apartheid segregation and racist policies, 
desegregation, inclusive, equitable, and non-discriminatory policies were instituted (see the Bill of 
Rights per the South African Constitution, 1996). Diversity was viewed as being an important 
element in the promotion of these policies and played a role in the reconciliation efforts following 
decades of apartheid and colonialism (see Cross, 2004).  
15 
 
15 | P a g e  
 
Multiple studies have illustrated, since the desegregation of schools (Soudien, 2004) and 
universities (Finchilescu, Tredoux, Mynhardt, Pillay, & Muianga, 2007), that integration, 
inclusivity, and reconciliation are not only a matter of simply bringing people together and 
embracing diversity. The contact hypothesis argues that prolonged contact between groups, 
including racial groups, can lead to reduced prejudice (Allport, 1954). Others have extended the 
contact hypothesis to argue that it is not only contact that is required, but a number of ideal 
conditions should also be met, such as regular and frequent contact, contact free of competition, 
and contact sanctioned by institutions (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). The tendency for 
ideal situations is, according to Dixon et al. (2005), to deal with societies as if they were 
laboratories in which variables can be controlled. Similarly, it may be possible that the use of racial 
diversity is based on the contact hypothesis, to a lesser or greater extent, that simply bringing 
people together reduces prejudice and promotes greater inclusive practices Dixon et al. (2005). 
However, despite the desegregation of general society, self-segregation remains rife in many 
spaces, and has been demonstrated to play out within higher education institutions (Shrieff, 
Tredoux, Dixon, & Finchilescu, 2005). It may be important, then, to understand if and how racial 
diversity is positioned within the training of psychologists in relation to the contact hypothesis, 
either implicitly or explicitly, in the selection of candidates for professional training.  
In respect to the current thesis on professional training, I propose that the question of merit and the 
standards of what constitutes ‘the right kind’ of psychologist may reflect White lifeworlds. The 
constructions of race, as well as gender, sexuality, and class identities, are a prominent feature of 
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how Euroamerican-centric psychology marginalises people by creating dichotomies of belonging. 
The racialised and gendered nature of Euroamerican psychology was, and continues to be, based 
primarily on White, heterosexual European and US lifeworlds, whilst at the same time demonising 
and dehumanising Black people (see Nsamenang, 1995; Ratele, 2016).  
Gordon (2007a) offers an analytical point in the paradoxical use of such terms as marginality and 
exclusion, where the author argues that a fight for recognition often reinforces the dominant 
group’s centrality in the world. The argument presented by Gordon (2015a) that Whiteness as a 
standard of what constitutes merit in institutions – in this case higher education institutions – 
requires re-evaluation in order to reflect Othered lifeworlds. However, it is not simply that 
Whiteness ought to be abandoned as a measure of merit and replaced with Blackness, but rather 
that which constitutes merit and value here – in Africa – cannot be Whiteness.  
1.3 On structure and form 
In the current thesis, I have chosen to commence with the theoretical perspective before engaging 
with a history of South African psychology, to be followed by the professionalisation and training 
of psychologists, the methodology, and the data that I have collected. The primary reason for 
choosing a slightly inverted thesis structure is to assert my own position on the training of 
psychologists through already existing literature, the historical developments within psychology, 
and the various social actors. Furthermore, this structure is offered in order to provide clarity as to 
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how, for instance, Euroamerican-centric psychology has continued its dominance over South 
African psychology. The importance of the clarity lies in the construction of the theoretical 
framework, or rather, more purposefully, the construction of an Africa(n)-centred perspective on 
the training of counselling and clinical psychologists.  
In elaborating on an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of clinical and counselling 
psychologists, I make links with Black psychology, as it emerged out of the US in the 1970s (see 
Mama, 1995). I will also engage with the work of Molefi Asante Kate (1988/2009) regarding 
Afrocentricity, whilst building on the work of Kopano Ratele (2016, 2017), to devise a theoretical 
lens through which psychology training programmes could become better equipped to deal with 
the specific socio-political conditions of contemporary South Africa. The connections between the 
different bodies of scholarship are important in building an Africa(n)-centred psychology that is 
non-essentialising about African experiences and realities, whilst also being critical of the 
globalised Euroamerican-centric psychology. I argue that an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the 
training of psychologists cannot rely on fixed identities and the reification of race as a biological 
construct, as race often leads to limited ways in which to theorise and practice psychology (Mama, 
1995). Rather, I propose that the structural and interpersonal effects of racism, which seeks to 
position people as ‘less than’, at best, or ‘non-beings’ at worst, as the central focus of analysis. 
Additionally, the work of building an Africa(n)-centred approach does not preclude the use of 
approaches and theories that do not necessarily focus on Africa. I will make use of some of the 
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theoretical and conceptual tools developed by Maton (2013) to elucidate legitimising and 
delegitimising processes in curriculum, pedagogy, and selection. 
Cloete and Pillay note that “[p]rofessionalisation is a key determinant in deciding the outcome of 
the struggle between paradigms” (1988, p. 53). The issue of the professionalisation of psychology 
is regarded in the current thesis as being at the epicentre of the challenges facing psychological 
practice. I argue that using the Masters training year as a starting point through which to investigate 
issues of pedagogy and demographic inclusion proves paramount; as, at present, it is at Masters 
level that psychological training culminates. Undergraduate and Honours levels already attempt to 
change the curriculum, but gender and racial demographics are futile if at the professional training 
level the discipline fails to change. As noted by authors such as Mayekiso, Strydom, Jithoo, and 
Katz (2004), and Bantjes, Kagee and Young (2016), the racial and gender demographics at 
undergraduate level are often misleading as there is a huge majority of Black students attending 
universities where the professional training level is still skewed in favour of Whites. The 
dominance of Whites in professional psychology points to how Euroamerican-centric psychology 
often weeds out those it has constructed as outsiders.  
I then concern myself with how the selection procedures of training sites are biased against Black 
students, using the ideas developed by Hlengwe (2015) and Booi, Vincent and Liccardo (2017) 
regarding their concept of ‘safe bets’. I link the concept of safe bets with Maton’s (2013) 
construction of the interplay between knowledge and knowers, as well as the relationship between 
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these and coloniality. Central to issues of the curriculum at Masters level is the role of Community 
Psychology, and the notions of multicultural practice, where I argue primarily against a lack of 
interrogation of the issues of power, and the lack of political intervention that I see as having de-
radicalised Community Psychology. 
To paraphrase Mignolo (1993), it is both necessary and important to consider Africa as the locus 
of enunciation from which I write (i.e. the where) about the training of psychologists (i.e. the what) 
and the need to (re)centre Africa (i.e. the why). I then delve into the development of psychology 
in South Africa by offering a discursive reading of the historical development of the discipline in 
the country. The position I take of an Africa(n)-centred perspective means that there is a necessary 
partiality to the way the early history of psychology will be presented and discussed. As Dladla 
postulates, “even what the historian considers ‘facts’ at all, which facts are worthy of recording 
and becoming historical facts is already an act of interpretation” (2017, p. 87). The locus of 
enunciation, which I show to be integral in an Africa(n)-centred perspective, becomes crucial in 
how I select and organise the history of South African psychology. Subsequent chapters focus on 
the critical aspects of psychology in the last years of apartheid and contemporary psychology and 
expand the idea of the situatedness of the current work and the commitment to Africa(n)-centred 
training programmes. Additionally, I present the historical and contemporary configurations of 
training programmes as they broadly relate to psychology, and the ideological influences of 
training programmes in terms of their socio-cultural and socio-political climates. The focus of the 
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chapter on professional psychology stretches across the apartheid era, contemporary psychology 
in South Africa, rising issues of professional boundaries, training sites, and the curriculum. 
I then move on to interrogating the collected data, which spans individual interviews with course 
coordinators and intern psychologists at five universities. The interviews are analysed using an 
(Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse analysis at an inter-institutional level that focusses on the 
curriculum and selection practices of the training sites in order to determine the differences, 
similarities, and general practices of professional psychology.  
In the final chapter of the thesis with the benefit of the interviews I revert to the overarching 
question of the study; how to (re)centre Africa in the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists? However, I engage the question in more operationalised forms as what might an 
Africa(n)-centred training of psychologists entail? I attempt to clarify this question by lifting some 
of the more predominant discourses raised by the course coordinators and intern psychologists, 
namely; who is considered the right kind of (knower) practitioner? What might a situated 
curriculum entail? and what is the role of the Professional Board for Psychology’s role in the 
training?  These questions all relate to the fundamental issues of selection, training and curriculum 
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Chapter 2: Elaborating on an Africa(n)-centred Perspective on the 
Training of Counselling and Clinical psychologists 
2.1 Introduction 
The current chapter focusses on elaborating upon an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the 
professional training of clinical and counselling psychologists. There are multiple assumptions that 
underpin what I pursue in this chapter. The most important of these assumptions is that, through 
colonialism and apartheid there was, and continues to be, a displacement, subjugation, and 
marginalisation of Africa in psychology (Bulhan, 1985). Another assumption is that colonialism 
and apartheid continue to influence psychology in the democratic era (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004). An 
Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of counselling and clinical psychologists is not a 
paradigm; rather, it is concerned with the epistemological grounding of the professional training 
of psychologists. ‘Epistemological’ refers to the set of assumptions that structure psychology as a 
whole (Huniche & Sørensen, 2019), and the training of its practitioners, more specifically. In 
psychology, the underpinning epistemology can be understood as (White) Euroamerican-centrism.  
Due to the historical and contemporary psychological practice of the marginalisation, subjugation, 
and inferiorisation of cultural minorities, both in Africa and elsewhere in the world, it is important 
to (re)frame the discipline within its current context. Thus, the concern in this current thesis is the 
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development and use of a theoretical frame that allows for the understanding of the professional 
training of counselling and clinical psychologists. I argue that an Africa(n)-centred approach, 
which is an endogenous rather than indigenous approach, and accepts the pluriversal in contrast to 
universal lifeworlds that are in Africa, is fundamental in working from and within Africa. The 
arguments presented by Painter and van Ommen (2008, p. 444) point to the importance of an 
Africa(n)-centred approach: 
The critical reproduction of Psychology as a discipline and a profession requires a new 
generation of students to be confronted with Psychology as something that does not exist 
ready-made, finalised and independent of them, but as something coming into existence 
around them, in dialogue with its time and location, with the desires and projects of those 
who work with it and are addressed or implicated by it. 
An Africa(n)-centred approach is understood in this thesis as decolonial in the sense that it is based 
on the understanding that in the aftermath of colonialism and apartheid, South Africa has been 
shaped through racial, gendered, and classed hierarchies. These hierarchies can be seen in different 
spheres of life across Africa, including in the professional training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists. An Africa(n)-centred approach is decolonial as it takes an understanding of these 
hierarchies as important forms of uncovering the continued marginalisation of Black lifeworlds in 
professional training programmes. 
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I will provide clarification on African Psychology because as Ratele, Cornell, Dlamini, Helman, 
Malherbe and Titi (2018, p. 2) contend that: 
[c]onceptual disagreement remains rife about African psychology. In their opposition to a 
specific conservative conception of African psychology, some scholars have mistaken 
African psychology intoto with, for example, ethonotheorising, folk traditions, 
psychological ethnography, African metaphysics, spirituality and transcendentalism, as 
well as traditional healing.  
More specifically, I will try to clarify some conceptual issues pertaining to an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective on the training of psychologists. The elaboration on an Africa(n)-centred perspective 
is in accordance with the arguments by Stevens that “[t]here is little doubt that theoretical 
frameworks are also ideological signifiers when located in particular historical and material 
contexts, and their application therefore needs to be understood within South Africa’s social 
climate of heterogeneity and contestation” (2003, p. 201). I pay attention to the contestations and 
similarities in varying critical theories, further extending the clarification well beyond 
ethnotheorising and African metaphysics to whether an African-centred perspective is decolonial. 
I also clarify what pluriversality has to do with the psychological training, and what endogeneity 
means in professional psychology.  
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I argue that the focus on an Africa(n)-centred perspective, as originally developed by Ratele (2016, 
2017), can allow for a new epistemic project of professional psychology that is not removed from 
the lifeworlds found in (South) Africa. Throughout the current chapter, I clarify some conceptual 
confusions that have led some authors, such as Makhubela (2016), to argue that the discipline is 
‘going nowhere slowly’. In line with the arguments presented by Painter and van Ommen (2008), 
primarily that the discipline of psychology needs to be thought of anew, the training of 
psychologists and the practice thereof needs to take more seriously the need to make central 
African lifeworlds. 
In this chapter, I argue that an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the professional training of 
counselling and clinical is constituted by, whilst building on, an array of critical epistemological, 
conceptual, and analytical tools. The thesis critically incorporates part of the work of Black 
Psychology as it has developed out of the US. I further incorporate and differentiate between an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective and Afrocentricity, as conceptualised by Molefi Asante Kete 
(1988/2009). I then offer a way to think through the seemingly stagnant demographic and 
epistemological change in training through the work of the Africana philosopher Lewis R. Gordon 
(2017) on disciplinary decadence and epistemic closure.  
In using these concepts, I speak to the decolonial nature of an Africa(n)-centred perspective, 
asserting pluriversality rather than universality, and propounding the locus of enunciation (see 
Mignolo, 1993; see also Ratele, 2019) as a vital component in curricula. Additionally, I argue that 
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to (re)frame curriculum issues within the training sites it is important to consider how certain 
knowledge is legitimised (see Maton, 2013) and linked with the selection of candidates. 
Following Ratele (2017) and Ratele et al. (2018), I have structured the chapter as a series of 
questions. These questions serve as guides in elaborating an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the 
professional training of psychologists. Additionally, by using questions – as headings instead of 
statements, the chapter illustrates some of the ways I, and others (Ratele, et al., 2018), have had to 
broach the topic of Africa(n)-centredness in psychology. The question-type structure is an 
articulation of the constant enquiry that is required when attempting to think a discipline, or at 
least a significant proportion of a discipline, anew. My strategy is to present the basic coordinates 
of the theoretical lenses through which I view the already existing information on psychology, as 
well as the information that I have sought from course coordinators and intern psychologists. The 
questions I address are: What is African Psychology? Is Africa(n)-centred psychological work 
decolonial? Is Africa(n)-centred psychology a move toward Africanisation and Indigenisation of 
psychology? Is an Africa(n)-centred approach not another iteration of Afrocentricity and Black 
Psychology? What might be gained from imbricating an Africa(n)-centred perspective with 
discursive psychology? After considering these in detail, I engage with the ultimate question of 
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2.2 What is African Psychology? 
One of the foremost conceptual confusions that exist in the writings of South African psychology 
is on the question of What is African Psychology. Makhubela (2016) exhibits some of the 
confusion that has plagued understandings of African Psychology, related mostly to a narrowing 
of African Psychology to indigenous African traditions or to universalist conceptions of the 
discipline. At the same time, a debate has been going on between Nwoye (2015, 2017) and Ratele 
(2016, 2017) concerning what is African Psychology. On the one hand, Ratele (2016, p. 5) 
contends that African Psychology encompasses “all psychological work that is taught, published, 
practiced, and studied in Africa”. On the other hand, Nwoye (2015, p. 105) argues that African 
Psychology is a: 
[B]oth-and psychology; that is to say, as an inclusive psychology encompassing not only 
the study of African indigenous psychology but also the study of the human condition and 
culture and the life of the mind in contemporary Africa, as well as the exploration and 
adoption, where necessary, of aspects of Western psychology that appear relevant for 
enabling us to confront the challenges of our present African predicament. 
The arguments by Nwoye (2015) and Ratele (2016) do not appear to show a difference in points 
of departure about African Psychology. However, Nwoye (2015) places as central to the 
understanding of African Psychology the need for an indigenous African worldview. He 
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distinguishes African Psychology from Western Psychology. By arguing that African Psychology 
is constituted by four orientations to both Africa and Psychology, Ratele (2016) expands the scope 
of the work done in, for, and about Africa and Africans. The four African Psychologies are: 
psychological African studies, critical African Psychology, cultural African Psychology, and 
Western-oriented African Psychology (Ratele, 2017). These four African psychologies do not 
represent a rejection of Nwoye’s definition of African Psychology, but rather, Ratele (2016) argues 
that Nwoye’s conceptualisation is limited in how we might be able to think through African 
Psychology. In reading Ratele’s (2016) mapping of African Psychology, it becomes clear that the 
definition provided by Nwoye is but one possible orientation of African Psychology.  
Nwoye (2017) rebutted the statement that indeed his – “and in the view of many scholars of African 
Psychology in continental Africa” (p. 329) – is a narrow view of African Psychology but should 
be understood as a postcolonial theory. Ratele does not respond to the rebuttal from Nwoye but it 
does require substantive consideration, for it offers important theoretical tenants from which to 
build. Nwoye’s (2017) clarification of the emergence and subsequent entrenchment of a 
postcolonial theory of African Psychology, has resonates with the conception of an Africa(n)-
centred perspective that may require addressing directly.  Firstly, it is well founded, and not a point 
of contention, that the rise in the African Psychology is becoming more visible since many 
countries in Africa, the Global South have achieved independence – the protest against the 
immersion in Nwoye’s (2017) argument. Secondly, closely aligned to a theoretical tenant I 
elaborate on in subsequent sections, I agree with Nwoye (2017) on the de-structive – Nwoye’s 
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(2017) destructive – and constructive – Nwoye’s (2017) reconstructive elements. There is a need 
to engage in ways that are de-constructive the ways that Euroamerican-centrism has remained been 
positioned as the only way in which the word may be understood. Further, it is critical that there 
is constructive engagement of Africa, which can be understood in the context of this thesis as 
situated practices of selection, in curriculum, and practice. The latter can be closely aligned with 
what Nwoye (2017, p. 331) argued as “challenging negative images of Africa…but also a self-
critical interrogation of troublesome aspects of some African indigenous cultural practices”.  
Even as the clarification that Nwoye (2017) offers and my agreement with parts of the work, it can 
be said that Nwoye confuses the whole for the part. To argue for African indigenous psychology 
is to argue for a cultural African psychology, as Ratele (2016) states in his response to Nwoye 
(2015). Further, Nwoye’s (2015) supposition may also encompass what Ratele (2016) terms a 
critical African Psychology, as the former recognises culture along other axes of oppression (see 
Nwoye, 2017). I suggest that Nwoye’s (2015) view of African Psychology is necessary but 
insufficient does not amount to an outright rejection of cultural and/or critical African Psychology. 
I show in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 how the deployment of culture in contemporary psychology 
requires critical interrogation, as it often recycles colonial understandings of Black people.  
To encompass all the work done for, by, in, about, and from Africa, African Psychology requires 
a move beyond the centring only of cultural African Psychology. For instance, in formulating the 
curricula of professional training sites, ‘the African’ is tacit in African Psychology. The aim would 
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be for ‘the African’ to not have to be mentioned, in the same way as Europeans or US Americans 
usually do not mention Europe or the US when speaking about psychology (see Ratele, 2019). 
However, it is still necessary to explicitly state Africa when fighting against the hegemony of 
European and US psychology. Ratele (2017b) makes the point that African Psychology may well 
include the work of people such as Jan Smuts, and the work of the Carnegie Study (1928-1932) 
into the poor White problem. Ratele (2017a) argues that in thinking about African Psychology it 
may be necessary to include work that is not necessarily for Africa, but rather can be about Africa, 
or even done in Africa particularly when attempting to design curricula. African Psychology 
devised in the manner that Ratele (2016) proposes illustrates the many epistemological 
contestations of Africa. Furthermore, the inclusion of the contestations means that the curriculum 
at the Masters training level can engage more critically with the practice of psychology as a whole. 
Tshepo Madlingozi, argues that Africa can be understood as both a Western imposition, and is also 
often used to reflect a “pure, detached, and untainted African world to go back to” (2018, p. 26). 
Simultaneously, Madlingozi (2018) notes that the notion of Africa as untainted forms part of 
critical scholarships’ fight against Western hegemony. However, this ‘untainted’ Africa 
Madlingozi maintains is unattainable and may present an essentialist trap for scholars and activists 
alike. Thus, he proposes, Africa should be written under deletion as Africa. I agree with 
Madlingozi that there needs to be a critical interrogation of the ways in which Africa is conceived, 
both as a ‘return to’ and as it has been defined and explained in much of Western scholarship. 
Regarding the ‘return to’ conceptualisation of Africa, I make the distinction between ‘return to’ 
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and a ‘return to the source’, as argued for by Serequeberhan (2009). While the former refers to an 
attempt to retrieve a pre-colonial Africa that is untainted by European colonialism, the latter is 
more closely aligned with an Africa(n)-centred perspective, denoting situated perspectives. These 
situated perspectives take cognisance of the entanglement of Europe and Africa as a result of 
colonialism and apartheid, and continued coloniality. I expand on entanglement and return to the 
source later in this chapter. 
2.2.1 Africa(n)-centred psychology and African Psychology. There is a difference 
between African Psychology and Africa(n)-centred perspectives to psychology. On the one hand, 
African Psychology refers to the larger field of psychology done in, from, by, and about Africa(ns) 
yet is not for and does not necessarily identify or empathise with Africa(ns) (see Ratele, 2016; 
Ratele et al., 2018). On the other hand, psychology that is Africa(n)-centred identifies with 
Africa(ns) and locates its epistemological foundations within the realities of Africa. By 
understanding that African Psychology encompasses all works done in, and about Africa(ns), the 
search is rather for psychology to be oriented towards and identify with Africa(ns).  
In an Africa(n)-centred perspective to psychology, the importance is on uncovering the epistemic 
project of how Africa is conceived in (African) Psychology. I argue that Africa in Africa(n)-
centred psychology can be understood as a geo-political, epistemological, and, to some degree, 
physical location from which to speak to the world. Huniche and Sørensen explain that their focus 
on psychology’s epistemic project is about: “how psychology comes to define particular 
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phenomena as areas of scientific concern, what kinds of phenomena are deemed relevant and for 
whom, and how the disciplinary shaping of psychological concerns has a bearing on what can and 
will be researched” (2019, p. 441). This explanation of the epistemic project of psychology can be 
extended to include not only the research of psychology but also what is deemed as appropriate 
knowledge to be taught in psychology. Additionally, using Huniche and Sørensen’s (2019) 
explanation of the epistemic project, Africa becomes the foundational component of the 
professional training and practice of psychologists. In short, Africa becomes the basis of the 
epistemic project of an (Africa(n)-centred) psychology.  
To illustrate the distinction that I make between African Psychology and an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective to psychology, I want to call attention to a reflective paper on teaching psychology at 
a contact and distance university by Peace Kiguwa and Puleng Segalo (2018). These authors argue 
that African Psychology “foregrounds and highlights the importance of contextual understanding 
of people’s view of the world. It further engages the need to acknowledge multiple epistemologies, 
thereby rejecting the universalist approach often taken by mainstream Psychology” (Kiguwa & 
Segalo, 2018, p. 5). In this definition by Kiguwa and Segalo (2018), there is a conflation of African 
Psychology and Africa(n)-centred perspectives – a misrecognition of the broader work in 
psychology, with the more specific work of situating Africa in psychology and/or situating 
psychology in Africa. 
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I would argue that there are at least two issues that arise out of a collapse of African Psychology 
and Africa(n)-centred psychology. The first is that there is a risk with the collapsing of African 
Psychology as work that is situated in Africa which positions Western and African Psychology as 
competing forms of knowledge rather than as knowledge systems that can be imbricated. This 
competing position may also lead to understanding knowledge as necessarily antithetical and may 
result in the inability to build on knowledges that are not necessarily for Africa. (I explore the idea 
of cumulative knowledge in more depth in the next section.) However, I am cognisant that the 
issue in psychology has remained the hegemonic nature of Western psychology and its 
universalising of (white) European and US subjects as the standard of normalcy.  
The second issue is that of extraverted knowledge. Taking the philosopher Paulin Hountondji’s 
(1986) arguments against Western scientific paradigms in Africa, that some aspects of African 
Psychology can be understood to be extraverted. Extraverted knowledge refers to ‘scientific’ work, 
which is done in, by, and about Africa(ns) but is oriented towards the West; Ratele (2016) terms 
such work in African Psychology as ‘psychology in Africa’. Psychology in Africa is work that 
uses Africa as a site of extraction, for the betterment of the West, keeping as its centre Western 
audiences.  So that although the work uses Africa, Africa remains in the periphery only serving to 
legitimise the dominance of the West. I argue that in light of the need for cumulative knowledge 
and the problem of extraversion it is important to understand the definition offered by Kiguwa and 
Segalo (2018) as referring to Africa(n)-centred perspectives rather than African Psychology.   
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The acceptance of Western Psychology of African Psychology is not a matter of semantics. Rather, 
it is an understanding that what African Psychology is today is entangled with colonial and 
apartheid oppressive structures. However, the distinctions between Western Psychology and 
African Psychology lies in African Psychology as contra-distinguishable from European and US 
(i.e. Western) psychology, whilst Africa(n)-centred psychology is distinguishable from 
Euroamerican-centric psychology. Africa(n)-centred psychology places, Africa(ns) at its centre, it 
is situated knowledge production, teaching, learning, and dissemination. Conversely, 
Euroamerican-centric psychology, which has come to dominate psychology the world over, places 
Europeans and Americans at its centre of knowledge production, (Mudimbe, 1988).  
I return to the centrality of Europeans and Americans in psychology in the section on Black 
Psychology presented later in this chapter to further distinguish Euroamerican-centrism in 
psychology. For the purposes of this discussion, I highlight the importance of careful consideration 
of the collapsing of Africa(n)-centred perspectives on psychology and African Psychology as 
having ramifications for the structure of professional training for counselling and clinical 
psychologists. The implications are such that if the argument is that there is an African Psychology 
that is not constituted by Western Psychology, this means that what the training of psychologists 
ought to entail is an African Psychology that replaces Western Psychology. In so doing, the risk 
is such that the West is positioned as monolithic and primarily one dimensional. Similarly, we do 
the same with African Psychology.  
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To make clear the argument that knowledges are not necessarily antithetical to each other, I turn 
next to Legitimation Code Theory (LCT), as first expounded by Karl Maton (2013), before 
detailing the question of decoloniality and Africa(n)-centred perspectives on the professional 
training of psychologists. 
2.2.2 African Psychology, knowledge, and knowers. The distinction that I make on the 
understandings of African Psychology reflect my positions on knowledge building. My sentiments 
are captured by Ali Abdi, who contends that: “African knowledge systems would have always 
developed better by themselves: indeed, knowledge…is a human project that was only achievable 
in the spirit as well as the actions of human togetherness, and it is via this reality, that it can serve 
well the lives of people” (2011, p. 81). Maton (2009) contends that knowledge is a human 
endeavour, maintaining that rather than conceptualising knowledge as competing, it is more useful 
to conceptualise knowledge as cumulative. Maton argues that cumulative learning is “where 
[students’] understandings integrate and subsume previous knowledge” (2009, p. 44) is integral to 
building knowledge. As Kontopodis and Jackowska (2019) argue psychology’s curriculum 
remains a pivotal point to which the epistemic project of psychology can be challenged and de-
centred from its Western socio-historical foundations.  
In understanding knowledge as cumulative it is possible to see that attempts to replace one 
knowledge (Western) form with another (African) provides a sense of provincialising Africa. 
Edward Said, in Freud and the non-European, illustrates how even for Freud, who “[belonged] to 
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a place and time that were still not tremendously bothered by what today…we would call the 
problems of the Other” (2003, p. 14), there is greater utility to his thinking than has previously 
been expressed. The issue of whether figures such as Freud belong in the curricula of ex-colonised 
nations is not simply a matter of yes or no. Rather, it requires moving beyond simple binaries of 
Western- and African Psychology and arguing for what can be gained from other places while 
firmly placing, as central to such a debate, the lifeworlds of Africans.  
An Africa(n)-centred perspective on the professional training of psychologists acknowledges that 
after formal colonialism and apartheid there remains an entangled relationship between the West 
and Africa. Homi Bhabha’s (1994) conceptualisation of ambivalence and hybridity synthesises the 
entanglement between Europe, the US, and Africa. Per Bhabha’s (1994) work, hybridity and 
ambivalence concern the complex relationships that are formed in the entanglement that results 
from colonialism. Serequeberhan (2009) similarly notes that hybrid knowledge needs to be 
claimed as part of the knowledge upon which Africa(ns) build(s). Andreotti (2011), meanwhile 
argues that for Bhabha the formation of identities, culture, and knowledge of either the West or of 
Africa are intertwined, even as the West bases its existence on the quest to create a copy of itself 
that is necessarily inferior. To speak then of an African psychology that is distinctly apart from the 
existence of the Western forms of knowing is to accept that the West, including its knowledge 
systems, developed in isolation from Africa. Evidence of the entanglement for which Bhabha 
(1994) argues is found throughout the history of African psychology. By understanding the 
entangled nature of post-colonial South African psychology, we are also better able to understand 
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how even in attempts to change the trajectory of the discipline, we may find ourselves reproducing 
colonial hierarchies. I argue, therefore, that what (South) African psychology, including the 
training of its practitioners, ought to be concerned with is how we might construct a perspective 
that acknowledges the entanglement and seeks to free Africa from the oppressive bounds of 
Euroamerican-centric perspectives. 
In building knowledge through the design of curricula, it becomes important to take into 
consideration the processes of the legitimisation of knowledge. LCT proposes that academic 
‘disciplines’ be viewed as having an arena that is comprised of three fields that continuously 
influence and affect one another, namely: 1) the field of production; 2) the field of 
recontextualisation; and 3) the field of reproduction (Maton, 2013). LCT is a conceptual 
framework “that enables knowledge practices to be seen, their organising principles to be 
conceptualised and their effects to be explored” (Maton, 2013, p. 3). The theory is based on the 
work of the French educational philosopher, Pierre Bourdieu’s, field theory as well as the British 
sociologist Basil Bernstein’s code theory (1996). LCT is an important tool in understanding how 
curricula is designed, as we are able, through the application of this theory, to not only view what 
is included (and/or excluded) in curricula but are also able to understand the underlying principles 
that continue the noted inclusion (and/or exclusion). Carolissen, Shefer and Smit indicate that “the 
psychology curriculum has been identified as a key area of challenge in addressing continued 
disparities in the training of psychologists and in addressing the mental health care needs of South 
Africa” (2015, p. 8). The principles that govern how curricula are structured are fundamental both 
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for the broader field of African Psychology as well as for how we ought to understand an Africa(n)-
centred perspective on professional psychology. For instance, part of the organising principles of 
the current practice of psychology is based on the exclusion and delegitimisation of other kinds of 
psychologies by Western Psychology (see Carolissen et al., 2015). 
What is particularly important in an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the professional training of 
clinical and counselling psychologists is the creation of the epistemic pedagogic device (EPD) 
(Maton, 2013). Together, the field of production, the field of recontextualisation, and the field 
reproduction form the pedagogic device (PD). The initial conceptualisation of the PD was 
introduced by Basil Bernstein (1996) as a symbolic ruler that could be used as a measure of 
legitimacy for decisions on curricula. Maton (2013) further extended the PD into the EPD (see 
Figure 1), describing it as vital in higher education, since whoever controls the EPD determines 
the legitimacy of knowledge. The EPD is crucial for understanding the continuous exclusion of 
certain knowledges within African Psychology, and points to various concerns around critical 
African Psychology, cultural African Psychology, and the dominance of Euroamerican-centric 
psychology. The EPD may also account for some of the ways in which the professional training 
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Figure 1: Arena created by the EPD (adapted from Maton, 2013). 
The extension of African Psychology to include Euroamerican-centric psychology can be clearly 
articulated in the EPD, as the field of production leads to the field of recontextualisation and then 
to the field of reproduction (see Figure 1). All three fields are dominated by Euroamerican-centric 
practices, with each field reinforcing the other and, thus, maintaining the dominance of 
Euroamerican-centric epistemologies. As I noted earlier, the challenges inherent in changing the 
trajectory of the discipline, more generally, and the professional training of psychologists, 
specifically, occur at multiple levels. Furthermore, the control of the EPD extends beyond the 
realm of academic disciplines, but still ensures that particular sets of consciousness prevail in 
society. This is in keeping with Maton’s argument about “domination and resistance, struggle and 
negotiation, both within education and across wider society” (2013, p. 77). 
Understanding the recontextualisation of psychological curricula reveals the underlying 
legitimisation process. In the context of the three fields that constitute the EPD, I focus on the field 
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of recontextualisation, which is “where discourses from the field of production are selected, 
appropriated and transformed to become pedagogic discourse available to be taught and learned 
within the field of reproduction” (Maton, 2013, p. 70). The field of recontextualisation involves 
the selection of content, along with the structuring of this content; thereby determining the form 
of, for instance, the professional training of psychologists.  
By focussing on the field of recontextualisation, I am able to demonstrate how knowledge and 
knowers are legitimatised, or considered legitimate, in training sites. The field of 
recontextualisation illustrates who and what is considered legitimate within the training of 
psychologists through the structure, design, and selection of curricula and candidates. Maton 
(2013), along with his predecessors, Bernstein (1996) and Bourdieu (1986), understood that the 
legitimisation of disciplines was not a natural occurrence. The struggles over the EPD concern 
how knowers or social actors within a discipline attempt to solidify their position and through the 
control of EPD “[a]ctors in positions of power are able to control the device such that dominant 
measures of achievement reflect the characteristics of their own practices” (Maton, 2013, p. 76). 
In understanding that African Psychology is wider in scope and includes a variety of orientations, 
we are better able to understand that, in training, what may remain a pivotal reason for the 
inexplicably slow pace in change in curricula and demographics is linked to those social actors 
who are in power. With respect to professional training, this thesis supports the understanding that 
the selection of candidates is connected to the selection and appropriation of curricula. More 
specifically, I assert that the selection of certain curricula from the field of production leads to the 
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selection of certain candidates. The current curricula is White-centric, which allows for the 
selection of knowers or social actors that reproduce, or who are easily absorbed into, the content 
of the curricula. The legitimisation of particular candidates as viable for training is, therefore, 
reproduced as normative.  
The types of knowers that are considered legitimate further underscore an essential part of the 
understanding of how psychology functions within the South African milieu. Maton, speaking 
about the transformation of British higher education in the 1960s, argues that “[d]isciplinary 
specialisation was predicated on cultural breadth that, in turn, assumed a certain social class of 
knower” (2004, p. 223). The current higher education landscape in South Africa also predicates 
the participation in higher education along racialised classed lines (Dlamini, 2019). I show, in 
detail, how African Psychology, in its early years, was overtly exclusionary to Black, poor, and 
working-class people. I also indicate some of the ways that contemporary psychology still latently 
excludes the Black, the poor, and the working classes.  
Although I revisit this theme in Chapter 4, it is worth mentioning here that the complications of 
the knowledge-knower relationship are typified by Hlengwe’s (2015) term ‘safe bets”. Hlengwe 
(2015) argues that safe bets are Black people who are closely aligned to the ‘normative’ knower 
of the institution. Safe bets carry the necessary cultural capital (see Bourdieu, 1986) to be able to 
assimilate. The cultural capital in South African higher education systems includes such aspects 
as the ability to speak English, attendance at a former Model C school (i.e. former Whites-only 
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schools in South Africa that subsequently became racially integrated) and/or private schools, as 
well as middle-class status (Hlengwe, 2015). Safe bets are, therefore, a crucial component in how 
psychological training maintains its status and reproduces its legitimisation at the level of 
recontextualisation. It cannot be overstated how ‘time-honoured tradition’ within any academic 
discipline poses a significant challenge in a world that is built on the subjugation and exclusion of 
those treated as the deviant Other. South African psychological training has, for the most part, 
continued to hold on to values and traditions that serve to exclude the majority of South Africans. 
Indeed, current South African psychology continues to value characteristics of potential 
psychologists that are shaped by the history of the country.   
I take on the arguments by Henri Ellenberger in his 1970 book, The Discovery of the Unconscious: 
The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry, that explores how psychology is influenced in 
large part by a person’s history. Using these arguments by Ellenberger (1970) it may be possible 
to see that the types of research (i.e. the field of production), decisions about which research is 
included and excluded from the curriculum (i.e. the field of recontextulisation), and how teaching 
and learning occur (i.e. the field of reproduction) are affected by the kinds of knowers. In placing 
this argument within the noted three fields that form the EPD, it becomes clear that these fields are 
not linear, but rather continuously feedback to one another, since they are influenced by the kinds 
of knowers.  
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In this section, I have contended that African Psychology refers to the broader field of psychology 
that includes Western-oriented forms of psychology. I have also illustrated the importance of 
conceptualising African Psychology as constituting multiple orientations, as devised by Ratele 
(2016, 2017); each of which focusses on parts of the lifeworlds of Africa(ns). It is only through 
understanding that some of the work within African Psychology does not constitute the whole that 
curricula can be designed to be more inclusive of Othered forms of knowledge. Furthermore, it is 
only through the broadening of the scope of psychology (i.e. the epistemic project) that we can 
begin to discern the parts of the discipline that have been subverted by other forms of knowledge 
that have rendered them illegitimate and of no value within the professional training of 
psychologists. Contestations of what constitutes ‘worthy’ psychological knowledge cannot be 
understood outside of those social actors who have control of the EPD. I have, thus, attested in the 
present section that the discipline may be better served if it were to search for a psychology that 
identifies with, and is situated in, Africa. Simply stated, an Africa(n)-centred perspective in 
psychology is necessary. I turn, next, to decoloniality and its relationship to an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective on the professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
2.3 Is an Africa(n)-centred perspective on professional training decolonial? 
In attempting to engage the question of whether Africa(n)-centred psychology is decolonial, it is 
important that we distinguish between colonisation and coloniality. Colonialism is simply the 
political, economic, and physical invasion of sovereign land by a nation of people through unjust 
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wars (Dladla, 2018). Colonialism in its formal state has ended in many parts of the world, including 
South America, the Caribbean Islands, and many parts of Africa. Coloniality is, on the other hand, 
what survives colonialism, namely “long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of 
colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production 
well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations” (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 243). 
Coloniality is the way in which the world is structured as the after effect of colonialism.  
Colonialism, as Mudimbe (1988) argues, creates the Eurocentric and US-centric idea that Europe, 
Europeans, and those of European descent are at the centre of the world. Since coloniality is what 
survives colonialism, coloniality constitutes the continuous reproduction of Euroamerican-
centrism. Coloniality encompasses at least four levers: 1) control of the economy, 2) control of 
authority, 3) control of gender and sexuality, and 4) control of knowledge and subjectivity 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). Coloniality refers to the continued existence of colonial structures, and 
can be found in books, academic articles, media representations, and day-to-day interactions 
amongst people (Maldonado-Torres, 2007).  
The definition of coloniality is crucial in interpreting continuous marginalisation of Africa(ns) 
within mainstreamed knowledge structures. As Hountondji (1986) argues, Africa, and the Global 
South, in scientific research, becomes a site of extraction for the validation of Western-oriented 
knowledge. Aníbal Quijano (2007) argues that the coloniality of power, which encompasses the 
first three levers noted earlier, is fundamental to the control of knowledge and subjectivity. The 
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control of power, thus, has implications for the training of psychologists, as the selection of 
knowledge determines the form of professional training. Moreover, coloniality with regard to 
gender and sexualities, racialisation (i.e. subjectivity), and market-driven capitalistic endeavours 
(i.e. control of the economy) affects who receives psychological services as well as who becomes 
a practitioner (Quijano, 2007). 
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni defines decoloniality as “not only a long-standing political and 
epistemological movement aimed at liberation of (ex-) colonised peoples from global coloniality 
but also a way of thinking, knowing, and doing” (2015, p. 485). This definition lends itself to an 
understanding of how psychological practice, through the training of practitioners, maintains 
Euroamerican-centric ways of knowing, doing, and thinking. Maldonado-Torres similarly 
maintains that “[m]ore than mere risks [epistemic and ontological colonisation] were preconditions 
of the rise of modern psychology and the social sciences… undergirding them there was a more 
encompassing coloniality of being, power, and knowledge” (2017, p. 433).  
Psychology understood in this way is, therefore, a product of coloniality, and, simultaneously, 
reproduces coloniality. Moreover, coloniality is the continued entrenchment of Euroamerican-
centrism, within various spheres of society. The reproduction of coloniality can be found in the 
research that characterised the early years of psychology in South Africa, which continued to hold 
sway throughout the years of apartheid. There are also still many parts of psychology, today, that 
continue to perpetuate coloniality.  
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Decoloniality makes visible some of the many facets of Euroamerican-centric psychology by 
arguing for better understandings of coloniality; for instance, in gendered dynamics and the 
constructions of masculine and feminine identities, and/or in what can be considered legitimate 
knowledge (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007). The dynamics that decoloniality makes visible are 
important in this study, as they relate their criticism not only to epistemologies but make links with 
how epistemologies are a function of how people within territories that have had long histories of 
colonialism are marginalised and delegitimised. Decoloniality is a vital component for an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective, as it speaks to the need to challenge colonial hierarchies. 
Furthermore, decoloniality, as imbricated within an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training 
of psychologists, allows us to look at the selection of candidates and curriculum structures as not 
neutral but rather as part of the reproduction of colonial hierarchies. 
Decoloniality points to a need to uncover the forces of coloniality that perpetuate the 
marginalisation of Africa(ns) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). In order to make the forces of coloniality, 
that continue Euroamerican-centrism, visible, Serequeberhan (2009) suggests that a two-pronged 
approach is necessary. This approach involves the double task of de-structive and constructive 
engagement with the vestiges of Euroamerican-centric hegemony in academia, as Serequeberhan 
(2009, p. 46-47) suggests: 
 
It is a practice of resistance, for it is engaged in combat on the level of reflection and ideas, 
aimed at dismantling the symmetry of concepts and theoretic constructs that have sustained 
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Euro-American global dominance. It is a resistance focused on challenging the core myths 
of the West–its self-flattering narratives–in terms of which its domination of the earth was 
justified. The practice of African philosophy is consequently internal to the very process 
through which the formerly colonized [sic.] world is presently reclaiming itself. It is, in 
this sense, a concrete practice of resistance. In its constructive aspect the practice of African 
philosophy has to engage in the systematic and critical study of indigenous forms of 
knowledge and ‘know-how’… 
Similarly, part of the effort to elaborate upon an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the professional 
training of counselling and clinical psychologists, I wish to contribute towards building a 
perspective that is agile enough to achieve both the goal of a de-structive reading of Euroamerican-
centrism as well as to be constructive of Africa(n)-centred forms of knowledge. It is important to 
note that the efforts at a de-structive interpretation of Euroamerican-centrism extend beyond the 
African philosophy as suggested by Serequeberhan (2009). I propose, therefore, that African 
philosophy in Serequeberhan’s (2009) thesis can be replaced with Africa(n)-centred psychology 
or Africa(n)-centred sociology, as the double task applies to decolonial efforts within many 
academic disciplines. In line with the arguments of a de-structive task of establishing an Africa(n)-
centred perspective are the assertions presented by Said (2002, p. 397) who states: 
The attempt to read a text in its fullest and most integrative context commits the reader to 
positions that are educative, humane, and engaged, positions that depend on training and 
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the taste and not simply on a technologized [sic.] professionalism, or on the tiresome 
playfulness of “postmodern” criticism, with its repeated disclaimers of anything but local 
games and pastiches.  
Moreover, the de-structive and constructive aspects of are in line with Maldonado-Torres’ (2007, 
p. 261) notion that “oppositions to coloniality of power, knowledge and being…[with] de-colonial 
turn refer[ring] to a shift in knowledge production…”. These aims of de-structive engagements 
with Euroamerican-centric thinking can be found in wide-ranging literature on decoloniality 
amongst Latin American scholars, including interpretations of coloniality offered by Mignolo 
(1993) and Quijano (2000, 2007). In South Africa, authors such as Dladla (2017) contend that, for 
African philosophy, it is necessary to do the work of de-structing analytic conceptions of concepts 
such as race and racism and providing the constructive positioning of racism its occurrence in 
historical and contemporary South Africa. Other authors, such as Kiguwa and Segalo (2018), who 
have located their analysis of curriculum issues in psychology within a decolonising paradigm, 
offer numerous ways in which de-structive readings of Euroamerican-centrism teaching and 
learning are often hidden in the lived experiences of students and academic staff. I offer these 
examples to position the importance of de-structive engagements that do not necessarily argue for 
the doing away of current forms of psychology, but rather as a way of showing the importance of 
the double task of Africa(n)-centred work.  
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Africa(n)-centred perspectives in psychology are both a quest for African psychologies that are 
situated in Africa, and psychologies that situate Africa (Ratele, 2017). Serequeberhan (2009) offers 
a necessary lens through which to view decolonial work, where the author’s conception of the 
constructive task succinctly captures the sentiments of an Africa(n)-centred perspective. In his 
explanation of the constructive task, Serequeberhan (2009, p. 47) proposes that the task is 
constituted by a “return to the source”. This return to the source is unlike the ‘return to’ school 
(see Nwoye, 2015) which, I have already argued, attempts to retrieve a pre-colonial Africa 
untainted by European and US colonialism. Rather, a return to the source is “aimed at 
systematically sifting through and appropriating, in terms and out of the exigencies of the present, 
aspects of our pre-colonial and colonial heritage of indigenous and hybrid knowledge” 
(Serequeberhan, 2009, p. 47). I agree with Serequeberhan (2009) in the sense that some aspects of 
African psychology, as mapped out in Ratele’s (2016) orientations, ought to focus on critically 
engaging with the qualities of pre-colonial and colonial Africa that may have utility to and for 
contemporary Africa. Additionally, my agreement extends beyond an expropriation of knowledge 
and serves, instead, as situated knowledge that is aware of its “birth, history, context, and point of 
view” (Ratele, 2017, p. 3). I, therefore, propose that an Africa(n)-centred perspective on 
professional psychology is not only situated within histories of the continent (i.e. those told and 
those subverted), but also situates Africa(ns) in psychological theory, research, teaching and 
learning, and practice. 
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An Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists is fundamentally based on the 
“shift in the geography of reason” (see Gordon, 2014, p. 89). Africa(n)-centredness thought of in 
this way relates to understanding the locus of enunciation of the author(s) of the theories that we 
use to interpret Africa’s lifeworlds. The locus of enunciation refers to asking who is writing what, 
from where, and to what end (Mignolo, 1993). This locus places emphasis on the epistemic 
location of the knowledges that we consume, distribute, and (re)produce, rather than on 
nationalistic boundaries. Similarly, the locus of enunciation of the professional training of 
psychologists ought to take seriously the purpose for which the training is taking place. By taking 
seriously our positioning in the world, we can no longer passively reproduce Euroamerican-centric 
perspectives on psychology.  
The locus of enunciation centres not only the author(s) of the text(s) which we consume and 
disseminate, but indicates, also, who is central in these theoretical conceptions of the world. For 
instance, it is important to recognise that most psychometric tests were developed for the purposes 
of testing European and US peoples and, as such, centre people in the West. Additionally, because 
Euroamerican-centric knowledge is based on the necessary inferiority of any other knowledge, the 
locus of enunciation of this current work becomes important, as it is necessary to keep in mind the 
ideas of norming in psychometric testing, not as an attempt to contextualise but rather as the 
continued reproduction of the Otherness of lifeworlds outside of Europe and the US. The use of 
norming in psychometric testing retains the notion that Europe and the US is the universal standard 
against which all Other lifeworlds must be measured.  
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The reproduction of Euroamerican-centric perspectives, or ‘mimicry’, as Bhabha (1994) termed it, 
particularly when it has to do with the training of psychologists, continues ‘epistemic violence’ 
not only on trainee practitioners, but on clients who do not fit Euroamerican lifeworlds. Epistemic 
violence is the manner in which research constructs the colonial subject. Additionally, as Thomas 
Teo argues “[e]pistemological violence is a practice that is executed in empirical articles and books 
in psychology when interpretative speculations regarding results implicitly or explicitly construct 
the ‘Other’ as problematic” (2008, p. 57). Epistemological violence, as implicit and/or explicit 
biases within psychological practise, renders the Other as the necessary inferior counterpart to the 
subject that is central (Fanon, 1967/2008). Through the mimicry of Euroamerican-centric 
practices, whether intentionally or unintentionally, there remains continuous epistemic violence 
that perpetuates the position of the inferiority of the Other. Models of what a good therapeutic 
client is serve as an example of the problematic way in which training can position particular 
people as the Other and leads to epistemic violence. Such issues have been recognised in research 
in the US regarding the micro-aggressions often enacted within the therapeutic context when White 
psychologists work with minority populations (see Sue & Sue, 2008). 
2.3.1 From universality to pluriversality. The assumption that Western knowledge is 
universal is one of the primary forms through which Euroamerican-centric knowledge has been 
able to maintain its hegemonic dominance (Nsamenang, 1999). The assumption of universality 
maintains that Western-derived knowledge systems are universal insofar as they apply to all people 
regardless of context (Nsamenang, 2007). It may be more accurate to argue that what is considered 
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universal knowledge is, instead, Western knowledge that has been universalised through various 
mechanisms, including colonialism and apartheid.  
One way to counter the universalistic conception of knowledge is through pluriversality, which is 
the acceptance of multiple epistemologies (i.e. pluri), in contrast to a singular (i.e. uni) all-
encompassing epistemology. Pluriversality is a departure from the universalism of Western 
knowledge. However, as Boidin, Cohen, and Grosfoguel (2012, p. 2) argue, “the decolonial 
proposal would be to search for universal knowledge as pluriversal knowledge, but through 
horizontal dialogues among different traditions of thought”. Furthermore, pluriversality de-
provincialises knowledge by purporting that not all Western knowledge is applicable everywhere, 
in the same way that not all knowledge from Africa(ns) is only applicable to Africa(ns). In 
understanding that there exists pluriversal psychologies, Africa(n)-centred perspectives extend the 
canon of what constitutes psychological research, teaching and learning, and practice of the 
discipline. These extensions allow psychological practise to be better positioned to respond to the 
needs of the South African population. 
An Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists is decolonial in the sense that it 
seeks to de-centre Euroamerican-centrism in Africa. This idea of de-centring is linked to the 
concept of pluriversality. Mignolo (1993) proposes that when it comes to universality, the 
argument that there exists a singular knowledge form applicable to all lifeworlds is false; rather, 
the author argues that knowledge exists, as does human life, in pluriversal forms. An Africa(n)-
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centred perspective on the training of psychologists, then, must take seriously what Boidin et al. 
argue as “the knowledge production of ‘non-Western’ critical traditions and genealogies of 
thought” (2012, p. 2).  
Thus, an Africa(n)-centred perspective must acknowledge that there are pluriversal psychologies 
as opposed to simply a universal psychology. The result of viewing the world from a particular 
location, marred with complex and entangled histories, produces qualitatively different lifeworlds 
(Ratele, 2019). That difference does not necessarily equate to inferiority of one knowledge from 
another; neither does it mean that all knowledges are equal all the time. Claiming that thinking 
from ‘here’ about the world does not diminish thinking from ‘there’ as necessarily wrong; yet, the 
geography of reasoning is a necessary element to the formation of knowledge.  
The universalisation of Euroamerican-centric knowledge in psychology has resulted in two 
interrelated practices; namely, epistemic closure and disciplinary decadence (Gordon, 2015b, 
2017). Firstly, it is necessary to understand that epistemic closure is “a moment of presumably 
complete knowledge of a phenomenon. Such presumed knowledge closes off efforts at further 
inquiry” (Gordon, 2015b, p. 49). Epistemic closure hence refers to how Euroamerican-centric 
knowledges are closed off to the existence of any other knowledges; thus, presuming that all of 
human life can be known through the epistemologies of Europe and the US (Nsamenang, 1999). 
In (South) African psychology, epistemic closure can be seen in the continuous importing of 
knowledge and over-reliance on Euroamerican-centric knowledge (Ratele, 2019).  
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Epistemic closure can have severe repercussions for the practice of psychologists, as it may result 
in micro-aggressions within the therapeutic context that alienate clients. It is also not only during 
a therapeutic encounter that epistemic closure may have negative ramifications. Indeed, such 
alienation can occur within the training sites themselves, wherein trainee psychologists can feel 
alienated by the very psychology that they are studying. The alienation of trainee psychologists 
requires urgent attention, as it indicates long-standing and problematic colonial exclusionary 
mechanisms. Alienation can be understood, as Fanon (1967/2008) argues, as the psychological 
state of being removed from one’s cultural artefacts – including language, knowing, and practices. 
This state of alienation can have detrimental effects on the lives of particularly Black trainees as 
they are continuously mis-recognised as not belonging and as the deviant Other (Stevens, 2001). 
Such psychological alienation is complemented, in large part, by a rapture in the relationship 
between the self and the world, as the self becomes ever-more estranged (see Hook, 2004). 
Alienation and estrangement caused by the imposition of Euroamerican-centric norms and 
practices can cause Black trainees to experience their training as psychologically violent. 
Epistemic closure is, thus, an important consideration for an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the 
training of psychologists, as it may indicate the extent to which professional training is 
Euroamerican-centric in nature.  
Secondly, it should be noted that disciplinary decadence in the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists subverts the pluriversal capabilities of the discipline. Gordon (2017) posits that 
disciplinary decadence is the act of turning away from living thought or reality, treating methods 
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as the equivalence of gods, and, thus, making the discipline itself reality instead. In simpler terms, 
the concern of decadent disciplines is not so much in social reality but the mastery of disciplinary 
tools. Decadence posits the completeness of disciplines (i.e. epistemic closure); thereby acting to 
exclude certain practices through the establishment and (re)production of normative 
Euroamerican-centric practices. Maldonado-Torres in his analysis of ‘Fanon and the Decolonial 
Turn in Psychology’ asserts that “[t]he idea of method as guarantor of truth and knowledge in the 
sciences emerged from a certain confidence about the capacities of the cognitive subject and the 
status of the object…” (2017, p. 432). It is through turning away from living thought, that is, from 
the reality of the many challenges that face South Africans, that psychology makes it possible for 
itself to continue to exist in its current configuration. At the Masters level, psychology is about the 
training and mastery of tools that those who control the EPD, as Maton (2013) has argued, have 
asserted as legitimate instruments and who often defend those tools when confronted with social 
reality.  
In order to counter disciplinary decadence and uplift the pluriversal capabilities of psychology, it 
may be useful to turn towards reality in the way that Long asserts, namely as the “searching 
examination of the material conditions of oppression – and their disastrous psychological sequelae 
– that most of our fellow citizens continue to endure” (2016c, p. 3). The examination of the material 
conditions in which most South Africans find themselves requires a conscious turn towards reality 
and not a reliance on current disciplinary methodology. Epistemic closure and disciplinary 
decadence can be found within psychology across the content, structure, and form of the training 
55 
 
55 | P a g e  
 
of psychologists. Specifically, epistemic closure and disciplinary decadence account for much of 
the resistances to change that has occurred at the curriculum level, pedagogy, and selection of 
candidates in professional training. An Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of 
psychologists takes the material conditions of people as paramount to how psychologists ought to 
be trained.  
Western universalised knowledge misrecognises and can be at times oppressive and epistemically 
violent to, Africa(ns). Grace Musila, in advancing the epistemic disarticulation of universality of 
knowledge, contends that “the blindspots, opacities and deceit that result from a mismatch of 
assumptions and ideas… emphasise that these disconnects are less about ignorance, and more 
about inability to acknowledge multiple modes of knowing and their accompanying indices of 
credibility” (2017, p. 693). This mismatch of assumptions can be epistemically violent in the 
misrecognition of normative behaviour as pathological, due to the underlying disconnect between 
the underlying premise and the given context.  
In the blindspots related to those people designated as ‘objects of enquiry’ (e.g. Black people), 
rather than ‘active subjects’, there is a continuous perpetuation of domination. By positioning 
Euroamerican-centric knowledge as the only way through which to make meaning of the world, 
there is continued misrecognition of African lifeworlds. Musila argues that the monopoly over the 
gaze continuously shapes the relationship between Europe and Africa in “that the Other is both 
subject to this gaze and incapable of returning the gaze” (2017, p. 694). An Africa(n)-centred 
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perspective on the training of psychologists is aimed at returning the gaze, thinking about the world 
from ‘here’, and de-structively engaging with Euroamerican-centric knowledge. 
Musila (2017, p. 704) offers an astute way in which to view the practices of disciplines within the 
academy today:  
Many academic disciplines are nonetheless firmly embedded in rigid conceptions of what 
constitutes knowledge, evidence, data, and legitimate modes of knowing. These 
conceptions largely serve the disciplines well, but fall short when it comes to developing 
analytic registers that can productively tease out the truths and insights contained in genres 
haunted by deficits of normative credibility and legitimacy. 
The dislocation of the individual from their environment allows professionals to encourage clients 
to seek individual solutions to the problems they are facing. Professionals provide a service to 
those who are usually connected to the dominant power structures; thereby acting to de-politicise 
broader issues by recasting individual concerns. Cloete and Pillay assert that the result of such an 
approach can lead to, for instance, “[h]owever adverse the material or social conditions of a 
woman, she must take it, transcend the situation and fully realize [sic.] her potential” (1988, p. 54). 
Furthermore, Louw contends that “[a]s a discipline becomes professionalised, the divisive issues 
that it deals with, such as race, capitalism, labour, deviant behaviour etc., are removed from the 
public domain and are isolated within the sphere of the professionals” (1988, p. 77). Disciplinary 
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decadence and epistemic closure caused by the universalisation of Euroamerican-centrism 
continues the epistemic disarticulation of professional psychology in Africa; thus, marginalising 
the majority Black population.  
2.4 Is an Africa(n)-centred perspective similar to Africanisation and the 
indigenisation of psychology? 
Leading on from Ratele’s (2016, 2017) conceptualisation of African Psychology, the question of 
whether an Africa(n)-centred perspective is similar to Africanisation and indigenisation may 
appear rather redundant; however, Africanisation and indigenisation still warrant further 
discussion. According to Letsekha (2013), there exist a number of definitions of Africanisation. 
One such definition is that Africanisation “can be understood as the adaptation of the subject 
matter, and teaching methods geared to the physical and cultural realities of the African 
environment” (Letsekha, 2013, p. 7). In other words, Africanisation is the act of taking what is 
foreign and making it relevant to the African context. The suffix ‘-isation’ indicates the act of 
turning what is not of Africa, in this case knowledge, into something that can be applied in/to 
Africa. The problem with this act is that it is a continuation of extraversion of knowledge (see 
Hountondji, 1986) paradigm through which psychology has already been operating in Africa.  
Africanisation legitimises Europe as a site of thinking, and Africa as a site of application, which, 
in turn, continues the dominance of Euroamerican-centric epistemologies in psychology. 
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However, others, such as Achille Mbembe, drawing from Ngugi wa Thiong’o, contend that 
“Africanisation is a project of re-centring” (2016, p. 35). I disagree with Mbembe’s (2016) use of 
Africanisation in this regard, as it attempts to equate Africanisation with Africa(n)-centredness, 
which disregards the dislocation of Africa in the ‘-isation’ process.  
Long (2016b) notes that Africanisation in psychology is often positioned as a racial and cultural 
endeavour that is exclusive to Black people. Indeed, Long maintains that the attempts to Africanise 
the discipline often encloses (African) psychology, leading to the discipline being “understood as 
[a] cultural undertaking” (2017, p. 293, emphasis in original). Ratele (2017) further argues that for 
some, African Psychology is a psychology about and for Black people, yet for him not all African 
Psychology is a psychology of, or about, Black people. I concur that understanding African 
Psychology as Africanisation is limiting and can often lead to the reification of Black lifeworlds.  
Ian Moll indicates that African Psychology is a myth when it is positioned as “1) …unique to a 
particular geographical region and its people(s) and 2) exists in active opposition to and struggle 
with, a psychology that is particular to another geographical region” (2002, p. 9). Moll (2002) 
further asserts that the Africanisation of psychology is the provincialisation of Africa and African 
Psychology. I agree with Moll (2002) that African Psychology needs to be de-provincialised; 
which is to say, African Psychology should be shown not so much as unique to a region but rather 
as situated knowledge – that which is aware of its history and context (Ratele, 2016).  
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Africanisation can be understood to be nationalistic in that it is concerned with drawing clear lines 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’; thereby, essentially, falling into the same trappings of universalised 
Western knowledge. The difficulty, thus, is that in attempting to draw binaries, many have fallen 
into the pitfalls of ‘national consciousness’ (see Fanon, 1963/2004), as evidenced by the search for 
an indigenous Africanised psychology. I maintain that the search ought rather to be for an 
Africa(n)-centred psychology that is aware of the entangled and pluriversal nature of human 
lifeworlds in a world still shaped by coloniality.  
Similar arguments as the problems with Africanisation can be made of the indigenisation of 
psychology. Kurt Danziger contends that indigenisation can be understood as “a profound localism 
in that virtually all significant contributions were deeply marked by the cultural context of their 
place of origin and were therefore not easily transplanted” (2006, p. 211). There are wo 
implications to the definition of indigenisation being offered by Danziger (2006), firstly that what 
is can be called Western Psychology is indeed an indigenous psychology of the West with 
variations in the US, the United Kingdom, and other parts of Europe. Secondly, positioning 
indigenisation as ‘localisation’ may imply that all psychology around the world is indigenised, 
however, this is not true of all African Psychology (see Anonymous, 1985; Dawes, 1985). The 
dominant form of African Psychology, which Ratele (2016) argues is psychology in Africa, is one 
such example of a non-indigenised form of African Psychology. Additionally, this notion of 
indigenisation as localism presents similar problems as Africanisation, in that it provincialises 
knowledge. Maton (2013), thus, asserts that knowledge and knowing should not be segmented; 
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that is, knowledge and knowing should not be so strongly bound to their contexts that they are 
only meaningful to and within that context. 
An endogenous psychology is an essential aspect to the training of psychologists, as it also includes 
cultural considerations of African lifeworlds, yet is not limited to these elements of culture. As 
noted previously, an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists is endogenous 
rather than indigenous. Ciofalo (2019, p. 7) defines Indigenous Psychologies as “systems of 
knowledge and wisdom based on non-western paradigms originating in their particular ecologies 
and cultures”. Letsekha (2013, p. 12) argues that where indigenous, particularly Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (IKS), is understood as the localisation of knowledge that is unique to a place 
and people, endogenous knowledge has “a rootedness in African conditions; a centring of African 
ontological discourses and experiences as the basis of one’s intellectual work”. There are some 
who have argued that indigenous, and indeed its actionability indigenisation, allows for the 
multiple epistemologies to co-exist (see Makhubela, 2016). However, as Danziger (2006) 
illustrates, on the process of indigenisation in the US and Europe, indigenisation is not amenable 
to the existence of multiple epistemologies. Moreover, Sundararajan (2019) argues that indigenous 
psychology can only contribute to global psychology if it can successfully navigate the schism 
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It is precisely the schism of indigenous psychology that endogeneity in an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective on the training of psychologists expands to include “the contradictions along lines of 
race, class, language, and culture” (Long, 2017, p. 293) that exist in Africa. These contradictions 
have local manifestations and global configurations that have required that the Global South, and 
others in the America’s, to take seriously the issue of coloniality as a result of continued 
Euroamerican-centric globalisation (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). Such an understanding places, 
as central, the question of the biography of both practitioner and client, decisions regarding the 
type(s) of knowledge included in curricula, and where psychologists ought to be practicing. I, 
therefore, argue that an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists is 
endogenous, as it refers to not only the geographical location of knowledge and people in 
professional psychology, but to the ability of professional psychology to “develop on the basis of 
its own resources” (Letsekha, 2013, p. 13).  
Africanisation and indigenisation can also be nationalistic in their conceptualisation and, as such, 
can remain limited in their view of the world. However, Ndumiso Dladla (2017) argues that 
nationalistic movements, such as the Africanism of Anton Lembede, are necessary starting points 
for many other movements (e.g. BCM initiated by Steve Biko and others). These nationalistic 
movements are inward looking, since inward focus is a necessary tenant of fighting against 
oppressive regimes through the liberation of the oppressed, and, as such, cannot be outrightly 
dismissed. As such, because Africanisation and indigenisation are limited to only the 
transformation of knowledge otherwise not of Africa and the localisation of said knowledge, they 
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may serve as starting points in the same way that Dladla (2017) observes in the relationship 
between Africanism and BCM.  
2.5 Is an Africa(n)-centred approach not another iteration of Afrocentricity and 
Black Psychology? 
Afrocentricity and Black Psychology developed out of the conditions of a White-centric US 
society that is content with misrecognising those designated as the deviant Other’. To fully engage 
with Afrocentricity and Black Psychology, it is necessary to understand the other side of what I 
have termed ‘Euroamerican-centric psychology’, and what is meant by Western Psychology. It is 
important to note that there is a slight distinction between Euroamerican-centrism and Western 
Psychology, particularly in terms of geography and epistemology. On the one hand, Western 
Psychology, in this thesis, refers largely to work that emanates out of countries in the so-called 
Global North. These countries are found mostly in Western Europe and extend to the US and 
Canada. On the other hand, Euroamerican-centrism refers to the manner in which the psychology 
that emerges from Western countries has come to dominate global psychology through its use of 
White and middle-class people as representing the norm in all societies. In short, Euroamerican-
centric psychology is the practice of psychology that privileges White, middle-class persons in 
Europe and the US. Euroamerican-centric psychology has been freighted across the world through 
colonialism and coloniality (see Dladla, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Serequeberhan, 1997). 
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More broadly, Euroamerican-centrism is White-centric, which means that it centralises cultural, 
ideological, and epistemological Whiteness as a standard for what is normative.  
Wade Nobles states that what initially necessitated Black Psychology in the US was the need to 
“correct the limitations of Western psychology…” (2013, p. 292). These limitations refer to how 
Black people in the US were regarded as objects rather than subjects of psychological study (see 
Mama, 1995). Black Psychology established itself as the study of Black people that centralises the 
lifeworlds of Black people as they exist without necessarily pathologising them (Jamison, 2018). 
Part of the reason for the pathological stance of (Western) psychology towards Black people in the 
US was that, until the 1920s, mainly White men conducted psychological research (Mama, 1995). 
In the same vein as Nobles (2013), Molefi Kete Asante (1988/2009) proposed that the only way to 
understand the Black condition in the US was to place the Black worldview as central through the 
application and development of Afrocentricity. Asante defines Afrocentricity as “…a holistic plan 
to reconstruct and develop every dimension of the African world from the standpoint of Africa as 
subject rather than object” (1988/2009, p. 105, emphasis added). Themba Sono elaborated that 
“Afrocentricity is a rejection of the centrality of conventional scholarship and scientism-a rejection 
of the Western intellectual tradition and modes of analysis [and that] Afrocentricity regards 
Western scholarships as a by-product of Eurocentricity” (1988, p. 69, original emphasis).  
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The distinction and mutual relationship that Sono (1988) makes between Western scholarship and 
Eurocentricity becomes the foundation through which Afrocentricity critiques the majority of US 
scholarship. Speaking specifically on the curriculum, Asante (1991) argues that by being White-
centric, Western curricula – and scholarship – renders Black people on the margins of White 
society. Moreover, the focus on the African as subject rather than object is an important 
juxtaposition with Euroamerican-centric constructions of the self-other dichotomy created by 
Euroamerican-centric epistemologies (Jones & Mtshali, 2013).  
Afrocentricity and Black Psychology both hold within them similarities, overlaps, and divergences 
with an Africa(n)-centred perspective. The main divergences between an Africa(n)-centred 
approach, Afrocentricity, and Black Psychology is that Africa(n)-centredness is not entirely or 
exclusively about Black people. Additionally, in epistemology, neither Black Psychology nor 
Afrocentricity can properly account for the lifeworlds of marginalised people in Africa. The Latin 
American scholar, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, in the book Epistemologies of the South: Justice 
against Epistemicide (2014), cautions against the reliance on critical Western theories in 
accounting for issues in the Global South. The caution speaks to the locus of enunciation, as 
Mignolo (2009) highlights the differing relationship between Western critical theory in 
comparison to scholarship in the Global South to the Western ‘empire’. This relationship to empire 
may result in what de Sousa Santos (2014, p. 20) has called ‘weak answers’, which “are those 
answers that do not challenge the horizon of possibilities”.  
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An important convergence between an Africa(n)-centred perspective, Afrocentricity, and Black 
Psychology appears in the work of William Edward Burghardt du Bois. Maldonado-Torres (2007) 
credits du Bois (1903/2003) for being one of the early proponents of the decolonial school of 
thought. The tradition of Black Psychology and Afrocentricity can be traced back to du Bois, who, 
in the early 19th century, attempted to reconstruct the ways in which social science studies 
understood the lifeworlds of Black people in the US. du Bois (1903/2003) proposed that when 
studying the lives of African-American people, the tendency was to look at them as problems 
rather than as people with problems.  
Gordon (2007b) extends du Bois’ ideas by proposing that there are two problems that dominate 
the study of Black people, namely: 1) the reduction to experience, and 2) disciplinary decadence. 
I have already discussed the latter in detail in a previous section in this chapter. Regarding the 
former, the concept asserts that all that Black people have to offer is experience, whilst White 
people (also) offer theory. Theory is the tool through which we choose to view the world – it is an 
important determinant of what we are able to see and how we see it (Stevens, 2003). Theory is a 
human invention, which causes it be ideologically laden (Stevens, 2003). It is with the idea of 
developing theory that can accurately reflect the lives of people in Africa that the need for an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists becomes necessary. 
du Bois (1903/2003) further highlighted the structural inequalities that existed within Black 
communities as the primary cause of the social ills that plagued Black people in US society at the 
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time. Fanon’s (1963/2004) conceptualisation of the zone-of-nonbeing is related to du Bois’ (1903) 
conception of the ‘problem people’. Other scholars have asserted the position of ‘non-beings’ in 
other ways. For instance, Aimé Césaire (1972) contends that the main aim for the colonialist was 
to turn those whom they had designated Black into non-beings because it is easier to disregard an 
object than it is to deal ethically with another person, or subject. The turning of Black people into 
things (i.e. the ‘thingification’ of Black people), as Césaire (1972) argues, is crucial in the 
continued disregard of Black people’s lifeworlds exhibited throughout the history of the colonial 
encounter. As part of the constructive aspects of an Africa(n)-centred perspective in psychology, 
the re-humanisation of the African lifeworld becomes markedly important; particularly with regard 
to how practitioners understand how social structures shape people’s lifeworlds.  
Afrocentricity and Black Psychology also exhibit the importance of advancing Black people as 
researchers and practitioners. Mama (1995, p. 54) argues that Black Psychology “has come to 
mean the study of black people, by black people…”. Hence, that Black scholars be knowledge 
producers can be seen as an important shared goal between Black Psychology and an Africa(n)-
centred approach. Gordon (2013, p. 46), in speaking about Africana philosophy (which should not 
be confused with Afrocentric philosophy) had this to say in respect to the development of theory 
by Black scholars: 
Black intellectuals face a neurotic situation. On one hand, many critics want to know if 
there are black thinkers on a par (or beyond) those in the Western canon ranging from Plato 
67 
 
67 | P a g e  
 
and Aristotle to Hegel and Marx and on to recent times such as Sartre and Foucault, and 
they would like to see black philosophers who aspire to such standards. On the other hand, 
when black intellectuals take on such a task, one that requires devoting a considerable 
amount of energy to the proverbial "life of the mind," they receive criticism for being too 
bookish and for failing to be "in the streets," where "the struggle" is being waged. 
The challenge of removing theory from the purview of Black scholars means that there is a 
continued dependency on Euroamerican-centric epistemologies for the content, form, and structure 
of the lens through which psychology is viewed. Ellenberger (1970) shows how much of 
psychological research is autobiographical in nature; where the types of research that are produced 
implicates the person who is writing the research. It is the persisting dependency on Euroamerican-
centric epistemologies that forms the bedrock of this thesis focus on an Africa(n)-centred approach 
to psychology. I argue that some of the challenges inherent in psychology are linked to who is 
involved in the profession; that is, by having psychology dominated by White people, the 
discipline continues its White-centric practices.  
According to Mama (1995), the entry of Black people into the profession gave rise to Black 
Psychology in the US. However, Long (2018) warns against the overreliance on racial identity in 
attempts to change the discipline within the South African context, asserting that an overreliance 
on racialised identity leads to divisive understandings about who can research what. While heeding 
this warning, I note that the matter of race and racialisation in psychology is not simply a matter 
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of pigmentation; rather, it is concerned with the commitment to an Africa(n)-centred perspective 
with regard to the research, teaching and learning, and practice of psychology. However, it is also 
necessary to note that it is ahistorical to argue that racial identity does not play an integral role in 
the understandings of human lifeworlds.  
Teo (2008) indicates that all research is speculative in the sense that it involves some kind social 
world and induced interpretation. This speculation is not divorced from who is making the 
interpretations (Teo, 2008). To discount the importance of scholarship by Black people or the 
domination of White people within the discipline perpetuates knowledge dependency. Moreover, 
if Black scholars in the US had continued to depend on their White counterparts, it would 
invariably have meant an acceptance of the negative problematic ways that Euroamerican-centric 
epistemologies positioned and continue to position Black people in the US and the rest of the 
world.  
Mama (1995) indicates a dogmatic development in the early, and even some current, work of Black 
Psychology that ascribes biological race as a given and not the racialised character of human life. 
Some early Black psychologists believed that African-Americans had no links to their African 
past; that ‘African culture’ had nothing to do with African-American lifeworlds (Mama 1995). 
However, Black psychologists and philosophers who came later attempted to establish the link 
between Africa and Black people in the US (see Nobles, 2013). The link to Africa for people such 
as Asante (1988/2009) was clear, even going further so as to argue that it is only through thinking 
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through ancient Africa that African-Americans can re-centre themselves. However, Mama (1995) 
asserts that early studies into Black identity reaffirmed racist legacies by referring to how Africa 
is often essentialised as monolithic (see also Stevens, 2015). The kinds of conceptions of Africa 
that essentialise the continent often do not take into account the differing lifeworlds that inhabit 
Africa, or that the colonial experience forms part of the socio-historical contexts through which 
the continent and its people exists in the world today. 
An Africa(n)-centred approach to psychology recognises the importance of scholarship developed 
by Black people as a necessary component to the development of new theories. The recognition 
that who is writing, and about what, should not be viewed as an investment in racial identity 
politics. Rather, such recognition is about what decolonial theorists such as Mignolo (1993) have 
contested is the locus of enunciation. I have already delineated the importance of the locus of 
enunciation in showing the decolonial potential of an Africa(n)-centred perspective in psychology, 
and, as such, I will not reiterate here. However, it is important to note that the locus of enunciation 
also addresses not only the importance of Black scholarship, but the vantage point from which 
these scholars are writing. Maton (2013) argues that current research into higher education has 
focussed mostly on questions of why, where, and who in the three fields that constitute the EPD. 
However, the author also emphasises that the fundamental contestation should be on ‘what’, as it 
constitutes the content of these fields (Maton, 2013). The contestation of the content of 
psychological training curricula is an essential element, as it has the ability to show knowledge 
dependency. As such, an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists that also 
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critically focusses on why, where, and who, as elements in the dominance of Euroamerican-centric 
knowledge that requires challenging, is necessary. 
The reluctance to accept, wholly, Afrocentricity and Black Psychology is the difference in the 
thinking within and the thinking outside of the empire (Mignolo, 1993). The relationship between 
those people who live in the Global South with the West is significantly different from those people 
who are considered the Other in the Global North. The entanglement and nature of the coloniality 
manifests itself differently when thinking from ‘there’ rather than from ‘here’. As Saths Cooper 
and Kopano Ratele maintain, against the use of Black Psychology or Afrocentricity, “[t]here is…a 
need for a South African black conscious psychology because: (a) Black American psychology 
cannot dwell on SA conditions, and (b) it is not necessarily black conscious in the way we define 
it” (2018, p. 255). The African-American author and literary scholar, Toni Morrison, in her book 
The Origin of Others, encapsulates the epistemic relationship between Black America and Africa. 
Morrison contends, “Africa was both ours and theirs, intimately connected to us and profoundly 
foreign. A huge needy homeland to which we were said to belong but which none of us had seen 
or cared to see…” (2017, p. 100-101).  
The explanation of Africa as being connected to Black people in the US and yet simultaneously 
foreign speaks to how although African-Americans are connected to Africa, that connection 
remains mediated by their distance to the continent. Through such mediation of distance, Africa 
can, thus, become an imagined, essentialised, and exotic place. In being cautious of the application 
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of Western critical theories in Africa, I argue that it is important not to divorce the development of 
theoretical constructs from the social world in which it develops. Ultimately, it is important to 
remember that while there are vast similarities in Black lifeworlds, there are also differences in the 
qualitative experiences of Black lifeworlds across the globe (Stevens et al., 2017). 
2.6 What might be gained from imbricating an Africa(n)-centred perspective 
with discursive psychology? 
In asking “What might be gained from imbricating an Africa(n)-centred perspective with 
discursive psychology” I attempt to bring closer the relationship between Africa(n)-centredness 
and language. This relationship is discernible in talk and text within psychology about Africa and 
what it means to talk about the world from the vantage point of Africa(ns).  
Discursive psychology marks a turn towards language, taking the role of language into 
consideration in creating and recreating institutions. Derek Edwards explains that discursive 
psychology is a “theoretical and methodological foundation for approaching psychological states 
and characteristics in terms of how people invoke, describe, ascribe, imply, and manage them 
within discourse and social interaction” (2012, p. 427). This definition is important in that it 
highlights a pertinent point about how language is not merely a tool of communication but, rather, 
an exploration of “how agency, intent, doubt, belief, prejudice, emotional investment, 
commitment, and so on, are built, made available, or countered indirectly through descriptions of 
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actions, events, objects, persons, and settings” (Edwards, 2005, p. 267) through discursive 
psychology.  
Taking the role of language seriously means looking at language beyond the level of the 
individual and understanding it as a social phenomenon. Teun van Dijk (1993) asserts that 
discursive work is social insofar as it is both historically constituted and presently produced 
towards a particular action. This orientation towards action can be seen in justifications, 
assertions, blaming, and prejudices within text and talk (Potter, Wetherall, Gill, & Edwards, 
2015). Further elaborating on the importance of the discursive turn, Edwards (2005, p. 258) 
says:  
There are three major strands in [discursive psychology]. These are: (i) respecification and 
critique of psychological topics and explanations; (ii) investigations of how everyday 
psychological categories are used in discourse; (iii) studies of how psychological business 
(motives and intentions, prejudices, reliability of memory and perception, etc.) is handled 
and managed in talk and text, without having to be overtly labelled as such  
I locate the present thesis regarding the professional training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists within the last strand of the noted discursive psychology as one way to investigate 
the motives for the selection of candidates and curriculum structures within training sites. Broadly, 
discursive psychology can be located within a social constructionism framework that does not 
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locate language in the realm of a system of representations but, rather, as part of social action 
(Bozatzis & Dragonas, 2014). Potter and Hepburn (2008) argue that discursive psychology should 
locate language within discursive constructionism. Discursive constructionism, they argue,  
…studies a world of descriptions, claims, reports, allegations and assertions as parts 
of human practices, and […] works to keep these as the central topic of research rather 
than trying to move beyond them to the objects or events that seem to be the topic of 
such discourse (Potter & Hepburn, 2008, p. 275).  
Others have closely aligned discursive psychology with poststructuralism, in that discursive 
psychology and post-structuralism both focus “on facts not as ‘states of affairs’ but as 
constructions put together for particular purposes” (Te Molder, 2015, p. 2). A poststructuralist 
discursive psychology lends itself well to the Africa(n)-centred perspective developed for this 
research, as it allows for the understanding of how knowledge is a social product (Kramer, 2019). 
However, such social products within a poststructuralist framework are not viewed as naturally 
occurring; instead, they are seen as the result of human action (i.e. language) that is directed 
towards the achievement of particular goals and objectives. In an Africa(n)-centred perspective, a 
poststructuralist understanding of language can, thus, reveal the socio-political implications of the 
ways in which people speak to, about, and from Africa in psychology.  
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In considering how to imbricate an Africa(n)-centred perspective and discursive psychology, it 
may be important to understand the use of the term ‘discourse’. Ian Parker contends that 
“[d]iscourse (language organized [sic.] into sets of texts) and discourses (systems of statements 
within and through those sets) have a power” (1990, p. 227). Kramer (2019, p. 237) elaborates on 
Parker’s (1990) definition by asserting that discourse should be understood “as a historicised and 
institutionalised set of constructed ideas, norms, rules and practices, [and] locates subject positions 
for individuals by providing categories (such as male or female) which we take for granted as self-
knowledge”. These definitions explain the components of discourses as not fixed within a 
particular time, but as emanating within an historical context and reproduced in language to create 
knowledge that we take for granted regarding the various institutions (e.g. Masters training). 
Additionally, because discourses are not relative to context, it is possible to see how they are linked 
to other discourses in other parts of the world and periods in history (van Dijk, 1993).  
Parker’s (1990) specific inclusion of power in the previously presented definition is particularly 
important in the current thesis, as power centralises the relationship of domination and 
subordination with which an Africa(n)-centred perspective is concerned. van Dijk (1993, p. 109) 
argues that power is linked to dominance in that “an abuse of social power, that is, as a deviation 
from accepted standards or norms of (inter)action, in the interest of the more powerful group, 
result[es] in various forms of social inequality, and access [to powerful discourses]”. Access to 
discourses means control of behaviour, and this is how power is held in contemporary societies 
(Foucault, 1973). Power, dominance, and access, thus, all form part of the turn to language in 
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discursive psychology; thereby illustrating the use of discourse within institutions to govern, 
maintain, and perpetuate certain forms of social action (Kramer, 2019; Parker, 2015).  
In thinking about power as the ability to govern and maintain certain social actions, it is possible 
that power can be refined as “seldom absolute, as long as other groups retain some measure of 
freedom of action and mind” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 109). However, because power, and, therefore, 
dominance and access are not absolute, it is possible for resistance to take place through a critical 
engagement with the underlying discourses.  
It is also important to note that discursive power, and its various forms, can be made visible in a 
number of ways. van Dijk (1993) proposes that there are two main means in which to study 
discourse. The first is to look at discourse as located in society, or as ‘social cognition’ (van Dijk, 
1993). The second – which is more closely aligned to the conception of discourse in the present 
thesis – is “if we study discourse as presupposing, embodying, enacting, reflecting or legitimating 
social and institutional arrangements” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 107). In relating discourse to the latter, 
it is possible that within and across institutions, how concepts such as race, class, and gender are 
addressed reflects the dominant cultural forms. These cultural forms are not necessarily that of 
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The concepts that I have highlighted as central in the current thesis, such as race, class, exclusion, 
and domination, do not exist in the realm of things – these become ‘real’ through text and talk 
(Parker, 2015). The importance of discursive psychology with an Africa(n)-centred perspective is 
that it makes visible the processes of legitimation and de-legitimation of the training of 
psychologists. In addition, language is not only a representation of the tangible, but also creates 
those very things (i.e. language is part of the world). Parker (1990, p. 227) maintains that because: 
[t]here is no simple correspondence between things with ontological status (objects) 
and the things we have given meaning to, talk about, know about […] such things 
belong to a realm of things with epistemological status. Crudely put, these are the 
things we have knowledge about  
Parker (1990) argues that in order to study, for instance, race or class with no ontological basis, 
we must transform these concepts into things by giving them epistemological status. Kramer 
(2019, p. 237, emphasis in original), similarly, says that “discourses are also arrangements of 
meanings that make up or constitute objects and thus analysis requires some degree of 
objectification”. The iteration of discourse as the objectification of things that have no ontological 
status through giving them epistemological status made by Parker (2015) is not without 
contestation. Potter et al. (2015) maintain that the definition of discourse as objectified is limited 
in that it reifies and fixes discourses as though they are deliberately organised in that way by the 
people using them. Reification, then, de-contextualises discourses and serves to create problematic 
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ways of understanding talk as being limited to the individual or the particular institution rather 
than as part of a larger socio-political context. Potter et al. (2015, p. 173) further argue that it may 
be better to understand discourse as ‘interpretative repertoires’ which are “broadly discernible 
clusters of terms, descriptions, commonplaces… and figures of speech often clustered around 
metaphors or vivid images and often using distinct grammatical constructions and styles”. 
Interpretative repertoires are extrapolations from situated practices, as they are linked to other 
clusters or terms in society.  
Notwithstanding the debates between Potter et al. (2015) and Parker (2015) on what constitutes 
discourse, I have chosen to use the terms discourse and discourse analysis instead of interpretive 
repertoire in the present thesis. My choice to use discourse is for ease of understanding rather than 
as a conceptual choice that rejects the Potter et al,’s (2015) understanding of interpretive 
repertoires. Moreover, I agree with the latter where they argue that discourses cannot be divorced 
from their contexts and are linked with other discourses elsewhere in society and the world (Potter 
et al., 2015). 
Bozatzis and Dragonas (2014, p. 15) further argue that the common denominator that binds the 
work of discursive psychology is the “emphasis on the performativity of language”. Even though 
there are differences in the use of the term discourse against the use of interpretive repertoires, the 
meanings are similar, particularly in the sense that Parker (2015) articulates a different type of 
discursive psychology to that of Potter et al. (2015). It may be possible, then, to see the criticism 
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of reification on the part of Parker (2015) as one that is resolved by placing, for instance, the idea 
of discourse within the realm of poststructuralism (Kramer, 2019). Interpretative repertoires are 
closely aligned to the idea of discourse within the Africa(n)-centred perspective that I am 
elaborating upon here, specifically in the sense that discourses cannot be understood as being fixed, 
but are always in flux, and linked to other discourses in larger society (Kramer, 2019).  
In the editorial for the Special Issue titled Twenty Five Years of Discursive Psychology, Martha 
Augoustinos and Cristian Tileagă state that “[discursive psychology] has offered an alternative 
way of conceiving the mutual relationship between people, practices, and institutions” (2012, p. 
405). This alternative way of conceiving the mutual relationship of institutions, practices, and 
people offers an important convergence point between discursive psychology and an Africa(n)-
centred perspective on the training of psychologists. Appropriately, the focus on people’s talk does 
not become embroiled in a search for truth or an accurate reality; rather it focusses on 
understanding how people’s talk represents the practices within institutions. Discursive 
psychology can be understood as being in line with an Africa(n)-centred perspective to the extent 
that its intention is to reveal how course coordinators’ and intern psychologists’ talk (e.g. in their 
interviews in this study) is oriented towards action. It should be noted that such talk is not oriented 
at the linguistic (Edwards, 2005) or cognitive (van Dijk, 1993) structure of talk, but on the larger 
discourses found within society and psychology (Kramer, 2019; Parker, 2015; Potter et al., 2015). 
According to Parker, “it is only when the wider context is understood (using theoretical 
framework, perhaps) that one gets a sense of how particular discourses reproduce a dominant 
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culture” (1990, p. 231). I suggest that an appropriate theoretical framework for the present thesis 
is an Africa(n)-centred perspective that takes the broader socio-political context into consideration 
along with the history of apartheid and colonialism. Moreover, it may be rather apt that an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective is then used alongside a discursive psychology as a means to 
understand how dominant discourses are reproduced within professional psychology Masters 
training. These discourses include the standard of White lifeworlds owing to the historical 
foundation of the discipline as a whole.  
Discursive psychology is important as it speaks to how subjectivities or subject positions are 
created in institutions (Edwards, 2005); such as psychology, in general, and psychology training, 
specifically. As Kramer states, “[d]iscourses contain subjects because they make available 
positions for particular types of selfhoods and, in turn, identities” (2019, p. 237, emphasis in 
original). The possibilities of particular selfhoods can be linked to how, within psychology, 
discourses of what it means to be a clinical or counselling psychologist are, perhaps, a reproduction 
of colonial and apartheid ideology. Discursive practices, thus, become pertinent in the present 
thesis, as Black and White lifeworlds are made visible through text and talk. Within an Africa(n)-
centred perspective, language in text and talk is essential, as it speaks to forms of power relations 
in institutions (Weatherall, 2012). In this thesis, I regard text and talk as especially relevant for 
how people position themselves and others within training sites; making discursive psychology 
paramount for an Africa(n)-centred perspective. 
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2.7 What is an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of counselling and 
clinical psychologists? 
The current chapter has served two purposes. The first purpose was to elaborate on the perspective 
through which I engage with the professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
For this purpose, I employed several established theoretical and conceptual tools, including 
decoloniality – most of which are born out of resistance to Euroamerican-centric practices, either 
in the Global South or in the West. I did this as a way to show how there are links between the 
different resistance movements, as well as how Africa(n)-centred psychology of the future needs 
to position itself in relation to the rest of the world. I further conceptualised an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective on the training of psychologists as not only an oppositional framework to the 
hegemonic Euroamerican-centric framework, but as being able to construct Africa(n)-centred 
psychology. The second purpose was for this current chapter to serve as conceptual clarification. 
The clarifications presented in this chapter are necessary, since the plethora of terms and registers 
used to describe the liberatory endeavours of oppressed and marginalised people are, at times, mis-
understood (see Makhubela, 2016).  
I assert that the intertwining of philosophy, psychology, political theory, and philosophy of 
education has illustrated, without outright stating as much, that an Africa(n)-centred perspective 
elaborated upon in this chapter is transdisciplinary. The noted Africa(n)-centred perspective does 
not adhere to the rules of disciplines that maintain that only certain knowledge that meets particular 
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criteria is applicable to understanding phenomena. Instead, what I have elaborated on here is a 
perspective that critically embraces multiple ways in which to view the world. This Africa(n)-
centred perspective moves through disciplines in order to make clear that the dominant forms of 
knowing are both limited and limiting to the breaking of the shackles of coloniality (see Gordon, 
2011). Transdisciplinarity becomes, as used in the elaboration of an Africa(n)-centred perspective, 
the only cure to epistemic closure and disciplinary decadence (Gordon, 2014). Simultaneously, an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective moves beyond the epistemic disarticulation that occurs through the 
gaze of Euroamerican-centric epistemologies.  
The feminist scholar and activist, bell hooks (1991), maintains that theory is not liberatory in and 
of itself, but is liberatory when it is deployed as such. Thus, the current conception of an Africa(n)-
centred perspective on the training of psychologists can only be liberatory when it takes seriously 
the concerns of Otherness, of how people are racialised as non-beings, and of how classist 
conceptions of human value continuously shape human life in Africa. I have established, therefore, 
that an Africa(n)-centred perspective is not merely concerned with the race of black, Indian, and 
coloured people. An Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists is also not 
simply an iteration of Afrocentricity or Black Psychology. Rather, it concerns how people are 
racialised, gendered, and sexualised into hierarchical categories of being, where some are 
considered as ‘less’ than others solely by how they look, their beliefs, their choices in partners, 
and cultural practices. An Africa(n)-centred perspective is, thus, not a reification of racial identity 
as a fixed construct, but is, rather, an ongoing process of categorising those that ‘belong’ and those 
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who ‘should remain outside’. Although some within South African psychology have argued that 
‘identity politics’ ought not to take primacy in discussions on the activities of psychology, I 
maintain that identity continues to shape the lived experiences of people, and by extension, 
psychology. 
I further contest that much of what is considered African Psychology represents but one orientation 
to the discipline and, as such, is deprived of much of the nuance involved in current African 
lifeworlds. I have shown how some of the arguments related to African Psychology confuse the 
terminology of the larger discipline with its constitutive parts. African Psychology as indigenous 
cultural psychology is tantamount to ethno-theorisation and is limiting – and limited – in scope. 
By introducing the language of legitimation, as well as cumulative knowledge learning, I have 
presented how fields, such as the discipline of psychology, are better conceptualised as being 
constituted by multiple epistemologies. Euroamerican-centric epistemic closure can only be 
overcome through espousing the pluriversality of knowledge and not through the essentialising of 
all African psychology to cultural psychology.  
Through this chapter, I have also provided evidence for how an Africa(n)-centred perspective on 
the training of psychologists is decolonial. Decoloniality is an eminently important aspect of an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective in all of psychology, as it denotes the importance of changing how 
knowledge is disseminated, by whom, and from where. The decolonial aspect of an Africa(n)-
centred perspective delineates how, through the control of knowledge, power, the economy, and 
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being, Euroamerican-centrism can continue its dominance in Africa. That, for instance, asking 
questions about psychological tests, textbooks, academic articles, that are used in the training of 
psychologists is to establish the underlying legitimisation processes within training sites. 
Decolonial aspects of an Africa(n)-centred approach offer what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) asserts to 
be the ‘language of the future’ and not simply empty signifiers through which we seek to exorcise 
the demons of our past. Decoloniality in an Africa(n)-centred perspective is concerned with the 
constructive aspects of resistance movements that take into account the historical entanglements, 
contemporary enactments, and future developments of psychology. 
In further elaborating on an Africa(n)-centred perspective in this chapter, I have highlighted the 
importance of focussing on the text and talk in training sites through the use of discursive 
psychology. I have also promoted the importance of discursive psychology with an Africa(n)-
centred perspective as being crucial to unravelling the mechanisms of legitimation within training 
sites. Moreover, these mechanisms of legitimation – specifically discourses and subject positions– 
can be found across the history of the discipline, as I show in subsequent chapters. By overlaying 
discursive psychology with an Africa(n)-centred perspective, the justifications, blaming, and 
contradictions in the current curricula and selection procedures of training sites can be made 
visible. In thinking through discursive psychology with an Africa(n)-centred perspective, I take 
seriously how, through text and talk, particular subjectivities and epistemologies are (re)enforced.  
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A new kind of framing of the discipline urges practitioners, researchers, teachers, and students not 
to take liberal notions of diversity at face value. I argue here that through considering 
understandings of the coloniality of being, following the thinking of Hlengwe (2015), we are able 
to think about the role of Euroamerican-centrism in the creation of safe bets. I have also asserted 
that the legitimisation processes within African Psychology of the right kind of knower is not 
devoid of the colonial hierarchies of people as gendered, racialised, and sexualised beings. Safe 
bets offer, thus, not only a way through which we are able to see who the gatekeepers within the 
discipline consider to be the ‘right kind’ of knower, but also the qualities that are deemed 
‘legitimate’ in psychology. Furthermore, by understanding the emergence of safe bets within South 
African psychology, I propose that we need to think through more than simply demographic 
change; rather, we should consider what demographic change, or lack thereof, would and could 
mean for the practice of the discipline within and outside of academic institutions. An Africa(n)-
centred perspective on the training of counselling and clinical psychologists should understand 
that demographics are not merely about cosmetic changes, but also implicate the kinds of research 
and teaching and learning that emanate from the discipline. 
To (re)centre Africa is, therefore, a much more engaged process than previously recognised, and 
involves thinking beyond the paradigms of given knowledge sets (i.e. disciplines). Centring 
involves often transgressing what has generally been considered normative (i.e. taking part in the 
practice of epistemological disobedience) and (re)centring the African lived experience that has 
been eroded through the colonial project (Jones & Mtshali, 2013). Yet, (re)centring also involves 
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understanding the hybridity of lifeworlds that have been formed as an aftermath of colonialism. 
This understanding involves designing curricula for the training of psychologists that does not 
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Chapter 3: History of Psychology 
3.1 Introduction 
Although I use the term history in this thesis, I am referring to how the discipline bends to, or 
against, the societal “requirements”. But rather than a chronological history of psychology in South 
Africa, it may be prudent to think of what I do as a genealogy of psychology. Michel Foucault 
(1977) maintained that genealogy allows us to see things not as snapshots in a particular historical 
moment, but rather as leading onto each other, continuously changing to link to new societal 
structures. The idea, for instance, of the “native” continuously shifts and changes, from culture to 
race. The recognition of how ideas have generative and amenable qualities allows for an 
investigation of the discursive practices of fields such as psychology to be made visible. Focusing 
on how psychology as a discipline emerges from particular societies concerned with the resolution 
of identified social ills the Euroamerican-centric discursive practices of psychology can be made 
visible so as to de-construct them. In focusing on the genealogy of psychology, it is possible to 
construct a more situated psychology by highlighting the relationship between the discipline and 
Africa.  
Several researchers have taken up the studying and writing of the history of South African 
psychology, and its relation to oppressive South African society (Cooper, 2014; Danziger, 1990, 
2006; Louw, 1986; Nicholas, 1990). Each of these studies focused on highlighting multiple, and 
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convergent, aspects of South African psychology. The current study focuses on these multiple 
issues as they are pertinent in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. The 
presentation of the history of psychology serves to explain how the discipline came to be in South 
Africa, with a focus on the dominant ideological influences that were formed by people both inside 
and outside of psychology. I focus mostly on the influences of psychology inside the discipline as 
a matter of contextualising the discipline rather than acting in decadent ways to limit the 
understandings of psychology. It is important to note that the history of South African psychology 
presented here is a partial reflection of the historical development of psychology insofar as it is a 
selective history of the discipline. In recognising the partiality of the history presented here, a space 
is created through which we can conceive of multiple histories of the discipline (see van Ommen 
& Painter, 2008). Further, this recognition of partiality is to elucidate my own locus of enunciation 
as a function of the perspective through which I draw, namely Africa(n)-centred psychology.  
Although the current thesis begins its historical conceptualisation of psychology during the 
colonial period, Mudimbe (1988) points out that colonialism is not the beginning of the history of 
Africa. However, what is paramount to the current thesis is psychology as a discipline, which has 
its origins in Europe and later the US. Therefore, in thinking through how contemporary 
psychology is taught, practiced, and researched it is necessary to understand its formulation in 
South Africa during colonialism. Further, it is through understanding the overt and direct 
marginalisation of Black people during the early years of the discipline that a clearer picture of 
contemporary psychology emerges. The numerous ways in which researchers have sought to 
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understand work on psychology and oppression (see Nicholas, 1993) include the use of 
psychological concepts to legitimise oppressive legislation and the conceptualisation of race in 
psychology (see Stevens, 2003), and the exclusionary development of professional psychology in 
South Africa (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). These works become pertinent in the current thesis as 
they relate to how the present psychological practice, theory and pedagogy have maintained their 
exclusionary biases against Black people. 
The main aim of this chapter is to elucidate the marginality of Black experiences within 
psychology as a function of both Euroamerican-centric practices and the larger social and political 
systems in South Africa. The focus on the marginality of Black lifeworlds is presented in contrast 
to the centring of White lifeworlds during colonialism and apartheid. Further, the history of 
psychology that is presented in this chapter will show how Euroamerican-centric practices are still 
largely a fundamental part of post-apartheid psychology and continues the marginality of Black 
lifeworlds in South Africa. I am heedful of the caution advanced by Long (2016c) against writing 
Whig histories of psychology when the discipline has failed in making the necessary changes.  
It is the explicit intention of the current thesis to highlight trends within South African psychology 
that have contributed to the marginalisation of most of the country’s population. In so doing, 
throughout the current chapter, the argument is that psychology is exclusionary against Black, poor 
and working-class people in South Africa. In this chapter, I will look at the issue of mental testing 
and the establishment of psychology departments, along with other critical issues such as eugenics, 
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influential figures, and links between South African psychology, US, and European psychology. I 
will, further, look at the important critical voices in the period I term late apartheid, linking this 
with the development of Community Psychology as an alternative form of practicing psychology. 
Additionally, the current chapter concludes by looking at the challenges faced by psychology in 
contemporary South African society, looking at multiple issues including liberal conceptions of 
multiculturalism and diversity, and relevance.  
3.2 Colonial and apartheid psychology 
The focus of this section falls roughly between 1818 and 1979, broken down into the periods 1818 
to 1918 which marks the beginning of psychiatry with its relationship to psychology. Then I move 
from about 1918 to 1979 as this period marks the beginnings and entrenchment of colonial and 
apartheid psychology. The periods constitute close two decades of psychological history, however 
it is worth noting that the two periods constitute a minor part of South African history, as such 
represent a selective history that focuses on the discipline of psychology. That I treat the historical 
developments of psychology as important foregrounds refuting the belief that psychology is in 
some way not a socio-political force and ahistorical that is shaped by and shapes societies in 
diverse ways. In short, the selective history I present of colonial and apartheid psychology places 
psychology firmly within the realm of ideological thinking on race and racism which still pervades 
South Africa today. 
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3.2.1 Psychology and Psychiatry. The development of psychology in South Africa as an 
academic discipline can be tracked back to the establishment of insane asylums in the mid-19th 
century. The establishment of asylums in South Africa reflected developments in Britain (Swartz, 
2008). The first asylum was Somerset Hospital, opened in 1818 in the British-held Cape colony 
(Foster, 2008). The hospital admitted people who were either physically ill or designated as 
“insane” (Swartz, 2008). Other asylums soon emerged in the rest of the country such as Robben 
Island and Grahamstown Asylum (now Fort England Hospital) (Swartz, 1995). The asylums were 
racially differentiated, a reflection of the growing worry within the British coloniser of the effects 
of racial mixing (Foster, 2008; Swartz, 2008). Further, it is important to note that the concerns 
with racial mixing, as with many colonial concerns, was also predicated on the argument that Black 
people were incapable of high mental processes and therefore could not have intricate mental 
disorders. It was, thus, in the interest of the White population to ensure that Blacks were separated 
to maintain the integrity of the White “mentally insane”. 
According to Swartz (2008), pathology for Africans during the period 1818 to 1930 was argued to 
be due to inferior “mentality”, “temperament” and “culture”. The assumption of inferior mentality, 
culture and temperament led to the conception of the term “primitive culture” to describe Black 
lifeworlds. The assumptions of inferiority were entangled with arguments against the mixing of 
races as leading to undesirable mental states of Whites. The undesirable mental states of Whites 
was argued to be caused by inferior Africans who would then contaminate Whites. In the 1920s, 
during in the infamous Carnegie Study (1932), one of the authors and a leading segregationists, 
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Johannes Rudolf Albertyn, argued that the “…social intercourse between Europeans and non-
Europeans [could lead to] the uncivilised mode of life of the native [having] a detrimental effect 
on the language, habits and even religion of the white family” (p. 138). These sentiments had 
widespread implications based as they were on dominant notions of Black people being of a 
“primitive culture” and “uncivilised” compared to people of European descent. 
The formation of asylums in South Africa is important partly because asylums allowed for the 
development of psychiatry, with psychiatry having had a fundamental impact on psychology. The 
development of classification of disorders such as Diagnostic Classification Manual (DSM), which 
is mainly devised by the American Association of Psychiatry (APA) in the US, and the 
International Classification of Disease (ICD), which is developed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), came out of mainly psychiatric practice (Botha, 2016). These classification 
systems are integral to the practice of psychologists as they are in wide use in South Africa today, 
with the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) recommending the use of both 
classification manuals (HPCSA, 2018a). In South Africa the development and use of DSM and 
ICD classification systems was preceded by the establishment of the Commission for Mental 
Hygiene in 1916. The commissions’ main aim was to regulate and promote mental hygiene in the 
South African population, which included the work of psychologists. The commission was headed 
by John Thomas Dunston a psychiatrist (Swartz, 2008). 
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The initial stages of South African psychiatry converged with the early years of mental testing in 
South Africa. Mental testing is a foundational part of psychology in almost all parts of the world 
(Richter & Dawes, 2008). Louw (1997c) notes that the development of psychological testing in 
South Africa became a fundamental contributor in shaping the construction of race through 
eugenics (which I discuss further later) and Christian-nationalism. The mental testing movement 
which emerged in South Africa, partly looking for “scientific” justification for the racial ideology, 
acts as an integral part of propelling psychologists to an important social standing, on par to some 
extent with psychiatrists. Although, it must be mentioned here, psychologists were not to receive 
independent practice until the mid-1970s, psychologists were an integral part of the racist ideology 
of the colonial period. Mental testing would be used in South Africa as a way to justify several 
social policies such as inferior education for the different races (see Richter & Dawes, 2008). 
3.2.2 Influential figures: White-centric scholarship. The number of early psychologists 
who were trained in the US exemplifies the freighting of US ideals of what psychology is, and 
what it ought to be doing in South Africa. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, 
the relationship between South Africa and the west incorporated how South African psychology 
mimicked Europe. The relationship between the US and South Africa points to an interesting and 
crucial point in how the west was able to freight ideas of psychology across the world. Of less 
interest in this historical account is how psychology moves from Europe to the US, even as 
Danziger (1990, 1994) offers an interesting history of this disciplinary movement. I am more 
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concerned with elucidating how psychology as a discipline moves into South Africa from the US 
and Europe. 
One of the most influential psychologists was M. Laurence Fick, who devised the first individual 
mental test used by the Commission on Mental Hygiene (Fick, 1929). M. L. Fick trained at Harvard 
University as a psychometrician. He was exposed to the Binet-Simon intelligence tests that 
measured reaction time as a marker of intelligence (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). Fick represents 
not only the freighting of US ideals of psychological practice but also the convergence of 
psychiatry and the early beginnings of psychology in South Africa with the development and use 
of the Official Mental Hygiene Individual Scale. The scale resembled a Binet-Simon type scale. 
In 1929, he published Intelligence test results of poor white, native (Zulu), coloured and Indian 
school children and the educational and social implications in which Fick (1929, p. 904) argued:  
This paper presents the findings in the case of European, poor white, coloured, Indian, and 
Native (Zulu) children. As these children were not tested primarily for the sake of 
comparison, representative selections were not made of all those groups.  
He adds later in the paper, “[i]n testing native children one cannot help noticing a number of factors 
that operate to the disadvantage of this group, and to a lesser degree Indian and coloured country 
schools” (Fick, 1929, p. 910). In the mist of racialised hierarchical ideology Fick (1929) was able 
to recognise the social issues that made it difficult for Black, Indian, and coloured children (sic) to 
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be appropriately compared with White children. According to Seedat and MacKenzie (2008), a 
decade later – in 1939 – Fick changed his tone using the same results and without justification to 
argue that Blacks were inherently (genetically) inferior to Whites. This change in tone paved the 
way for the inferior education of Blacks to be institutionalised in more stringent and formal ways 
under the The Native Administrative Act of 1927. Later during apartheid, the same “scientific 
research” would become the basis, along with other racist research, for the Bantu Education Act 
(1953) which formally separated schooling for Whites, Indians, Coloured and black people. 
It was not only Fick who would go to the US to obtain a higher education degree and use mental 
testing as a legitimising tool for racialised hierarchical orders during colonialism and apartheid. 
Charles Loram also received his training at Yale University in the US. He became a member of 
the Native Affairs Commission. Loram authored the 1917 book The Education of the South African 
Native using psychometric testing to conclude, amongst other things, that Black children were 
significantly intellectually inferior to White children (Seedat & Mackenzie, 2008).  
Another important figure in the early years of psychology, and who had a connection to the US, 
was Ernest Gideon Malherbe. Malherbe was the founder of the National Bureau of Educational 
and Social Research (NBESR) (Fleisch, 1995). Malherbe was a University of Columbia trained 
educational psychologists. He was the lead author and investigator in the Carnegie Study of 1928-
1932 on the Poor White Problem in South Africa. The connection between Malherbe and the US 
would prove to be crucial in the development of South African psychology, and indeed South 
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African society. Malherbe was the primary reason that the Carnegie Corporation was able to 
establish the Carnegie study with poor Whites as he had a previous relationship with the head of 
the Carnegie Corporation (Fleisch, 1995). In the NBESR Malherbe was joined by M. L. Fick, 
making the bureau important and influential to the goals of the colonial state, and later the 
development of the apartheid state. 
In much the same way that the influence of the US can be seen in these prominent figures, so too 
does the relationship between South Africa and Europe. One such figure who repeatedly makes an 
appearance at different points in South African history, and psychology more specifically, is 
Raymond William Wilcocks. Wilcocks established the first psychology laboratory at Stellenbosch 
University in the early 1920s (Cooper & Nicholas, 2012). The laboratory, which was housed at 
Stellenbosch University’s Psychology Department, was modelled after William Wundt’s 
laboratory which was established in 1829 in Germany (Louw, 1988). Further Wilcocks’ modelling 
of the laboratory after the Wundt’s lab was due in large part to his having obtained his doctoral 
degree at the University of Berlin. Although there were pressing issues for South African society 
(particularly for those in power at the time) such as the poor Whites, the laboratory in Stellenbosch 
University might have been less concerned with resolving these issues directly. Louw (1988) 
contends that the development of psychology in Germany from Wundt and others was not 
concerned with solving societal ills of the time. Rather the lab developed out of a search for a 
unifying psychological theory. The issue of disciplinary concerns versus societal utility is an 
important convergence of psychology between international developments and South Africa. 
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As far as prominent figures in South African psychology are concerned, Hendrick Frensch 
Verwoerd is the most noteworthy; he became known as the “architect of apartheid” (Leach, 
Akhurst & Basson, 2003). In 1927, Stellenbosch University established the Department of Applied 
Psychology headed by Verwoerd (Foster, 2008). The Department of Applied Psychology, in 
contrast to that of Wilcocks, was concerned with the application of psychological knowledge in 
resolving the challenges of (Afrikaaner) society. Verwoerd, it warrants mentioning, was a protégé 
of Wilcocks, having been supervised by Wilcocks at masters and doctorial level through 
Stellenbosch University. Verwoerd then becomes one of the few prominent psychologists whose 
training was primarily in South Africa and not through a European or US university. However, 
Verwoerd spent time in Germany before his appointment at Stellenbosch University. Importantly 
these links illustrate a complex relationship of how knowledge, and ways of practice within 
disciplines, can be passed through supervisors, not only through direct contact with the empire. 
3.2.3 Scientific racism and the eugenics movement. Appel defines eugenics as “the 
science of improving a race by controlled breeding, providing scientific legitimacy to notions of 
white superiority in South Africa and elsewhere [in the world]” (1989, p. 551). Eugenics in this 
sense is the use of “science” to create what Edwin Black (2003) called the “master race”, to assert 
Whites and the cultural practices associated with them (Whiteness), as being superior to all others. 
According to Seedat and MacKenzie (2008), in the 1920s South Africa established the Eugenics 
and Genetics Standing Committee as part of the South African Association for the Advancement 
of Science (SAAAS). The primary aim of the Eugenics and Genetics Standing Committee was to 
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entrench what was already a practice that had taken shape in the US, the use of science to argue 
for racial hierarchies.  Danziger (1990) highlights that the growth of mental testing in the US was 
promoted by a search for individual differences. This search for individual differences was 
intertwined in the US and in South Africa with the issue of racial differences, which was 
conceptualised as eugenics. Worth mentioning here is that although racism predates the use of 
science to justify racial ordering, scientific racism becomes fundamental in the entrenchment of 
the subjugation of Black people (Louw, 1997c).  
Scientific racism took hold in South Africa almost simultaneously with its emergence in the US 
(Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). Scientific racism in South African psychology was spurred on by 
the need to justify the superiority of White lifeworlds over Black lifeworlds. Black (2003) explains 
that the eugenics movement in the US was composed primarily by the fields of biology, 
psychology, physiology, anthropology, and medicine. Richter and Dawes, in explaining the 
exclusionary and oppressive practices of psychology against Black children in South Africa, 
highlight that the “…eugenics movement found fertile ground in South Africa” (2008, p. 293).  
The eugenics movement developed and was able to flourish in South Africa primarily because 
legislated racial categorisation was a major part of South Africa’s social fabric. The eugenics 
movement was a way to additionally legitimise the oppression of Black people, as there was 
“scientific evidence” for the superiority of Whites. 
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Psychology played a significant role in the legislative marginalisation of Black people, as can be 
seen during the increase in standardised testing during the period after 1910. Seedat and 
MacKenzie (2008) highlight that the rise of gold mining resulted in increased competition for jobs. 
The “high rate” of poor Whites in that period meant that racist ideology for job reservations for 
semi-skilled and skilled jobs became important. The competition for jobs was also a major 
challenge given that this period also saw the beginning of the First World War and the competition 
for resources to fund the war endeavours became crucial. As Louw (1988) argues, the first and 
second world wars accelerated the rise of psychology in Europe, the US, and in South Africa – an 
“independent” colony of Britain at the time. Psychological testing measures were used to 
legitimise racist ideology to keep cheap Black labour in the service of capitalist industry. Fleisch 
(1995) argues that the NBESR was instrumental in influencing the legislation around schooling 
systems of both Black and White children. Coming on the back of the eugenics movement, both 
in SA and in western countries, the NBERS under Malherbe conducted several studies that were 
to influence the policy direction of the country, not only in that period but also for years to come. 
3.2.4 Institutionalising Psychology. Psychology was taught within Philosophy 
Departments until 1918 when it became a separate field of study (de la Rey, 2001). The 
development of psychology as an academic discipline first developed within the historically White 
Afrikaans-speaking universities – henceforth referred to as HWASU – and historically English-
speaking universities – henceforth referred to as HWESU (Foster, 2008). Stellenbosch University 
was the first to establish a Department of Psychology in 1918 (headed by R.W Wilcocks). The 
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University of Cape Town followed in 1920 (headed by Hugh Reyburn). At the University of 
Witwatersrand (Wits) a separate psychology department was established in the mid-1920s (headed 
by Ian Douglas MacCrone), with Rhodes University establishing a Psychology Department in 
1926 (headed by C. Morris Ramsey), and the University of Pretoria in 1929 (headed by Paul R. 
Skawran). The development of psychology departments indicates the relationship between the 
greater social, economic and political landscape in South Africa with psychology. The concern 
during the mid-19th century of elevating White South Africans to a standing above all other races, 
therefore creating universities and departments that would serve Whites, was an important part of 
that society. This is exemplified in the appointment of Verwoerd in 1927 at Stellenbosch 
University, and the focus on using psychological theory in the advancement of White Afrikaner 
communities (see Leach et al., 2003). Finally, the link to the development of psychology within 
HWASUs and HWESUs is about the increase in human capacity to serve the economic needs of 
the colonial capitalist structures, such as for instance within education and within industry.  
While what is now the University of Fort Hare was established much earlier as the Natives 
University, so- called ‘ethnic’ universities were established by The Extension of the Universities 
Act No. 45 of 1959 was a continuation of the apartheid policies that aimed at extending the infra-
humanising of Black people. The Extension of the Universities Act No. 45 of 1959 was preceded 
by a number of other acts of parliament that were aimed at entrenching segregationist policies. 
Two of these laws are pertinent in the ways in which they affected the country, the Bantu Education 
Act No. 47 of 1953 and the earliest of the Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950. These two acts served 
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as blueprints for the emergence of the Universities Act as the restriction of movements of people 
under the Group Areas Act impacted the education of Black people. The Universities Act, much 
like the Bantu Education Act, positioned Black people as deserving a lower quality education, and 
hence the creation of ethnic universities through this legislation. These ethnic universities where 
not inferior by virtue that they were majority Black, but that the state did not give them similar 
financial support and infrastructural development as was offered to historically white universities 
(HWUs). Ethnic universities such as the University of Zululand had limited resources available to 
them to conduct research and develop training curricula.  
Although psychology first developed in both HWASUs and HWESUs, there were tensions 
between these universities. The tension between a head of department of a HWASU and a head of 
department of a HWESU is indicative of the tensions that existed within psychology, and outside 
of psychology, between the English and the Afrikaners. Matthews (1959) argued that HWASUs 
could be classified generally as being “closed” as they did not permit access to Black people at 
any level, whilst HWESUs could be classified as “open” as they allowed Black people to access 
the universities only at a certain level. In the context of colonial and apartheid laws that prohibited 
racial mixing at all levels of society, HWASUs became strongholds for the Nationalist Party 
ideologies, whilst some HWESUs were “progressive” towards the inclusion of Black people 
(Bohmke & Tlali, 2008). The fact that HWASUs were “closed” and that HWESUs were “open” 
had an impact on exclusion and inclusion of people within psychology, both as practitioner and as 
client. Moreover, it is worth noting that although there could be a broad classification of HWUs 
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as either being “open” or “closed”, in general the nature of the research conducted in and by these 
universities can be described as exploitative, racist, and class-biased (Bulhan, 1993).  
The developmental trajectory of historically Black universities – hereto HBUs – in South Africa 
was different from that of HWUs for several reasons. The most important was that although the 
majority of the students were Black the universities were under the administration of Whites. 
According to Cooper and Nicholas (2012), the first Black university in South Africa was The South 
African Natives College (which later became University of Fort Hare), which was created in 1916. 
As with most issues affecting Black people under colonialism and apartheid, the education at 
HBUs was inferior to that of universities designated for Whites. The South African Natives 
College mostly directing its energies towards Christian-based education influenced by the 
missionaries that dominated South Africa at the time (de la Rey, 2001). The administration of The 
South African Natives College was under the University of South Africa (Unisa) whose 
responsibility was to oversee the examinations of the college (Cooper & Nicholas, 2012). The 
presence of White staff and administrators within Black universities continued until the end of 
apartheid. For instance, even when the University of Fort Hare became a “Bantustan” university 
(Bantustans were created under apartheid as ethnic enclaves that were still part of the apartheid 
state but were independent), most of the staff members were still White (de la Rey, 2001). 
However, Cooper and Nicholas (2012) note that all HBUs currently have psychology departments. 
102 
 
102 | P a g e  
 
Regarding the psychology departments of HBUs, little to no detail is available about the 
establishment of the psychology departments. In comparison to the history of the HWASUs and 
HWESUs, which appears in various publications (Foster, 2008; see Cooper, 2014), there appears 
to be a neglect with regards to the details of the early days of psychology departments at HBUs. 
As much as can be told about the evolution of psychology within HBUs is their relationship to the 
HWUs, and I would add how they acted as appendages to HWUs. For instance, the relationship 
between the early years of the University of the Western Cape (UWC) with the University of Cape 
Town (UCT), and with Stellenbosch University, with the latter university having some of their 
staff composition moved to UWC (Jeremy Davidson, personal communication).  
On the curriculum of HWASUs and HWESUs there are usually two traditions of psychology that 
can be discerned after 1948 at the postgraduate level. The curriculum influence at HWASUs came 
from their links with Dutch and German universities, and as such HWASUs mostly focused on the 
humanistic approach, which was aimed at understanding (White) people’s material conditions 
(Bohmke & Tlali, 2008). For HWESUs, the curriculum was mostly focused on the behavioural 
school of thought, which is the modification of behaviour, largely influenced by the US (Bohmke 
& Tlali, 2008). Interestingly the humanistic approach of the HWASUs did not lead to these 
universities being empathetic towards Black people who had suffered years of subjugation under 
colonial and apartheid states. Instead, like the universities in which they were based, psychology 
departments in HWASUs were part of the justification of segregationist policies and the 
subjugation of Black people.  
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The university was, and continues to be, an important context for the (re)production of racist 
ideology. The (re)production of racist ideology becomes clear in the relationships between figures 
such as Wilcocks, Verwoerd, and Adriaan J. la Grange; the universities were key in shaping 
apartheid political ideology. Whilst Wilcocks was the mentor of Verwoerd, la Grange was a 
protégé of Verwoerd and had a strong relationship with Wilcocks (Nicholas, 1990). La Grange 
would go on to be a rather influential figure in South African psychology from about the 1950s to 
the 1980s, especially in psychological organisations (Foster, 2008; Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). 
The relationships between supervisors and their students point to the importance of this 
relationship as shaping and reinforcing of ideology, an important consideration both as a point of 
historicising psychology and also of understanding present-day South African psychology. The 
pedagogical practices of all psychology departments, not just HWASUs psychology departments 
must be investigated. The teaching and learning practices which involve the curriculum, who is 
being taught, and who is involved in the teaching are important in the type of psychology practiced 
inside and disseminated beyond universities. 
3.2.5 Black-centric scholarship: The place of Chabani Noel Manganyi. This sub-
section focuses on Chabani Noel Manganyi and his place in South African psychology both 
historically and in contemporary enactments of the discipline. Relative to other figures in the 
historical evolution of psychology, Chabani Noel Manganyi occurs as a marginal figure. 
Manganyi’s marginal position is unsurprising in the general scheme of psychology. In a discipline 
wherein White, European, and US scholarship dominates the centre, Black scholars such as 
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Manganyi are relegated to the margins and this is often the case when their central focus is on the 
lifeworlds of Black people. 
Grahame Hayes (2016b) notes, however, that Manganyi is an important figure in South African 
psychology, albeit that he is under-appreciated. In comparison to other notable figures in 
psychology, such as Malherbe and Wilcocks, Manganyi is neither recognised nor influential. 
Malherbe can be considered influential in psychology as he was a leading figure in the 
development of psychometric tests for military, industry, and education (see Fleisch, 1995). 
Wilcocks is highly regarded in some quarters, such as at Stellenbosch University, where he has a 
building named after him which houses the psychology department. Manganyi’s relegation to the 
periphery of psychology is a both a function of the historical socio-political environment of 
apartheid and contemporary fascinations with Euroamerican knowledge (see Hayes, 2016a). 
Manganyi is widely recognised as the first African (sic) clinical psychologist in South Africa 
(Couve, 1986). He received his bachelor’s degree and his first post-graduate degree from the 
University of the North (now University of Limpopo) and the University of South Africa (Unisa) 
respectively (Manganyi, 2016). Manganyi would go on to study his Masters degree and training 
in clinical psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), an HWESU (Manganyi, 
2016. In a 2013 article that preceded the publishing of his auto-biography, Manganyi notes that 
when he was applying for the position of intern through Wits, “it was as if Africans were not 
expected to train as clinical psychologists!” (Manganyi, 2013, p. 280). Further, in the histography 
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of psychology, the fact that Manganyi studied at an HWESU is in line with the “open” status of 
these universities. However, trainee clinical psychologists from Wits would go to Tara Hospital 
for their internship training. The hospital was a designated Whites-only hospital under apartheid 
law. Manganyi as a Black person under the same law posed a significant challenge to the system 
because he was not allowed to complete his internship at Tara Hospital. Manganyi applied for an 
internship at Baragwanath Hospital (now known as Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital) (Manganyi, 
2013). He would go on to complete his internship and spend several years after his internship at 
Baragwaneth Hospital. Manganyi would go back to university in 1970 to complete his PhD in 
psychology, relating to body image, through Unisa (Manganyi, 2016). A further important part of 
his academic development was the time he spent at Yale University in the US between 1973 and 
1975, which became a crucial part of his development as a psychotherapist. 
Manganyi is particularly interesting because he was the only Black psychologist during the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s writing prolifically about Black people’s psychological experience under 
apartheid. Manganyi had started his academic writing career prior to obtaining his doctoral degree 
in 1969 (Manganyi, 2013). His intellectual career saw the publication of Being-Black-in-the-World 
(1973) which is now considered, within the critical psychology realm (see Foster, 2008; Painter & 
Blanche, 2004), as pioneering work on Black experiences. The book was an extension of his 
previous intellectual work in his doctoral thesis, which focused on the body in a racialised society. 
The centrality of the body in Manganyi’s work was, as he remarks, a preoccupation that was “…not 
morbid, but aris[ing] out of the recognition of the body’s central position in existence” (Manganyi, 
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1973, p. 6). Couve notes that Manganyi’s work, which included psycho-biographies such as 
Looking through the keyhole and Exile and Homecomings: a biography of Es’kia Mpahlele, was 
an attempt to “contexulise the discipline” (1986, p. 90). Manganyi wrote “about violence, about 
alienation, about racism, about the effects of oppression on the minds and bodies of black people” 
(Hayes, 2016a, p. 74). The writings on violence, racism and oppression are topics that are receiving 
much attention in contemporary South Africa, however problematic some the conceptualisations 
of these issues remain (see Stevens, 2003). 
The period of Manganyi’s writings coincided with those of other people who were critical and 
politically aware at the time. These writings occurred outside psychology, least of all the 
pioneering work of Steve Biko and others in the BCM (Biko, 1978/2004). Manganyi himself notes 
that his writing of the Black experiences and psychological theorisation was “intended as a 
contribution to the body of books and papers on the black experience” (Manganyi, 1973, p. 3). It 
was not only that he was writing at the same time as Biko and others but BCM influenced the 
writings of Manganyi, for which Manganyi pays tremendous attention in the second chapter of the 
book. Hayes (2016a) also contends that the Black Power movement in the US heavily influenced 
Manganyi’s work. However, as Couve (1986) notes, Manganyi’s work was a blend of psychology 
and politics, taking seriously the way the political system in South Africa at the time of his writings 
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Manganyi was writing in a time where speaking about issues of oppression and racism was 
sanctioned under various laws. The importance of Manganyi’s writing was that he was a lone voice 
within a discipline that misrecognised, to put it mildly, the experiences and lifeworlds of Black 
people through the (re)production of racist discourses. It is worth noting that because, during the 
apartheid years, there were laws that prohibited publication of material that was viewed by the 
state as in opposition to it. Following the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 
of 1950 most work, people, and organisations considered to be supporting communism were 
banned (Harvey, 1961). Steve Biko and many other like-minded people, including Saths Cooper 
(a psychologist), both leading exponents of the BCM, were either banned from public appearance 
or arrested. The banning and arrests of Biko and Cooper happened during or post publishing of 
Being-Black-In-The-World. Biko was subject to a banning order in 1973 whilst Saths Cooper, 
along with several others from the South African Students Organisation (SASSO), was arrested 
and tried for “terrorism” (sic). For Manganyi to risk any association with them would have placed 
him in danger of state sanctions through arrest or banning, even though in Being-Black-In-The-
World Manganyi has a chapter dedicated to Black Consciousness – no mention is made of Biko or 
Cooper. In psychology the work of James Garden Taylor, who was a UCT based psychologist in 
the 1950s and 1960s, had a Marxist orientation and construed by the apartheid government to be 
promoting communism therefore leading to its banning (see Foster, 2008). As Foster (2008) notes, 
the writings by Taylor, which included ‘How black sees white’ and The “inferiority” of women, 
all of which were published before the promulgation of the Act in 1950, were subsequently banned. 
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In 1976, Manganyi helped establish the first psychology department at the University of the 
Transkei (now part of Walter Sisulu University), an HBU (Hayes, 2016a). Manganyi became the 
first head of department of the newly establish psychology department and later dean of the faculty 
(Manganyi, 2013). Manganyi held the deanship position until 1980 when he left the position due 
to the apartheid and Transkei governments becoming increasingly oppressive (Manganyi, 2016). 
During his tenure at University of Transkei, Manganyi continued to write, publishing Alienation 
and the body in racist society: A study of the society that invented Soweto in 1977. Manganyi’s 
continued writing whilst being at the forefront of developing the discipline at an HBU indicates 
the importance that should be afforded to him. As indicated earlier in this thesis, little is known 
about how psychology was taken up within HBUs including the University of the Transkei. 
However, what is known is that Manganyi, through his own writing and continuous engagement, 
has illuminated some of the complexities and difficulties of establishing the first department at 
what was a Blacks-only (ethnic) university (see Manganyi, 2016). 
To speak of Manganyi as influential would be ahistorical in the sense that his work was, and 
continues to be, relegated to the margins of psychology. Hayes (2016a) notes that with all the 
academic hurdles put in front of him, and acts of absolute bravery for which he had to engage in 
during apartheid, Manganyi is still in the margins of South African psychology. I would add that 
there is an entire generation of psychology practitioners, researchers, teachers, and students who 
are unaware of Manganyi. The place of Manganyi in South African psychology, as should be 
extended to all Black lifeworlds, should be at the centre of epistemic developments. Least of all 
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that Manganyi’s work was one of the first attempts within psychology to destabilise the hegemonic 
dominance of White-centric epistemologies that subjugated Black people. 
In the period between the 1950s and the late 1970s there were a limited number of voices within 
psychology that spoke against the dominant discourses. This lack of a larger chorus of voices 
speaking against the dominant racist discursive practices can also be attributed to the fact that most 
psychologists considered the discipline to be neutral in its application, research and even its 
teaching – in short psychology was believed to be neutral because it was a science (Seedat & 
McKenzie, 2008). One of the most prominent amongst the “scientific neutralists” during apartheid 
was Simon Biesheuvel, who contended that psychology was not in the service of oppression but 
rather investigated psychological phenomena in a value neutral manner (see Seedat, 1998). It is 
difficult to justify that psychology was neutral in any manner given its early days in South Africa 
because mental testing was used in the justification of racial hierarchy. It is even more difficult to 
assert value neutrality when one considers the work of Simon Biesheuvel. To this end one can note 
the interpretive repertoires used by Biesheuvel (1957, p. 309): 
At the other end, there is an increasing number of urbanized African professional and 
business men whose habits and personality make-up render them indistinguishable from 
their white colleagues, though a more intimate study might reveal both remnants of their 
traditional culture and an outlook and motivation coloured by their position in a multi-
racial society which imposes differential restrictions on its members. Between these two 
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extremes one finds all stages of transition from a primitive culture (sic) to Western 
civilization. 
This extract indicates a clear value position on the part of Biesheuvel. The idea of a “primitive 
culture” indicates that for Biesheuvel (1957) people of African descent, and most likely even for 
those of South Africa’s Coloured and Indian population, their cultural lifeworlds were backward 
and barbaric. Many scholars have shown that scientific neutrality is often a way in which many 
social sciences have tended to maintain existing social order of oppression (Danziger, 1990; 
Seedat, 1998). Further, scientific neutrality has many of the same arguments inherent in the late 
19th century eugenics movement in South Africa, Europe, and the US. In a sense scientific 
neutrality often ignores the many ways which social conditions often produce many of the 
challenges that are faced by Black people in South Africa, and the world. Scientific neutralists 
much like “eugenists” ignored social conditions and would often maintain a deficiency in culture 
and/or in biology. 
Psychology’s legitimisation was to be seen through the work it was doing within industry, the 
military, and towards the work done to and for White communities. Psychology had been 
fundamental in the World War II efforts as standardised testing for selection of military personnel 
in distinct roles was heavily used (Danziger, 1990, 2006; Louw, 1988). Although most psychology 
departments had been established some twenty years prior to the National Party taking power, 
there was a larger growth in psychology at the end of the war. Evidentially, psychology was crucial 
111 
 
111 | P a g e  
 
in the reinforcement of racist ideology; foundational to this was psychology’s relationship to 
Europe and the US. It is in this sense important to broaden the conception of Euroamerica to 
include the colonisation and apartheid era conceptions of psychology that dehumanised and 
decontextualised Black people’s lifeworlds, and by extension a sizable portion of Africa.  
3.2.6 Critical voices within psychology. The current section focuses on the critical voices 
within psychology, particularly around what can be referred to as late-apartheid (1980-1993), 
which began to indicate the problematic ways that psychology was practiced, theorised, and taught 
in South Africa. In this section the aim is to highlight the ways that the political environment 
shapes and is shaped by activities within psychology. The period between 1980 to 1993 was 
marked by a declaration of state of emergency in South Africa, with increasing state violence in 
and around mostly Black townships (see Swartz, Dowdall & Swartz, 1986). This state of 
emergency also saw an increasing number of psychologists begin to question the practices of 
psychology for the broader society – not just those racialised as White. 
The discursive practices of psychologists towards a more inclusive and progressive psychology 
was in contradiction to the dominant discursive practices of exclusion, subjugation, and scientific 
neutrality. I argue that psychology has never been without value-laden judgment, with the early 
days being marred by racist and sexist values which reflected the times in South African history. 
This is not to say that there has been a “history of overcoming” in psychology where issues of 
racism and sexism have been eradicated. Psychology has remained relatively stable over time, with 
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some progress being made through feminist discourses, decolonial theory, Africanisation and other 
such registers. I argue that although the development of criticality within psychology was 
influenced by the socio-political climate, the evolution of critical psychology did not necessarily 
eradicate the problematic conceptions of race, class, and gender (Long, 2016a; see Macleod, 2004). 
However, it is necessary that I highlight in this section the developmental trajectory (and lack 
thereof) of current psychological practices, particularly the rise of critical psychology voices. 
Further issues of multiculturalism and the emergence of the so-called relevance debate are engaged 
with in the current section as they have a significant barring on the current practices within 
psychology. Finally, worth noting is that I argue later in the chapter on democracy that positionings 
of multiculturalism and relevance are necessary but not sufficient to address the complex 
challenges faced by psychology at all levels and at training level. 
According to Foster (2008, p. 94), critical psychology can be understood in two ways: 
First it is critical of the field of psychology itself-its theories, assumptions, methods, 
techniques, practices and research problems. In this regard it targets two main problems of 
mainstream psychology: The ontological issue of ‘self-contained individualism’…and the 
epistemological issue of positivism-empiricism. Second, it is critical in a dedication to 
large-scale political projects, a concern with social transformation, justice, human rights 
and welfare; it proposes values which are direct towards human betterment, helping those 
denied a voice, those with little power. 
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The arguments raised by Foster become foundational in the way critical psychology was shaped 
during late apartheid, as some psychologists became disgruntled with the role and function of 
psychology in South Africa. I maintain that it is in the understanding of both the theoretical 
foundations and the manner that psychology is deployed within the larger social context that 
influences to a considerable extent the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. During 
late-apartheid the country experienced an intensified period of anti-apartheid activism, with 
increasing pressure from countries in the west issuing economic sanctions on South Africa to 
reverse apartheid policies (Cross, 1999). 
3.2.6.1 Psychology in Society. It was during the late apartheid period that the issue of 
relevance began to emerge, which has become a topical issue within psychology (see Long, 2013, 
2017; Macleod, 2004). I extensively discuss the issue of relevance in psychology in the next 
chapter that deals with the professional context of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
However, the relevance debate and the other critical traditions in South African psychology found 
a home in 1983 in the journal Psychology in Society (PINS) (Foster, 2008). The establishment of 
PINS was largely a reaction against the mainstream psychology, including the South African 
Journal of Psychology (SAJP). Although I do not wish to go into the history of SAJP, it is worth 
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The PINS journal’s main aim was “to critically explore and present ideas on the nature of 
psychology in capitalist society. There is a special emphasis on the theory and practice of 
psychology in the South African context” (PINS, 1983). Explicit alignment of critical traditions 
focusing on the theory and practice of psychology marked an important departure for South 
African psychology, which previously was conformist. Additionally, there was little dynamism in 
how South African psychology imagined its theoretical conceptions, and the practice of the 
discipline other than the focus on which European or US schools of thought it aligned too (see 
Bohmke & Tlali, 2008). For the editors of PINS this dynamism could be located in “the extremely 
complex relationship of the individual to society [which] remains unquestioned and unexamined 
by either therapist or client” (PINS Editorial, 1983, p. 1). 
PINS covered a variety of issues between 1983 and 1993, corresponding in many ways to the 
issues that were affecting the larger society. Although the early writings appear to be dominated 
by White psychologists, this domination can be attributed to the limited number of Black 
psychologists in the discipline at the time. The topics covered by the journal spanned; psychology’s 
utility in industry, African philosophy, and the issue of mental testing. PINS remained critical of 
psychological practice and engaging in debate about the future directions of the discipline. For 
instance, in discussions about future directions of the discipline a vibrant debate ensued about the 
role and place of African philosophy (see Cross, 1985; also see Hountondji, 1985). 
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PINS was, and remains, an important part of the psychology landscape. Grahame Hayes (2014), 
the founder of PINS, notes in the Special Issue celebrating the journal’s 30th anniversary that 
keeping a journal such as PINS for 30 years is a remarkable endeavour. It is, however, worth 
mentioning that much like Manganyi, PINS remains important to those who are committed to 
liberating psychology from its colonial shackles. Although in the greater history of psychology, 
PINS is a crucial component, it is important to keep in mind that “[t]he politics and economics of 
journal publishing are not friends of independent and radical ideas…” (Hayes, 2014, p. 1). 
3.2.6.2 Against Euroamerican-centrism. The problems recognised in critical psychology 
meant that critical psychology was poised to play a significant role in a period where liberation 
discussions had reached its peak. Seedat (1998) argues that critical psychology is a broad umbrella 
term that encompasses many facets of work that is liberatory from the research, teaching, and 
practices of mainstreamed psychology. Mainstreamed psychology is entrenched in exclusionary 
and oppressive Euroamerican-centric discursive practices. Issues of power and psychological 
knowledge are therefore inherent in the way critical psychology is positioned arguing that 
mainstreamed psychology is mainly about the maintenance of power for certain groups (White) 
through the oppression of other groups (Blacks) (Hook, 2004). In this sense, some psychologists 
during late-apartheid began to engage with how psychology had applicability to communities that 
were outside the dominant purview of psychology (Seedat, Cloete, & Shochet, 1988). Whilst 
others such as Anonymous (1986) argued that psychology needed to be indigenised to fit better 
with the realities of those who have been marginalised in and by psychology, whilst others such 
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as Dawes (1986) began to speak about the issue of how the relevance of psychology needs to deal 
with the issues affecting all South Africans, not just Whites. 
It is first worth engaging with the ideas around indigenisation as they relate fundamentally to a 
theoretical orientation that purports to focus on Black people as marginalised by Euroamerican 
mainstreamed psychology. The focus on indigenisation in South Africa came at the back of the 
focus on culture, which was used to legitimise and delegitimise people (Anonymous, 1986). Those 
that believed that the problem with psychology rested within the Euroamerican cultural tradition 
(Dawes, 1985) contested the cultural appropriateness of psychological services and theorisation. 
The challenges of Euroamericanised mainstreamed psychology means that the hegemonic theories 
that are developed in Europe and the US prioritise White lifeworlds. In this sense, indigenisation 
was key in thinking about the excluded population groups, specifically women and/or Black 
working-class, and poor people (Seedat, 1998). 
3.3 Community Psychology as an alternative form of practice 
3.3.1 Evolution of Community Psychology. The period of late apartheid saw the 
emergence of Community Psychology in South Africa both as a theoretical conception and in 
practice. In the mid-1980s the marginalisation of Black and working-class peoples in 
psychological theory and practice, particularly relating to the monumental effects of apartheid, led 
to some progressive psychologists in South Africa looking for alternatives to better intervene in 
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Black lives. One such intervention can be seen in the work of Seedat, Cloete, and Shochet (1988) 
who published Community Psychology: Panic or Panacea (1988) which was the first published 
record of an engagement in South Africa with Community Psychology. It is worth noting that 
Community Psychology as a practice in marginalised communities may have existed prior to this 
publication, however the framing of this kind of practice as Community Psychology in South 
Africa is found first in this publication. 
The development of Community Psychology in South Africa can be contrasted with the 
development of Community Psychology in the US, particularly the Swampscott Conference in 
1965. The focus of Community Psychology in the US has largely been argued to be apolitical, and 
in the service of dominant ideology, specifically due to its use of the community health model 
which relies on the individualised models of mainstreamed psychology (see Gokani & Walsh, 
2017). In South Africa Community Psychology focused on the marginalised and oppressed, 
marking its roots in South Africa with a critical and liberatory stance, in much the same way that 
it had in other places in the Global South (see Yen, 2008). According to Mohamed Seedat “[i]n 
situations of social oppression, the cultural, ideological and epistemological incongruence inherent 
in [Euroamerican-centric] psychology often creates a sense of crisis, alienation and 
disempowerment for progressive psychologists and students of psychology” (1997, p. 261). It was 
this sense of alienation that caused some to begin to break the boundaries of mainstreamed 
individual psychological practice. 
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It is in the individualistic tradition that the major Euroamerican theories dominate psychology in 
South Africa.  These include psychoanalytic conceptualisations with its various developments such 
as Melanie Klein’s work in Psychodynamic Theory (see Lemma, 2008), extending to the work of 
Aaron Beck in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (see Westbrook, Kennerley, & Kirk, 2011) 
who argue for the modification of either cognition or behaviour or some variation of both. The 
search for individual subjectivity in psychology leads to the separation of the individual from their 
environment, which means that “both the causes and cures of contemporary society are reduced to 
the realm of the individual” (Jacoby, 1975, p. 68). This renders Community Psychology as existing 
in the Global South as a radical mode of engagement in psychological work, as there is a shift from 
couching the individual as central to rather considering social conditions as the centre of pathology 
and health. Those individuals exist as part of smaller and larger social systems that continuously 
act against and for the individual’s pathology and health (Pillay, 2003). As such the introduction 
of Community Psychology in South Africa was linked with the political climate of anti-apartheid 
activism as apartheid was seen to be a major factor to the psychological wellbeing of the oppressed 
majority (Seedat & Lazarus, 2011). It was through the framework of theorising from the margins 
that Community Psychology was able to establish itself as a viable alternative to the narrow 
tradition of mainstreamed individually focused psychology. 
I contend that Community Psychology is best thought of as straddling in dynamic and in non-linear 
ways between the use of traditional individualistic psychology and social system focus. The 
conceptualisation of Community Psychology as radically shifting from the individual to societal 
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ills is not without contention amongst scholars in the field, although beyond the scope of the 
current section it is worth engaging briefly with this issue. According to Yen (2008), Community 
Psychology is not a unitary field of study with agreement on what it is that it focuses on. Some 
argue that conservatively Community Psychology still focuses on the individual, however, it pays 
more attention to the social when compared to “traditional” psychology (Coimbra, Fryer, Menezes, 
& Seedat, 2012). Others such as Ngonyama Ka Sigogo and Modipa (2004) understand Community 
Psychology as possessing wide ranging strategies through which intervention occurs, including 
activist interventions directed at societal political and economic power structures. David Fryer and 
Adele Laing highlight the complexity of Community Psychology by problematising the notion of 
attempting to reach an answer to the question, What is community psychology? Instead they offer 
that “…it is clear that there are diverse community psychologies and clear that different community 
psychologies, like other social phenomena, are products of the time, place and conditions of their 
construction” (Fryer & Laing, 2008, p. 8). 
Further, if we accept that Community Psychology exists as a plethora of community psychologies, 
it can be argued that Community Psychology existed in South Africa prior to the late apartheid 
period. For instance, Wilcocks (1932), in the Carnegie Report, noted that for the poor White it was 
the social conditions that rendered them unable to progress in increasingly industrialised South 
Africa rather than mental inefficiency. Stated more clearly, Wilcocks subscribed to the same 
assumptions of Community Psychology that if social conditions were to be addressed the poor 
White would be better able to advance in society. A focus on social conditions for many 
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psychologists in South Africa at that time was only the preserve of the White population, because 
to be White was to possess an inherent superiority that could only be curtailed by social conditions. 
However, Black people’s social conditions created by the political conditions of the country where 
not afforded to similar standing as the challenges faced by Black people were viewed as being 
because of genetic inefficiencies. In contrast to a pathologising Community Psychology of early 
White psychologists, Community Psychologists in late apartheid, along with other critical 
psychologists, placed at the centre of Black suffering the conditions in which they lived, both at 
the political level and at the social level, with issues of liberation being central. As such 
Community Psychologists in late apartheid argued for the (re)humanisation of Black people by 
attempting to engage with marginalised communities (see Lazarus, 1988). 
3.3.2 Community Psychology in the democratic era. Although I hold that Community 
Psychology is ostensibly linked with the issues of relevance and multiculturalism (which I will 
cover in more detail later) I discuss contemporary enactments of community psychology here as a 
way to show the evolution of Community Psychology. The period under scrutiny here is from 1994 
to the present day. Analysing contemporary enactments of any discipline or subdiscipline presents 
itself with many challenges, least of which the continuous changes that affect the structure of the 
discipline, including debates on the scope of practice (which I deal with later). 
According to Carolissen, Rohleder, Bozalek, Swartz, and Liebowitz (2010), since the ushering in 
of democracy Community Psychology has established itself as a sub-discipline of psychology in 
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South Africa. Community Psychology is privileged in the current thesis, more than other sub-
disciplines such as for instance Social Psychology, particularly for its relationship with resistances 
within psychology. This section on contemporary enactments of Community Psychology engages 
with how the development of Community Psychology within a critical psychology tradition is 
instrumental in how it is positioned in the training of psychologists. I further add that community 
psychology has, unlike when it began and for many years after, become part of the mainstream 
and how this mainstreaming has shifted the understandings of what community psychology is able 
to do. 
Community Psychology established itself as an alternative and/or addition to “mainstream” 
psychology, in that it took political and activist roles of psychologists as an important part of 
psychological practice (Yen, 2008). As such, at the start of the current millennium, Community 
Psychology was being taught at universities at both undergraduate levels, and most importantly 
for the current thesis, at professional training sites (de la Rey & Ipser, 2004). In 2001 the first 
South African community psychology textbook was published, Community Psychology: Theory, 
Method and Practice, South African and Other Perspectives by Mohammed Seedat, Norman 
Duncan and Sandy Lazarus. The publication of this book is an important development in 
establishing the mainstreaming of community psychology. 
Community Psychology in democratic South Africa focused on equipping students with a focus 
that goes beyond the normative one-to-one therapeutic encounter and shifting the focus on the 
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social conditions of previously marginalised communities (Ngonyama ka Sigogo & Modipa, 
2004). The focus on Black marginalised communities by Community Psychology falls in line with 
the democratic government’s aim of redress of past injustices (see Letsekha, 2013). The benefits 
of the mainstreaming, the acceptance of Community Psychology as a viable alternative to 
Euroamerican-centric mainstreamed psychology, meant that Community Psychology could enjoy 
the benefits of funding resources and can reach a far greater cohort of trainee psychologists (Seedat 
& Lazarus, 2011; Yen, 2008). 
The mere introduction of Community Psychology is necessary but not sufficient to instigate the 
change in the practice of psychology (Yen, 2008). Community Psychology is necessary in so far 
as it can diversify a greater scope for psychological research, theory, and practice, however, it is 
limited in that it has become trapped within the narrow frame of Euroamerica. Ngonyama ka 
Sigogo and Modipa (2004) highlight that community psychology often must contend with the 
hegemonic dominance of Euroamerican structures within universities. Yen (2008) notes that in 
counselling psychology there are challenges with students often falling back on the individualistic 
psychology interventions during community-oriented interventions. The mainstreaming of 
Community Psychology is often co-opted by the Euroamerican-centric hegemonic epistemologies 
meaning that students and lectures alike often cannot move beyond individualistic psychology. 
Although Community Psychology has been an essential part of psychology in South Africa it 
appears to have not made the necessary inroads towards a radically different discipline. South 
African psychology, as indicated earlier, has remained largely Euroamerican-centric and continues 
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to treat Black lifeworlds as the pathological “Other”. It is maintained here that to address the issues 
facing psychology – that of the inadequate representation of Black people at the professional level 
and the Euroamerican-centric pedagogical practices in professional training – psychology needs 
to go beyond current conceptions of community psychology (see Ratele, Cornell, Dlamini, 
Helman, Malherbe, & Titi, 2018). 
It is important to note that hegemonic power structures maintain themselves by mainstreaming 
parts of radical movements. Although Community Psychology is being taught at various levels of 
psychology, according to Yen (2008), Community Psychology still holds a marginal role within 
curricula. Moreover, hegemonic power structures often engage in ideological recuperation. Simply 
hegemonic structures maintain power through the recuperation of radical ideology and often 
neuters radical movements. Ahmed and Pillay (2004) noted that the challenge for Community 
Psychology within clinical psychology training programmes is that the programmes are often 
viewed as already covering the necessary basis for psychological practise. It is in this 
understanding of the “theoretical and practical richness” of training that is primarily based on the 
individualistic, Euroamerican-centric conceptions of psychology that maintains Euroamerican 
power structures. 
Worth reiterating here is the congratulatory tone surrounding international standards as the 
benchmark for the state of psychology in South Africa (see Young, 2013), which often acts as a 
silencer of local realities. Seedat and Lazarus (2011) argue that Community Psychology, although 
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holding a radical and critical stance of the problematic ways in which psychology in South Africa 
operates in and outside the academy, African voices within global Community Psychology have 
largely been on the margins. It is to this end an important consideration that Community 
Psychology is often within South African psychology offered a small portion of the training of 
psychologists to retain vital Euroamerican-centric structures of power. It is imperative that 
(community) psychology training and practice in present day South Africa engage in a reflective 
process that highlights such issues, as noted by Fryer and Laing (2008); as what is (community) 
psychology? and who has the authority to construct (community) psychology? The co-option of 
parts of Community Psychology into the dominant Euroamerican power structures may lead to the 
“community mental health” approach which is the dominant model of Community Psychology in 
the US which does not prioritise issues of social justice and (re)distribution of resources (Yen, 
2008; Gokani & Walsh, 2017). 
Anthony L. Pillay, Rashid Ahmed and Umesh Bawa argue that there is a danger in creating “a tale 
of two psychologies, a psychology serving the rich (traditional individual psychology) and a 
critical-community psychology for the poor” (2013, p. 54). Carolissen et al. (2010) maintain that 
the issue of having two psychologies is often the issue of the race and class conjecture in South 
African society, largely due to the colonial and apartheid legacies. “Community” is therefore 
positioned as the Black, poor, and working classes in South African psychology, at professional 
training level (see also Ngonyama ka Sigogo & Modipa, 2004). The creation of the binary of 
mainstream psychology that focuses on the White, middle classes, with the Community 
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Psychology which is concerned with the livelihood of those who were previously marginalised 
reinforcing the form of othering that is foundational to psychology. The tale of two psychologies 
is a tale of the centre remaining the same in both past and present conceptualisations of the 
discipline, whilst giving the cosmetic appearance of change. As Ahmed and Pillay (2004) note, 
while most training programmes in South Africa have added Community Psychology, this has not 
led to a fundamental shift in the orientation of the training psychologists which is steeped within 
the Euroamerican-centric traditions. 
3.4 Psychology organisations 
The case of the psychology organisations shows how apartheid was not merely a state enforced 
system but was in effect supported by individuals within the psychology who believed in the 
inferiority of Black people. There were beliefs amongst some psychologists that the sharing of 
platforms with Black people would compromise psychological organisations (Nicholas, 1990). 
This section is intended to elucidate the continuous exclusion and marginalisation of Black people 
within psychology. It further shows that exclusion does not only exist as an ideological, sometimes 
covert, mechanism in psychological theory and research. Rather that there were figures within 
psychology who pursued a White-centric psychology. Taken together with the sub-section on 
Manganyi, there is a clear picture that emerges about the upholding of racists beliefs within 
psychology. Additionally, I will show how even when the discipline through its organisations 
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attempted to correct its racist past, this was driven by self-preservation rather than an engagement 
with issues affecting the country. 
At the point of inception for South African Psychological Association (SAPA) in 1948 the 
membership was not exclusive to Whites (Nicholas, 1990). However, it should be noted that the 
political dynamics in the country meant that no Black person was involved as practitioner in the 
field of psychology. When Black people did enter the field of psychology the fact that SAPA did 
not bar Black membership became a point of contestation. In 1957, a Black woman psychologist 
– Ms Josephine Naidoo – attempted to join SAPA but was met with resistance from members 
within the organisation. Whilst some of SAPA’s members felt she should be allowed membership, 
others were in opposition to the inclusion of Black people as members. Those members of SAPA 
who opposed the membership of Black psychologists included A. J. la Grange (Cooper & 
Nicholas, 2012). 
The issue of whether to allow a Black women membership into SAPA deserves attention, 
particularly as it relates to the current low participation rates of Black people in psychology. Lionel 
Nicholas contends that “[t]his mythical overwhelming black membership has remained an 
omnipresent figment of white South African psychologists’ imagination” (2001, p. 22). Gordon 
(2012) argues that for most Black people in anti-Black societies they suffer from the paradox of 
hypervisibility even as they are rendered invisible, this paradox Gordon terms illicit appearance. 
The request by Josephine Naidoo to gain membership into SAPA was illicit appearance in that her 
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request evoked an anxiety amongst White psychologists of being overwhelmed numerically by 
Black people, although the request came from one Black person (see Nicholas, 2001). This anxiety 
of the appearance of one Black person possibly leading to an overwhelming number of Black 
people entering “White spaces” can be seen in the remarks made by A. J. La Grange that it was 
obvious that SAPA was for White psychologists and that the White psychologists would be 
outnumbered by Black psychologists (Nicholas, 1990). 
To appear as a Black person in an anti-Black world is experienced as violent to the dominant 
hegemonic order of White superiority. The invisibility of Black people in an anti-Black world is 
viewed as just and, therefore, the appearance of one Black person is an injustice to the system 
(Gordon, 2017). Hypervisibility is the result of normative practice of Black invisibility. Further, 
this illicit appearance is not withstanding the fact that most psychologists during the apartheid era 
were White and most Black people could not gain access to training institutions. It is also possible 
to see how hypervisibility is also a form of invisibility, in the sense that when a Black person 
appears as a representative of many, she fails to be an individual with a set of skills. However, it 
is worth mentioning here, and is extensively dealt with in later chapters, that there is a paradoxical 
effect in individuality in a “transforming” society such as present-day South Africa. 
In 1962, La Grange, along with other members of SAPA, started the Psychological Institute of the 
Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), which was exclusively formed for White psychologists (Seedat 
& Mackenzie, 2008). Whilst PIRSA made it clear that its organisation was only for Whites, SAPA 
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remained rather ambivalent about the reasons for allowing Black membership. Nicholas 
comments, “…the admission of [B]lacks centred around avoiding censure from the international 
community, maintaining standards for all psychologists, and promoting unity and the study of 
psychology by [B]lacks rather than defeating unjust apartheid laws” (1990, p. 59). There were 
inherent contradictions in the protest from those psychologists who felt that SAPA should be 
exclusively White. First of these contradictions is that Black people could train and become 
psychologists in South Africa, however, Black psychologists were not considered good enough to 
be amongst White psychologist. Secondly, although there were some who remained in SAPA after 
the breakaway had occurred, the reasons to remain in the organisation was linked with self-
preservation – censure from the international community. 
The existence of two separate psychological organisations came to an end in 1983. SAPA and 
PIRSA would merge in 1983 to form the Psychology Association of South Africa (PASA) (Long, 
2016a). The formation of PASA was not incidental as the academic boycott of South Africa, 
economic sanctions by countries in Europe and the US weighed heavily on these organisations to 
denounce the apartheid laws (Nicholas, 2014). Due to member composition of SAPA, PASA was 
comprised of Black members. However, Cooper and Nicholas (2012) argue that the formation of 
PASA did not necessarily result in the change of the discipline, as this new organisation was still 
largely White, Afrikaner, male dominated. 
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Another organisation that coincided with the establishment of PASA was the Organisation for 
Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSSA) in 1983, brought together by a variety of 
mental health workers who were concerned about the mental health issues brought on by the 
increasing brutality of the apartheid system (Foster, 2008; Seedat & Lazarus, 2011; Yen, 2008). 
OASSSA was established apart from the psychologist’s organisation PASA. Concerns about the 
pressure from the west had reached its peak during the late apartheid period, which meant that 
psychologists, particularly White psychologists, needed to act in ways that would appease the 
international community so as not to lose established relationships (Cooper & Nicholas, 2012; 
Nicholas, 2014). However, OASSA’s formation over a decade after the split of PIRSA from SAPA 
indicates the slow pace through which those within psychology moved to attempt to eradicate 
issues of racial marginalisation within the field. As mentioned earlier, psychologists during and up 
to late apartheid maintained that psychology is not a political field, whilst at the same time acting 
in alignment with and in the maintenance of the dominant hegemonic power relations. The move 
to establish OASSSA can be seen to the effect that many within psychology could not pretend that 
psychological services were being applied democratically, as ironically the constitution of PIRSA 
had argued (see Nicholas, 1990). 
Important to note here is the establishment of the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA) 
in 1994 with the ushering in of democracy. Although not falling within the period 1980 to 1993, 
PsySSA is an integral part of contemporary psychology’s landscape in South Africa.  Cooper and  
Nicholas (2012) note that PsySSA was established as a “non-racial” organisation, a clear indication 
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of the alignment of PsySSA with the democratic South African government. PsySSA’s explicit 
non-racialism stance was important to unite South African psychologists under one organisation 
and move on from the past complacency of psychology with oppressive colonial and apartheid 
regimes (Cooper, 2014). PsySSA further took on the publishing of the South African Journal of 
Psychology (SAJP), which was published by PASA from 1983, and prior to that by SAPA and 
PIRSA jointly from 1970 (Cooper & Nicholas, 2012). 
PsySSA’s role in South African psychology appears to be a difficult one with the plurality of 
voices to which it attempts to amplify. These voices include women, gender and sexual minorities, 
and Black people. PsySSA has created several sub-divisions, including the African Psychology 
Forum, and the Gender and Sexualities Division, to allow a space for marginalised groups to 
discuss pertinent issues (PsySSA, 2018). Notwithstanding these attempts by PsySSA, the 
organisation has often been a place for many heated discussions about the role of psychology in 
South Africa. Long (2013) notes how the contestations about the discipline’s failure to broaden its 
reach to poor, often Black, communities were put by the former president of PsySSA, Emmanuel 
Tlou, in contra-distinction with the issues of the scope of practice. Tlou argued that psychologists 
appeared to be far more concerned about the less than 20% of the country’s population who can 
access psychological services rather than how the discipline has failed to attend to the rest of the 
population (Long, 2013). Later, I engage with the issues of the scope of practice for psychologists 
as it pertains to the training, highlighting the very issue raised by Tlou more than a decade ago as 
an important part of the fabric of South African psychology. 
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Returning to the late apartheid period, two issues become pertinent. The first is that the need to 
maintain professional relationships with Europe and the US, which had proved lucrative in the past 
– for instance the Carnegie Study, became the main driver for some psychologists to react in more 
humane ways towards Black people. The second is that psychology does not seem to have 
reconciled with its anti-Black racist foundation. However, the work that was conducted by a few 
psychologists in this period has had a lasting impact on the South African psychology landscape, 
particularly the critical nature in which debates about apartheid and state sanctioned violence 
against Black people. Community Psychology was a prominent marker of the late apartheid period 
with its initiators primarily being Black psychologists, indicates the racialised way psychological 
practice was constructed. It is clear from this period, and the period preceding formal apartheid, 
that psychology perpetuated racist ideology, and it too was in turn affected by racist dogma. To 
return to the idea of “overcoming” introduced at the beginning of this section, psychology did not 
overcome its anti-Black racism during late apartheid. What is noticeable is that racist dogma co-
existed with the progressive ideology that aimed to include the marginalised communities as a 
focal point of psychological services. The negotiations that took place before the formation of 
PsySSA in 1994 exemplify the co-existence of racist ideology and the progressive ideology. 
3.5 Psychology as a multicultural discipline: The challenges of democracy 
Letsekha (2013) argues that the transformation agenda in South African higher education post-
1994 was aligned with the principles and philosophies outlined in the South African constitution. 
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The argument in the current section is that psychology in post-apartheid South Africa has reflected 
the larger societal values of multiculturalism and diversity, non-racialism, equality and equity, 
however, progress has been rather slower and, in some instances, almost non-existent. As such the 
current section focuses on what have been some of the developments in South African psychology 
that have occurred since 1994, whilst problematising the way psychology has operated as 
insufficient to fully engage with the challenges facing the discipline. The focus falls here on two 
interconnected concepts that have formed an important part of psychological practice and teaching 
since 1994, specifically the notion of relevance, and multiculturalism/diversity. 
Danziger (1990) illustrates how psychology around the world is hegemonically Euroamerican, in 
that it carries constructions of what it means to be human that are based on European and US 
lifeworlds. In the previous sections of this chapter the focus was largely on the racist nature of 
psychological practice in South Africa, and how these practices are linked intrinsically with how 
psychology was positioned within the larger socio-political context. Additionally, in the previous 
sections, particularly in the latter section, to indicate how there were forms of resistances to this 
conceptualisation of what psychology ought to do in practice and theory. The resistances to 
Euroamerican-centric, individualistic, dis-embodied psychology indicates that there should exist a 
different kind of psychology in democratic South Africa that does not privilege Euroamerica. 
However, what has become clearer is that psychology has continued to be Euroamerican-centric 
both in practice and in theory (see Macleod, 2004). 
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3.5.1 Multiculturalism. Towards understanding multiculturalism, it is perhaps apt that 
there is an understanding of what is meant by culture. Malherbe (2019, pp. 2-3) contends that 
“culture constitutes a social group’s values, beliefs, practices, meanings, and norms — all of which 
signify ever-shifting and contextually bound processes and products that organize people’s lives 
in relation to one another”. Gill Eagle (2005) notes that the term culture is often used in several 
different and contested ways that are often wrought with confusion, particularly in psychology 
Masters training courses. These confusions may be as a result of the historical context through 
which the term culture in psychology, and in general South African society, has come to hold 
particular – unchallenged – meanings. What is important in these contestations is that, often, 
culture is used as a euphemism for Black people. The use of culture as a marker for Black people 
has a historical foundation, as Swartz (2008) notes, race being predated in colonial times by the 
term culture. When historised the term culture then has an inflection linked very much towards the 
labelling of Black people’s lives as cultural, thus primitive, whilst making invisible the hegemonic 
cultural norms of Europe and the US. Moreover, Long notes that often psychology is fascinated 
with the “black box [of] culture” (2016c, p. 2) without looking at other factors that may play a 
significant role in the failures of the discipline, including class, racialisation, and gender. This 
facisination is recognised by Malherbe (2019, p. 2) as the attempt by psychology “[prioritize] an 
essentializing approach that understands culture as a kind of adjunctive that is to be conquered, 
managed, and/or comprehensively outlined.” 
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Emma Johnston defines multiculturalism as “a situation in society where diversity is widely 
accepted and valued, by all ethnocultural groups, and where cultural groups maintain their ethnic 
and cultural distinctiveness while still participating in daily life of greater society” (2015, p. 375). 
Further it is important to understand that like much of the terms, concepts and ways of 
understanding lifeworlds, multiculturalism emanates in psychology from the US. Munley, Duncan, 
Mcdonnell, and Sauer (2004) argue that multiculturalism evolved in the 1980s, specifically within 
counselling psychology, as a way to include the racial minorities in the practice of psychologists. 
These developments of multiculturalism in professional psychology occurred during the same 
period that critical psychology emerged in South Africa.  
The problem with multiculturalism is that it continues to conceal the Euroamerican power 
structures within psychology, and in the broader South African society. The centre is thus left 
largely unchanged, unchallenged and in fact reinforced, whilst an illusion of change is often 
presented through the addition of “multicultural practice”. This illusion holds true even through 
the marginal position that Community Psychology holds within the training of psychologists, and 
as also noted previously in this chapter, the idea of relevance largely reifies this position. I do not 
wish to argue that those who have occupied the margins through years of colonialism and apartheid 
should continue to do so. Rather what I am pointing at here is there has not been a careful 
interrogation of the ways in which psychology in the democratic era continues the cultural 
(re)production of the west. 
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The, at best, asymmetrical relationship between Euroamerica and Africa, or at worst, self-nonbeing 
dichotomy makes multiculturalism a problematic way to conceptualise the practice of 
psychologists. Frantz Fanon (1967/2008) introduces the term “zone-of-nonbeing” to illustrate the 
complex ways in which the relationship between Black and White is not only asymmetrical but is 
based fundamentally on the Black as a non-human. In this type of dialectic, that of the self and the 
non-other it is not possible to have a multicultural society, and in relation to psychology it is not 
possible to have a multicultural discipline. To argue for a multicultural psychology is to assume 
that all cultures are equal, or rather it is to assume that all cultures are regarded as equal in a society. 
To speak of a multicultural psychology in the manner that Johnstone does is to ignore the continual 
existence of colonial and apartheid dichotomies of self-non-being. 
Not all persons in South African society were considered equal. To be exact, Blacks were 
considered primitive culturally and intellectually, and this continued to hold sway into apartheid 
(Swartz, 2008). There is evidence within psychology that indicates the relationship between 
Euroamerican psychology and racist practices that dominated during colonialism and apartheid as 
a contributing source of positioning Black people as inferior to Whites (see Nzimande, 1984). 
Gordon (2017) accentuates how the issue of equality in an anti-Black world is a slippery slope in 
which those seeking justice (Blacks) are often compelled to engage with a world that views their 
very demand of equality as a violation of the established justice. Stated differently, when one 
argues that there exists a plethora of cultural worldviews with some that have just remained 
unnoticed up to a point it is a fallacy, as what is considered normative in that society or discipline, 
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is based on the subjugation of other cultures, peoples and epistemologies. Pointedly, 
Euroamerican-centric psychology, that which has dominated psychology since its inception, exists 
primarily through the subjugation of any other form of knowing and cultural conceptions of 
psychological being. 
The continual re-production of monolingual, White-ethnocultural psychologists presents two 
problems and on-going challenges for the conception of multiculturalism. For monolingual, White-
ethnocentric psychologists they get to opt-out of fully participating in the full spectrum of the 
country. Essentially because these psychologists are monolingual they can simply argue that they 
do not speak the language, and there is difficulty in obtaining interpreters. In the context of the 
need for psychological services for the majority of the population, it is difficult to justify the 
“commitment” to a multicultural discipline. 
Further, going back to the foundations of psychology in South Africa, it is possible to see that 
Blacks were considered as not having an internal lifeworld (Swartz, 2008) that they lacked the 
ability to create complex practices and traditions that can be considered as culturally significant. 
For instance, some authors have suggested that the way to view the issues of a cultural mismatch 
between psychology and client is to think through idioms of distress (Hinton & Lewis-Hernandez, 
2010). However, this raises the question of understanding the multitude of cultures and how this 
can be approached in training. The idea of idioms of distress of course reasserts the notion that the 
“western idioms” are the norm whilst the rest of the world is a deviation from this norm. Important 
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to note here is that the power structures of Euroamerican cultural, epistemological, theoretical 
models that are freighted through various modes in South African psychology have not been 
addressed. In a discipline dominated by Euroamerican-centrism Black people are considered as 
non-beings, it is rather odd to think that without the reconfiguration of psychology Black people 
have a cultural lifeworld that can be considered in the “multi”-culturalist discipline. In simpler 
terms not all cultures, and by extension people, are considered equal within the Euroamerican 
tradition of psychology and as such renders peculiar the idea of multiculturalism in a discipline 
that has not addressed the inherent power structures. 
Robin Kelley (2018) argues that multiculturalism fetishises differences whilst ignoring power. The 
turn to multiculturalism continues the dominance of Euroamerican-centric psychology and 
marginalises Africa. The inclusion of multiculturalism in the training of psychologists may have 
been an important first step after the abolishment of apartheid to broaden the scope of training. 
However, the issue of what is often considered to be multicultural psychology, is often Black 
people, people in the lower economic strata of society, and not White and/or middle classes. Stated 
differently, the challenge with the conceptualisation of multicultural practice in South African 
training programmes is that it marginalises most of the people and treats them as cultural/racial 
and class minorities. 
Multiculturalism appears to be a move towards fairness and a leap for social justice endeavours 
within psychology. Still yet, I maintain that the implementation of multiculturalism in the (South) 
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African context often seeks to maintain the Euroamerican-centric status quo. Anthony Naidoo 
(1996) maintains that multiculturalism has become a fourth force in mental healthcare, further 
stating that multiculturalism in counselling is not outside the scope of mainstream psychology in 
that all of counselling is multicultural. This is not limited to only the counselling aspect of 
psychology. I maintain that psychology is cultural in that it is steeped in the traditions and cultural 
aspect of Euroamerica. Moreover, multiculturalism is a fallacy steeped in maintaining the centre 
as Euroamerican whilst Africa remains in the margins. 
3.5.2 Relevance. The question of a relevant psychology arising in the early 1980s when a 
strong chorus of dissenting voices began to ask questions about psychology’s wilful ignorance of 
the plight of Black people (Nell, 1990). The issue of relevance has continued to haunt psychology 
well into democracy, both at the level of theory and at the level of practice. The issues of relevance 
have taken up various forms over the years, with focuses ranging from indigenisation 
(Anonymous, 1986) to the idea of “modern” versus “modernising” (Dawes, 1998) to 
Africanisation (Letsekha, 2013) and recently decolonisation (Pillay, 2016). Each one of I argue 
poses serious challenges to psychological practice in South Africa, however, each also is limited 
in moving the discipline forward. One is compelled to ask and answer questions such as: If we are 
to indiginise psychology are we not provinciliasing Africa? Whose indiginise are we speaking 
about in a “multicultural” society? If the challenge, as posed by Dawes (1998), is that South Africa 
is not modern, whose modernity are we speaking of? Is it not the problem that Euromodernity 
seeks to erase all other types of moderns? These questions are posed here to illustrate the 
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conundrum that psychology has found itself in when dealing with the issue of relevance. Moreover, 
relevance does not properly encapsulate the issues of power as asserted through colonialism, 
apartheid, and US cultural imperialism. Rather relevance is viewed here as a form of reformist 
intellectual and political engagement that does not eradicate the asymmetrical relationship between 
Africa and Euroamerica. 
Long (2016a) notes that the issue of relevance has been a part of psychology since the discipline’s 
inception, from the first time the first students left Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory to return to the 
US. The relevance of psychology was on the applicability of the new psychological knowledge in 
the US (Danziger, 2006). In South Africa, psychology showed its utility in society through support 
and legitimisation of segregationist and racist notions of Black people. The notion of relevance 
then is an important one to understand in its historical context, in that psychology can be relevant 
and legitimate under certain political and societal norms. Psychology in the colonial and apartheid 
era was viewed as relevant socially, culturally and in the market. However, Long (2016b) and 
Foster and Long (2013), when raising the issue of relevance in psychology, are referring to a 
different kind of relevance, one that includes psychological practice, teaching and research that is 
inclusive of Blacks, gender non-conforming individuals, and sexual minorities. 
According to Long and Foster (2013) relevance in psychology takes up many forms from social 
relevance, which involves being responsive to the needs of the society, to cultural relevance, which 
they argue is the premise of Afrocentricity, and market relevance which is related to international 
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benchmarking (see also Long, 2013). This way of viewing relevance allows for a much greater 
view of the challenges facing psychology since the beginning of democratic South Africa.  
Catriona Macleod (2004) notes that even though the relevance debate in South Africa has a long 
historical basis, ten years into the democratic era, psychological research had failed to broaden its 
scope, mostly focusing on students and people in urban areas. The point by Macleod should be 
underscored here as it speaks to how, in the context of training, if research is itself exclusionary, 
it stands that the training will also be exclusionary. Using Maton’s (2013) conceptualisation of the 
EPD it is clear that the fight for the control of the EPD is not only limited to the curriculation but 
should be extended to the field of production (research). 
The issue of relevance has failed to address the fundamental concern of power that plagues 
psychology both in teaching and in practice. Relevance, positioned in any one of the four ways as 
suggested by Long and Foster (2013), fails to ask new questions about psychological lifeworlds of 
people in Africa. Relevance does not address the challenges that are faced by psychology in South 
Africa, rather it argues that existing psychological theories can be applied to the South African 
context. The conceptualisation of relevance as application continues to position Europe as a site 
of thinking and Africa as a site of application, which maintains the current power relations between 
Africa and Europe and US America. Paulin Hountondji (1986) explains this type of knowledge as 
extraverted knowledge, knowledge oriented towards the west contributing more towards the 
western canon than it does to building the African canon. Husan Bulhan notes that “[Africans were 
used] as convenient guinea-pigs for enhancing Euro-American self-knowledge and for advancing 
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scientific knowledge of dubious relevance…” (1993, p. 4). Extraverted knowledge maintains, 
creates and re-produces a knowledge dependence. 
Relevance addresses to some degree the issue of inclusivity with regards to clients. What relevance 
fails to account for are the power structures and particularly the dominant Euroamerican-centric 
power structures that often push these very groups of people to the margins of society and renders 
them non-normative and deviant. Relevance fails to encapsulate the reason for present-day South 
African psychology’s inability to move from a Euroamerican-centric discipline that still places at 
its centre the lifeworlds of Whites. Moreover, relevance also fails to address the issue of who 
delivers the psychological services. Relevance thus fails to account for the fact that a large 
proportion of psychological practitioners are still White (HPCSA, 2017b). 
The issue of relevance has historically been intertwined with the idea of indigenising psychology.  
Indigenisation is simply the turning of one form of knowledge, usually imported, to suite local 
contexts (Danziger, 2006). Indigenisation looked at in this way does not especially pose a 
significant problem in itself. However, the importing of knowledge traditions, particularly from 
the US and Europe, to Africa did not undergo significant changes to content and form. Anonymous 
argues that indigenise psychology is one that takes “full consideration… [of] the socio-political 
conditions…” (1986, p.8). Although the explanation given by Anonymous is in line with the 
arguments I advance in my iteration of an Africa(n)-centred perspective, indigenisation or 
relevance is limited in advancing how, especially in contemporary psychology, we can account for 
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the socio-political conditions. The limitation I am highlighting is one that affects the theory, 
research, teaching, and practice of the discipline. As I have advanced in the theoretical perspective, 
relevance and indigenisation are crucial to the foundation of an Africa(n)-centred psychology. 
Much in the same way as the taking up of psychology in the US from Europe was characterised 
by a process of large-scale indigenisation (Danziger, 2006), so too it may be necessary in South 
Africa. 
Much of what characterises South African psychology is scientific mimicry. Ignacio Martín-Baró 
(1994) describes scientific mimcry as the quest for legitimacy that leads psychologists in different 
contexts to accept models and theories that came mainly from the US and Europe uncritically. The 
discussion on colonialism and apartheid psychology indicated scientific mimicry that has lasted to 
present day South Africa. The persistence of scientific mimicry can be found in the third relevance 
dimension, that of market relevance, in the sense that international standards often mean that 
psychology in South Africa must reflect as far as possible the psychology in the US and in Europe 
(see Long, 2016a; Young, 2013). Market relevance often overshadows the other two due to how 
international standards are driven by White cultural and social lifeworlds that are not entirely 
represented in (South) Africa. The challenges of framing the debate in psychology as an issue of 
relevance makes it possible then to maintain the Euroamerican-centric dominance of psychological 
theory, models, and practice. The relevance debate becomes a way in which issues of power and 
people’s relations to power are made invisible and further entrenches psychology’s apolitical 
stance on issues that affect Black, poor, and working-class people. 
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Relevance appears to be a challenge to practitioners to think much more broadly about society, 
cultural issues and marketability of skills. However, relevance simultaneously makes it possible 
for psychology to introduce such concepts as multiculturalism and diversity as euphemisms for 
Blacks, gender non-conforming people, and sexual minorities. As maintained earlier in this current 
section the relevance debate that has taken shape in psychology has allowed for interesting and 
important conversations about what psychology is, and what it ought to be doing in society, still 
yet relevance as an important driver of change has failed to encase holistically the issues of power. 
3.6 Chapter overview 
Ngonyama Ka Sigogo, Hooper, Long, Lykes, Wilson, and Zietkiewics (2004) argued that 
psychology, society, and the subject of psychological knowledge cannot be understood separately 
from one another. The current chapter began by arguing for the links between psychology and 
broader social issues, particularly the issues of equality and equity as being formative in how 
psychology is conceived in democratic South Africa. Amongst other prominent challenges, the 
parts of this chapter delved into the formation of psychology as an academic discipline, implicating 
mental testing, psychiatry, and eugenics as integral to the evolution of psychology. Further, it 
argued that the movement of people between Europe and South Africa, and the US and South 
Africa, was crucial in the development of the discipline. I further showed how a collective of 
critical voices began to arise in the period between 1980 and 1993. However, prior to that, 
Manganyi was a lone voice rallying against Euroamerican-centric epistemologies. The term 
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culture is often employed to undermine the lifeworlds of Blacks in South Africa, which leads to 
the concealment of (white) Euroamerican-centric structures as normative. If psychology is to be 
taken seriously, the need for issues of equality and equity, there appears to be a need to 
fundamentally change what it considers the subject – both the content and the people – of 
psychology. 
It is important to note that Ngonyama ka Sigogo and Modipa highlight that “[t]he nature of 
psychology’s subject matter is determined by the historical context in which it is constituted, rather 
than predating the discipline in a timeless manner” (2004, p. 566). At this point in history, 
psychology as a discipline cannot continue to exist outside of the historical context. Psychology in 
South Africa, and Africa as a whole, has attempted to escape history by positioning itself as a 
value-neutral field (see Nsamenang, 1999; see also Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). This has only 
served to alienate not only the field from the people it is meant to help but also it has been received 
as a violent instrument that participates in the oppression of Black people around the world 
(Cooper & Nicholas, 2012; Louw & van Hoorn, 1997; Macleod, 2004). 
Further, the chapter attempted to unpack the multi-layered discursive practices with the focus 
falling on the issue of relevance and multiculturalism as extensions of each other. The discussion 
on psychology in democracy indicates worrying trends that relate to the power structures and 
Euroamerican-centric practices that continue to marginalise. Further, I argued that the issues facing 
psychology relate to how the discipline has attempted to move forward without addressing issues 
145 
 
145 | P a g e  
 
of asymmetrical power relations that formed the foundation of the discipline in its early years. 
These foundational issues related to the marginalisation of Black people, the subversion of critical 
disciplinary conversations and the scientific mimicry that characterises the discipline. 
I engaged with the issue of relevance as it pertains to the use of culture, the market, and 
international standards. I linked the relevance of debate with the idea of multiculturalism as 
limited, and worse yet limiting, conceptions of discursive disciplinary change. I postulate that a 
(re)framing of the debate should be around: How do we centre Africa in the teaching, knowledge 
production, and practise of psychologists? What are the discursive practices of psychology that 
lead to the continuous existence of marginal societies, cultures and people? Who is being taught 
psychology? And to what end? These questions are at the core to broadening the scope of 
psychology to include issues of power and people’s relationship to power, rather than argue that 
change is only possible through (white) Euroamerican-centric parameters. Investigating these 
questions is central to answering the main question of this study: How do we (re)centre Africa in 
the training of counselling and clinical psychologists? Is imperative to understand the issue of 
psychology’s utility in South Africa as a shift from relevance. In short, how does psychology 
situate itself in relation to Africa (see Ratele, 2017)? 
The proceeding chapter will deal with professional psychology as related to counselling and 
clinical psychology. The chapter deals with the historical development of professional psychology 
in recognition of the socio-historical contexts as important determinants of contemporary 
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enactments of the discipline. The chapter on professional psychology deals with the discursive 
practices of the training, and the “external” influences on the training of psychologists. I also show 
the limited research into the training of psychologists with rather broad engagements with issues 
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Chapter 4: Professional Psychology Training 
4.1 Introduction 
Shahnaaz Suffla, Garth Stevens and Mohamed Seedat assert:  
[Psychology] has mirrored salient discriminatory and oppressive processes associated with 
‘race’. In this regard, organised professional psychology has not only developed as a 
reflection of racist ideology in South Africa, but has also primarily been responsible for a 
dialectical maintenance and perpetuation of [discrimination] both internal and external to 
the profession itself. (2001, p. 28) 
Against this backdrop, the chapter focuses on professional psychology. The objective of the 
chapter is to historicise discourses of race and racism, and curriculum related issues within 
professional psychology. Further, the chapter also deals with contemporary issues affecting 
professional counselling and clinical psychology. The primary aim of the chapter is to engage more 
clearly with selection procedures that often act as exclusionary mechanisms, and how the 
curriculum at the level of training is integral in shaping the role of psychology in contemporary 
South Africa. A third component of the chapter, which is integrally linked to both selection and 
curriculation, is on the discursive field created by the Professional Board for Psychology – referred 
to interchangeably as the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA). The chapter will 
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deal with issues of the scope of practice of counselling and clinical psychologists, which since the 
promulgation of the regulations on psychologists in 2011 has become a deeply contested issue 
(HPCSA, 2018b). In attempting to elucidate the relationship between professional psychology 
training and the Africa a focus on curriculum development, selection, and the scope of practice in 
the historical and contemporary enactments of counselling and clinical psychologists. A number 
of diverged and converged points between clinical and counselling psychology at particular points 
in South Africa are a central focus. 
I look at the training of counselling and clinical psychologists at multiple levels in this chapter; the 
epistemological level, physical access, and the contribution psychologists are supposed to make in 
society. Each of these has been looked at by multiple scholars (Johnston, 2015, 2018; Mayekiso, 
Strydom, Jithoo, & Katz, 2004; Pillay, Ahmed, & Bawa, 2013; Pillay & Kramers-Olen, 2014; 
Pillay & Siyathola, 2008), but there is yet still no clarity with regards the challenges faced by 
professional training specifically, and psychology in general. Others have looked at the training 
from the perspective of the trainee psychologists concerning the curriculum, supervision, and 
perceptions of the discipline in South African society (Carolissen, Shefer, & Smit, 2015; 
Chitindingu, 2012; Hira, 2012; Mhambi, 2012; Nair, 2008). While all these factors in some way 
form part of this thesis, what remains a rather under researched part of the professional training in 
psychology is the selection of candidates. As such, as part of the multi-layered understanding of 
the training of counselling and clinical psychologists, I focus on selection, the curriculum, and the 
issues surrounding the scope of practice for psychologists. 
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The aim of the study is to investigate the ways in which the trajectory of the training of counselling 
and clinical psychologists from a (white) Euroamerican-centric practice to an Africa(n)-centred 
practice. Masixole Booi, Louise Vincent, and Sabrina Licardo succinctly capture the change in 
trajectory that forms the bedrock of the current treatise wherein they assert, “[t]he transformation 
of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa will involve rethinking and reimagining all 
practices, institutions and values that existed in the apartheid system” (2017, p. 15). In attempting 
to reimagine the practices, institutions, and values, the focus falls on answering the question; How 
do we (re)centre Africa in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists? Several key areas 
arise in attempting to answer the question; How do we (re)centre Africa in the training of 
counselling and clinical psychologists? Firstly, the areas relate to what is meant by the term 
professional and how it links to dominant notions of the role and function of psychologists. 
Secondly, the demographic representations of psychology at professional level becomes pertinent 
as it illustrates the exclusion of Black people within the discipline through selection procedures 
that are based on Whiteness as standard. Thirdly, the curriculum of the training as a vehicle for the 
importing of Euroamerican notions of psychology. 
I contend that the training of counselling and clinical psychologists remains the epicentre through 
which exclusionary practices in psychological practice remain hegemonic. The previous chapters 
of this thesis illustrated the ways psychology developed from Euroamerican-centric convictions of 
the self, health, and society. I will contend in the present chapter that the development of the 
professional categories of psychology was heavily influenced by similar Euroamerican-centric 
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discourses. I further assert that professional psychology in the form of counselling and clinical 
psychology categories has remained an exclusionary socio-political endeavour. I highlight 
fundamental issues through which the training of clinical and counselling psychologists continues 
the marginalisation of Africa(ns). 
4.2 Development of psychology professionals 
It was in 1972 that the apartheid government gazetted the regulations for the registration of clinical, 
vocational, industrial, and research psychologists (Cooper & Nicholas, 2012). In contrast, in the 
west (Europe and the US), the earliest registration categories were for clinical, organisational, and 
educational psychologists (see Lunt, 1999).  The professionalisation of South African psychology 
was formalised through the promulgation of the Health Professions Act No. 56 of 1974. The Act 
created the South African Medical and Dental Council – currently known as the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa – which took on the responsibility of regulating the profession of 
psychologists (Cooper, 2014). 
The Health Professions Act also saw the creation of the Professional Board for Psychology. The 
Professional Board for Psychology was responsible for the maintaining of standards for registered 
psychologists (Louw, 1997b), a duty which previously was largely the responsibility of the two 
professional organisations, SAPA and PIRSA (Louw, 1997a; Suffla et al., 2001). The Professional 
Board for Psychology was constituted as an auxiliary service to medical professions, with the first 
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two boards being chaired by psychiatrists (HPCSA, 2018b). Further, the Board of Psychology was 
populated by apartheid sympathisers and promoters such as A. J. la Grange and Abraham B. van 
der Merwe (Nicholas, 2001). It is important to recognise that the establishment of the Professional 
Board for Psychology and the incorporation of psychology into the HPCSA did not result in moral 
and ethical engagement of psychology with the Black population. Psychology continued its racist 
alignment with apartheid well into the 1980s (Nicholas, 1990). Further, the limited number of 
Black psychologists in the country during the apartheid years can also be evidence of the dialectical 
relationship between the apartheid state and professional psychology (see Cooper & Nicholas, 
2012). 
Currently the Board for Psychology is a fully recognised professional body. According to the 
Health Professions Amendment Act No. 29 of 2007, members of the community, who must not be 
registered with that board, should constitute the professional boards, including the Professional 
Board for Psychology, with no less than 20%. Pertinent to this study is the stipulation of the 
representation by educational institutions within the Professional Board for Psychology (Health 
Professions Act No. 29 of 2007). The appointments are at the discretion of the Minister of Health 
through a nomination process by the larger HPCSA body, in consultation with organisations such 
as PsySSA and general registered persons in the profession (Health Professions Act No. 29 of 
2007). There is a level of involvement by the general professional psychology on who is on the 
board. A restriction on what this choice may entail as of the amendment of the Regulations 
Relating to the Constitution of the Professional Board for Psychology of 2008 (DoH, 2008b) is 
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only at the level of designated groups, namely women, Black people, and people living with 
disabilities who, according to the constitution of the board, must constitute 12 of the 20 places on 
the board. The importance of how the Professional Board for Psychology is structured is to show 
that although this is a regulatory body, which has juristic powers through the HPCSA, it is 
comprised by people within professional psychology, with these people being from the different 
registration categories. Moreover, the people who constitute the Professional Board for 
Psychology in their capacities in the various educational institutions may be involved in the 
training of psychologists. 
I contend that “professional” illustrates the many criticisms of elitism and exclusivity within 
psychology. Whereas the term professional can mean persons registered and regulated through the 
various legal acts, it also points to complicated social categories in society. Alvin Gouldner (1979) 
posits that the development of the professions in much of the (westernised) world was the 
development of a new class; this class was to be linked with the political and economic elite. Suffla 
et al. (2001) argue that in the early years of psychology in South Africa psychologists exploited 
their roles as researchers and psychometricians to promote the employment of their expertise, 
aligning themselves with the ruling class’ ideology. The development of the new class, as 
described by Gouldner, resembles in many ways the development of the professional psychology 
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Ingrid Lunt argues that “[t]raditional definitions of professions emphasize a unique body of 
knowledge and set of skills (for gatekeeping and standard-setting), a code of conduct, self-
regulation, and disciplinary procedures for its members” (1999, p. 241). This definition by Lunt 
of professionals is also well aligned with the professional level psychology as defined by the 
HPCSA (2018). These definitions of professional psychology represent in some ways an attempt 
to move away from a direct relationship between professional psychology and the political and 
economic elite. As Louw (1988) maintains, the elevation of skills and expertise in professional 
definitions is a move by the professionals to assert the neutrality of the scientific methodology as 
unbiased and uncontaminated by any political ideology. I have illustrated in the construction of an 
Africa(n)-centred perspective that “scientific methodology”, least of all that of psychology, has 
never been without the socio-political ideology of the society. 
Useful in framing the current chapter and discussions on professional psychology is the work of 
Bledstein (1976, p. 32) who defined professions as:  
[A] full-time occupation in which a person earned the principal source of an income. 
During a fairly difficult and time-consuming process, a person mastered an esoteric but 
useful body of systematic knowledge, completed theoretical training before entering a 
practice or apprenticeship, and received a degree or license from a recognized institution… 
Moreover, a professional embraced an ethic of service which taught that dedication to a 
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client’s interest took precedence over personal profit, when the two happened [to] come 
into conflict. 
Professionalisation within psychology did not occur without the influence of the larger societal 
discourses of race, particularly the focus of psychology towards the minority White population. 
For instance, when he became the head of Applied Psychology at Stellenbosch University, 
Verwoerd maintained that psychology should focus on the issues affecting the White (Afrikaaner) 
community (Leach, Akhurst, & Basson, 2003). The establishment of the Carnegie study into the 
poor White problem is a pivotal example of the focus on Whites, which in turn became an 
important marker for the development of psychology in South Africa (Louw, 1986). Seedat and 
MacKenzie maintain that “…in oppressive societies (such as apartheid South Africa) service 
professions are characterised as either serving the interests of their clients, the profession itself, or 
the class in which they are located” (2008, p. 65). The concern for the development of professional 
psychology was an attempt to resolve social issues that included education and work for the White 
minority (see Long, 2016a). 
Seedat and MacKenzie (2008) note that several factors resulted in the professionalisation of 
psychology, mimicking developments in Europe and the US. Firstly, the establishment of a 
professional organisation – in South Africa PASA – and secondly enough individuals who can 
enter the profession to engage in debate through academic journals. Nicholas (1990) notes that the 
beginning of professionalisation for psychology was in 1946 when psychologists were approached 
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to form part of the medical supplementary services. In Europe and the US, Lunt (1999) argues that 
the American Psychological Association (APA) was the first to establish the professionalisation 
of psychology just after World War II, with Europe following suite immediately after. World War 
II proved to be an important part of the development of psychology globally as many militaries 
across the globe used psychologists for the testing and classification of military personnel. In South 
Africa, I have highlighted the role of Malherbe in the development of military testing apparatus 
which would play a role in legitimating the role of psychology within South African society. The 
professionalisation of psychology in South Africa followed the trend of aligning itself with the 
dominant classes, and as such could be “relevant” to South African society. 
Seedat and MacKenzie (2008) highlight that three other stages make it possible for the 
professionalisation of a discipline; firstly, institutionalisation which allows for the development of 
experts to apply the knowledge, the fourth and fifth have to do with disciplinary boundaries of 
knowledge and members of the profession respectively. These developments are similar to those 
that happened in Europe, with Lunt (1999, p. 241) contending that “professionalization refers to 
the development of the use of skills based on a unique body of theoretical knowledge, education, 
and training in those skills, competence ensured by examination, a code of professional conduct, 
orientation toward the public good, a professional organization”. The institutionalisation of 
knowledge is linked to how the education system is a site for the reproduction of “cultural 
conservation and ideological reproduction of the interests and values of the dominant classes” 
(Booi et al., 2017, p. 5). The dominant classes in South Africa are still White, even as the levers 
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of power in South African government appear to be Black. The dispensing of psychological 
knowledge in the service of military, industry, and (unequal) education systems in South Africa 
and across the globe point to the nature of the disciplinary knowledge within professional 
psychology. 
Professional psychology, and psychology in general, have shown little regard for Black lifeworlds 
either by using inappropriate mental testing procedures or through being in the service of the 
colonial and apartheid states (Seedat, 1998; Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). According to Suffla et 
al., “[o]rganised professional psychology’s historical role and evolution has often mimicked and 
mirrored socio-historical developments within the South African social formation at different 
historical junctures, and in this way has acted as a microcosm of South African society at different 
points in time” (2001, p. 28). Professional psychology developed in much the same manner, as did 
psychology in general, driven largely by racist, exclusionary ideology. Further, psychology since 
1994, much like psychology during the colonial and apartheid era, developed as a microcosm of 
the larger socio-political project. In contemporary South African society, the issues of 
transformation are, as Booi et al. (2017, p. 4) contend, “also an ideological process, which needs 
to interrogate the nature of privilege, the distribution of power in society and the processes through 
which social exclusion is maintained”. The nature of privilege and the distribution of power within 
contemporary South African psychology is an important consideration not only as to how Black 
people were excluded from being practitioners but also their subjugation through the curricula. 
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4.3 The scope of practice 
In the current section, I will deal with the scope of the practice (SOP) as it has fundamental impact 
on the design of training programmes. The current section understands the scope of practice on 
two interconnected levels; firstly, as practice that is legislated in the promulgated SOP, and 
secondly at the level of ideology, which is hidden within the text. The definitions of professionals 
that I have provided are illustrative of the discursive practices that underpin the profession of 
psychology. The SOP of psychologists makes explicit provisions for what the practice of 
psychologists entails but can also be seen to stipulate when the practice of psychological skills is 
applicable and how these psychological skills are deployed. Importantly, the SOP for 
psychologists can have profound effects for who receives services and the efficiency of these 
services. I further assert that the SOP of clinical and counselling psychologists can be understood 
as one of the ways that the discipline has maintained its Euroamericanised hegemony, both with 
regards to practitioners and clients. Moreover, the SOP has an effect on the training of 
psychologists as training can often be oriented towards the SOP. 
I treat the training of counselling and clinical psychologists as similar even as I understand the 
distinctions that define the nature of the practice of psychologists. Historically, the histories of 
counselling and clinical psychology are distinguishable although they have been often interlinked 
and at times in contestation with each other (Leach et al., 2003). Watkins (1983) asserts that much 
of the debate between counselling and clinical psychology in the US has been on distinctions and 
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similarities focusing on roles and functions of psychologists. In South Africa, the discussions about 
the role and functions of counselling and clinical psychology also span a long historical period 
from the early years of the professionalisation of psychology (see Young, 2013). Further, the 
distinction in South Africa of clinical and counselling psychology is also traceable to English-
speaking universities and Afrikaans-speaking universities (Leach et al., 2003). Clinical 
psychology has historically been associated with historically White English-speaking universities 
whilst counselling psychology was associated with historically White Afrikaans-speaking 
universities (Bohmke & Tlali, 2008). Leach et al. (2003) note that counselling psychology began 
at Stellenbosch University in 1927 with the establishment of the Applied Psychology Department, 
although the category was not named as “counselling psychology” until much later in the 
development of psychology in South Africa. Whilst Pillay and Kramers (2003) note that clinical 
psychology probably began in 1956, with the records of the HPCSA showing the first person 
registered as such in that year, this registration preceded the promulgation of the legal act that 
would allow for “psychologists” to practice. 
The birth of clinical and counselling psychology in South Africa mirrored the developments of 
clinical and counselling psychology in the US and Europe post-World War II (Louw, 1988). 
Although the histories of counselling and clinical psychology often diverge, they also present with 
a number of convergences that are of interest in the present thesis. Watkins (1983) argues that 
three themes emerge out of clinical psychology in the 1920s US: 1) psychometric trend, 2) the 
mental health movement, and 3) the psychodynamic orientation. Whilst for counselling 
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psychology the themes are: 1) the vocational guidance movement, 2) the psychometric trend and, 
3) the psychotherapy tradition. These themes of counselling and clinical psychology are reflected 
in the historical account of South African psychology beginning from 1917 with psychology 
becoming an independent discipline. I will not risk repeating the historical account of South 
African psychology, but it is worth noting that these themes of counselling and clinical psychology 
in the US are mirrored in South Africa. Largely, I have asserted in Chapter 2, due to people such 
as M. L. Fick training in the US during the rise of the psychometric trend in the US. 
The initial registration categories for psychologists consisted of vocational, industrial, military, 
and research psychologists (Cooper, 2014). It is worth noting that the decision to have various 
registration categories at the onset of the Health Professions Act No. 56 of 1974 was a concern 
shaped largely by the role that psychologists were to play in the apartheid structure. This role was 
largely both a legitimisation of the ruling class’ distinction between Blacks and Whites in the 
schooling system (vocational), in industry (industrial psychologist), military (clinical), and the 
development of academic standards (research). The discipline’s legitimacy was based reciprocally 
on how closely it aligned itself with the ruling class’ ideology. There were overlaps between the 
various professional categories, however the registration categories all served in different ways to 
legitimise and continue the domination of Whites in South Africa. 
Contemporary professional registration categories include counselling, clinical, research, 
psychometrist, registered counsellor, industrial, and educational psychologists, which all have 
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varying degrees of specialisation (HPCSA, 2018b). In a bid to make the registration categories 
more distinct the Professional Board for Psychology, through the national Department of Health 
(DoH), promulgated the Regulations Defining The Scope of The Profession of Psychology of 2008 
(DoH, 2008). Subsequently, the board, through the minister, promulgated an amendment to these 
regulations to include the scope of practice of the registration categories to differentiate between 
the different categories (see DoH, 2011). Many counselling psychologists viewed the 
promulgation of the scope of practice in 2011 to have favoured clinical psychologists over the 
other professional registration categories (Bantjes, Kagee, & Young, 2016). Part of the concern 
over the scope of practice was that it would result in the loss of income for many psychologists, 
especially those who work in private practice, as medical aids would refuse to pay for services 
rendered (Young, 2013). 
Pretorius (2012) contends that the overlaps between counselling, clinical and educational speak to 
the core competencies of the categories being similar rather than them being identical. In the latest 
HPCSA (2018b) report, it is noted that there is often a confusion between the scope of practice 
and the regulations of the different professional categories, with the former speaking more 
specifically to the core competencies of the categories. These confusions and overlaps have 
become a point of litigation, for which counselling and educational psychologists dispute the scope 
of practice (HPCSA, 2018b). Moreover, in a bid to resolve the conflicts that have arisen since 
2011, the DoH (2018b) published new regulations with scopes of practice for psychologists for 
the registered psychologists to make comments. As of the time of writing, the DoH has decided to 
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rescind the 2018 notice of the scope of practice and revert back to the 2008 regulations (DoH, 
2019), with no mention of the scope of practice amendment of 2011. Pertinent to the current thesis 
is how the overlaps between counselling and clinical psychologists are also found in the training 
of these professional categories. 
The profound impact of the scope of practice extends in many respects to the training of 
psychologists as differentiations begin to emerge in training models. According to Pillay et al. 
(2013), the training of counselling, clinical, and educational psychologists in many South African 
universities was conducted jointly. The joint training programmes have become something of an 
anomaly as the HPCSA has moved to distinguish between the various professional registration’s 
categories (see Young, 2013). The distinction at training level of counselling and clinical 
psychologists is inseparable from the contestations in the SOP for clinical and counselling 
psychologists. Further, as Lunt (1999) observed for Western Europe, the distinction between 
training of clinical and counselling psychologists is in large part caused by a move to increase 
professionalisation. The perceived imposition from the Professional Board for Psychology to 
separate the training of counselling and clinical psychologists was not well received by some 
universities, specifically those that train counselling psychologists (Young, 2013). These debates 
have implications for the training of counselling and clinical psychologists, including the 
curriculum and to some extent the selection of candidates. For instance it could be argued that 
students begin to choose their careers based on the perceived superiority of one registration 
category over another. In this regard Pillay, Bundhoo and Ngcobo (2008), in a Mauritian and South 
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African comparative study, found that a large proportion of South African students who wanted to 
study psychology as a profession indicated they wanted to study clinical psychology. Another 
implication of this debate is highlighted by Young (2013), who argues that the SOP does not 
properly reflect the training of counselling and clinical psychologists which courses a mismatch 
between the legislation and the training of psychologists. 
4.3.1 Professional psychology and capital. Training institutions for counselling and 
clinical psychology maintain Euroamerican-centric practices and therefore perpetuate an 
apolitical, oppressive form of psychology. Psychology has always had an interlinked relationship 
with capitalism in South Africa, for example in the work of people such as E. G Malherbe which 
maintained the inhumane apartheid policies of job reservations for Whites (see Cooper, 2014). On 
the relationship between psychology and capitalism, Long (2016) argues that the “psy” disciplines 
thrive under conditions of neo-liberal capitalism because of their focus on the advancement of the 
individual. Further, the individual is centralised in how they should accept and adapt to the 
capitalist demands, of increased productivity and efficiency. As such, most of the professional 
registration categories are geared towards assisting individuals adjust as far as possible to the 
different domains of life such as school, work, and personal relationships. This assisted adaptation 
is not necessarily problematic but becomes so when people are made to accept a life of oppression. 
Louw (1988) argues that for psychologists during apartheid the focus was on maintaining the 
importance of skill, expertise, and service. The focus on the skill and expertise served the 
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ideological function of scientific neutrality that concealed the psychologists were not in service of 
the oppressive apartheid regime. Nicholas (2001) argues that many White psychologists did not 
regard themselves as being political when siding with the apartheid regime, but when the plight of 
Black people was being discussed this was deemed as diluting the scientific value (neutrality) of 
psychology. Thomas Teo contends that “[e]mpirical methods and commitments to empiricism and 
‘objectivity’ could not prevent the reality that minorities gays and lesbians, subaltern groups, lower 
classes people with disabilities etc., were portrayed as inferior or as a problem when differences 
were found” (2014, p. 593). The argument that psychology is neutral is an ideological position that 
is deployed within some sectors to maintain the status. For instance, Pillay and Kramers-Olen 
(2014) note that in one university the 30 years between 1981 to 2010 spanning apartheid and post-
apartheid South Africa, intern clinical psychologists remained hegemonically White. 
In a recent survey on registered psychologists, the HPCSA (2017b) found that psychologists are 
still largely serving a White client base. Other scholars have pointed to how psychology uses 
models and theories developed using White Euroamericans (see Cooper, 2014). Although 
professionalisation stresses scientific neutrality, employing scientific methodology that is free of 
political ideological influence, it is clear throughout the history of psychology that this has not 
been the case (Louw, 1988). As Suffla et al. (2001, p. 28) note, “[p]sychology in South Africa was 
predominantly a white profession that had become integrally bound with the political ideology of 
racism since the early part of the twentieth century”. Scientific neutrality is a fallacy as the focus 
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on the skill, expertise and service of psychologists, is influenced by the socio-political positions in 
South African society. 
4.3.2 National Health Insurance. The White Paper on the National Health Insurance 
(NHI) was published in 2003 as an amendment to the National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 towards 
universal health care coverage for all South Africans (DoH, 2017). The NHI will have an impact 
on the practice of psychologists as the state becomes the largest health care buyer of health 
services. Psychologists under the NHI will not necessarily form a core part of the health care 
system at primary, intermediary or tertiary level. Mental health will be mostly the responsibility 
of other mental care workers such as social workers (DoH, 2017). However, the Final Ideal Clinic 
Manual published in 2018 (DoH, 2018) does make mention of psychologists, and the role that they 
will play as contracted-in and contracted-out teams of private practitioners (DoH, 2018).  
It is important to note as Cooper and Nicholas (2012) argue that during apartheid many 
psychologists were employed by the state with lower numbers in private practice. However, in 
contemporary South Africa the NHI in its current configuration may only affect the psychologists 
secondary work context as most psychologists may remain in private practice. The results found 
by HPCSA (2017b) that reports that 49% of clinical psychologists primarily work in private 
practice survey focusing on the activities of psychologists. These results are collaborated by Deane 
(2017) who found that around 48% of clinical psychologists in her study were in private practice. 
Bantjes et al. (2016) found similar results in a study they conducted on the contemporary state of 
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counselling psychology. They reported that an estimated 49% of counselling psychologists in 
South Africa work primarily in private practice, whilst the HPCSA (2017b) reports a slightly 
higher figure of 53%. Moreover, according to Carolissen et al. (2015), there is a low number of 
psychologists in the public sector in general (14.8%) of these a significantly lower number of 
White psychologists (30%) than Black psychologists (70%). Young (2013) argues that the 
unavailability of opportunities for counselling psychologists within state run institutions is the 
main driver toward an entrepreneurial approach to psychological practice. The high number of 
counselling psychologists in private practice can be attributed to the low number of positions 
available to counselling psychologists.   
In response to wanting to increase the number of practitioners and clarifying professional roles, 
the HPCSA (2018b) has recommended that in the future the training of psychologists may have a 
generalist category at Masters level rather than the specialist categories that are currently being 
used. Lunt (1999), in speaking about the professionalisation of psychology in the west, particularly 
in Europe, argued that increased professionalisation often comes with the increased length of 
training. South African psychology continuously mimics the trends in the west, as neo-liberal 
capitalist considerations continue to take hold within and outside of the discipline. Further, the 
increasing length of time spent studying towards a professional degree has implications for access 
into professional psychology. For students whose families depend on them for financial support, 
particularly first generation Black working-class students’, access to psychology at the 
professional level will become more elusive. Professional psychology may find itself continuing 
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to battle with issues of race, class, and gender representation when there is an increase in the length 
of time in studying. 
According to Painter and van Ommen (2008, p. 441), “[p]rofessional Psychology in South Afr ica 
is already increasingly packaged in prototypical American ways, complete with ready-made 
products and consumers”. The reference on ready-made packaging is about the training sites use 
of European and US American models uncritically, which usually privileges White and middle- 
class consumers. For instance, in their review of the report by PASA on the training of 
psychologists, van der Westhuyzen and Plug (1987) argued that training sites in South Africa 
applied the scientist-practitioner model. According to Lunt (1999), the scientist-practitioner 
model, also known as the Boulder model, developed in the US, aimed at establishing psychology 
as a science, and emphasising the professional stature of the discipline. The problems associated 
with the scientist-practitioner model are primarily about psychology being concerned with its 
legitimacy rather than how best it can be deployed in the service of society. Moreover, the ready-
made packaging of psychology is linked with the neo-liberalisation of the discipline, imbued as it 
is with capitalist structures that promote individualised interventions as opposed to a focus on 
structural issues. Predetermined packaging of the discipline for White and middle-classes is to the 
continued exclusion of Blacks and working-classes, which is evident in the increasing numbers of 
counselling and clinical psychologists in private practice. 
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The NHI is significant in the discussions around the scope of practice as it may affect in significant 
ways the practice of psychologists, and as such the distinctions being made between different 
registration categories may also change or remain the same. As far back as the 1980s, Louw (1988) 
noted that the contestation that often arises out of the need to distinguish between the roles of 
professional registration categories within psychology has less to do with the benefit of society. 
Rather the fixation on the differentiation of the professional registration categories is primarily 
about the needs of the professionals. There are two parts to this issue. First, there is a matter of the 
consequences of capitalistic or entrepreneurial approaches and the role of psychology in society. 
Secondly, an associated issue is that of the high number of counselling and clinical psychologists 
who are in private practice (HPCSA, 2017b). The change in the scope of practice brought about 
the contestations between private and public practice, and more pertinently the contention between 
the poor and the middle to upper classes. 
The scope of practice of counselling and clinical psychologists, including the debates that have 
ensued since the promulgation of the regulations on the scope of practice in 2011 and culminated 
in the court case in 2016, indicate that intra-disciplinary boundaries have taken precedence over 
the concern for the provision of services. The scope of practice debates point to how psychology 
has failed to embark on changes that serve the larger South African population, rather it has 
pursued avenues that keep the discipline at the level of practice as elitist and exclusionary. The 
report of the HPCSA (2018b) suggests that there is concern about the place of psychology in 
democratic South Africa. However, the report offers little in the way of direct solutions. 
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Psychology’s concern with the intra-disciplinary boundaries, rather than attempting to expand its 
reach, is a point of interest in the current thesis as it points to how both counselling and clinical 
psychologists are trained. The pertinent questions in relation to the scope of practice is, What are 
counselling and clinical psychologists trained to do? And with who are they trained to work? 
4.4 Training sites of counselling and clinical psychologists 
In the previous sections, I outlined the external forces that shape the training and practice of 
counselling and clinical psychologists. I outlined how the Professional Board for Psychology 
regulates the training of psychologists as a legislative body, and the impact that the HPCSA has 
on the training of psychologists. The focus in the previous sections was to illuminate two of the 
objectives of the study, which is to answer: what are counselling and clinical psychologists trained 
to do? And with whom are they trained to work? These objectives, I have argued, are evident in 
the development and contemporary practice of psychologists, and through the scope of practice of 
psychologists. Keeping in mind the study’s theoretical framework, an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective, I was able to illustrate that even through structures such as the scope of practice the 
discipline remains Euroamerican-centric. Moreover, I noted that the NHI promises to change some 
of the practice contexts of psychologists, and to some degree the training of psychologists. 
There may be some problematic ways of doing things within training institutions that have been 
left unchallenged. Amongst these ways is the selection of candidates and the pedagogical mimicry 
169 
 
169 | P a g e  
 
of Euroamerican models and theoretical constructs that often do not reflect the realities of the 
people psychology claims to serve. The current section aims to further the discussion on the 
training of psychologists by focusing on two main categories of the training: selection and 
curricula. The selection and curricula of the training of psychologists is in line with the second and 
third objectives of the study which is to answer: who is being trained? and what are they being 
taught? This section speaks to issues of access to higher education in general, but, more 
specifically, to access to professional psychology degrees. Further, in highlighting what students 
are taught there are similarities with the arguments by Carolissen et al.’s (2015) focus on practices 
of inclusion and exclusion within the curriculum, as either an extraverted orientation toward the 
west or practices of situated practice. 
4.4.1 The characteristics of training sites. Some psychology departments were able to 
establish training for clinical, counselling, educational and industrial psychology in the 1970s 
(Pillay, 2016). The establishment of training sites within psychology departments occurred during 
the same period that the Professional Board for Psychology was established in 1974 (Louw, 
1997b). However, the establishment of the training sites in universities reflected the broader 
establishment of Psychology Departments, in the sense that HWUs established the training sites 
well before HBUs. Bantjes et al. (2016) note that counselling psychology training was initially 
only provided at HWASUs, for example at Stellenbosch University and University of Port 
Elizabeth (now part of Nelson Mandela University) – which was technically a dual English and 
Afrikaans university. The only English-speaking university to offer training of counselling 
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psychologists during apartheid was the University of Natal (now part of the University of Kwa-
Zulu Natal) (Leach et al., 2003). Clinical psychology was offered mostly at HWESUs, and to a 
lesser extent at Afrikaans-speaking universities (Bantjes et al., 2016). 
In 2002 the South African government amended the Higher Education Act No.101 of 1997 to make 
provisions for the Merger of Public Higher Education Institutions. This amendment was to do 
away with the ethnic universities that were created under apartheid and reduce the number of 
universities from 36 to 21 (Hall, Symes, & Luescher, 2004). This provision gave birth to new 
configured universities such as the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal – a merger between University 
of Natal and University of Durban-Westville, the former a Whites-only university and the latter a 
former Indians-only university (Karodia, Shaikh, & Soni, 2015). Mzamane Convy Baloyi and 
Goonasagree Naidoo (2016) note that the mergers, though to some degree aimed at the quantitative 
changes of universities, were also aimed at the qualitative changes such as increasing access for 
Black people into university and doing away with the apartheid ethnic university divide. Karodia 
et al. (2016, p. 329) remain critical of the university mergers as they argue that: 
One of the downsides of the merger strategy was that it left most of the so-called traditional 
apartheid universities intact such as the Universities of Witwatersrand, Pretoria, 
Stellenbosch, Rhodes, and Cape Town and to a very limited extent the Free State 
University (only took in the small QuaQua campus of a homeland). This has allowed these 
universities to remain unscathed and were thus able to maintain the apartheid status quo as 
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opposed to the traditional and historically disadvantaged black universities which included 
the universities of the Bantustan homelands, such as the University of Bophuthatswana, 
the University of Zululand, the University of Venda, the University of the North and the 
University of Fort Hare, and the University of Durban Westville which was incorporated 
into the University of Natal and now called the University of Kwa-Zulu - Natal. 
The arguments by Karodia and colleagues are important to not only higher education as a whole 
but has a fundamental impact on how merged universities are viewed within psychology. If the 
merger of universities did not fundamentally change the qualitative, institutional cultures of 
apartheid White universities, how might selection and curriculation take place? Taking seriously 
the challenges that Karodia et al. (2016) mention, it may be that institutional cultures that are 
centred on Whiteness continue to prevail. Moreover, the fact that HWUs were left “unscathed” in 
the merger processes is also an important component that requires attention, as these universities 
may continue unabated to reproduce colonial and apartheid practices. 
To return to the thrust of the current thesis, currently counselling and clinical psychology training 
programmes are offered at 13 universities including HBUs (HPCSA, 2017a). Bantjes et al. (2016) 
note that two out of the thirteen programmes hat train counselling psychologists were suspended. 
Although Bantjes et al., (2016) do not name the universities who had suspended their counselling 
programme, one noticeable absentee from the list of accredited universities is the University of 
Zululand, an HBU. Additionally, is that Stellenbosch University is also noticeably absent from the 
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list of accredited universities for counselling psychologists. The absence of Stellenbosch 
University is interesting as far as it was the first place where counselling psychologists received 
their training, and because of the historical legacy of the university for South African psychology.  
Training sites for psychologists are important as they carry histories that continuously shape the 
manner in which professional psychology is structured. Pillay and Siyathola (2008) note that for 
clinical psychologists there was a persistent racial divide in the training institutions ten years into 
democracy. The majority of Black psychologists were trained at HBUs. Data on the training sites 
of counselling psychologists has not yet been collated. Recent data on where Black psychologists 
are trained is not available, and it is unclear whether the trend observed by Pillay and Siyathola in 
2008 has changed. I assert that the racial divide on the training of psychologists is due to the 
selection procedures of universities and the structure of the curriculum as determining factors.  
The next sections will deal in particular with how selection and curricula within training sites is 
Euroamerican-centric, with a view of illustrating how training sites are the epicentre of the 
stagnation of the profession. 
4.4.2 Selection. One of the biggest challenges facing the training of counselling and 
clinical psychologists in South Africa converges on the question: Who is trained into professional 
psychology? Selection procedures of universities are one of the most contentious issues within 
psychology. The report by the HPCSA (2018b) notes that the 6th Board of Psychology (1999-
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2004) recommended that universities admit an equal number of Black and White students into the 
Masters training programmes. The recommendation was an attempt to change the demographic 
profile of psychologists. This recommendation does not appear to have had the desired effect of 
changing the demographic composition of psychologists, as noted in the same report by the 
HPCSA (2018b). It is worth mentioning, however, the arguments presented by Carolissen et al. 
(2015) that the increase in Black psychologists does not necessarily lead to a fundamental change 
in psychological practice. That said, the importance of tracking demographic transformation 
cannot be undermined because of South Africa’s racist history that excluded Black people from 
participating fully within professions such as psychology. Demographic change can then be 
understood as a necessary but insufficient factor for the necessary change in the trajectory of the 
discipline.  
The merger of the universities culminated in what became the massification period in South 
African higher education, resulting in the increased numbers of Black students in undergraduate 
programmes (Council on Higher Education, 2004). Ronelle Carolissen and colleagues (2015) note 
that there is a large disparity between the number of Black students in undergraduate psychology 
programmes and those in postgraduate studies, specifically professional programmes. The 
numbers of Black students in professional programmes and the resultant low numbers of Black 
psychologists can be attributed to a constellation of issues, including institutional cultures, length 
of time it takes to become a psychologist, and perceptions of psychology as a profession. 
Carolissen et al. (2015, p. 12) note that “undergraduate numbers of black students mask the 
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continued racialised profile where those who continue to professional levels in psychology remain 
skewed towards white and historically advantaged communities”. The differences between 
undergraduate students and professional programme enrolments suggests that psychology be 
understood at various levels so as to not cloud the challenges that are faced at each level. 
Disparities in Black and White trainee psychologists may be accounted for by looking at the 
institutional cultures of the different training programmes, whilst simultaneously holding the 
disciplinary discursive practices that may continue to exclude the participation of Black students.  
The VitalStats (2019), which is a higher education monitoring report that covers a period of five 
years, is published by the Council on Higher Education (CHE) to report on, amongst other issues, 
postgraduate success rates. The report indicates that there are higher numbers of Black students 
enrolled in 2017 for Masters programmes’ across higher education, and the graduate rates are 
higher than for White students (CHE, 2019). However, it remains that in psychology professional 
degrees there are low numbers of Black students when compared to White students (Carolissen et 
al., 2015).  
The current section’s focus on demographic transformation is hindered by the unavailability of 
comprehensive data that focuses on the selection of psychologists. For instance, the American 
Psychological Association (APA) has periodic studies on the admissions, applications and 
acceptances of students into various professional categories at both the Masters and doctoral level 
(Michalski, Cope, & Fowler, 2017). Similar types of research are not available in South Africa, 
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and thus can be seen as a severe gap in understanding whether Black students are not applying or 
they are not being selected into professional programmes. Further, statistical data such as the 
admissions and applications of students into professional training programmes offer an important 
starting point for questions of qualitative experiences on the selection procedures at various 
universities. Additionally, South Africa does not collate the information on student demographics 
specific to the professional training of psychologists (Yvette Daffue, personal communication). 
This lack of information on the training of psychologists, at the very least, at the level of statistics 
makes it difficult to understand how far the profession has moved in comparison to apartheid era 
training. The current section, therefore, relies on the statistical information of qualified 
psychologists to illustrate the demographics of trainees within institutions. Some of these statistics 
are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1: Registered counselling psychologists as of February 2015 




Total Total Percentage 
African 115 9.4% 38 8.8% 153 9.3% 
Coloured 52 4.3% 16 3.7% 68 4.1% 
Indian 81 6.7% 19 4.4% 100 6.1% 
Not Known 208 17.1% 109 25.1% 317 19.2% 
White 762 62.6% 252 58.1% 1014 61.4% 
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1218 73.7% 434 26.3% 1652 100% 
Source:  Adapted from Bantjes et al. (2016) 
 
Table 2: Registered clinical psychologists as of February 2015 






African 367 17.6% 120 13.7% 487 16.4% 
Coloured 82 4.0% 27 3.1% 109 3.7% 
Indian 127 6.1% 27 3.1% 154 5.2% 
Not known 356 17.1% 235 26.8% 591 19.9% 
White 1155 55.3% 469 53.4% 1624 54.8% 
Total clinical  2087 70.4% 878 30.6% 2965  100% 
Source: Adapted from Bantjes et al. (2016) 
It is possible to discern from the results from Bantjes et al. (2016) that there is still a 
disproportionately high number of White psychologists being trained into counselling and clinical 
psychology programmes. Mohamed Seedat (1998) noted that the racist practices within academic 
institutions were the largest obstacle for the entry of Black trainees into professional training 
programmes, whilst Suffla et al. (2001) assert that by the end of apartheid 10% of all registered 
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psychologists were Black. de la Rey (2001) notes that the majority of lecturers in psychology, 
including at HBUs, were White. The infra-humanisation of Black people and the subsequent 
barring of Black people from educational opportunity can be summarised by the words of Hendrik 
Frensch Verwoerd, former Prime Minister of South Africa. Verwoerd asserted that: 
The school must equip the Bantu [black] to meet the demands which the economic life of 
South Africa will impose on him…there is no place for him in the European community 
above the level of certain forms of labour…What is the use of teaching a Bantu child 
mathematics when it (sic) cannot use it in practice?...This is absurd (sic) (cited in Nicholas, 
1990, p. 59). 
The persistence in the numerical dominance of White people within professional training 
programmes brings into sharp contrast the idea of merit within professional psychology. In 1958 
Michael Young published the The Rise of the Meritocracy: 1870-2033 in which he argued that the 
rise of the elite classes saw a rise in the discourses of meritocracy. The promotion of meritocracy 
positions institutions as only in pursuit of the (international) competiveness and high academic 
standards, rather than excluding on the basis of other criteria such as class, race, and gender. The 
use of the term “meritocracy” for Young (1958, p. 21) was in an ironic sense as arguing that for 
many people in power meritocracy took hold because they “have rule not so much by the people 
as by the cleverest people; not an aristocracy of birth, not a plutocracy of wealth, but a true 
meritocracy of talent”. Meritocracy thus serves the purpose of illustrating an opening up of 
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professions and schools to everyone, depending on their ability rather than their race, gender, and 
class. However, merit-based systems often ignore structural inequalities that are the result of – 
ironically – race, gender, and class which results in the continued reproduction of inequality (see 
Clycq, Nouwen, & Vandernbroucke, 2014). In professional psychology, then, it becomes 
important to understand that the tendency to focus on meritocracy as existing outside the socio-
political landscape recreates the problems of skewed demographics in the professional training. 
Moreover, as Booi et al. (2017, p. 7) attest, “the ‘paradox’ of commitment, to equity in the 
measured university but not to diversity as central to academic life, is maintained by a politics of 
‘quality’ and ‘excellence’ which have emerged as discursive practices, invoked by HWUs, to 
reproduce social class differences and maintain their position as leading higher education 
institutions globally”. 
In speaking about meritocracy, the issue of student deficiency is also ominously present. Clycq, 
Nouwen, and Vandenbroucke (2014) make the observation that the focus on student deficiency 
often masks the problems of institutional culture that is exclusionary. Vincent and Hlatshwayo 
argue that in particular for first-generation students “deficiencies of both cultural and economic 
capital have featured in the literature on first-generation student experiences” (2018, p. 120). The 
focus on deficiencies often leaves the problems of institutions as continuously exclusionary, to in 
particular Black students. The focus is then towards these students who have in the past been either 
called underprepared (see Bozalek and Boughey, 2012) or disadvantaged (see Smit, 2012). In the 
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deficit discussion seldom are institutionally embedded practices that exclude students, raised this 
continuing to position Black students as the problem (Kessi & Cornell, 2015). 
Psychology at the professional level poses interesting and complicated questions to how gendered 
access to disciplines is often regarded at university, as psychology in the main remains a feminised 
discipline (HPCSA, 2018b; Skinner & Louw, 2009). This feminisation is dubbed so by the number 
of women who since the 1980s in South Africa have numerically dominated professional 
counselling and clinical psychology (Bantjes et al., 2016). This numerical domination of females 
within psychology began in the 1980s coinciding with the rise of females within the profession 
globally (see Ostertag & McNamara, 1991). Importantly it must be added that the rise in the female 
participation in professional psychology was not a rise in participation of different racialised 
people rather it was specifically a rise in white female participation in psychology (Curtis, Grier, 
& Hunley, 2004; Skinner & Louw, 2009). In Table 1 and Table 2 above from the results of the 
Bantjes et al. (2016) there is a clear indication of the continuation of the numerical dominance of 
white females within professional psychology in South Africa.  
It is important to note that there is a distinction between the feminisation of professional 
psychology, with professional psychology being feminist. While feminisation refers to a high 
number of feminine subjects in the discipline (Skinner & Louw, 2009), a feminist psychology 
refers to the taking the conditions of oppression of especially women in patriarchal societies as an 
important part of psychological work (see Burman, 1998). Tamara Shefer argues that psychology 
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has been implicated in the valorisation of feminine subjects stating that; “[psychology] has also 
been widely acknowledged that psychology, in particular the psychology of gender, has been 
highly problematic in the way in which it reproduces and legitimates gender difference and 
inequality” (2001, p.34).  
As with race, class, and language, gendered identities intersect with each other in various ways to 
maintain (white) Euroamerican-centrism. It is important then to consider in what ways the white 
feminisation of the profession continued the exclusion of Black women and men by positioning 
them as objects of psychology rather than subjects who actively participate in the discipline. 
Pertinent to this objectification may be the observation by Ratele (2009) of how Black femininities 
and masculinities under colonial and apartheid laws could be contrasted to white femininities. On 
the one hand, White femininities were considered to be soft and subordinate and white 
masculinities as sexually conflicted and antagonistic (Ratele, 2009). On the other hand, Black 
femininities were hypersexualized and unreliable (Lewis, 2005) and Black masculinities as 
perpetually perpetrators of violence (see van Niekerk & Boonzaier, 2019). What perhaps is 
significant is the view of emotional under- or non-development of both Black men and Black 
women (see Swartz, 2008) as a significant part of objectification in professional psychology. 
It is unsurprising that the majority of trainers in professional Masters training programmes by 1994 
were White due to the few Black psychologists at that time (HPCSA, 2018b; Jeremy Davidson, 
personal communication). The trend in professional psychology of having a sparse number of 
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Black psychologists has continued in the democratic era (see Table 1 and Table 2). The low 
number of Black psychologists, in comparison to White psychologists, indicates the continued 
dominance of White, middle-class, Euroamerican lifeworlds within psychology. Moreover, the 
trend of White psychologists dominating psychology also has effects on the trainers within 
institutions. The White trainers find themselves in a position to look beyond their own privilege 
and deliver what essentially is foreign to them (Ngonyama ka Sigogo, Hooper, Long, Lykes, 
Wilson, & Zietkiewicz, 2004). 
Other studies have revealed that there is a perception of an inherent contradiction between selection 
equity and merit. In one of the few studies that focused on selection of clinical psychologists, 
Truab and Swartz (2013) found that White candidates showed concern for how selection equity 
was deployed in training sites. The concerns centred on feeling that they, as White students, were 
being disadvantaged when race was used as one of the criteria for selection even when the Black 
students were not as academically strong as they were (Truab & Swartz, 2013). In comparison, 
Christian et al. (2002) reflected that their experience of selection equity appeared to diminish the 
focus on their individual merit and focused on their race. Selection equity and its various meanings 
for students whose lives are racialised due to the historical and contemporary socio-political 
structures is an important consideration for this thesis. Moreover, selection equity holds various 
meanings for training sites and as such cannot be understated as an important part of the study.  
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Booi et al. (2017) argue that selection-based programmes such as the ones that they investigated 
have a tendency of “safe bet recruiting” when it comes to the recruitment of Black people. This 
type of recruiting is based on finding people who will fit into the programme rather than attempt 
to forge new paths. Moreover, safe bet recruiting is linked to how institutions attempt to maintain 
the status quo, which is the reproduction of (White) Euroamerican-centric practices, in what Booi 
et al. (2017) have termed academic inbreeding. The extent to which professional psychology 
training programmes engage in safe bet recruiting is not immediately visible when looking at the 
statistical data provided by Bantjes et al. (2016) or the HPCSA (2017b) report. It is possible to 
make an argument that Black candidates are chosen for how closely they resemble the 
Euroamerican standard, which in psychology is usually White, middle class and female (Bantjes 
et al., 2016; HPCSA, 2017b). 
In using the concept of safe bets is to point to the institutional cultures within, specifically, HWUs 
that are exclusionary to Black candidates. The turn towards safe bets also indicate a kind of 
exceptionalism of Black candidates of differentiating between those Black people who belong in 
comparison to those who do not. Exceptional deserves to be de-constructed. Black safe bets can 
refer to exceptionalism of certain Black candidates who simultaneously carry the burden of 
“representation” whilst being heralded as exceptional from the other Blacks. It is the exceptional 
Black candidate who approaches the status of “human”, in other words who approaches Whiteness, 
in the ways that Fanon (1962) argued in using the term lactification. Lactification can be 
understood as not only the “desire to be white” but an alienation and estrangement from Black 
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lifeworlds in pursuit of being a suitable candidate for Masters training. However, it is the standards 
that create the exceptional that require close inspection rather than the candidates themselves. 
Rozena Maart (2014), in Philosophy born of massacres. Marikana, the theatre of cruelty: The 
killing of the ‘kaffir’ notes how the Black policemen who shot at the Black miners were attempting 
to kill the parts of themselves that are regarded as the lowest forms of humanity. The selection of 
safe bet candidates requires to some extent forms of Blackness that are regarded as unsuitable 
within the professional training programmes. Walter Mignolo notes that “[i]nstitutions [and 
training sites] are created for two functions: training of new (epistemic obedient) members and 
control of who enters and what knowledge-making is allowed, disavowed, devalued or celebrated” 
(2009, p. 18). The control of who enters the discipline is linked with who are the gatekeepers of 
the discipline and what qualities they value within candidates. To select candidates that will be 
epistemically obedient means that “safe bets” are often chosen on Euroamerican-centric standards. 
The standards used to choose new members are based on exclusionary practices against many 
Black people. Referring to the selection procedures, the autobiographical part of the candidate’s 
application can serve to be a gatekeeping mechanism in which safe bets appear to be the most 
desirable candidates. In simpler terms, because value is placed on the autobiographies that fit a 
narrowly defined perception of what it means to be a psychologist, safe bets may present 
autobiographies that fit the dominant practices. 
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The HPCSA (2017b) indicates that for most psychologists, English and Afrikaans are still the 
primary languages used in psychological therapeutic settings. Language is undoubtedly linked to 
the high number of White psychologists. The report by the HPCSA (2017b) found that 60% of the 
consultations from the practitioners who completed their survey practice in English, with 
Afrikaans in second at 20%. Noteworthy here is that Black people speak multiple languages that 
often include English and/or Afrikaans (StatsSA, 2016a). However, the continued privileging of 
English and/or Afrikaans shows the disregard for many of the language groups within South Africa 
(Cakata & Segalo, 2017). According to the Language Policy for Higher Education of 2002, it is 
reasonably possible everyone has the right to receive tuition in their preferred language and should 
not be discriminated against on the basis of their language (Department of Higher Education and 
Training [DHET], 2002). Ahmed and Pillay (2004) note that the skewed language distributions in 
favour of White middle classes significantly hamper the delivery of mental health services to most 
of the country’s population. Moreover, the report by the HPCSA (2017b) found that most of the 
practitioners in their survey could practice proficiently in English (approximately 70%) then 
Afrikaans (44%), with the third closest proficiency coming in IsiZulu (approximately 6%). Further, 
even as the HPCSA filtered their results according to the racial/ethnic category of the practitioner, 
English is still the most frequently used language in consultation, however, showing a significant 
decline from the general average amongst Black practitioners (HPCSA, 2017b). 
Language is probably a central issue in the selection of counselling and clinical psychology 
trainees. It is no small matter that there is continued benefiting of a minority of South Africa’s 
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population through language. This has a profound influence on the selection of candidates, as 
language can be a barrier for access for most students who may not necessarily speak English 
and/or Afrikaans (see Foley, 2004). Using English and/or Afrikaans signals to a psychology 
oriented toward a White, urban middle classes who can access psychology both as client and 
service provider. Empirical evidence of the focus on White, urban, and middle classes can be found 
in the HPCSA (2017b) survey, with special reference to the geographical area, the client base, and 
practice context. These three areas in the report point to how psychological practice in all 
professional categories, but specifically for the purposes of this thesis, clinical and counselling 
psychology, have remained hegemonically White, urban, and middle-class focused. I maintain that 
this hegemony in practice context has much to do with the selection of candidates who enter the 
profession and the structure, form and content of the training programmes from which these 
practitioners emerge. Psychology can maintain its status quo through privileging characteristics in 
Masters candidates that leads to a high number of psychologists in private practice and in urban 
areas. 
Mayekiso et al. (2004) argue that for clinical psychology there are insufficient numbers of Black 
applicants to choose from in Masters selection. It is worth noting that even though this may be true 
there may be an implicit selection bias. The selection for counselling and clinical psychology 
training programmes criteria may be in favour of people who speak English and/or Afrikaans and 
understand things a certain way (privileging Euroamerican understandings of lifeworlds). Further, 
the selection bias may also be influenced by the intentions of the training. The perceived suitability 
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of a candidate for the training may not be constrained by the pool of applicants, but also by the 
way the trainers view suitability. In other words, if the training programme is heavily influenced 
by western modes of thinking the selectors are more likely to select individuals who lean towards 
that orientation. 
In terms of selection procedures for Masters clinical and counselling professional training 
programmes across various universities, a few studies have investigated perceptions of students 
on the selection procedures (Christian, Mokutu, & Rankoe, 2002; Kleintjes & Swartz, 1996; Truab 
& Swartz, 2013). There is little empirical work investigating if there is uniformity or differences 
in the selection procedures of training sites. However, in 1985 PASA commissioned a report on 
the challenges facing the training of psychologists which was subsequently completed in 1987 
(van der Westhuyezen & Plug, 1987). Further, van der Westhuyzen and Plug (1987, p. 167) noted 
that the universities that responded to the survey for the report all shared these genetic stages of 
selection:  
Stage 1. Application form 
Candidates write a brief autobiography 
Reports by referees 
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Stage 2. Personal interview 
Observation of applicants’ interpersonal skills in role play and leaderless groups 
Personality assessment 
Presentation and evaluation of cases by applicants 
Evaluation of video-taped therapeutic interviews by applicants 
Stage 3. Final selection panel 
Selection procedures are a central mechanism that continue the exclusion of Black people from 
professional training programmes. Pillay et al. (2013, pp. 47-48) mention that “selection varies 
across universities, indices such as academic excellence, reflexivity, life experience, and a 
community orientation are used in an attempt to recruit the most appropriate students…”. There is 
a marginal consideration, in the study by Pillay and colleagues, of selection procedures. Other 
recent studies into the training of psychologists (see Pillay et al., 2013; Pillay & Kramers, 2008; 
Pillay & Kramers-Olen, 2014) have been limited by not investigating selection procedures of 
professional programmes. For example, the criteria that Pillay et al. (2013) refer to were similar to 
the ones found by van der Westhuyzen and Plug (1987), particularly in relation to academic 
performance and personality of students. It is possible that the lack of information on how 
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universities select candidates for the professional Masters training programmes may be concealing 
problematic, untransformed practices. 
4.4.3 Curriculum practices. In much the same way as selection procedures of training 
sites for counselling and clinical psychologists, the curriculum at Masters level has received little 
attention. Although several authors, such as Long (2013, 2016a), Long and Foster (2013), and 
Macleod (2004) have spoken about the “irrelevance” of psychology, there is little empirical 
investigation into the training curriculum. The discussion I present here on the training of 
psychologists is limited to a few studies for which the curriculum of psychology in general has 
been discussed, which includes the Masters training level curricula. The historical development of 
psychology and the lack of Africa(n)-centred perspectives within South African psychology 
indicate that the discipline has not de-oriented itself from the west. Moreover, the present section 
deals with the third objective of the study which is to engage the question, what is being taught in 
the clinical and counselling psychology Masters training courses at various universities in South 
Africa? 
The curriculum structure of professional psychology training mimics US and European curriculas 
(see Painter & van Ommen, 2008; Seedat & Mackenzie, 2008). According to the HPCSA (2018b), 
in the early years of professional psychology training there was uncritical absorption of western 
models. The dominance of western models in professional psychological training has remained the 
case up to this point. The contestations about what should be included in the curriculum of the 
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professional training programmes is central in the debates on the scope of practice (see HPCSA, 
2018b). Further, crucial to the current study, the curriculum of training programmes for 
counselling and clinical psychologists reflects the continued dominance of Euroamerican-centrism 
within South African psychology. I agree with Carolissen et al. (2015, p. 15) in their contention 
that:  
When a curriculum clearly functions in a way that primarily includes students who are 
already in positions of privilege, while further marginalising and blocking the identities of 
students who are not, then we need fundamental and far-reaching change to transform it 
from an instrument of oppression to a tool that can help to bring about equitable social 
relations between citizens. 
To use the curriculum as “a tool that brings equitable change” – in short, an Africa(n)-centred 
curriculum – it is important that the curriculum is not only understood as not only what is being 
taught but as broader than content. A distinction, however, must be made between pedagogy and 
the curriculum. Pedagogy is defined by Basil Bernstein as “a sustained process whereby 
somebody(s) acquires new forms or develops existing forms of conduct, knowledge, practice and 
criteria from somebody(s) or something deemed to be appropriate and evaluator…” (1996, p. 78). 
On the other hand, Carolissen et al. (2015, p. 9) define curriculum as “what is taught (content), 
how teaching takes place (process) and the ethical and moral practices of teachers’ work (context) 
with students”. They further elaborate that the curriculum is therefore “a symbolic process 
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whereby reality is reproduced, repaired and transformed in historical and social context and 
through which we (both students and educators) may articulate our experience in the world by 
studying bodies of knowledge”. This is an important way of conceptualising the curriculum, not 
only as a content, but also as a way in which reality, both disciplinary reality and societal reality, 
is constructed. This definition of the curriculum lends itself well to how we understand the 
construction of African-centred training programmes for clinical and counselling psychologists. 
Bernstein (1996) and Maton’s (2013) epistemic pedagogic device as constituted by the three fields 
– field of production, field of recontextualisation, and the field of reproduction. The epistemic 
pedagogic device is crucial in the understanding of the curriculum of professional Masters training 
programmes. The field of recontextualisation offers a number of ways in which to understand the 
curriculum practices of the professional training programmes. In extending the field of 
recontextualisation, Bernstein (1996) proposed a distinction of the professions as singulars or 
regionalised. Singulars he described as the disciplines that are inward looking characterised by 
“strong inner commitments centred in the perceived intrinsic value of their specific knowledge 
domains” (Beck & Young, 2005, p. 185). Regions, on the other hand, Bernstein (1996, p.52) 
argues, “are constructed by recontextualising singulars into larger units which operate both in the 
intellectual field of disciplines and in the field of external practice”. Classically, psychology is 
conceptualised within this framing as a singular, however, through its professionalisation has 
moved rather significantly into regionalisation. Regions are not only internally, in the institutions, 
controlled but are also determined by the market to which they oriented, with various stakeholders 
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driving the field of recontextualisation. In the context of professional training, the HPCSA, through 
the Professional Board for Psychology, plays a role in the way the curriculation occurs within 
training sites. Singh (2015) maintains that most professional disciplines, such as psychology, 
straddle both the singular and regionalisation. It could be possible to accept the analysis by Singh 
that professional psychology typifies the straddling in the debates over the scope of practice. 
However, I illustrated that the debates over the scope of practice are concerned not with the most 
effective use of the discipline for the public good but rather with disciplinary domains. In keeping 
with the field of recontextualisation and the extent of the singularity or regionalisation of 
professional psychology, it becomes pertinent to understand the extent of the HPCSA’s shaping 
of the curricula and its subsequent effects on trainee psychologists. The investigation of the 
HPCSA’s role in the curriculation of the Masters counselling and clinical psychologists will occur 
at the level of the field of recontextualisation. 
The HPCSA, through the Professional Board for Psychology, maintains the standards of curricula 
that are acceptable for the training of psychologists. The Professional Board for Psychology 
provides guidelines to universities on what are the requirements for the first year (M1) and second 
year (M2) of the training of all psychologists (see HPCSA, 2010a). Paramount in the current thesis 
is the M1 year, for which the HPCSA provides competencies and Exit Level Outcomes (ELO) (see 
HPCSA, 2019a, 2019c). These ELOs include psychological assessment, psychological 
interventions, professional practice, research, policy development and programme design, training 
and supervision, and ethics and legislation (HPCSA, 2019a, 2019c). It is important to note that 
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each one of these ELOs has been highlighted as having its own challenges, for instance, it has been 
pointed out that some psychometric assessment tools are devoid of contextual utility (see Foxcroft 
& Roodt, 2009). Furthermore, I contend that the models used for the training of psychologists 
continue to be derived from western countries including models for which psychological 
assessment is based. Evidence of the continued domination in psychological assessment is in the 
list of approved assessment tools (HPCSA, 2014). 
Paulin Hountondji (1986) notes that the majority of scientific knowledge in Africa is extraverted. 
By this he means that it is less oriented toward building and servicing Africa than contributing to 
the Euroamerican knowledge repository. Psychological knowledge is also extraverted as it treats 
Black communities in Africa as sites of application as compared to sites of knowledge creation. It 
imports Euroamerican ideals of psychological health and wellbeing into Africa. It treats context 
less as a site of thought and knowledge generation but rather as a site of application. This type of 
extraversion means that western derived models are continuously used within the professional 
training sites, particularly for the curriculum. Carolissen et al. (2015, p. 11) maintain that for South 
African psychology in general there has been an attempt to resist this extraversion by:  
[P]roduc[ing] texts that represent local contexts and experiences and challenge traditional 
asocial and ahistorical thinking in psychology. Thus many of the well-known critical 
psychologists in South Africa invested much time and energy from the mid-1990s onwards 
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in developing alternative, critical and more locally representative texts to draw on in the 
curriculum. 
The issue of dependence on Euroamerican-centric theories and models has been highlighted 
throughout the current thesis, however, it bears mentioning here again. The lack of theoretical 
development coming from the (South) African context has led to a continued dominance of US 
and European theories, thus perpetuating the misrecognition of Africa (Pretorius, 2012). The 
reliance on Euroamerican-centric theories and models of wellbeing and health means that the 
practice of psychologists will continue to create the kinds of knowledges that exclude Blacks, poor 
and working-class peoples. 
The curriculum development of training sites at HBUs reflected what was happening at HWUs. 
Most of the early Black psychologists received their training mainly through historically English-
speaking universities, which meant that the curriculum at HBUs followed what was happening at 
HWUs, particularly English-speaking universities. In addition, the large number of White 
academic staff across the universities (de la Rey, 2001) meant that there was a reliance on HWUs 
for guidance with regards to curriculum structure (Jeremy Davidson, personal communication). 
Moreover, there was the infantising nature of the relationship between many HBUs and HWUs 
persisting into late apartheid. In general, therefore, psychology programmes at HBUs and HWUs 
often reflected each other, at least at the level of the curriculum. 
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It is concerning that there is continued lack of collated historical and contemporary information on 
HBUs. HBUs currently produce the largest cohorts of Black psychologists (Pillay & Siyathola, 
2008), for which little is known about the curriculum structure. It is also concerning that the early 
replication of HWUs training programmes at HBUs has continued into the current democratic era 
and indicates the difficulty in attempting to transform psychology (Painter & van Ommen, 2008). 
It is important in the current study that HBUs are investigated as part of the larger (re)production 
of Euroamerican-centric dependency. 
To deal with some of the challenges inherent in the training of psychologists, in relating to the 
elitist and racially biased (White) nature of the training and practice of psychology, many training 
sites instituted a community psychology course (Seedat & Lazarus, 2011; Suffla & Seedat, 2004). 
It is worth noting that the HPCSA does not make explicit provision for the inclusion of community 
psychology courses at M1 (HPCSA, 2010b, 2010c). However, there is provision for community 
psychology training which should form 10% of the M2 year (HPCSA, 2010). Carolissen et al. 
(2010) argue that current pedagogic practices of community psychology create a racialised sub-
discipline. It leaves mainstream psychology unchanged as a White, and middle-class, psychology, 
and constructs community psychology as something for Blacks and the poor (see also Carolissen, 
2014). 
Linked to the challenge of creating a racialised discipline are issues relating to the multiculturalism 
discourse that often surrounds contemporary psychology. To reiterate the link between community 
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psychology and multicultural practice it is important to note that the development of multicultural 
competencies (see Eagle, 2005) can be understood as developing an understanding of Black 
people, queer people, poor and working-class peoples. For instance, Johnston (2018) illustrated 
that one of the main challenges for clinical psychology training was multicultural practice and 
supervision. Although Johnston falls short of mentioning the race of the client and student 
population, the continued reference to “immigration” and the use of “culture” implies reference to 
poor and Black people. The use of multiculturalism even in community psychology often 
continues to position Black people as the non-normative other that is different from the normative 
White, middle-class population that is the “subject” of psychology (see Kelley, 2018). Further, 
Coimbra, Menezes, Fryer, and Seedat (2012) argue that community psychology in the Global 
South, due in part to Euroamerican donor funding, perpetuates the challenges faced by oppressed 
communities. Moreover, the challenges inherent in the current conception of community 
psychology relate to the understanding of “community” as referring to Black, poor and working-
class communities (Carolissen et al., 2010; Ngonyama ka Sigogo & Modipa, 2004). 
Pillay (2016) notes that community psychology at both teaching and practice level often relies on 
the individualised mainstream psychological interventions. Fryer and Laing (2008) maintain that 
how community psychology is constituted is largely dependent on who has the authority to 
construct community psychology. Presently the hegemony of Euroamerican-centric practices 
extends to the larger university spaces, as evidenced by such things as the institutional cultures 
(Higgs, 2004). These Euroamerican-centric institutional cultures relate to who has the authority to 
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construct the nature of disciplines, and as a result, even critically oriented sub-disciplines such as 
community psychology are often co-opted. The increasing institutionalisation of community 
psychology has led to the sub-discipline being defined mainly from a Euroamerican perspective, 
ultimately creating a mimicry of the community mental health model in the US (see Gokani & 
Walsh, 2017). As with many of the models coming out of the US and Europe, the community 
mental health model relies primarily on apolitical models (Coimbra et al., 2012). Ultimately, the 
addition of community psychology courses in Masters training programmes has not led to 
fundamental change to the orientation of the training away from the Euroamerican-centrism (see 
Ratele et al., 2018). 
4.5 The Racialised class disparities and professional psychology 
Long (2016c) describes the challenges facing the contextualisation of psychology as not entirely 
an issue of culture but rather the challenge of class disparities found in South African society. 
Historically it is not a matter of great debate that the class disparities in South African society were 
along racial lines (StatsSA, 2017b). This racialisation in class was because of the social 
engineering of apartheid (Jones & Mtshali, 2013). Apartheid racial economy was predated by a 
number of colonial policies during the early- to mid-19th century that sort to position Whites in 
better economic standing then Black people (Seedat & McKenzie, 2008). This racialised economic 
division caused by apartheid and colonisation has persisted into democratic South Africa and has 
continued the uneven distribution of the country’s resources (StatsSA, 2017b). 
197 
 
197 | P a g e  
 
These racilised class disparities not only affect the client population of counselling and clinical 
psychologists but may also affect the practitioner population of the categories. Carolissen et al. 
(2010) note that merely training more Black psychologists does not resolve the issues inherent in 
the teaching and practice of psychology. Other authors have also noted that the “Blackening” of 
psychology is a necessary but insufficient step towards a decolonised discipline (Ratele et al., 
2018). According to Dlamini (2019), because of the racialised nature of South African exclusion, 
there is little attention paid to matters of class that often play a significant role in higher education 
contexts. Class feasibly is about more than the economic status but speaks to issues of social capital 
within the institutions and relating to issues of language. Social capital – the resources that allow 
students to be able to navigate institutions successfully (see Vincent & Hlatshwayo, 2018) – may 
also be linked to the safe bet recruiting (see Booi et al., 2017) in professional training programmes. 
Moreover, it is possible to see how the length of study towards a professional psychology degree 
can disadvantage those that are from working-class and poor backgrounds from accessing 
professional training programmes. It remains that even when institutions are attempting to 
“diversify” their trainee populations, class is one of the central components that requires careful 
attention. Unfortunately, there is no data that attempts to draw direct connections between class 
and selection procedures within professional psychology programmes. 
The issue of class and race is inextricably linked to the practice context of clinical and counselling 
psychologists. This is since, for example, the economic marginalisation of the majority of Black 
people also means that they are unable to pay the private practice rates of psychologists. In the 
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survey by HPCSA (2017b), clinical psychologists reported that their client base was 70% Black 
and only 33% White, whilst counselling psychologists reported 64.5% Black and 36.5% White 
clients. It appears that class, and not just race, may play a key role in who gains access to 
psychological services. Additionally, worth noting, however, is that Black practitioners tended to 
see far more Black clients (70%) than their White counterparts who saw a higher number of White 
clients (35%). It is necessary to note that the challenge in professional psychology is to resolve the 
racialised class disparities of client populations. These racialised classed disparities reflect the 
broader South African socio-political context. However, it would be absolving professional 
psychology of responsibility to say that the issue only rests in the political realm rather than an 
imperative to which the discipline is able to respond. 
The issue of class disparities is related to the neo-liberal state of South African society that 
privileges individualism and market freedom. Joan Louw commented that “[p]sychology’s aim of 
‘production and control of behaviour’, in an economic order where greater efficiency, productivity 
and profits are at most important considerations…is much too close to social discipline and control 
for comfort” (1988, p. 75). This is in line with the arguments made by Long (2016c) wherein he 
notes that the “psy” disciplines thrive under liberal conditions in comparison to other contexts. 
This shows that the desire to control the individual, to function more efficiently under capitalist 
conditions, was not only a concern for the apartheid state and colonial periods but is also a concern 
for a liberal democratic state. Accordingly, Painter and Ommen (2008) note that what is often 
neglected is a serious interrogation of the role that the new “liberated” psychology fulfils in the 
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reproduction of a now global capitalism and the formation of neo-liberal subjects. Seedat (1998) 
maintains in The quest for a liberatory Psychology that such a psychology includes issues of race, 
class, and gender as they pertain to equity and justice. The issues of class, gender, and race, I argue, 
are not outside the prerogative of training institutions, as training sites are responsible for 
producing psychologists who (re)produce (or resist) global capitalist norms. The global capitalist 
norms that exclude the working-classes, poor, and often Blacks are a function of the racist (White) 
Euroamerican-centric ideology that is freighted around the world. It is not an overstatement to 
argue that psychology, through its training programmes, places market considerations at the centre 
and ultimately excludes Black people. 
Euroamerican-centric ideology is White-centric in the sense that it places White, middle-class 
lifeworlds at the centre of inquiry. South Africa’s history of colonialism and apartheid, coupled 
with the failures of the democratic government, means that the marketplace excludes Black people, 
and is continually reinforced by increasing private practice rates. Bernstein (2000) notes that 
knowledge is not like money, it is money, and as such knowledge flows to where there is the 
highest demand (profitability). It is important to recognise the difference of demand as highest 
profitability (private practice) and demand as where there is the highest need for the services 
(public sector). The distinction being made on the two types of demands places Black people at a 
considerable disadvantage, for it is Black people that must contend with the low economic 
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The high number of psychologists in private practice reflect not only the free marketplace outside 
the training institutions but also how the structure of the training is shaped by neo-liberal capitalist 
considerations. The structure of training programmes prepares students for the world of elite 
private practice. This is made possible through the reliance on Euroamerican-centric theories and 
models. Young (2013) indicates that, comparatively, counselling psychology in South Africa is 
aligned with counselling psychology in Europe and North America. This alignment acts as a 
solidifying mechanism for the legitimacy of counselling psychology in South Africa. There is 
inherently nothing wrong with comparing practices in South Africa with that of other countries, 
however, when the legitimacy of psychology in South Africa can be established through how 
closely it compares to countries in the west, it is an indication of the difficulty of moving from a 
dependency on Europe and the US. 
Research and practice contexts that favour urban and middle-class populations will be reflected 
within the professional training of psychologists. A large majority of psychologists work in urban 
areas, and in particular in the centre of the South African economy, Gauteng (HPCSA, 2017b; see 
also Louw & Machemedze, 2015). If we consider that a substantial proportion of the registered 
psychologists are working in private practice and thus inaccessible to the majority of the urban 
(and rural) poor, due to the high private practice rates, this is a worrying trend (HPCSA, 2017b; 
Pillay & Kramers, 2003). Macleod (2004), investigating the issue of relevance in South African 
psychology, found that the majority of research focused on the urban and middle-class populations, 
whilst little research was on rural and poor South Africans. It is no wonder that the majority of the 
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psychologists are higher in provinces where it is assumed that people can afford the services (Louw 
& Machemedze, 2015).  
The notion of the epistemic pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1996; Maton, 2013) as integral in how 
knowledge is developed and disseminated within professional psychology may show how 
psychological training, and practice remains (white) Euroamerican-centric The reasons for 
psychologists choosing to practice in urban areas may also be influenced by the nature of their 
training, in that the training privileges a particular kind of client base. The findings by Macleod 
(2004) of psychological research being heavily focused on urban and middle-class populations, 
the teaching within training institutions may tend to focus on those populations also. In terms of 
the pedagogic epistemic device it is possible to frame this as transformation from the field of 
production to the field of recontextualisation and the field of reproduction. 
It is possible, against the backdrop of the focus on urban and middle-class populations, to argue 
that psychologists are inadequately trained to deal with people living in peri-urban and rural areas 
(Ahmed & Pillay, 2004; Pillay, 2015; Pretorius, 2012). Urban areas offer a context in which people 
are assumed to be more “westernised” or, to use Dawes’ (1998) conception, “modernised”. Some 
assumptions, for example, that perverse rural communities include the argument that rural 
communities are not receptive to psychology (see Pillay & Kramers, 2003), can be constraining to 
the decisions that psychologists make post-training. Rather than adjust the training to fit the 
multitude of people that make up the country’s population, psychology at the level of training 
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focuses on the urban middle-class sector of South Africa. What is important to note here is that in 
the training of psychologists these myths are not debunked but are often reinforced in the 
curriculum and to some degree with the selection of candidates. 
In the preceding chapters I have outlined the enormity of the challenges facing the training of 
counselling and clinical psychologists. I have argued that the training is the epicenter of the 
challenges facing service provision to the majority of the country’s population. I have argued that, 
in the main, psychology remains oriented towards the west in selection and curriculation of the 
training. Moreover, I have illustrated that the challenge has remained the Euroamerican-centrism, 
which centralises White, middle-class lifeworlds to the exclusion of Black, poor and working-
class. A pivotal question to changing the trajectory of the discipline at the level of training, I have 
outlined the question guiding the present study as, How to (re)centre Africa in the training of 
psychologists? This question is conceivably linked to four objectives namely; who is being trained, 
where are they being trained, what are they being trained to do, and how are they being trained? 
To engage with these objectives, I have outlined the theoretical framework of this thesis as one 
that moves away from the centralising Euroamerican lifeworlds, towards Africa(ns). An Africa(n)-
centred perspective to the training of counselling and clinical psychologists that I have constructed 
as understood here; as an endogenous approach accepting of the pluriversal nature of human life 
in Africa and focusing on the African, not as the excluded Other, but rather as the subject at the 
centre. In the following chapter I will outline the methodology that was used in the collection of 
the data and the analytic tools used to engage with the data. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1 Research aim and objectives 
The main aim of the study was to investigate dominant practices of the training of clinical and 
counselling psychologists that displace Black, poor, and working-class people as the Other. The 
study aimed to investigate the dominance of (white) Euroamerican-centric notions of the practice 
of psychologists through the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. I proposed that it 
is through an Africa(n)-centred perspective in the training of psychologists that the hegemonic 
Euroamerican-centric training can be changed. An Africa(n)-centred approach is understood here 
as a pluriversal, endogenous approach that places Africa and Africans as central to the 
development of theory and practice of psychologists. The aim of the study was informed in large 
part by the socio-political history of colonialism and apartheid, and its aftermath coloniality, which 
continues the marginalisation of Africa(ns).  
To engage in an Africa(n)-centred perspective in the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists, I operationalised the aim of the study as: how do we (re)-centre Africa in the training 
of masters counselling and clinical psychologist? To answer the main research question, I 
developed three research objectives that pertained to the components of the training of counselling 
and clinical psychologists. Firstly, I asked, who is being trained? The question of who was being 
trained was less about the statistical makeup of the training sites as this is evidenced in the 
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psychologists’ demographics (Bantjes et al., 2016; HPCSA, 2017b) illustrates the skewed nature 
of racial demographics within psychology. Rather, in asking who is being trained, the question 
was about selection procedures that may be informed by Euroamerican ideals of what it means to 
be a psychologist. The question of who was also able to draw in both the experiences of the 
selectors and the intern psychologists. Secondly, I argued that one of the key components of the 
training pertains to what are counselling, and clinical psychologists trained to do? This question is 
linked with the high number of psychologists in private practice, the de-politicised nature of 
psychology, and the continued exclusion of Black people as clients. Moreover, the question of 
what counselling and clinical psychologists trained to do was to show the influence of the HPCSA 
(2018b) through such legislation as the Regulations Defining The Scope Of The Profession Of 
Psychology maintain the practices of training sites with regards to the role and function of 
psychologists. These practices extend to beliefs and values that may be linked to the selection of 
both candidates and curricula, influenced largely by the historical legacies of the sites themselves 
– whether they are HBU, HWASU, HWESU, or merged. Finally, the third objective of the study 
was to engage with what are trainee psychologist being taught? The issue of the curriculum is 
central to how psychologists’ practice as it often illustrates the continued mimicry of Europe and 
the US. I conceptualised the curriculum in the same way as Tebello Letsekha as “what knowledge 
is included or excluded from university teaching and learning” (2013, p.8), but also more broadly 
to include the content, context and process of teaching and learning within training sites (see 
Carolissen et al., 2015).  
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5.2 Research design 
The current study is focused within the discipline of psychology, from the history to the 
professionalisation of the discipline. However, I have maintained throughout this study, and in 
especially elaborating on an Africa(n)-centred approach, that part of the challenges facing the 
discipline have been the decadent nature of psychology. In so doing, I have constructed a 
perspective that is agile enough to allow a view of the training of psychologist that is not limited 
to the disciplinary boundaries but thinks through various other disciplines. An Africa(n)-centred 
perspective to the training of counselling and clinical psychologists, I have argued, is 
transdisciplinary in nature, due in large part to how psychology has turned towards itself and 
constructed a reality outside that of the larger South African socio-political landscape. To remain 
true to this tenet of transdisciplinarity to the training of psychologists, the methodology deployed 
must also place value in transdisciplinarity. An important distinction is therefore made between a 
methods and methodology, which, according to Fairclough (2012, p. 13), can be understood as: 
[m]ethodology is to be understood as a transdisciplinary process of theoretically 
constructing the object of research for a research project; particular methods are selected 
according to how the object of research is constructed. So it is not just a matter of ‘applying 
methods’ in the usual sense, and we cannot so sharply separate theory and method. 
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The study employed a multicase approach the universities were treated as limited case studies. Yin 
contests that a case study is a research strategy that “is used in many situations to contribute to our 
knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena” (2003, 
p.1). A multicase study is, as Stake asserts, “a special effort to examine something having lots of 
cases, parts, or members” (2006, p. vi). The professional training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists has multiple members across different universities as trainers. Further to this, at any 
given year professional clinical and counselling psychology has new members entering the 
profession as members. The primary reason for using a multicase study approach to the universities 
is to ensure that each university category – HWASU, HWESU, merged, and HBU – can be placed 
within a larger historical context. Stake (2006) argues that multicase studies can take long periods 
to complete, but can be done within dissertation projects, within a few months of investigation.  
Further, by using a multicase study, it is possible to see how decisions regarding the curriculum 
are made within each university, and then how these occur at the cross-case level. Yin’s assertion 
that a case study is better suited to when asking ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and when “the focus 
is on a contemporary phenomenon within real-life context” (2003, p. 1). A multicase study 
approach in this study was therefore able to illuminate the field of recontextualisation, with regards 
to how research is selected and organised for training purposes. Additionally, through a multicase 
study method, the research was able to delineate the selection processes within the universities as 
products of the universities ideological or philosophical orientation.  
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Five universities out of the sixteen accredited by the HPCSA (2017a) that offer either one or both 
training of counselling and clinical psychologists were the sites of data collection. The universities 
in this study were sourced from three main provinces and cities in the country, namely the Western 
Cape and Gauteng Province, while two of the universities were in the Eastern Cape Province. The 
universities were chosen as representing one of the following categories; Historically Black 
University (HBU), Historically White University (HWU) – one former Afrikaans-speaking 
university (HWASU) and two former English-speaking universities (HWESU), and a merged 
university (MU). The categories were chosen as a representation of the generic historical, and 
contemporary, developments of psychology. The reason for the inclusion of a second HWESU is 
due to it explicitly positioning its training as an alternative form of training. Moreover, the sites 
also meant that I was able to move beyond notions that Euroamerican-centrism is only pervasive 
within HWUs, with HBUs being unaffected. It is clear within the larger contextual analysis of 
training sites that I outlined in Chapter Three, that HBUs may not be immune to the (white) 
Euroamerican-centric hegemony, due in large part to their histories of being linked with HWUs. 
Further, as pertaining to an Africa(n)-centred perspective the tentacles of global coloniality are not 
limited to institutions with a history of numerical dominance by whites.   
The data collection methods for this study were qualitative, semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with the intern psychologists and course coordinators. According to Rachel Ormston, Liz Spencer, 
Matt Barnard and Dawn Snape, qualitative research is characterised by “aims and objectives that 
are directed at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world off research 
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participants by learning about the sense they make of their social and material circumstances, their 
experiences, perspectives and histories” (2013, p. 4).   
Johnny Saldaña explains the importance of qualitative inquiry as the “meticulous attention to 
language and deep reflection on the emergent patterns and meanings of human experience” (2009, 
p. 10). The in-depth interviews were meant to engage the participants on three main issues relating 
to their social world, the curriculum, selection of candidates, and training for professional 
psychology. Semi-structured interviews have the ability to elicit themes and areas of interest, 
which allows for more flexible interviews that are focused on particular areas (Rabionet, 2011). 
The interviews with course coordinators were semi-structured so as to allow for other emergent 
issues to arise during the interview process and not only the areas that I had identified as important. 
The course coordinator interviews focused on the structure of the curriculum including the choice 
in the assessment of students and how candidates are selected for the programme. The interviews 
with the intern psychologists differed in focus, centering on the intern’s experiences when they 
were potential students undergoing the selection procedures at the universities, and secondly as 
student psychologists – their experiences of the M1 training curriculum.  
The interviews were transcribed using a transcription company, due to the volume of the interviews 
would have been difficult for me to transcribe. Instruction was given to the transcription company 
to highlight the point at which participants switched from English to isiZulu and isiXhosa. I then 
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did the transcription and translation. The use of a transcription company was to ensure the accuracy 
and integrity of the participant’s words. 
5.3 Participants 
There were two primary categories of participants in the study, intern psychologists and course 
coordinators. The HPCSA provides a definition of intern psychologists in the Handbook for the 
Training of Intern Psychologists and Accredited Institutions. Intern psychologists are defined as 
people who have completed a 3- or 4-year undergraduate degree and the end of the first year 
directed Masters course (HPCSA, 2010). The choice of intern psychologists as participants is 
primarily on the basis of their having completed the first-year Masters course and as such were 
able to retrospectively engage with the selection, training, and curriculum procedures of their 
respective universities. The HPCSA makes no provisions for definition of course coordinator. For 
the purposes of this study a course coordinator is defined in the present study as a person(s) 
responsible for the course for the student psychologists who are registered as such under the Mental 
Health Act No. 29 of 2007. Course coordinators provided valuable information on the general 
structure of the clinical or counselling psychology first year course, as they are central to the 
structure of the courses. 
The participants were recruited through the 5 university training sites who agreed to participate in 
the study. Permission was sought from the registrars of the universities and the heads of the 
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respective departments of Psychology, to contact the staff members and students. An email with 
the title of the study, the aims, the form of participation and the ethical clearance of the study was 
sent to the various staff members after obtaining their email addresses from the heads of 
department. The intern psychologists were emailed either by myself from a list provided by the 
course coordinators, or by the course coordinators, the intern psychologists could contact me 
directly after receiving the email. 
Tables 3 and 4 below are a representation of the participants in the study. Most of the categories I 
have created to represent the participants characteristics are the way the participants represented 
themselves during the research process. Although the profiles are descriptive rather than 
explanatory, they offer and important adage to the context of the research into the training of 
counselling and clinical psychologists. Seidman (2006) maintains that participant profiles allow 
others, the readers of our studies, to learn about the participants. The relevant characteristics of the 
participants are used to develop a picture of the varying and similar population groups from the 
various universities. The participant profile is an important part of the presentation of the data, 
where here I provide a broad participant profile for every institution that participated in this study. 
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Table 3: Course Coordinators 


















4 years Counselling Psychology 







19 years Clinical Psychology 




12 years Counselling Psychology 
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5 years Clinical Psychology 







4 years Clinical Psychologists 







14 years Counselling Psychology 










4 years Clinical Psychology 
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Table 4: Intern Psychologists 
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In total, I conducted 23 interviews across the 5 universities, with 8 course coordinators, 4 of whom 
coordinate counselling programmes and 4 of whom coordinated clinical programmes. I interviewed 15 
intern psychologists who had completed their M1 year(s) between 2016 and 2017, with 8 counselling 
psychology interns and 7 clinical psychology interns. The majority of the course coordinators were 
white females. The demographics of the course coordinators reflected the general demographics of 
clinical and counselling psychology as reflected by the HPCSA (2017b) and Bantjes et al. (2016). There 
was a demographic balance, with the interns participating in the study, although there was skewed 
participation towards either Black females or white females at institutional levels. Additionally, the 
course coordinators reflected a long institutional memory at each site, averaging an overall nine years 
of training experience at Masters level. The length of time at Masters training level for course 
coordinators is consequential only insofar as it points to institutional memory and ‘expertise’ of 
training. For the intern psychologists’ activities before training reflected that a number of them had 
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been in their honours year prior to doing their M1 year, illustrating more transitions into M1 year from 
honours year.  
Seidman (2006) notes that there are significant challenges when conducting in-depth interviews with 
‘elites’. Elites are understood as people in positions of power including people in professions such as 
psychology (Bledstein, 1976). The availability of participants at the training sites was a major challenge 
to the completion of the data collection. At the onset, I had not prescribed a maximum number for 
participants, only that there should be a match between the course coordinator and intern psychologists. 
The match was that for inclusion in the study, and for analytic purposes, at least one course coordinator 
must have been interviewed; and at least one or more intern psychologist from that course must have 
been interviewed. In the tables 3 and 4 above, it is apparent that the criteria have been met, except for 
the HWASU where in the clinical programme no intern psychologist participated in the study. The 
challenge of recruiting participants for this study proved to be more difficult and elusive at this 
particular site, even after a number of communications were sent to the intern psychologists.  
It bears mentioning that for some of the training sites, there was low participation. Given that each site 
trains between 6 to 12 candidates, interviewing one candidate is significantly low. The low participation 
is a significant matter in terms of how interns as new entries into the discipline and course coordinators 
as gatekeepers of the discipline at professional level view research studies such as this one. 
Illustratively, in attempting to recruit participants for the study, a course coordinator declined 
participation citing institutional reputation, even though the institution itself had granted accesses for 
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the study. In the HWESU2, only one intern was interviewed and she was the only one who responded 
to my email invitation. Seidman’s (2006) describes the problems that are pervasive in research with 
people in positions of power, such as taking control of the interview and the venue in which interviews 
are conducted. One of the shorter interviews conducted with the course coordinator at the HWASU, 
the control was purely in the hands of the interviewee. The length of the interview was influenced by 
the nature of the interviewees’ answers, wherein questions were answered in short statements offering 
little in-depth engagement. However, on the main the research participants, both intern psychologists 
and course coordinators provided in-depth reflections on the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists. 
5.4 Data analysis 
5.4.1 Coding steps. The steps for coding and the creation of themes for analysis for both 
the archival data and the interviews were similar. Saldaña (2009, p. 3) defines a code as “a word 
or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative 
attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data”. Coding can be understood as the process 
of transforming large quantities of data into smaller interconnected patterns within and across data 
sets. The analysis can be classified into descriptive and value coding. According to Saldaña (2009), 
value coding refers to a participant’s values, attitudes, and beliefs, whilst the descriptive coding 
can be referred to in terms of structures and processes. Descriptive coding is used to describe the 
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different components of the training, whilst the value coding is to highlight the more underlying 
meanings of the components of the training.  
There are three steps involved in the analysis of the interviews of the different training sites. The 
first step in coding was organising all the data according to the institution. This way of organising 
data was in line with the multi-case study method.  Although the analysis of the data was made at 
a cross-institutional level, it was important that the data be organised at the level of the institution 
because it allowed for preliminary coding within the cases.  
The second step involved two cycles of coding. The first cycle for coding was conducted by hand, 
for which Seidman (2006) allows for a closer look at the data. In the second cycle of coding, I used 
a computer-based programme, OneNote, to organise the data in a more accessible platform. In 
moving from paper to the computer, it also allowed me to relook at the data for the second time, 
whilst at once being able to access the codes for the generation of themes.  
The third step in the coding of the data was to move from the codes towards the development of 
themes. The organising and identifying of themes is an essential part of interpretation of data. I 
used thematic coding in making links amongst the descriptive and value codes, which allows for 
looking at the core categories (themes) of the interviews. Theming is about the creation of 
categories which emanate from codes, and codes create themes. Coding and theming are related, 
but distinct processes that should not be confounded. Although thematic coding is used in thematic 
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analysis, and at times cannot be separated (Braun & Clarke, 2006), I argue that this type of theming 
is useful for the analytic tool – which I offer below – I used to interpret the data, as it tracks patterns 
of talk as they (re)produce practices within the training sites.  
5.4.2 (Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse analysis. In the 2003 article Discursive 
psychology: Between Method and Paradigm Jonathan Potter highlights that:  
it is confusing to talk of [discursive psychology] as a paradigm […and] it is equally as 
confusing to talk of [discursive psychology] as a method [rather i]t is not a free-standing 
set of data generating and data analytic procedures. It is an approach embedded in a web 
of theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions (p. 783). 
In elaborating an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of clinical and counselling 
psychologists, I highlighted the debates between Potter and colleagues (2015) with Parker (2015) 
on the understanding of discourse as reified. In the analysis of the data, the caution advanced by 
Potter et al. (2015) about not viewing discourses as fixed in time and place is particularly 
important. Rather than presenting texts and talk as fixed in time, in discursive psychology 
discourses are viewed as historically constituted, contemporarily created, and reproduced. Micheal 
Arribas-Ayllon and Valerie Walkerdine, in explaining of Foucauldian discourse analysis, argue 
that “firstly, the analysis of discourse entails historical inquiry, otherwise known as ‘genealogy’. 
Secondly, analysis attends to mechanisms of power and offers a description of their functioning. 
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And lastly, analysis is directed to subjectification – the material/signifying practices in which 
subjects are made up” (2008, p. 92). Although the understanding of discursive practices in the 
current study are not necessarily Foucauldian, the explanation by Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 
(2008) of the different components of analysis are particularly apt. In understanding the 
relationship between discursive psychology and an Africa(n)-centred perspective it is also in how 
historical contexts are treated within discourse analysis. As Ian Parker argues “history in discourse 
analysis, then, should not be seen as something that pulls the strings of individual actors: rather, it 
lays out a field of action in which individuals understand themselves and others” (2004, p. 311). 
Similarly, within an Africa(n)-centred perspective to the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists, I have contended that the historical context of psychology comes to bear on the 
present-day training of psychologists. It ought to be difficult to understand the development and 
deployment of discourses within institutions as only contained within the contemporary. It is 
possible to see how discourses are not self-contained, in other words, do not refer to themselves, 
but rather to other past and present discourses.  
In extending discursive psychology into analytical use a critical discourse analysis (CDA) was 
employed in the analysis of the data. Teun van Dijk defines critical discourse analysis as “a type 
of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” 
(2001, p. 352). In CDA the focus is on uncovering the oppressive structures embedded within 
discourse (Fairclough, 2012) which can be linked with the discursive psychology focus of 
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understanding language as a component of social practice (see Potter, 2003). Social practices vary 
from context to context and from time period to time period, yet they are always linked through 
genealogical developments in society making the historical context in which they have occurred 
paramount to understanding their contemporary enactments (see Foucault, 1977). CDA is therefore 
an important way of understanding how power structures, dominance and inequality are created 
and reinforced within society and institutions through focusing on text and talk of different people 
within a given institution.  
The use of CDA as a method of analysis presents no contradictions with an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective on the training of psychologists. An Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of 
counselling and clinical psychologists is an endogenous, rather than indigenous, approach meaning 
that an Africa(n)-centred perspective values the capacity to evolve from its place of origin (see 
Lestekha, 2013), but is eminently placed within a global landscape. In placing value on being 
centred in, on, about, and from Africa, an Africa(n)-centred perspective does not negate the 
existence of multiple epistemologies to knowledge – it is pluriversal. Pluriversality of knowledge 
means that there is no contradiction between using an analytic tool developed in Europe with an 
Africa(n)-centred approach. It is thus important that the analytic tool be viewed as an (Africa(n)-
centred) critical discourse analysis, with the parenthesis symbolising the tacit nature of an Africa 
within the analysis.  
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The identification of discourses occurs within an Africa(n)-centred perspective, which I have 
stated to be against the hegemonic (white) Euroamerican-centric practices. The dominant 
discourses that arise within psychology are a reflection of discourse in western-based culture 
(Parker, 2004). Similarly, the discourses and the interpretations thereof reflect the de-structive and 
constructive nature of the current thesis in the practices of professional training sites of clinical 
and counselling psychologists. CDA explicates that there is no value-free science, and that whether 
or not people are aware of it, there are always particular values that drive their view of the world 
(van Dijk, 2001). An Africa(n)-centred perspective similarly rejects the notion of value-free 
science and implicates the influence of historically produced social structures. The social wrongs 
that are referred to in CDA are operationalised within this study as primarily the orientation of 
South African psychology towards (white) Euroamerican-centrism, in the curriculum and the 
selection of candidates. (White) Euroamerican-centrism is not only limited to the discipline of 
psychology or professional level psychology but is part of the larger socio-political landscape 
embroiled by coloniality. 
In Real Things: Discourse, Context and Practice Parker (1990, p. 231) argues that: 
[t]o identify a discourse is to take a position, and the ability to step outside a 
discourse and to label it in a particular way is a function of both the accessing of 
dominant cultural meanings and the marginal (critical) position which the 
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researcher takes (within or alongside another discourse or sub-culture or 
commonsense). 
Critical discourse analysis forms part of the turn to language; stated differently, CDA is premised 
on the idea that discourse is a central component in understanding the (re)production and 
constructions of particular social practices (Potter, 2003). Edwards (2005) notes that there are 
various ways in which types of discursive analysis can be differentiated, and the most important 
way has been in how they approach the task of analysis. In one form of discursive analysis, 
particularly those that focus on naturally occurring talk, there has been a move toward using 
conversation analysis (CA) (see van Dijk, 1993). In the present study, because the talk and thus 
the ‘object’ of analysis was not in naturally occurring settings but rather in interviews, the analysis 
was critical discourse analysis (CDA). As Potter and Edwards (1999) contest, interview talk 
remains eminently analysable within the domain of discursive psychology in that “interview talk 
[is] an arena where a range of issues to do with stake, identity, justification, morality, and so on, 
can and do become relevant” (1999, p.451). Although the current study did not use the more 
conventional notion of analysis within discursive psychology, it was important that the study was 
framed within discursive psychology because of its links to the performativity of language 
(Bozatzis & Dragonas, 2014; Potter & Edwards, 1999). The performativity of language is often 
taken for granted as normative part of human life (Potter, 2003) in places such as universities, thus 
contributing to, for instance, the normalising of inequality. It is in using CDA that the underlying 
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mechanisms – interpretive repertoires and subject positions (Augoustinos & Taliga, 2012; Kramer, 
2019) – of trainees, trainers, could be made visible.  
An explicit position against the exclusion and marginalisation of Black, poor and working-class 
people both at the level of physical participation and at the level of epistemology counteracts the 
ideas of value-free science. To understand the extent to which this exclusion has continued into 
democratic South Africa, two types of questions become pertinent, viz. ‘how’ and ‘why’. These 
types of questions are demarcated in the aim and objectives of the current study, focusing on how 
and why candidates are chosen and the structure of the curriculum including the reasoning of the 
choice of texts in teaching. In the analysis of the text and talk in the training sites the discourses 
became a focal point in the way that these “representations are constructed as solid and factual, 
and on their use in, and orientation to, actions (assigning blame, eliciting invitations, etc.)” (Potter 
& Edwards, 1999, p. 448). The analysis of the text and talk can be viewed as less a discovery of 
discourses but rather on what the discourses aim to do in relation the training of psychologists, 
particularly how decisions are justified.  
Various forms of talk that have been identified by different scholars, which I will term here as 
‘discursive devices’, which people use in text and talk in order to achieve a desired goal, which 
may be to conceal reveal, justify, explain or any other performance of discourse, are particularly 
pertinent. These discursive devices may be found in the ways people attempt to manage their own 
stake in any topic (Edwards & Potter, 1992), contradictions in talk about particular topics, and how 
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people manage these become particular important (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Moreover, people 
may use of extreme case formulations which act to defend a particular description (Edwards, 
2000), and a list of threes common discursive device used to illustrate completeness (Atkinson, 
1984). These discursive devices are particularly important when considering the discourses of both 
course coordinators and interns who are being asked to make evaluations on the professional 
training of psychologists.  
Critical discourse analysis makes visible the subjectivities and power relations created through 
discourses in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. The use of discourse is linked 
to how people position themselves and positions others (Potter et al., 2015) in the training. Subject 
positions, or subjectivities, may help in revealing how closely people, course coordinators and 
interns in this study, draw closer to or distance themselves from the dominant discourses in the 
training. Subjectivities that are negotiated and formed as part of the discourses central to the 
psychology training are understood as products of the larger discursive practices of the discipline 
(Kramer, 2019). These discourses can be considered central constructions of the discipline as they 
shape the type of subjectivities that are created to reflect or resist the Euroamerican-centric practice 
of psychologists. Further links with CDA are illustrated in Kramer’s assertion that “[c]ritical 
approaches to discourse analysis address social concerns by recognizing how discourse, as a 
historical, social and cultural constituent, is used as a means to construct and conceal power 
relations” (2019, p. 236). Power relations as explicated in the development of the Africa(n)-centred 
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perspective and the historical and contemporary enactments of the discipline, also form part of 
grasping the practices of professional psychology training.  
In arguing critically about discourse on the professional training of psychologists, it brought the 
analysis closer to the relationship between discourse and the material world. This relationship 
between discourse and the material world is part of the CDA tradition as van Dijk (2003, p. 353) 
argues that “CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, 
or challenge relations of power and dominance in society”. The relationship between discourse 
and materiality is revealed in discursive psychology in how discourse constitutes society and 
culture, discourse as being ideological, and discourse as form of social action (Parker, 2015; Potter 
& Edwards, 1999). Discourse can reveal something about the social structure of psychology in 
how inequalities are reproduced within the curriculum and the selection of candidates. Jaspreet 
Nijjar (2018), in using CDA, assert that the texts and discourses connect to the larger socio-cultural 
context, power relations that are revealed in the text, and how the text perpetuate or destabilise 
hierarchies. Finally, by focusing on discourses in the analysis of the data, I was able to illustrate 
how the challenges facing the discipline need to be understood as part of larger socio-political 
failings. 
It is plausible within an (Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse analysis that the analysis of the data 
be seen as not purely inductive or deductive. I have already argued that it is rather improbable and 
unattainable to argue for a value free look into any social phenomena. I have posited that various 
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socio-political positions influence how we view the world, and in this case the data collected in 
this study. Ritchie et al. (2013, p. 6) contest that “[w]hile qualitative research is often depicted as 
an inductive process, this is a rather misleading simplification... For example, when so-called 
inductive researchers generate and interpret their data, they cannot approach this with a blank 
mind”. Although an inductive approach was used in the analysis of the data, in the main, I was 
guided by the theory, and therefore a deductive approach was also relied on. I took the caution of 
Seidman (2006) that an inductive approach often leads to a limited analysis of the data. To mitigate 
against this limitation, I coded the data as themes emerged (inductive), after which I used a 
deductive approach (see Hlatshwayo, 2019). Further, in expanding the data analysis into both 
inductive and deductive approach, I aimed to diminish the possibility of falling into the same 
(white) Euroamerican-centric trappings of epistemic closure. 
5.5 Ethical considerations 
Ethical clearance was attained from the University of South Africa’s College of Human Sciences 
and further clearance was obtained from each university. Access to the different sites was gained 
through the registrars of the universities, some universities required reciprocal ethics clearance for 
the study. In most cases, there was a requirement for clearance from the human resources division, 
which was obtained. Informed consent was obtained from the heads of the respective Psychology 
departments, and then individual informed consent was obtained from the individual participants. 
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The study did not involve any vulnerable population groups, such as people living with disabilities 
or diagnosed with any mental disorder.  
The multicase study design limited the anonymity and confidentiality of the institution, and as 
such, limited the anonymity of the course coordinators, particularly from people who attended the 
institution. To mitigate against the challenge of the diminished anonymity of the participants the 
universities are not referred to by name to guard against any reputational damage that may result 
from the study. The participants of the study were also given pseudonyms to protect their identity.  
The interviews were initially face-to-face with the participants but owing to the challenges of 
recruiting people for face-to-face interviews, an amendment was requested to conduct electronic 
interviews. The participant’s interviews were stored in the encrypted hard drive of the different 
training institutions. Due to the extent and number of interviews in this study, a transcription centre 
was used. All the transcribers signed confidentiality agreements and the original interviews were 
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Chapter 6: Discourses of race 
“God, I often say it’s like selecting the Pope.” (Menzi, course coordinator, HWESU2) 
6.1 Introduction 
As discourses are historically constituted (van Dijk, 1993), it is important to understand their 
manifestation, but equally, how they come to bear on the contemporary functioning of society. As 
indicated earlier, issues of race and racialisation are an integral part of the fabric of South African 
society and, as such, race and racialisation become central components of an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective to the training of counselling and clinical psychologists. Apartheid race categories are 
still in use in South Africa; for example, they are still used in census data (StatsSA, 2016b), in 
university admissions policies (see Kessi & Cornell, 2015), and in employment statistics (StatsSA, 
2017a). This indicates that the use of race categorisation as a way to measure redress not only 
affects professional psychology, the use of race categorisation and how best to ensure equality cuts 
across higher education in South Africa (Gibbon & Kabaki, 2006). In the professional training of 
counselling and clinical psychologists, racial categories are used to discern the participation of 
previously excluded groups of people (Pillay & Kramers-Olen, 2014). 
Borrowing from Michael Maton’s (2004) notion of a ‘right kind’ of knower, which he developed 
while exploring the 1960s British Cultural Studies, this chapter deals, in part, with the objective 
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of who is being trained. In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate that professional training in 
psychology, by virtue of its selection mechanisms, posits that there is a right and wrong kind of 
knower. Historically, the determinants for a right and wrong kind of knower have been based on 
the master signifiers of race, gender, and class. In contemporary discourses, these master signifiers 
begin to also be shaped by such things as meritocracy, diversity, and deficit however, the effects 
of the exclusion of Black, working-class, and poor people continues.   
The question of who is being trained lends itself well to an (Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse 
analysis, as an (Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse analysis gestures towards exclusionary 
discursive practices within institutions. In an Africa(n)-centred perspective, which is endogenous, 
pluriversal, and centres Africa(n) lifeworlds, it remains important to investigate the institutional 
mechanisms within professional psychology that create the necessary conditions for the exclusion 
of Black lifeworlds. This exclusion also extends not only to students, but also to what is deemed 
necessary to include in a curriculum, and in what ways such information is curated.   
The analysis that follows in this chapter brings course coordinators and former M1 students – now 
intern psychologists – into conversation with one another. Not only was it necessary to bring into 
close proximity the discursive practices that hold for course coordinators and the students they 
selected and subsequently taught, but it was also important to make visible the institutionalised 
discursive practices that cut across the various universities. The analysis, therefore, emphasises a 
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dialectic between institutions, course coordinators, and interns that centres on the practices of 
professional psychology that continue to be exclusionary.  
6.2 Discourses of merit  
6.2.1 Meritocracy. In focussing on the exclusion of the majority Black population 
from professional psychology, it is almost inevitable that discourses of merit will arise. As 
Michael Young has argued, meritocracy is often used by those in power to legitimise their 
position by arguing that meritocracy is “not an aristocracy of birth, not a plutocracy of 
wealth, but a true meritocracy of talent” (1958, p. 21). I have suggested that race and 
racialisation plays a significant role in the entry of students into professional training, as 
either candidates are recognised as inherently belonging or misrecognised as the Other, who 
does not belong. This suggestion is based on the continued use of (White) Euroamerican-
centric standards of entry into professional training programmes. Kessi and Cornell note that 
“[d]iscourses of transformation thus produce knowledge about black students as undeserving 
of an education either because they are lacking in capabilities (they are accused of not 
entering on merit) or lacking in hard work (they are accused of being unfairly advantaged)” 
(2015, p. 2). The use of racial categories in the selection of candidates for professional 
training may evoke meanings that they are not selected on the basis of merit but for the 
purposes of racial representation. In the following extract, Matshepo, a counselling 
psychology intern from the MU, speaks about how the use of race for selection often brings 
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with it feelings of inadequacy. Answering a question on the concept of racial quotas in 
selection, she stated: 
It’s like you have to prove that you deserve to be here and that’s probably why we try and 
work harder compared to other people who were chosen, maybe because their race didn’t 
really matter.  
In Matshepo’s contention that “it’s like you have to prove that you deserve to be here”, she may 
be attempting to illustrate how there is a sense that she, and students like her, must continuously 
justify why she (they) deserve(s) to be in the programme. She adds “that’s probably why we try 
and work harder compared to other people”, which could perhaps be illustrating the added pressure 
of being Black in the professional programme. Matshepo continues to say that “other people who 
were chosen, maybe because their race didn’t really matter”. Although she does not name the 
“other people”, it is likely that she is referring to her White classmates. I would suggest that 
Matshepo is referencing how Whiteness is rendered invisible and normative within the selection 
of candidates. I would also suggest that this invisibility of Whiteness positions those students who 
come to be white as eminently suitable, through the discourse of merit, for professional 
programmes. Moreover, Matshepo’s use of “you” and “we” also assumes a shared mutuality of 
the knowledge of not only her Black classmates but also me the researcher. This shared mutuality 
of knowledge can be linked to the ways in which Steve Biko (1978/2004) and Chabani Manganyi 
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(1973/2019) understood Blackness. The mutuality of knowledge is of oppressive conditions that 
position Black students as not belonging within the professional programme.  
 
Thabo, an intern clinical psychologist from the MU, further encapsulates the discourses of merit 
that arise because of how race is positioned within the selection of training candidates in the 
following extract: 
 
But I keep saying this to many people, it’s really, with us Blacks, when we make it into the 
programme it’s always because we are Black, but when a White person makes it into the 
programme it’s because their marks were good and they engaged well in the interviews. 
As soon as a Black person makes it into the programme, everyone forgets that you also 
submitted a transcript of your marks. As soon as a Black person enters the programme, 
everyone forgets that you also went and engaged with a whole group of people for an hour. 
In stating that it’s “when we make it into the programme it’s always because we are Black”, Thabo 
is indicating how race appears to play a significant role in the discourses of merit. He further 
elaborates that “when a White person makes it into the programme it’s because their marks were 
good and they engaged well in the interviews”, where he may be bemoaning discourses of merit 
that position him (as a Black student) as incapable and White students as necessarily capable 
because they are White. Thabo also suggests that the discourses of merit and their relationship to 
race ignore that Black students, as with their White counterparts, “also submitted a transcript of 
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your marks” and “engaged with a whole group of people for an hour”. In the comparison between 
Black and White students, Thabo attempts to show the (seeming) equality of the process of entry 
into the professional programme. However, I would propose that Thabo’s comparison falls into 
the re-inscription that supposes that the selection into professional programmes is a meritocracy. 
As Young (1958) illustrates, meritocracy is a fallacy used to justify the continuation of 
exclusionary systems. Although race-based quotas are used to situate inclusive practices (Erasmus, 
2012), this quota-based system appears to hold particular kinds of meanings for students (see Kessi 
& Cornell, 2015). 
In the next extract, Sarah, the course coordinator at the HWESU of the clinical programme, 
highlights how the negative perceptions created in the selection of a special group of candidates 
may have negative ramifications. I had asked Sarah if race is important in the selection of 
candidates and she answered by saying “yes”:  
But at the same time I think that always sometimes leads to a backlash of, well, you were 
only selected because you’re an equity candidate. And that’s something we’ve really 
argued against ’cause our [...] Generally, and this is a generalisation, but equity candidates 
are so much better at talking to social issues, often because they come from more diverse 
backgrounds than white candidates. And obviously I’m generalising, but that we have in 
no way had to [...] Because the Board has this issue of ‘it’s a requirement that there’s a 
50% equity intake’, that can sometimes lead to a very negative narrative about you’re only 
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here because you’re an equity candidate. And that certainly has not been my experience 
sitting in selections that that’s been something we’ve had to force or push. 
In stating that “but at the same time I think that always sometimes leads to a backlash”, Sarah is 
perhaps showing how the issue of race can be interpreted to mean that Black students enter 
professions solely through them being Black. Sarah may also be trying to suggest her recognition 
of the discourse of Black students and merit when she adds that “you were only selected because 
you’re an equity candidate”. Moreover, Sarah may perhaps be shifting the cause of the negative 
narrative of Black students towards the Professional Board for Psychology when she argues that 
“because the Board has this issue of ‘it’s a requirement that there is 50% equity intake”. I would 
suggest that although equity policies often work in conjunction with the discourses of merit (see 
Erasmus, 2012; Kessi & Cornell, 2015), it is still important to consider how institutions address 
the policies that can reproduce negative discourses of race versus merit. One way in which training 
sites, in particular, have attempted to legitimise the entry of Black students into professional 
programmes can be seen in the statement by Sarah that “generally, and this is a generalisation, but 
equity candidates are so much better at talking to social issues”. In seeking alternative forms of 
legitimation, training sites may invariably act to reproduce the notion that Black candidates are 
extraordinary, or, as Kessi and Cornell (2015, p. 2) have argued, that Black students are not viewed 
“as rightful co-beneficiaries of transformation”.  
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Traub and Swartz (2013) have showed how the discourses of merit in relation to Black students 
within professional training programmes can pervade how White students view Black students. 
The perceptions by White students in the professional training programme that participated in the 
Traub and Swartz (2013) study positioned themselves as belonging in the programme, whilst Black 
students where positioned as not belonging. Taking Truab and Swartz (2013) findings it may be 
possible that perceptions of the right kind of knower, or of who belongs in the discipline, permeate 
through to how candidates, after being selected, are viewed within the training sites and other 
spaces that Black students occupy as psychologists. This is evidenced when Thabo, an intern in 
the clinical programme from the MU, states that being Black and a psychologist is at times under 
question, even from clients, because most psychologists are White. Extending his answer on a 
question I had asked about whether or not the composition of the selection panel mattered to him, 
Thabo stated:  
Cause you see, when you think about psychology you don’t think about, at least for me, 
you don’t think about black people […] I don’t know if you get the feeling as well, but I’m 
a very ghetto person and you don’t get very ghetto people in psychology [...] Even now in 
my internship people get surprised that I’m the psychologist. I work now at a hospital and 
then I’ll have patients there waiting for me on Monday morning, and then I go, okay, and 
then take a patient to my office. And then when they get there, they’re like, ‘oh, I thought 
you were taking me to the psychologist’. I’m like, ‘no, this is it.’ 
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I would propose that Thabo illustrates one broad point from two angles. One relates to who he is 
in relation to psychology. The other is the relationship that psychology has with him as a Black 
person. With regard to the first angle, Thabo states that “when you think of psychology you don’t 
think about, at least for me, you don’t think about black people.” This statement may be understood 
as illustrating how psychology has, by and large, ignored Black people, or has positioned Black 
people as the Other. Thabo’s statement can also be taken, even with the qualifier “at least for me”, 
to indicate that even though he is, at the point of this study’s interview, an intern psychologist, he 
still regards himself as an outsider within the profession. Thabo further elaborates on his position 
in relation to professional psychology by stating that “I’m a very ghetto person and you don’t get 
very ghetto people in psychology”. Thabo does not provide clarity on what he means by “ghetto 
people”. However, the ‘ghettoness’ that Thabo refers to could mean a number of characteristics; 
but I would propose that it may also broadly mean Black people who come from a township or 
who look a certain way. Moreover, it is possible that Thabo is also speaking about how Black 
people from a particular background are regarded as not belonging within professional psychology, 
as evidenced by “you don’t get very ghetto people in psychology”.  
The second angle, I propose Thabo is raising, is the question of the relationship psychology has 
with him as a Black person. In stating that “even now in my internship people get surprised that 
I’m the psychologist”, Thabo may be presenting evidence that professional psychology and people 
who encounter the profession view him as not belonging in the discipline. In the opening lines of 
Native Life in South Africa, Solomon Plaatje (1916/2007, p. 1) states, “[o]n the 20th of June 1913 
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the South African native found himself [sic.] not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his 
birth”. While Plaatje was referring to Black people being rendered landless and out of place within 
the Union of South Africa, I suggest, similarly, that the discourses of merit evident in psychology 
render Black people as pariahs – out of place – within the professional training. The story that 
Thabo narrates of the patient at a hospital who says to him “oh, I thought you were taking me to 
the psychologist” indicates how professional psychology, through its exclusion of the majority 
Black population, has rendered Black practitioners as pariahs within the profession.  
To extend the findings of Traub and Swartz (2013) it may be important to consider the experiences 
of some White intern psychologists in contrast with those of Black trainees, such as Thabo, as 
intern clinical psychologists from the MU. For instance, Nick, an intern counselling psychologist 
from the HWESU, recounts that “this is automatic. You’re old, you’re white, you must be a 
professor or a doctor or something like that”, which points to him being pre-positioned as a 
qualified psychologist, compared to his other Black intern colleagues. Additionally, I would also 
suggest that the “automatic” nature of this perception is due to the continued positioning of 
Whiteness as the set standard for achievement (see Gordon, 2015). In the following extract, Nancy, 
a counselling psychology intern from the HWASU, narrates similar perceptions of herself as a 
White female at the HWASU. Answering a question regard how she thought the panel had 
perceived her during selection, Nancy, amongst other things, stated the following: 
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Because people perceive, students perceive me to be a senior psychologist and they’ll say 
... And funnily enough, at [township] they used to say they wanna see the old White 
woman, they don’t wanna see the other girls. Which is hysterical, cause the other girls 
would be like ‘Dr. [name omitted for confidentiality]’. 
Nancy states that she is often viewed as a “senior psychologist” and that the perceptions that 
“people” and “students” with whom she works have of her are due, in large part, to her being an 
“old white woman”. This statement by Nancy suggests that because of her being an “old White 
woman”, she is regarded as belonging within professional psychology, and not merely as 
belonging but as experienced. I would propose that when Nancy states that “they don’t want to see 
the other girls”, she may be referencing her classmates, who are younger than her. Nancy continues 
to reference a Black female lecture “Dr. [name omitted for confidentiality]” who appears to be 
grouped with the “other girls” who people do not want to see. This inclusion of a Black female 
lecture, as being a junior to Nancy suggests the perpetual juniorisation (see Ndlozi, 2017) of Black 
people in (White) Euroamerican-centric professions such as psychology. While Nancy may view 
the situation as light-hearted, in stating that it is “hysterical”, there is a sense that discourses of 
merit extend beyond entry into the discipline to how Black lectures and practitioners are positioned 
within professional psychology as a whole.  
6.2.2 Deficit discourse. When looking at the discourses that surround applications, it is 
evident that some universities require recruitment strategies that will attract more Black students 
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(see Mayekiso et al., 2004). I propose that because all the universities in this study, including the 
HBU, are struggling to attract Black students, they all require recruitment strategies. At present, 
generally, all the universities in the study rely on recruiting from their Honours classes, which 
appear to be linked to the practices of safe bet recruiting (see Booi et al., 2017). Moreover, there 
appears to be negative perceptions of HBUs, by HWASU and HWESUs, with regard to candidates 
that come from HBUs; that is, candidates applying from HBUs are often seen as not being ‘good 
enough’ for the professional programmes at HWUs. Patience, the course coordinator of the clinical 
programme at the HWASU, explains that the HWASU does not recruit from HBUs. In the 
following interview extract, Patience recounts an encounter with a colleague on the issue of 
recruiting from HBUs: 
Then I said, where do we advertise? Do you advertise in places like the [HBU]? And he 
indicated to me that they wouldn’t go that far, because if someone comes here and applies 
from the [HBU], for example, how will they get funding if they don’t have money, cause 
the university doesn’t provide funding. 
In higher education, discourses that surround the entrance of Black people have been marred by 
arguments of decreased standards (Smit, 2012). The questions raised by Patience of “do we 
advertise in places like the [HBU]?” and the subsequent response that “someone [who] comes 
here…from the [HBU]” will not be able to afford the course may refer to the deficit discourse that 
surrounds Blackness. I would propose that the deficit discourse linked with financial constraints 
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may be used as a way to justify the non-participation of Black students at professional training. 
However, the deficit discourse may also reinforce the view of Black people as a problem, rather 
than as people with problems (du Bois, 1903). The status of the problem can also be seen to extend 
to how HBUs are viewed as problems, with problem students. This view limits the available 
training opportunities of those candidates whose first postgraduate degrees are from HBUs. 
Instead, HBUs can be better understood as universities that have major historical challenges and 
are, for the most part, also populated by students who have historical challenges that have changed 
little since democracy.  
It is important, therefore, to consider how safe bet recruiting, as explained by Booi et al. (2017), 
may have an impact on the ways in which Black students experience selection. Mignolo’s (2009) 
notion of ‘epistemic obedience’ becomes pertinent in this respect, as it points towards the ways in 
which obedience to ‘accepted knowledge’ can be filtered through institutional cultures that are not 
interpretable only through discourses of race. To underline this point, Siphe, an intern in the 
counselling programme at the HWESU, speaks about how the racial demographics did not bother 
her because she had got used to the department’s demographics since she had spent her 
undergraduate years there. Siphe, in answering a question on the composition of the selection 
committee had this to say: 
It was fine, because this is an environment I’m very well-versed in. I was doing my 
Honours, so I had a relationship with the people that were interviewing me […] with this 
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environment. And maybe I’ve become so acculturated with the issues here that it’s easy to 
mistake them for non-issues. Because I’ve been here eight years. This is how we do things. 
This is how things are done in Psych. It’s a given. Until you encounter other places and 
you’re like, hold up, hold up, wait a minute, but things can be different. So retrospectively 
I can see that. I can’t say I experienced it that way in the moment, because I didn’t know 
better. 
Siphe indicates that the selection “was fine, because this is an environment I’m very well-versed 
in”. It may be that the selection of candidates from the same universities promotes “academic 
inbreeding” (Booi et al., 2017), which can make it easier for a student to assimilate into the 
university in the Masters programme but can also act in the service of maintaining the status quo. 
Siphe later stated that “until you encounter other places and you’re like hold up, hold up, wait a 
minute, but things can be different”, which illustrates a slight discomfort with how, at the HWESU, 
she may have had it easier due to her having spent “eight years” there.  
Familiarity with the surroundings is not necessarily a problem, as students may rely on this social 
capital to navigate the university. It is, however, important to note that when universities rely on 
selecting students who are familiar with the university, it may result in the continuation of the 
status quo. Siphe recognises how she may be contributing to the maintenance of the status quo 
when she states that “and maybe I’ve become so acculturated with the issues here that it’s easy to 
mistake them for non-issues”. This acculturation is the result of being trained into institutional 
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cultures through years of contact, to the point where a person reproduces and misrecognises 
problems as being normal. Siphe further states that “this is how we do things. This is how things 
are done in psych. It’s a given.” In this moment, Siphe may be recognising the kind of epistemic 
closure which exists within the HWESU that is reproduced and upheld through various 
institutional mechanisms.  
It is possible to argue that part of the reliance on safe bet recruiting is that training sites are of the 
view that recruiting from other universities may lower the standards of their programmes. Menzi, 
the course coordinator of the HWESU2, when answering a question regarding language and its 
relationship to the selection of candidates, raised the issue of academic marks and other 
universities. Menzi stated: 
Depending where it comes from, because we know our programme and teaching at 
undergrad, we don’t know very well the programmes at other places, and sometimes a 
person comes with a 80 and then we’re thinking, ‘how did that happen?’, when the rubber 
hits the road. 
Menzi’s assertion that “depending where it comes from” may suggest that academic marks are not 
enough to grant the student consideration for selection. This statement regarding academic marks 
can also be extended to how training sites conduct recruitment processes and raises questions about 
which universities are considered to produce the ‘right’ kind of candidate. Menzi refers to prior 
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experiences of “a person comes with an 80 and then we’re thinking how that happened, when the 
rubber hits the road”. This example may have been given to justify the inbreeding recruitment 
processes that maintain the status quo. Menzi continues that “we don’t know very well the 
programmes at other places”, which serves to reinforce the idea that the deficits that students may 
bring to the HWESU2 are due to differences in quality of Honours programmes across universities. 
6.2.3 Selection: The good enough candidate. In The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology 
of Medical Perception (1973), Michel Foucault draws a comparative genealogy between the clergy 
and doctors in showing how the clergy, prior to the European Enlightenment Age, held control 
over people’s behaviour by controlling discourses of health and ill-health according to principles 
of religion. Subsequent to the European Enlightenment Age, doctors, Foucault argues, occupied – 
and continue to occupy – a similar position to the clergy regarding the control of behaviours of 
health and ill-health; he asks, “[a]re not doctors the priests of the body?” (1973, p. 32). Derek Hook 
(2007) argues that in Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison (1977/1995), Foucault 
extended upon the idea of doctors having control over powerful discourses of health and ill-health 
to include therapists and counsellors.  
In responding to a question on the activities for selection of candidates, Menzi, the course 
coordinator of the programme at the HWESU2, stated, “God, I often say it’s like selecting the 
Pope”. In this statement, Menzi may be attempting to illustrate the important position in 
contemporary society that psychologists occupy in respect to control over the discourses of health 
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and ill-health. However, the control over entry into professions such as psychology, I suggest, is 
bound up with histories of oppression and exclusion that are carried out along racial, classed, and 
gendered lines.  
It is important to consider selection criteria not only as procedures, but as the ways in which 
selection is aligned with the context in which candidates are to be trained. Regarding the devising 
of new paths for selecting candidates for clinical and counselling psychology training, there 
appears to be no change in the current selection procedures and criteria. Specifically, I found 
similar types of selection procedures in the selected universities as those that were reported by van 
der Westhuyzen and Plug (1987), who investigated professional training sites of psychologists 
under apartheid. These practices include a focus on autobiographies, observations of applicants’ 
interpersonal skills in roleplay and leaderless groups, and personality assessments (van der 
Westhuyzen & Plug, 1987). Variations of these criteria appeared across the various institutions 
that participated in this study, with each institution focussing on one combination or another.  
Elretha, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the MU, notes the use of psychological 
assessment as an important mechanism for selection. In her interview, she elaborated on the use 
of a specific test, and what it offers the clinical programme at the MU’s selection process: 
They come in, we do a psychometric testing. We do the NEO. We’ve been using the NEO 
which has been very helpful…. We’ve used the NEO before, we’ve used the 16PF, but 
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we’ve found the NEO to be the most accurate in what we are looking for. It just gives you 
a launchpad in terms of introversion, extroversion, tendermindedness. So those are the 
kinds of questions that you might want to ask. And we will say, here’s your NEO in front 
of us, you indicated that you feel this and tell me about that. So it’s a way of just uncovering 
what is happening. 
Epistemic closure, as Gordon (2015) highlights, entails foreclosure on further understandings of 
what should be considered legitimate knowledge in a discipline and, as such, brings to the fore the 
idea of who is considered a good enough candidate. Elretha’s stating that “we’ve used the NEO 
before, we’ve used the 16PF” illustrates the continuous reliance on psychometric tests for the 
selection of candidates. Her further elaboration that “we’ve found the NEO to be the most accurate 
in what we are looking for” may serve to justify the use of the psychometric tests. She adds that 
such characteristics as “introversion, extroversion, tendermindedness” become part of the things 
her university programme looks for in candidates. I would suggest, thus, that both the 
characteristics and the means through which these characteristics are uncovered may be seen as 
part of the episteme of selection processes that have been a dominant part of professional 
psychology. The continued reliance on apartheid-style selection procedures also indicates 
epistemic closure, and I would submit that the unchanged selection procedures of the universities 
are based on the assumption that what a psychologist was under apartheid, and what the role of a 
psychologist is in contemporary South Africa, is viewed as the same. 
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Lucas, the course coordinator of the counselling programme at the HWESU, notes that, over time, 
roleplays have declined in importance for selection, although they are still in use. In answering a 
question about the selection procedures at the HWESU, Lucas stated: 
An example of that, how it translates is, in our selection process, there’s a roleplay and the 
roleplay is a one-on-one counselling simulated session. Short, short, 10, 15 minutes, but 
just to get a sense of connection and in that situation… The prominence of that rating in 
our final decision has declined because, and the motivation for that is that that is not the 
primary function of a psychologist in South Africa anymore. So whereas that had a great 
prominence 20 years ago when I started here, it has … 
The practice of psychologists has, in the past, been focussed towards one-on-one counselling 
(Seedat et al., 1988), which has translated into training sites valuing this particular skill in 
candidates. Lucas’ statement that “in our selection process, there’s a roleplay and the roleplay is a 
one-on-one counselling simulated session” may indicate the importance of individual therapy. 
Lucas further argues that “[t]he prominence of that rating in our final decision has declined 
because, and the motivation for that is that is not the primary function of a psychologist in South 
Africa anymore”. The emphasis on the lack of prominence of the roleplay may be to emphasise 
how the training site is attempting to move away from individual therapy, particularly to break 
away from the old ways of conducting selections and trainings. However, I would suggest that the 
continued use of roleplay at the HWESU speaks to the fundamental epistemological orientation of 
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the training site towards the primary role of psychologists being one-to-one counselling. 
Furthermore, the ‘prominence’ of one-on-one counselling is apparent in the results of the survey 
by the HPCSA (2017b), which indicated that the majority of counselling and clinical psychologists 
work in private practice contexts. The private practice context is largely tailored to one-on-one 
counselling. Lucas continued on to explain ‘prominence’, or the lack thereof, of one-on-one 
counselling as the primary role of the psychologist:  
We want them to go out and be able to function as competent psychologists, but within the 
particular context in need of South Africa. Which has a big overlap with the context in need 
of the UK, but it is very different. It is very different. And the difference is the shift away 
from the conventional, more conventional notion of psychology as a therapy talking kind 
of thing.  
The entanglement of Africa and Europe, as explained in Homi Bhabha’s (1994) argument of 
hybridity and ambivalence, is often a challenge that is difficult to unravel. I would suggest that the 
explanation offered by Lucas for the continued use of roleplay in the selection process is part of 
the entanglement of Africa and Europe. Lucas’ addition that the selection of candidates should 
account for the need to shift away from “the conventional, more conventional notion of 
psychology” can be understood as the need to move away from the (White) Euroamerican-centric 
ideal role of a psychologist. Yet, he appears to justify the continued use of roleplay when arguing 
that there is “big overlap with the context in the UK” before turning back to arguing that “it is 
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different” when referring to the South African versus UK contexts. It may be important, then, to 
consider what Kurt Danziger (2006) asserts to be the indigenisation of psychology in places such 
as the UK and US, and how that psychology was then subsequently freighted across the rest of the 
world. The difficulties experienced by training sites may be in thinking within this entanglement 
when addressing situated practices of selection. Additionally, it may be possible that training sites 
rely on the similarities of contexts between the UK, for example, as a way to justify continuous 
(White) Euroamerican-centric practices.   
It should be noted that in this current study, the experiences of the selection process for students 
varied across racialised lines. For the most part, White students experienced the selection as 
comfortable, while Black students experienced the process in negative ways. For example, Mbali, 
a counselling psychology intern from the MU, speaking on a question about the assessment 
procedures at the MU, she also referred to how the criteria for selection required her to be alienated 
and estranged from parts of herself:  
That’s an honest fact, ngeke uzushinshe (you won’t be able to change yourself), just 
because where you come from or this career says I must be assertive or this career says I 
must be independent and what not, I can’t take myself away from myself, that’s the one 
thing I can’t do, wherever I meet new people, they will judge me based on who I am, and 
who I am will be based on what I learnt from home, and that is also one of the reasons they 
252 
 
252 | P a g e  
 
selected me, because of who I am and now all of the sudden I have to change the same 
person, and make them select me. 
In stating that “must be assertive or this career says I must be independent”, Mbali attempts to 
illustrate that, in order for her to become a psychologist, she has been required to be something 
with which she may not necessarily identify. As Fanon (1967/2008) explains, alienation and 
estrangement are some of the most crucial ways in which colonialism attempted to subordinate 
Black people through rendering their lifeworlds as being in need of ‘civilisation’. Mbali’s 
reflection “that is also one of the reasons they selected me, because of who I am and now all of the 
sudden I have to change the same person” may show a frustration with the professional training 
she has received, as it is incommensurate with her life. She continues to add that “wherever I meet 
new people, they will judge me based on who I am, and who I am will be based on what I learnt 
from home”, which may indicate that she is currently being estranged from her home life through 
the training she has received. Additionally, Mbali may be raising an issue with the importance 
being placed on being a psychologist rather than who she is as a person.  
In contemporary contexts, entry into professional programmes is still guided by (White) 
Euroamerican-centric standards and renders Black lifeworlds ‘peculiar’. I would suggest the 
analysis that Rosina Maart (2014) makes of the 2014 massacre in Marikana is pertinent to 
understanding what Mbali may be communicating. In observing the majority Black police killing 
Black miners, Maart (2014) states that the shooting was to kill the “kaffir”. That is to say, for the 
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Black police, the act of killing Black miners was to rid themselves of the parts of their selfhood 
that represented Blackness as sub-human, with the protesting miners being representations of this 
Blackness (Maart, 2014). The feeling that Mbali speaks about in the previously presented interview 
extract, namely of having to change herself, could be seen as involving the ‘killing’ of the parts of 
herself that are rendered ‘undesirable’ within the professional training. 
6.2.4 Racialised subjectivity in selection. Not only are the right kinds of knower 
determined by the characteristics that are valued from candidates, but also the subjectivities of the 
selectors. If, in the selection process, it is maintained that the characteristics of the candidates 
influence the type of psychology practitioner, it may also be important to ask about the 
characteristics of those doing the selection of said candidates. Disciplinary discourses have been 
constituted by the history of colonialism and apartheid and can be understood as laden with the 
‘colonial gaze’. The colonial gaze can be understood, as Musila (2017) argues, as a gaze that is 
all-seeing while remaining unseen by its subjects. I suggest that the colonial gaze, is a driver of 
maintaining the status quo, as it only allows for narrow possibilities of change. In part, because 
the colonial gaze misrecognises epistemologies – and ontologies – that do not fit the (White) 
Euroamerican-centric standard, the result is Othering and pathologizing of Black lifeworlds. The 
colonial gaze is a function of being socialised within a discipline, of being selected as an 
epistemically obedient member that can reproduce the system (Mignolo, 2009). 
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In answering a question regarding the composition of the interviewing panel, Lucas, the course 
coordinator of the counselling programme at the HWESU, begins by stating: 
It’s a pretty white affair. But you see, it also changes over time as people come and go. But 
it’s a pretty white selection panel. 
In a report by the HPCSA (2018b), the researchers’ detail that the majority of lectures within 
psychology departments are White, with the professoriate having the largest proportion of Whites. 
Lucas’ proclamation that “it’s a pretty white affair” suggests that the majority of selectors at the 
HWESU are White. In his response, Lucas may be attempting to illustrate that change occurs with 
demographic transformation of staff when he states that “it also changes over time, as people come 
and go”. Lucas, however, may also be attempting to reemphasise the numerical domination of 
Whites in selection when he maintains that “it’s a pretty white selection panel”. White, in the 
present study, is understood not only as those who have come to be categorised as White through 
the colour of their skin, but rather how White represents “the norm that is invisible, working in the 
background as a standard, not of one particular way of being in the world, but as normalcy…” 
(Vice, 2010, p. 324). Although, Lucas may only be referring to skin colour I suggest that this 
numerical domination may also point to the operation of Whiteness.  
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As a white female for instance, Deborah, an intern from the counselling programme in the 
HWASU, claims that the racial composition of the selectors was not a factor. Answering a question 
about the staff composition at the HWASU, Deborah answered:  
I never actually thought about it, uhm, I don’t think so, I don’t, I don’t, I think I was 
probably very selfishly like, you know, just trying to make it work for myself, I don’t ever 
think I thought, no, it did not ever matter to me. 
I would propose that because Whiteness is rendered invisible (Vice, 2010), for White students, 
particularly at HWUs, race and racialisation is also rendered invisible. Deborah’s first assertion 
that “I have never thought about it, uhm” may indicate the level of comfortability that Deborah 
has experienced at the HWASU as a White female. Moreover, her stating that “I think I was 
probably selfishly like, you know, just trying to make it work for myself” may also be an attempt 
to give a reason for why she was comfortable, apart from the way she has been racialised. Deborah 
also uses the term “you know”, which may be an attempt to find common ground with me, the 
only other person in the room. This attempt at finding commonality may indicate the discomfort 
that Deborah has with her sense of comfortability, and her feeling “selfish” as a result. 
Paradoxically, the call for a situated professional psychology requires that the very people who 
produce the type of subjectivity that maintains the system be the ones that act against the system. 
Sarah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HWESU, highlighted the paradox 
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as being difficult to resolve, as several factors are continuously at play. In answering a question 
pertaining to the role that staff composition has in the selection of candidates, Sarah stated: 
I have no doubt it has an influence on the kind of candidates that are being selected because 
we all, I think we have, by virtue of us being psychologists we went through the selection 
process ourselves, there’s a kind of [...] And as a psychoanalytic, thinking I can’t help, but 
think there are all kinds of projections and identifications happening, whether it be that we 
identify with someone of the same race and the same class and the same gender in a positive 
way or whether we identify with them defensively in a negative way, because of a kind of 
a sense that we need to be showing that we’re wanting to bring about redress et cetera. I 
have no doubt it plays a role. 
Sarah appears to be making an interpretation that “by virtue of being psychologists we went 
through the selection process ourselves”, which may indicate how objectivity may not be possible. 
She adds that “all kinds of projections and identifications happening”. These projections and 
identifications may, as Sarah continues to state, be as a result “of the same race and the same class 
and same gender”. In this assertion, Sarah may be attempting to show her awareness of the 
intransigence of Whiteness, and how it may foster bias within professional training selection. 
Moreover, Sarah states that the projections and identifications can also be made “in a negative 
way, because of a kind of sense that we need to be showing that we’re wanting to bring about 
redress”. This may serve to illustrate how, even when the colonial gaze is being mediated by other 
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discourses, such as the diversity discourse – which is dealt with in more detail later in this chapter 
– it remains that the selection of candidates is primarily a subjective process.  
Intern psychologists also engage with the discourses of subjectivity in selection; illustrating a 
somewhat complex mode in which, for instance, race is made visible or invisible within the 
selection of candidates. For example, Nomagugu, a clinical psychology intern from the HWESU, 
illustrates one way in which students, during selection and training, engage with subjective 
selection. In the following extract, Nomagugu highlights the numerical domination of Whites 
within selection as being a problem for her: 
There’s no one representing me as [uNomagugu]. First thing’s first, akho umuntu 
omnyama, singaya le siya le (there is no black person, we can go this way and that way 
with the conversation). So I feel that there are some things that only an African person can 
understand. 
The lack of Black people on the selected universities’ selection panels creates a difficult 
circumstance for candidates like Nomagugu who may feel that “there’s no one representing me” 
which may be in reference to her as a Black person in the selection process. Representation may 
also indicate an important way of communicating belonging within professional training 
programmes. Nomagugu continues to say “so I feel that there are some things that only an African 
person can understand”, wherein she may be referring to similar mutuality of knowledge 
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recognised by the BCM (see Manganyi, 1973/2019). However, in Black Consciousness, the 
mutuality of knowledge is not only based on racial categories but extends to conditions of 
oppression and exclusion that move beyond the dominant four race categories (Manganyi, 
1973/2019). In Nomagugu’s explanation, the racialisation of people into the four groups appears 
to still persist as a way of understanding the experiences of people.  
It is important to note that Black students at the HWUs, more so than at the HBU, stated that 
representation was a challenge for them. However, for White candidates, race did not appear to 
hold the same kind of saliency as it did for Black students across the training sites. As a white 
women Anna, a clinical psychology intern from the HBU, in the following extract indicates a kind 
of unconscious identification with White selectors in the HBU. In responding to a question related 
to the composition of the selectors at the HBU, and how she experienced the selection panel, Anna 
said:  
For me, I didn’t experience that. I guess I would be lying if I said that in some ways that 
you don’t [...] There is a certain sense of probably a very unconscious connectivity with 
someone of the same race as you. I think it happens to all of us. So I suppose it kind of, it 
obviously plays a role. 
Anna raises that “there is probably a very unconscious connectivity with someone of the same race 
as you”, in which she may be attempting to argue that she is not responsible for the role her race 
plays in the selection process. Anna continues to add that “it obviously plays a role”, which may 
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illustrate an arrival at a conclusive point with regard to the role of race in selection. Anna also 
indicates a sense of discomfort with the idea of the mutuality between her and people of her race 
by adding that the connection is “very unconscious”. She may further attempt to justify her 
realisation by stating, with hesitation, that “I think it happens to all of us”. While Anna uses the 
idea of race to explain what she perceives to have happened in her interview, it is rather poignant, 
I would suggest, that it is the similarities in lifeworlds that allow for mutual knowledge. This type 
of positioning can be juxtaposed with how, for Black candidates, there is often more conscious 
forms of misidentification with the selectors, because the selectors at most of the selected 
universities are White. This mutual knowledge allows for ease of access into meanings that people 
make of their lives and the lives of others; thus making the absence of people who have access to 
a candidates’ lifeworld all the more problematic. 
6.3 Discourses of diversity 
6.3.1 Racial diversity. Discourses of racial diversity are central to how the South African 
liberal democracy has positioned itself after the 1994 elections. This positioning can be specifically 
seen in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Racial diversity, particularly through 
the lens of the contact hypothesis, posits that it is necessarily enough to simply bring people 
together for racial integration to occur (Dixon et al., 2005). Thus, diversity remains an important 
part of the training of psychologists. Nthabiseng, an intern clinical psychologist from the HBU, 
summarises her experience of her training at the HBU, and points to the prominence of diversity 
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in the training, by stating that “diversity in thinking, diversity in framework wise. I think that’s the 
two major things if I were to summarise them.” In the following extract Lucy, the course 
coordinator at the HWASU counselling programme, was responding to a question regarding the 
ways in which the composition of selectors plays a role in who gets selected: 
And the same with having a diverse group in the class, because by virtue of people coming 
from different backgrounds, having different perspectives, those things almost happen 
automatically, that everybody becomes sensitised. It’s much easier than trying to teach it 
from a book. So to me that’s really a great way of transformation, is just having a variety 
of people in the room. 
Lucy’s statement that by “having a diverse group in the class… things almost happen 
automatically, that everybody becomes sensitised,” appears to draw from the discourses of 
diversity as panacea for people becoming sensitive to differences. Lucy attempts to qualify her 
statement by adding “almost”, and she continues to add that “so to me that’s really a great way of 
transformation, is just having a variety of people in the room.” I would suggest that simply having 
people from different backgrounds in a room to together allows for “automatically, that everybody 
becomes sensitised” is a fallacy. Moreover, Robin Kelley (2015) warns that fetishising difference 
often falls short of addressing everyday struggles with which those who are cast as different must 
suffer. Lucy may be attempting to illustrate the importance of having a plurality of backgrounds 
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within the training of psychologists, both with regard to selectors and students; yet, in doing so, 
she over-emphasises the role of racial diversity. 
A multiplicity of scholarly work suggests that students in the same university tend to self-segregate 
along racialised lines (see Dixon et al., 2005; Erasmus, 2003; Finchilescu et al., 2007). In the next 
interview extract, Matshepo, a counselling psychology intern from the MU, was responding to a 
question regarding race within the training programme: 
And then even in the seating there’s a divide. We know who sits there. So it’s the two black 
students and then the four white students and then the two coloureds and then the rest of 
the black students. So it was always like that. Even lecturers would complain, say, oh, 
you’re always sitting like that. So everyone sat with the race that they were comfortable. 
But then obviously, we’re psychologists, we like diversity. So we would be like, no, there’s 
no problem, we’re cool, everyone is cool. 
Matshepo states that “we know who sits there. So it’s the two black students and then the four 
White students and then the two coloureds and then the rest of the black students.”  In this sentence 
she may be attempting to illustrate how the divisions amongst students, who have been racialised 
according to the four apartheid-based racial categories, were eminently visible within the seating 
arrangements in the class. In a study by Schrieff et al. (2005), similar types of self-segregations 
were visible in university dining halls, which may point to higher education environments 
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mirroring societal normative practices. Matshepo continues by saying that “but then obviously, 
we’re psychologists, we like diversity”, which may suggest that she is (sarcastically) pointing to 
how the discourses of diversity do not necessarily translate into the reality of the classroom. The 
discourse of racial diversity, of ‘us versus them’, draws into question the reliance on racial 
diversity as a panacea for training programmes, as issues of race and racialisation are often 
uninterrupted by simply bringing people into closer proximity with each other (Schrieff et al., 
2005). 
In the following extract, Patience, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the 
HWASU, was responding to a question I had posed about the inclusion of diversity as a criterion 
for selection. Patience stated:   
So that was the thinking behind including this term diversity, when we give them a score. 
So diversity, the goal to include this term diversity is to redress the historical race, class 
and gender inequalities in terms of access to higher education. There’s a need to increase 
diversity in selection of students in order to change the profile of the profession to align 
with the needs of the country, and to respond to the issue of diversity of students trained at 
the MA psychology level. 
Patience indicates in her response that “so diversity, the goal to include this term diversity is to 
redress the historical race, class, and gender inequalities in terms of access to higher education.” 
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The use of diversity as a marker of race, in particular, suggests that White students do not meet the 
criteria of diversity. Patience argues that “there’s a need to increase diversity in selection of 
students in order to change the profile of the profession”. The “profile of the profession” that 
Patience may be referring to here is that of the numerical domination of White people within 
professional counselling and clinical psychology. I would propose, therefore, that because White 
candidates are rendered normative within professional training sites, diversity explicitly points to 
Black students. 
Whiteness, as Samantha Vice (2010) has argued, is often invisible. It is made invisible by White 
people in power who aim to maintain their position of power. Racial diversity can be understood, 
then, as focussing on what is visible; on race; on how people look (see Erasmus, 2017). The focus 
on racial diversity can, thus, act as a mechanism that further establishes Whiteness as being 
invisible within professional training. Within an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the professional 
training of counselling and clinical psychologists, the focus is not only on the visible, but on what 
is rendered invisible when relying on particular discourses. Discourses of racial diversity can, then, 
be understood as referring to Black candidates whilst simultaneously rendering as normative White 
candidates. In other words, the discourse of racial diversity is often reserved to illustrate the 
inclusion of Black people within professional training programmes, which may imply that the 
training is White-centric. The operation of Whiteness is, thus, made invisible in the account of 
including diversity as a criterion.  
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Discourses of racial diversity are also embedded within the legal regulations of the discipline, 
through the Professional Board for Psychology. Legal regulations, which I expand upon more in 
Chapter 7, form part of the discursive practice of the training sites. Lucas, the course coordinator 
of the counselling programme at the HWESU, in answering a question related to the role that race 
plays in the selection of candidates, stated:  
But there’s a Health Professions Council instructional request that we should attempt to 
have 50% of a training group to so-called designated populations, which is really Black 
candidates. Candidates that were not advantaged by the apartheid system. 
Lucas’ statement that the “Health Professions Council instructional request” may be referring to 
the relationship that the training site has with the HPCSA. Lucas may also be positioning himself 
and the training site as at the mercy of the rules of the HPCSA. Lucas moves on to say that the 
“instructional request” is that “we should attempt to have 50% of a training group of so-called 
designated groups”, which suggests a position of disagreement with the “instructional request”, as 
it appears from his response that racial diversity that emanates from the HPCSA appears to force 
transformation onto training sites. I suggest that the issue of redress framed within the discursive 
field of the policies set out by the HPCSA can denigrate Black lifeworlds to equity targets. These 
targets create the contention that there is a general struggle across universities to find people 
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The discourses that are linked to the HPCSA as the driving force for demographic transformation 
can also be located within the discourses of racial diversity for trainee psychologists. For students, 
it becomes apparent that university training sites become fixated with how candidates look; they 
relay to a great extent on the discourses of racial diversity (see Swartz, 1996). In the following 
extract Musa, a clinical psychology intern from the MU, notes that the discourses of racial diversity 
as race quotas has a negative effect on Black students: 
During the selection. I think definitely. I think because there was [...] I think when I came 
in there was a bit of pressure from the board and the university to diversify and so at a 
certain level you do become a statistic […]. So I guess that also, the structure that comes 
from above, maybe not necessarily from the panel itself, almost dictates how many. 
Because they can only take say seven students and so they need a number of Black students 
and a number of [...] So you are fighting maybe not for the six spots, but you’re fighting 
for the two that need to, or two or three or however many that needs to be Black for them 
to meet whatever standards they need to meet. 
Musa’s statement that “I think when I came in there was a bit of pressure from the board and the 
university to diversify”, may indicate that his university needed to accept him because they needed 
to (i.e. were required or forced to) diversify. By using the term “diversify”, Musa may be using 
diversity as a marker for having more Black students. This statement by Musa can also be linked 
to racial diversification being imposed rather than willingly sought, as he guesses that “so I guess 
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that also, the structure that comes from above, maybe not necessarily from the panel itself”. Musa 
may also be referring to how the panel may not have necessarily desired to diversify, but does not 
provide clarity for his mention of the diversification coming from above. He does, however, 
indicate that the training site’s need to select a certain number of Black candidates when he states 
that “to meet whatever standards they need to meet”. Further elaborating on his position, Musa 
states that “because they can only take say seven students and so they need a number of Black 
students and a number of…”. This statement speaks to how the students begin to view the selection 
process as dependent upon selecting a certain number of Black candidates. Musa also hesitates to 
mention “a number of …”, which may point to how he positions the discourses on diversity as the 
meeting of racial quotas as applying to Black students.  
This view of a racial quota system can be linked to students believing, as Musa states, that “you 
are fighting maybe not for the six spots, but you’re fighting for the two that need to, or two or three 
or however many that needs to be Black for them”. I would suggest that Musa’s assessment of the 
racial quota system is linked to Black students’ feeling that training courses reserve positions prior 
to the selection process, which creates a possibly unfair bias against one group versus another. 
Moreover, the perception may then be that the only people against whom Black students are 
“fighting” for a place in the training programme are those of their own race group, rather than 
those deemed ‘suitably qualified’.  
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Zimitri Erasmus (2012) argues that while race causes much ambiguity, other forms of oppression, 
such as class, that have been characteristic of the colonial and apartheid histories may be useful 
indicators regarding transformative efforts at institutions. However, race remains – as Fanon 
(1967/2008) reasoned about colonial Algeria – a master category; a factor that is overdetermining, 
first from without then from within in the colonial encounter. The role of race as a master signifier 
has remained a significant part of the tapestry of much of the ex-colonised world through 
coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). Through various forms of resistance, that in psychology can 
be traced back to several moments, in its most concentrated form in the 1980s, race has taken on 
different forms, such as diversity. It is important to consider, then, that there are other issues 
intertwined with the racialisation of people’s lifeworlds in colonial and ex-colonised nations, 
which include gender, language, and class as critical components of lifeworlds. I turn next to 
gender diversity.  
6.3.2 Gender diversity. Any analysis of what can be considered the right kind of knower, 
or in simpler terms a person who is granted access to powerful discourses, is incomplete without 
the assessment of the gendered nature of professional psychology. The results by Bantjes et al. 
(2016) on the demographics of psychologists reveal that most of the trained counselling and 
clinical psychologists are White females. Patience, the course coordinator of the clinical 
programme at the HWASU, highlights the ways in which gender can become a vexed issue within 
training sites, as university requirements come into contrast with the professions needs. 
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Responding to a question regarding whether gender is considered in the selection of clinical 
psychology trainees, Patience said:  
And we consider gender in terms of our professional psychology having for example less 
male psychologists compared to female psychologists. But you see, the university doesn’t 
look at it like that. So if you are a white male, the university still sees you as a white 
applicant. So even though you meet the gender criteria for the professional psychology, 
you’re not meeting the diversity criteria in the university. So we looked at that and we 
looked at gender and race, but race is the diversity criteria we look at more than the other 
diversity criterias. 
Patience’s response that “we consider gender in terms of our professional psychology having for 
example fewer male psychologists compared to female psychologists” may be an attempt to 
highlight her awareness of the numerical gender disparities in professional psychology. Skinner 
and Louw (2009) indicate that the feminisation of psychology began in the 1980s, with Curtis et 
al. (2004) also referring to a similar type of feminisation occurring in the US. However, the 
reference to the feminised nature of professional psychology needs to be understood in reference 
to White females in particular, and not as being inclusive of all women. She further states “but you 
see, the university doesn’t look at it like that. So if you are a white male, the university still sees 
you as a white applicant”, which may allude to the differences in priorities between the profession 
and the university requirements with regard to demographic transformation. Patience also 
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mentions that in the selection process “race is the diversity criteria we look at more than the other 
diversity criterias”. This statement may serve to illustrate how race remains a master signifier for 
transformation in training programmes.  
The dominant forms of articulating masculinities are, predominantly, argued to be averse to the 
expression of ‘softness’ and ‘emotionality’ (Malinga & Ratele, 2016). Furthermore, these forms 
of masculine expression do not only include violent or toxic masculinities but can extend to the 
varying forms of emotional expression that can be contraindicated within the structures of 
professional training. In the following interview extract, Menzi, the course coordinator of the 
HWESU2, attempts to illustrate how training institutions may view male candidates that apply to 
their programmes:  
Now, I don’t trade in the area of stereotypes, but there’s something about, I don’t even say 
the maturity levels of men, there’s an emotional presence that they seem to be entangled in 
way more than women generally, so they are [...] We spend a whole lot more time 
discussing male candidates, for example, because we are so split on them and the deficits 
are so glaring that we know we’re gonna take this person, but actually they’re sitting here 
with many, many, many issues. So the pool is limited. In addition to that there’s something 
about the readiness of many of the male candidates. They might turn out to be great 
psychologists later, or many of them also just subsequently become researchers even 
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though they might have done this kind of programme. But they’re not as readily trainable 
as women candidates are. This is controversial, but… 
In stating that “I don’t trade in the area of stereotypes”, Menzi may be attempting to neutralise any 
negative connotations that may arise as a result of his statements that follow. In stating his position 
on men and their general selection into professional programmes, Menzi shows a reluctance to 
state “but there’s something about, I don’t even say the maturity levels of men, there’s an emotional 
presence that they seem to be entangled in way more than women generally, so they are ...”. These 
sentiments are linked to how men persons are considered to be socialised to express themselves 
(e.g. with anger and frustration, rather than crying) (see Malinga & Ratele, 2009). Menzi further 
states that “we spend a whole lot more time discussing male candidates, for example, because we 
are so split on them and the deficits are so glaring that we know we’re gonna take this person”, 
which may also serve to justify the position of his training site as having attempted to do all that 
is possible to ensure the entry of males into the programme. I would propose, however, that there 
is a need to interrogate what is meant by emotional readiness, as this may be bound up with 
colonised ways of viewing men, and specifically Black men, so that a standard of Whiteness 
remains invisible (see Ratele, 2009). Menzi may also be positioning female candidates as 
perpetually selectable in professional training programmes through his statements. The 
understanding of an eminently selectable candidate can also be positioned against the higher 
number of White females within professional psychology (see Bantjes et al., 2016). In situating 
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‘selectability’, it may become evident that White female candidates are considered readily 
selectable, as they already fit into the dominant view of psychologists. 
In the following extract, Elretha, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the MU, was 
reflecting on the number of male versus female applications to the training programme that they 
receive. Elretha mentions: 
Difficult to get males. The males are always terribly outnumbered. We try not to have all-
female classes. We had that once and it was a disaster. So we do look at the diversity of 
the total class pool, because they need to interact and work together as well. So we try and 
do that. We find, certainly Indian males are very few and far between. Occasional coloured 
male but not all that often. We’re getting more and more young black men, which is really 
nice. 
Elretha’s referring to how it is “difficult to get males. The males are always terribly outnumbered” 
may be an attempt to emphasise that it is not that males are not being selected, but rather that they 
are not applying. Elretha may also be using an extreme case formulation,“terribly”, in order to 
show her level of concern regarding the number of male trainees in professional programmes. In 
further elaborating on the applications of males into the programme, she states that “we try not to 
have all-female classes. We had that once, and it was a disaster”. Elretha does not offer a reason 
for why the all-female class was a disaster. She may, however, be illustrating how selection panels 
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are aware of the importance of attracting and recruiting male candidates. Elretha adds that the 
applications of males can further be delineated according to race when she notes that “we find, 
certainly Indian males are very few and far between. Occasional coloured male, but not all that 
often. We’re getting more and more young black men”. In speaking about the differences in 
applications and the entry of men along racial lines into the programme, her statements may serve 
to reinforce the idea of awareness regarding the challenges that face the discipline with regard to 
race, and not only gender.  
6.3.3 Curriculum diversity: Multiculturalism and Community Psychology. In much 
the same way as the notion of diversity, multiculturalism often refers to attempts to include Black 
people in spaces from which they have been previously excluded (see Johnston, 2018). It is 
important to consider how the discourses of diversity as multiculturalism shape curricula within 
the training of psychologists. Carolissen et al. (2015, p. 17) makes the case that curriculum 
diversity “should not devolve to the inclusion of ‘multicultural’ components or culture 
mainstreaming, especially when this is generally interpreted using essentialised notions of culture 
or identity that reinscribe binaristic difference and inadvertently rationalise inequality”.  
Curriculum diversity may often be a conservative change that focusses on, mainly, changing a few 
things within the existing curriculum, rather than rethinking the content and structure of the 
training as a whole. In the following extract, Leah, the course coordinator of the clinical 
programme at the HBU, was responding to a follow-up question related to the types of things to 
which students get exposed during their training:   
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So when we discuss it much of our concerns is around the very Eurocentric nature of our 
curriculum and how we could actually make fundamental changes to that. And it’s 
something that we struggle with. Yes, there is some literature emerging from Africa, from 
the South African context, there’s quite a lot of it. And we try and focus on incorporating 
that literature into particular modules as appropriate. So that students are not just exposed 
to one particular ideology or one particular worldview that they have a broader 
understanding of the multicultural context in which we live in and the various people that 
they will ultimately be serving. 
Leah’s statement that “we discuss it much of our concerns is around the very Eurocentric nature 
of our curriculum and how we could actually make fundamental changes to that. And it’s 
something that we struggle with” is perhaps a script formulation (see Edwards, 1994) that may be 
an attempt to illustrate how the HBU takes seriously the issue of curriculum change. In stating that 
“and it’s something that we struggle with”, Leah may also be using a disclaimer that evokes 
empathy towards why the curriculum has not changed. Perhaps Leah’s stating that “we try and 
focus on incorporating that literature into particular modules as appropriate” before arguing that 
“so that students are not just exposed to one particular ideology or one particular worldview, that 
they have a broader understanding of the multicultural context” can suggest that literature 
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I would propose that the use of multiculturalism in the process of curriculum change is based on 
reformist interventions that keep the core the same whilst ‘integrating Africa’. These integration 
strategies, as based on the idea of multiculturalism, often ignore the fundamental issue of the 
epistemological foundations that are (White) Euroamerican-centric in nature. Moreover, the 
integrated reformist approach to curriculum change that has as its basis (White) Euroamerican-
centric epistemologies has the potential of delegitimising knowledge emanating from Africa.  
The effects of the reformist approach to curriculum change is perhaps evident in Leah stating that 
“yes, there is some literature emerging from Africa, from the South African context, there’s quite 
a lot of it. And we try and focus on incorporating that literature into particular modules as 
appropriate”, which may be an anticipation of a critique that there is literature available from South 
Africa that can be used. Her statement here also appears to be a contradiction, evidenced in her 
firstly stating that there is “some literature” then stating, “a lot”, where after she also attempts to 
manage the contradiction by saying “actually”. This contradiction is perhaps indicative of the 
challenges inherent in the dominance of Euroamerican-centrism, albeit there is growing research 
in, about, and for Africa, training programs still find legitimacy through primarily European and 
US research.  
It is often easier to track the continuities and discontinuities of traditions in universities and training 
programmes at universities that have been merged; however, all the training sites in this study 
present with histories of (dis)continuity. The challenges within the current curricula rest with how 
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the core of these curricula has remained the same over time. In the MU, which was previously 
designated as a Whites-only university, there was a concern for a loss of tradition. In the following 
extract Elretha, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the MU, was responding to a 
question regarding what the MU training site views as an eclectic style with regard to its 
curriculum:  
And we’re finding – this is kind of inhouse problems – we’re finding that the loss of 
expertise, particularly in the neuro- and the psychopathology, is having a very negative 
impact on our students. Because we’re desperately trying to find people to fill those gaps 
and we are concerned about the level, the depth of expertise that we had of people who’ve 
been lecturing for 25 years, that depth of expertise is gone. And that has become, it’s 
become a problem for us. But I think it’s just, those are the things we’ve traditionally been 
strong on. I mean, this programme was very similar when I did my masters at the end of 
the 80s. 88, 89. We did virtually the same modules. Probably not quite the same content, 
but virtually the same modules. 
Elretha’s statement that “this is kind of inhouse problems” may be a disclaimer to diminish the 
importance of what she is about to say in anticipation of her statement of “the depth of expertise 
that we had of people who’ve been lecturing for 25 years, that depth of expertise is gone”. In this 
statement, she may be attempting to illustrate the severity of the loss of expertise in these areas. 
Elretha then states that “I mean, this programme was very similar when I did my masters at the 
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end of the 80s. 88, 89. We did virtually the same modules. Probably not quite the same content, 
but virtually the same modules”. Here, Elretha’s statement offers the use of history as a basis for 
which the programme has been fully entrenched with the professional training of psychologists. 
Elretha’s statement that the programme has been the same since the 1980s is particularly 
concerning, because this points to a continued desire to maintain the status quo. Moreover, I would 
argue that the concern with the loss expertise illustrates that professional training continues, as it 
did in the 1980s (see Anonymous, 1986), to orient itself towards White lifeworlds and, as a result, 
has continued to exclude Black lifeworlds.  Additionally, this concern for a loss of expertise, the 
desire to keep things the same brings into question the attempts at change focusing on 
multiculturalism.  
In contrast to a desire to keep the programmes the same, some have questioned the role that 
psychologists ought to be playing in contemporary society. Patience, the course coordinator of the 
clinical programme at the HWASU, in the following interview extract was responding to a 
question regarding how staff composition influences the curriculum: 
I think for years it has affected the curriculum. I think when I started, I’m from a 
government hospital setting and I felt like, when I first started here I felt like I don’t know 
what the students are learning that is going to help them to be interns when they go to the 
interns. And from the time, while Dr [name omitted for confidentiality] was still here I 
always told him that we are not equipping them to work in a government hospital setting. 
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But here, to make changes is very difficult, because when you’re set in your own ways it’s 
hard to accept a new idea and a new change. 
Patience uses the phrase “I think”, which may illustrate that she is attempting to anticipate 
disagreement about her evaluation of the programme. She continues to add that “I felt like, when 
I first started here, I felt like I don’t know what the students are learning that is going to help them 
to be interns when they go to the interns.” This appears to be Patience’s critique of the structure of 
the training programme at the HWASU, and she makes use of the phrase “I think” as a way of 
distancing herself from the institution. Moreover, she refers to the internship site, which may 
illustrate that her major concern is with the market relevance of the trainees; that is, the extent to 
which they are able to function in the world ‘out there’.  
She further elaborates that “from the time, while Dr. [name omitted for confidentiality] was still 
here, I always told him that we are not equipping them to work in a government hospital setting”. 
This statement perhaps most clearly states her position; namely that it is important that clinical 
psychology interns are able to work within a market that has become clearly demarcated for them. 
Patience further states that “here, to make changes is very difficult, because when you’re set in 
your own ways it’s hard to accept a new idea and a new change”. This statement perhaps reinforces 
her earlier distancing from the institution. It appears that Patience has resigned herself to accepting 
that change at the HWASU is difficult to achieve, as the professional training site continues in the 
same way as it has historically. While there is much that can be said about the HPCSA and other 
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forces that come to bear on the training of psychologists, the histories of these programmes is an 
essential area in which stagnation can be located. 
Curriculum diversity as multiculturalism is linked to the dominant historical notion of ‘culture’ as 
referring to Black people. The deployment of community in relation to multiculturalism in this 
way solidifies the Otherness of Black lifeworlds in psychological training. Reciprocally, by 
studying Blackness as a sub-category in community psychology or multiculturalism, there is a 
concealment of Western-derived culture that serves to consolidate the dominant position of White 
lifeworlds. In the following extract, Menzi, the course coordinator at the HWESU2, was 
responding to a question regarding the material used in the curriculum:  
So some courses are very, like the social-psych course is a course on race and racism, a 
course on gender. Courses like that are very amenable to having a South African-based 
curriculum, heavily South African, ’cause there’s a lot of ready material in that space. So 
my course, the course, the counselling, sorry, the community psychology course has, about 
80% of the material is South African and South American, some Australian stuff, people 
like Christopher Son, who do stuff with indigenous communities. But I’m very deliberate 
about that. 
Menzi’s statement that “heavily South African, ’cause there’s a lot of ready material in that space” 
referring to “social psyche” and “gender” may perhaps illustrate how the curriculum is dependent 
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on the current research being conducted in these areas. Menzi continues that “the community 
psychology course has, about 80% of the material is South African and South American”, which 
may indicate that he is attempting to position the community psychology course as embedded 
within the South African context. Moreover, the use of “heavily” and “80%” may be using 
softening language so as to establish the factual nature of the description of the courses. Menzi 
further states that “I am very deliberate about that”, which may be to indicate that he has taken the 
task of changing the curriculum as an active process, rather than one that would occur naturally. 
Menzi may also be positioning himself as agentic in the process of curriculum change, which may 
also position others whose curriculums are not as amenable to change as not being in the same 
process.  
In the following extract, Ntokozo, an intern clinical psychologist from the HWESU, was 
responding to a question addressing the place of community psychology in the training 
programme: 
It felt like that, actually. The community psychology thing, just like the thesis, very often 
it felt like it was something on the side, not something [...] I don’t know really how to 
explain it, but it felt like it was something you need to do on the side. So very often we 
would go attend seminars and then we’d think when do I squeeze in the community project 
so that I can go to the community site? So it felt like something on the side. 
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Ntokozo’s statement that “the community psychology thing, just like the thesis very often it felt 
like it was something on the side” appears to be a comparison between two components of the 
training that serves to solidify his argument. Ntokozo adds that “so very often we would go attend 
seminars and then we’d think, ‘when do I squeeze in the community project?’” this appears to be 
an attempt to explain the place of community psychology in the training programme. Ntokozo’s 
use of the phrase “squeeze” may be an extreme case formulation to reinforce his apparent point 
that community psychology is “like it was something on the side”. I would propose that the 
position of community psychology that Ntokozo is alluding to, renders the idea of curriculum 
diversity as yet another way in which the professional training programmes continue 
Euroamerican-centric domination.  
This chapter dealt with discourses of race, lifting the issue of racial diversity, a related discourse 
of meritocracy, and how the subjectivity of selectors may play a role in who is selected into 
professional programs. What may become particularly important is how diversity maintains 
(white) Euroamerican-centrism, in how diversity often refers to the inclusion of Black people into 
training programs. In referring to the inclusion of Black people diversity may also reinforce the 
racialised discourse of the peculiarity of Black lifeworlds (see Kessi & Cornell, 2015). 
Additionally, the perpetual juniorisation of Black people was also evident in some the experiences 
that where shared by some of the White interns. Similarly, discourses that surround the curriculum 
where also related to the need to ‘diversify’ raising a related discourse of multiculturalism to refer 
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to Black lifeworlds. Additionally, related to the diversification of the curriculum is the role and 
place of community psychology in the training of psychologists.  
Even with the extent of the discourses of race covered in this chapter there is, however, an eminent 
sense that there is an incompleteness to the discourses of race that have been covered in this 
chapter. In the next chapter I focus on three discourses that were hidden and/or omitted in the 
interviews with the course coordinators and the interns. The first focuses on class, the second on 
language, and the third focuses on power and subjectivity, with the first two relating more 
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Chapter 7: Hidden and Omitted Discourses  
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I look at 3 discourses that are often hidden and/or omitted within the selection and 
training of, and curriculum offered to, professional psychology students. In the previous chapter, 
I dealt directly with discourses of race, in large part due to the tapestry of South African society 
being defined by race and racialisation. In this chapter, I will address the hidden discourses 
pertaining to class, language as a mechanism of access and exclusion, and related to discourses on 
power often remains unconsidered in professional training are also presented.  
In the first section I address the issue of class, as it relates to social positioning. I explore the ways 
in which class is omitted in the consideration of candidates and the M1 training. The second section 
looks at a related issue that of language and the discourses surrounding language in professional 
training, recruitment, selection, and curriculum are varied. In an Africa(n)-centred perspective on 
the training of counselling and clinical psychologists, language is viewed as not simply a mode in 
which we communicate, but carries with it, as Habermas (1985) argues, the lifeworlds of people. 
These lifeworlds are also constituted by class which requires equal attention. The third section in 
this hidden discourses chapter focusses on how power relations create particular subject positions. 
I explore the relationship between power, which Lewis Gordon describes as “the ability to make 
things happen, to make the possible actual” (2017, p. 39) and the subjectivities of course 
283 
 
283 | P a g e  
 
coordinators and intern psychologists in professional training. These subject positions are often 
related to the Professional Board for Psychology’s role of regulating and governing the 
professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists. 
7.2 Discourse of capital 
Class may both be conspicuously visible in the selection and professional training of counselling 
and clinical psychologists, yet it is made simultaneously invisible within the training institutions. 
Class is often a difficult-to-handle element in the transformation efforts of higher education (see 
Dlamini, 2019). Although class carries particular ways of making meaning of the world through 
experiences, as mediated through such things as social capital, it is often overlooked within the 
structures of training psychologists. Moreover, class is often thought of in relation to intersecting 
identities, such as language and race, which are often more clearly visible. Answering a question 
that I had asked about whether class is considered in the selection of candidates, Lucas, the course 
coordinator of the counselling programme at the HWESU, stated:  
That’s not as explicit. Because it is not [...] And pigmentation is something you can see, 
class is not something you see. So that is not that explicit. So I suppose it is more an 
individual sensitivity that the individual person busy with the selection will look at. To be 
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Lucas’ statement “that’s not as explicit. Because it is not…” indicates a slight hesitation with 
regard to the understanding of class as one way in which people are excluded. In this statement, 
Lucas may also be revealing that class remains an implicit criterion, due in part, as he states, 
because “pigmentation is something you can see, class is not something you see”. Lucas may be 
illustrating how race is viewed as the most visible criterion of transformative actions within the 
training sites, which I would suggest limits and (re)inscribes race as real. The reliance on skin 
colour rather than racialisation, which would include the material effects of race – which manifests 
in class – may point to the limiting of available discursive practices in the professional training 
sites who participated in this study. Lucas’ explanation that “to be quite honest with you, as far as 
I know it’s not an explicit variable category to consider in our selection” may also be an indication 
that, in the moment of answering the question, he began to reflect on why class is not considered 
in the as a determinant of selection.  
In 1988, Peggy McIntosh published White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack in which 
she made the observation that Whiteness is an invisible knapsack through which people who have 
been racialised as White negotiate the world. The knapsack is based on race (i.e. how a person 
looks) and operates through the racialisation of people in both the historical and contemporary 
articulations of lifeworlds (McIntosh, 1988). Menzi, the course coordinator of the HWESU2, 
accounts for the tension inherent in the selection of candidates relating to class and race when he 
observes the dichotomy between middle-class status and the working-class backgrounds of trainee 
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psychologists. The following extract forms part of Menzi’s response to a question related to class 
in the selection of candidates:  
And it’s easy to watch this. So while a middle-class, Model C, St. John kind of whatever, 
St. Mary’s kind of student has a lot of cultural capital in the university space, they sound 
smart, all of those things, put them in [names former Blacks-only township] and they’re 
inadequate, or they’re seen as this outsider that’s looked and gawked at, but that’s not 
productive. They might be respected, ’cause they look like they have money or something, 
but it’s not productive. They’re framed very clearly as an outsider. 
Menzi’s statement “so while a middle-class, Model C, St. John kind of whatever, St. Mary’s kind 
of student has a lot of cultural capital in the university space, they sound smart, all of those things, 
put them in [names former Blacks-only township] and they’re inadequate” may be referencing the 
differences in what is considered valuable capital. Menzi may be attempting to illustrate how the 
university remains removed from the Black population of the country. In arguing that the “they’re 
framed clearly as outsiders”, Menzi may also be illustrating how middle-class backgrounds within 
the university carry important social capital that can aid trainees in being effective students. 
Conversely, his statement may indicate that students from working-class backgrounds can 
successfully navigate township communities. Menzi’s elaboration that “they might be respected, 
’cause they look like they have money or something, but it’s not productive” may be an indication 
of how class can delineate both insider and outsider statuses that may be hindrances to the work 
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of trainee psychologists. Furthermore, Menzi’s use of the phrase “they” throughout the interview 
extract which may be in reference to both White and Black middle-class trainee psychologists, he 
offers no clarity on who is they. I would suggest that in speaking about class in this way, Menzi 
may be indicating the importance of class.  
Discourses of capital as linked to class also appear to shape the ways that students within the 
training sites interact. For example, in the following interview extract from Thobeka, a counselling 
psychology intern from the HWESU2, she narrates a story about having to use one of her 
classmates’ cars for community work: 
It was horrible. I can only think of the word horrible. Because it meant that when we got 
to [names former Blacks township] they felt that because they had carried us they had some 
sort of, power is the only word I can use, or access or should lead the project. 
In stating that “it was horrible. I can only think of the word horrible”, Thobeka may be attempting 
to emphasise her feelings of inadequacy that were associated with the event. Thobeka further 
elaborates on the issue by stating that “when we got to [names former Blacks township] they felt 
that because they had carried us”. The reference to “carrying us” by Thobeka may also indicate 
how, for Black trainees, they became juniorised in their interactions with White students. Thobeka 
continues to add that “they had some sort of, power is the only word I can use, or access or should 
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lead the project”, which may be an attempt to illustrate the asymmetrical relationship that is created 
through class.  
In the next extract, Sarah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HWESU, notes 
that there is an important case to be made for the inclusion of class as an explicit criterion in the 
selection of candidates:  
I think generally in terms of class, and I am generalising, but again there’s a sense that that 
candidate might be more able to reflect on social issues than someone from a very 
protected, privileged background. That has tended to be my experience, that people who 
are from a more disadvantaged socio-economic are generally more aware and are able to 
speak much more easily to those kinds of social context issues.  
In terms of what Sarah mentions as “people who are from a more disadvantaged socio-economic 
are generally more aware and are able to speak much more easily to those kinds of social context 
issues”, she may be attempting to show how she is aware of the importance of having people from 
working-class backgrounds in the training programme. In referring to “that candidate”, Sarah may 
be referring to students from working-class backgrounds as being more inclined to understand the 
context of marginalised communities. Sarah’s mentioning of “that has tended to be my experience” 
suggests that she may feel that others may disagree with her statement. I would suggest that what 
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Sarah is mentioning is an important consideration alongside considerations of transforming along 
racialised lines.   
From the participant responses presented in the previous chapter, it is clear that issues of class are 
often linked with other discourses, and particularly with discourses of race. I have attempted to 
show that class ought to be considered as an important way in which change within the training 
sites can be directed. Precisely because students from working-class and poor backgrounds pose a 
challenge to the normative way of viewing transformative change within training sites, this is a 
necessary challenge in expanding the pluriversality of lifeworlds within the profession. The 
discursive practices of higher education institutions and, by extension, the training sites, require 
that selectors be open to new possibilities of articulating what it means to be a psychologist. Class 
is but one way in which these new discursive articulations can occur. I turn next to language and 
its related discourses that have been hidden or omitted in the professional training. 
7.3 Language as a mechanism for access, exclusion, and privilege 
But I do think, quite honestly, there would be very severe limitations on how much I could help a 
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In an Africa(n)-centred perspective, language shapes the manner in which institutions are 
structured and organised to (re)produce particular lifeworlds. The tensions that exist in other 
components that are central to the selection of candidates may also be discernible in the role that 
language plays in selection and training. That is, language can be a means of exclusion, as various 
language policies have come to exemplify, specifically at HWASUs (le Courdeur, 2013). 
Language, however, may hold an interesting way in which to understand the position of the 
training sites in relation to society. Issues of access, privilege, and exclusion can be considered 
under the rubric of language in both the perspective of training sites as well as in larger society. 
Since language does not simply transmit information, it is important to understand what is lost and 
gained in privileging English and/or Afrikaans in the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists, as is currently the case within the South African university context (Cakata & 
Segalo, 2017).  
7.3.1 Access. According to Ahmed and Pillay (2004), language as a means of accessing 
training has not been properly considered within the selection and training of counselling and 
clinical psychologists. While language remains an integral part of the practice of psychologists, its 
apparent side-lining in the selection and training process may point towards the continued 
reproduction of (White) Euroamerican-centric lifeworlds. In answering a question as to whether 
or not language plays a role in the selection of candidates Lucy, the course coordinator of the 
counselling programme at the HWASU, stated: 
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Not really. Well, okay, let’s think. It does play a role inevitably to some extent, because 
part of the selection criteria is academic proficiency and a lot of that is language 
proficiency. So, for example, to score high and to get a good mark in Honours you’re gonna 
have to have English skills specifically. We try not to discriminate according to language, 
so we’re used to working with people with English language second language. We’ve had 
some Afrikaans students who struggle with English more than many of the black students, 
but actually very few Afrikaans students. 
Lucy’s initial response of “Not really” may have been her attempt to show that students may not 
be denied access because of how well they can express themselves in English. Her immediately 
stating that “it does play a role inevitably to some extent, because part of the selection criteria is 
academic proficiency and a lot of that is language proficiency” may speak to her attempting to 
show that when it comes to the issue of language, it is not in the selectors’ control. This lack of 
control may be evidenced through her statement regarding “academic proficiency”, which refers 
to the standards set by the university.   
Additionally, Lucy’s statement that it is “English skills specifically” that are required within the 
training programme may be her attempt to position White Afrikaans students as also being at a 
disadvantage. She continues this thought with “we’ve had some Afrikaans students who struggle 
with English more than many of the black students”, which may have served to illustrate that the 
problematics of language cut across racial lines. Given the history of the HWASU, the need to 
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single out English as a disadvantaging factor for both Black and White Afrikaner trainees may 
have been important to her. I would argue that HWASUs, such as the one that participated in this 
study, have historically placed White Afrikaner lifeworlds (i.e. languages, cultures, etc.) as central 
to the functioning of the institutions (le Courdeur, 2013). Lucy does appear to want to correct her 
statement in the comparison of Black and White Afrikaner students by stating that “but actually 
very few Afrikaans students”. The history of the country is marred by the imposition of English 
(i.e. colonialism) and then White Afrikaner lifeworlds (i.e. apartheid), which may account for Lucy 
having to ‘correct’ her position on White Afrikaner students and Black students. Leslie Swartz 
notes, “[t]he apartheid government systematically advanced the interests of Afrikaans by making 
it a requirement that persons working in the public service be able to speak the language” (2000, 
p. 186). 
English, as a language, should not merely be understood as the language of communication within 
the training sites but as denoting values and attributes of the profession. For example, Lucas, the 
course coordinator of the counselling programme at the HWESU, illuminated on the position of 
English within professional training. In answering a follow-up question regarding the language 
and selection of a student who can speak multiple South African languages but struggles with 
English, Lucas said:  
So the example that you’re using will be a distinct advantage in the practice. But 
academically, that particular M1 student must still write in English and write assignments 
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in English, write case reports in English. That is the, has become [...] Even though we say 
we have 11 official languages, English is the lingua franca in South Africa. That is the 
language of, professional language of communication. So that is where the tension then 
comes in. 
Lucas’ listing of the role of English saying that “but academically that particular M1 student must 
still write in English and write assignments in English, write case reports in English” may have 
been an attempt to illustrate the centrality of English in the training programme and curriculum. 
The different components of the training that Lucas mentions, namely “assignments” and “case 
reports” may also serve to indicate how the “particular M1 student” in the example may be at a 
disadvantage. In further stating that “even though we say we have 11 official languages, English 
is the lingua franca in South Africa”, Lucas may also be attempting to position the training site as 
having no control over the role of English in the country. Others such as Cakata and Segalo (2017) 
have noted the lingua franca status of English and the subsequent continued marginalisation of 
Black people’s languages. In further elaborating on this position of the training site, Lucas 
specifically mentions “that is the language of, professional language of communication”, which 
he may have mentioned so as to show that it is, again, the profession and not necessarily the 
training site that has dictated the language conditions.  
Grace Musila’s (2017) epistemic disarticulation is made visible in how two modes of epistemic 
grounding can come to be disconnected from one another; as what is considered legitimate in one 
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place is not the same in another. In this study, the two epistemic modes can largely be understood 
as the (White) Euroamerican-centric nature of the training sites and the required Africa(n)-centred 
modes, as carried through language and other contextually embedded artefacts. Jessica, a clinical 
psychology intern from the HBU, highlights that even if the training can equip her with many 
tools, the severity of the limitation that language brings forth cannot be ignored: 
But I do think, quite honestly, there would be very severe limitations on how much I could 
help a Xhosa-speaking person who couldn’t speak English at all. That’s it. 
Jessica’s statement that “I do think, quite honestly” may be an attempt to speak to how her own 
inability to speak any other language other than English did not bar her from accessing training, 
while it may limit her from being able to be effective in practice. I would propose that the training 
sites come to represent something of the colonial space that firmly entrenches itself within the 
(White) Euroamerican-centric ideals. In the use of the term “severe”, Jessica may also have been 
attempting to emphasise the extent of the limitation for her as a monolingual speaker of English. 
Jessica’s use of the phrase “that’s it” illustrates a kind of finality to her point about the disjuncture 
that is perpetuated by language. She may also be positioning herself as fully aware of the 
paradoxical situation of having monolingual English speakers in a context that requires people to 
speak languages other than English. I would argue that training sites, in some way, are current 
geared towards training psychologists to work within the profession (i.e. to communicate with 
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other psychologists), and also preparing psychologists to effectively serve only a small minority 
of South Africans – English-speaking, and mostly middle-class.  
7.3.2 Exclusion. Although exclusion forms part of the crux of this thesis, language as a 
mechanism for exclusion specifically presents an important way in which the training sites in this 
study may think about demographic transformation and increasing the effectiveness of 
psychological services. Exclusion is linked to the issue of access and can be seen to represent one 
end of a continuum in which access to both clients and professional training may possibly occur. 
In the following extract, Thobeka, an intern counselling psychologist from the HWESU2, was 
responding to a question addressing the role of language in the selection process. She argued that 
the issue of language can act as mechanism through which exclusion can occur: 
And perhaps speaking multiple languages is definitely a plus in the field and something that 
I think they write in the papers they give us, the briefs they give you before the selection 
week. But it only for me, not in selection was an issue. It was just perhaps later on when I 
was in the M1 class and being able to speak a certain language gives you access to certain 
spaces and excludes you from others. 
Thobeka indicates a slight hesitation when she states that “perhaps speaking multiple languages is 
definitely a plus in the field”, which may illustrate that speaking multiple languages holds an 
ambiguous position in the selection and training process. Thobeka, who had revealed earlier that 
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she was a foreign national who came to South Africa when she started university, illustrates this 
ambiguity when she states that “but it only for me, not in selection was an issue. It was just perhaps 
later on when I was in the M1 class”. In this statement, Thobeka may be indicating how different 
languages are privileged within the training of candidates and that entry into the university may be 
contingent on knowing a particular language – English. Yet ‘in the field”, English may not 
necessarily have the same privilege. Thobeka continues that “being able to speak a certain 
language gives you access to certain spaces and excludes you from others”, which may indicate 
that she has become aware of how particular languages allow for access into certain communities, 
such as universities. 
In the following extract, Malusi, an intern counselling psychologist from the HWESU, was 
responding to a question regarding whether or not he felt the selection process was fair and 
equitable: 
But, firstly, they check the language even though they do not tell you that you have to be 
able to articulate yourself in English. I’ve seen this when I was part of the selection process. 
That is, when I was doing my M1, then when we had to sit for those candidates who are 
going through that play where I become a client and the candidate who’s here for selection 
becomes a therapist. So that small play. When we had an argument with the person who 
was in charge for that process. So she was saying, no, this person cannot articulate herself, 
as a result it would be hard for us to consider her for the training. 
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Malusi’s response that “they check the language even though they do not tell you that you have to 
be able to articulate yourself in English” potentially describes the way in which English is rendered 
as a central component in the selection process. Additionally, Malusi, by stating that “even though 
they do not tell you that you”, may also be attempting to point to the problematic practice of the 
training site at the HWESU concealing the importance of English articulation in the selection 
process. He continues to state that “I’ve seen this when I was part of the selection process”, in 
which he attempts to establish his position as factual through the inclusion of personal experience.  
When Malusi says “When we had an argument with the person who was in charge for that process. 
So she was saying, no, this person cannot articulate herself, as a result it would be hard for us to 
consider her for the training”, he may be using his statement to legitimise his position that language 
is considered paramount in the selection of candidates. I would suggest that Malusi’s account of 
the selection process reflects the concerns raised by Ahmed and Pillay (2004), who note that 
language may continue to act as an exclusionary mechanism in professional training. The centrality 
of English within the selection of candidates may also raise questions regarding training sites 
commitment to increasing access to psychological services for people who do not speak English 
as a primary language.  
Exclusion may also be understood as occurring during the interaction between trainees and clients, 
which makes it necessary to consider how the centrality of English may act as an exclusionary 
mechanism for trainee psychologists during their interaction with people outside of the training 
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site. Swartz (2000) maintains that, amongst monolingual speakers of English, there is a resistance 
to learning a new language. I would further add that learning another person’s language is based 
on the need to survive, particularly as regards the need to relate effectively with others. 
Monolingual speakers of English may find that their survival has not come under threat and, as 
such, the need to learn any other language apart from the lingua franca is not significantly 
necessary. Menzi, the course coordinator of the HWESU2, answers a question related to the role 
of language in the selection and training in the following interview extract: 
They’re framed very clearly as an outsider. Bring in the person who greets in the language 
and who can engage in the language, and the difference very quickly is gotten out of the 
way. And you can meet and understand the person’s context, because that’s all carried and 
embodied in language. 
In stating that “they’re framed very clearly as an outsider”, Menzi may be referring to monolingual 
English speakers, who may struggle to access the lifeworlds of the majority of Black people. In 
referring to them as “outsider”, Menzi may also be attempting to illustrate how the status of in-
group and out-group is influenced by more factors than only race and emphasises language as key 
in relationships. Menzi also elaborates on the role of language in contexts beyond the training 
classrooms by stating that it is “all carried and embodied in language”. This statement re-
emphasises the position of the importance of language in the training of psychologists. His 
statement may also be referencing language as part of people’s lifeworlds. Moreover, where Menzi 
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says “bring in the person who greets in the language and who can engage in the language, and the 
difference very quickly is gotten out of the way. And you can meet and understand the person’s 
context”, he may be raising the importance of selecting and growing trainees who can “understand 
the person’s context”. I would agree with Menzi that language is a central component in bridging 
gaps between people, especially when language also serves as an important point to which 
professional psychology can be situated within the South African context.   
In addition to the difficulty of expression during selection, there may be an associated challenge 
during the training itself for students who are not fluent in English. Musa, an intern clinical 
psychologist from the MU, noted a problem that arises from being unable to write well in English: 
Because at the end of the day a psychologist [...] There’s a huge component of having to 
be able to write well and write clearly and concisely. And so if you can’t do that then it 
becomes problematic. 
Musa’s assertion that “because at the end of the day a psychologist…” potentially positions 
psychology and being a psychologist as referring to a specific type of person (i.e. someone who 
may be able to specifically communicate in English). Musa also appears to make his awareness of 
the centrality of English known when he states: “there’s a huge component of having to be able to 
write well and write clearly and concisely”. His argument that “and so if you can’t do that then it 
becomes problematic” may be an attempt to illustrate that even though most of the universities 
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have argued that being able to speak multiple languages is regarded as an important component 
for selection, English remains a centralised component of the selection and training of candidates. 
In the following interview extract, Sarah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the 
HWESU, was responding to a question I had asked regarding the role of language in the assessment 
of students during the M1 year: 
So because of that, the understanding that perhaps second-language English speakers or 
people who are not first-language English speakers would struggle more or wouldn’t be 
able to perform as well in the actual written exam, there has been an attempt or where 
we’ve thought about how to ensure that it’s not overly weighted. That what’s equally 
weighted is also the oral exam opportunity and course work opportunity, where obviously 
it does have to be written in English, but you have access to, you’ve got time to really focus 
on your written expression, you’ve got access to various language editors, etcetera.  
Sarah’s statement “that perhaps second-language speakers or people who are not first-language 
English speakers” may show a bit of hesitation in naming who those “people who are not first-
language English speakers” may be. It is unclear why Sarah does not name the type of student. 
However, according to StatsSA (2016a), most of South Africa’s population, particularly Black 
people, does not speak English as a first language, which may suggest that Sarah is referring to the 
majority Black population. Sarah continues to add “would struggle more or wouldn’t be able to 
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perform as well in the actual written exam”, which may illustrate her awareness of the ways that 
language can act to exclude people. Expressing that “there has been an attempt or where we’ve 
thought about how to ensure that it’s not overly weighted” may also point to how the role of 
English is difficult to change under the current structural determinants of university requirements. 
Sarah goes on to say: “That what’s equally weighted is also the oral exam opportunity and course 
work opportunity but you have access to, you’ve got time to really focus on your written 
expression, you’ve got access to various language editors, etcetera”. She is likely attempting to 
highlight how the equal weighting of coursework, and oral and written examinations allows for a 
diminishing of the disadvantage that second and third language speakers of English may 
experience.  
7.3.3 Privilege. If we consider Habermas’ (1985) assertion that a lifeworld is constituted 
by language, amongst other cultural artefacts, we can conclude that language gestures towards the 
centrality of particular lifeworlds within the training of psychologists. In the following interview 
extract, Mbali, an intern from the MU in the counselling programme, responded to a follow-up 
question related to the issue of language:  
[A]t time yes, uhm, but at the time, they would be given the opportunity to choose when 
they want to or not, unlike on our side is never like a matter like you could choose, but you 
know you can’t. 
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Mbali’s response that “they would be given the opportunity to choose when they want to or not” 
may illustrate that White trainees were afforded opportunities to shape their training to, 
opportunities that Black trainees were not afforded. Mbali adds that “unlike on our side, is never 
like a matter like you could choose, but you know you can’t”. This statement may be her attempt 
to illustrate that Black students have not had (and still do not have) the same opportunities as their 
White counterparts. Moreover, I would suggest that this lack of choice for Black, bilingual students 
illustrates their marginality, and as such the marginality of Black lifeworlds. Mbali also uses the 
terms “they” and “our”, which may illustrate her perception of the separate groups in the class. 
These groupings return to the constant theme in the discourses of race that have been presented 
throughout this study.  
The discourses of privilege that Mbali attempts to show are embedded in how she may feel, namely 
that White trainees have the option and opportunity to opt in and/or out of particular client groups, 
based on language, class, and culture. Although she states that “you know you can’t”, Mbali may 
be attempting to reveal how these practices of privilege remain tacit rather than explicitly stated. I 
would suggest that the extract from Mbali’s interview is also revealing of how Whiteness, as a 
persistent social position, is contorted into privilege. That is, to be white is to be regarded as ‘fully 
human’, to have the power to choose, on your own terms, what you regard as necessary. To be 
white is to be a subject (Césaire, 1972). To be Black is to be an object that is acted upon, to be, as 
Fanon (1967/2008) observed, concealed in a state of perpetual objecthood. Black students, if they 
fail to meet the English expression criteria, can be excluded from study and/or work opportunities, 
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whilst White trainees can choose with whom they work, thereby consistently operating from a 
place of inclusion. Thus, the ability to choose clients may indicate how White trainees may 
possibly be viewed as perpetually belonging within the training programmes. Mbali’s account may 
also illustrate how Whiteness operates in ex-colonised nations; wherein Whiteness takes on more 
inconspicuous forms rather than being overtly exclusionary. In the following interview extract, 
however, Sarah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HWESU, argues that 
monolingual English speakers are at a disadvantage when it comes to selection for training. 
I think what’s more important, having just gone through a paper selection now, is if we are 
going to select someone that only speaks English, they have to be ‘flipping wow’ in some 
other category that we couldn’t possibly pass them up. It’s something that increasingly is 
becoming, is something that we are pushing, the language skills. So because of the clients 
that we want our students to be able to serve, but alongside that we have to [...] Because 
this is a university that the degree is in English and the teaching is in English and the thesis 
has to be written in English. 
Sarah’s statement that “is if we are going to select someone that only speaks English, they have to 
be ‘flipping wow’ in some other category that we couldn’t possibly pass them up” may be an 
attempt to argue that her training site places great value in the ability to speak multiple languages. 
However, the statement may also suggest that the continuous selection of monolingual English 
speakers is justifiable through them being exceptional in other areas. I would propose, therefore, 
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that there is an invisible subject in this statement, namely the bi-lingual candidate, who will not be 
selected because they do not possess these exceptional attributes. Often, the bi-lingual speaker is 
Black, and of a working-class background (see StatsSA, 2016a).  
Sarah adds that “it’s something that increasingly is becoming, is something that we are pushing, 
the language skills”. This statement suggests that the training site as doing as much as is possible 
to remedy the problems of language in practice and training. However, Sarah appears to add a 
disclaimer on the importance of language in the selection process by adding “but alongside that 
we have to [...] Because this is a university that the degree is in English and the teaching is in 
English and the thesis has to be written in English”. Sarah may also be positioning the training site 
as being determined by the context of the university when she states with hesitation that “but 
alongside that we have to...”. I would propose that the attempt to demonstrate their recognition of 
the contradictions in how language is considered within training sites may serve to position the 
training sites as helpless against the larger system. This positioning raises issues of power that I 
will elaborate on in the next section of this chapter.  
From participants’ responses presented in this section, language appears to serve multiple roles 
within the training of clinical and counselling psychologists. Exclusion, privilege, and access, 
therefore, become a central part of the discursive practices of the training sites when considered 
under the rubric of language. Additionally, these factors (i.e. exclusion, privilege and access) speak 
not only to the university training sites but extend outward towards the practice of trainee 
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psychologists. This latter point is important when considering with whom trainee psychologists 
are trained to work. It appears that English is still privileged within the training of psychologists, 
even when it is not the common language of South African society. In the tension between training 
site and society, the training sites appear to be taking precedence; thereby reproducing the 
exclusivity of the discipline to lifeworlds expressible in English. I would argue that Lucas is correct 
in his assessment of the country and the profession with regard to language. However, as I have 
shown earlier in this chapter, with the inclusion of Lucy’s comments, there is a sense of 
helplessness that pervades the training sites. This sense of helplessness shifts accountability and 
power to external forces. Moreover, I would add that there is a sense that, whilst university policies 
and the structure of the discipline centralises English as the lingua franca, there is also an 
acceptance of this centralisation as ‘the way things are’. In carving out new forms of practice that 
may create discursive possibilities for the profession that are pluriversal, training sites may be 
required to engage in deliberate forms of epistemic disobedience. 
7.4 Power and subjectivity 
“I think we’re a very passive bunch. I think psychology has, psychologists and psychology have a 
very bad history in this country. We never raised a voice when we should have raised a voice” 
(Elretha, clinical programme course coordinator, MU) 
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The Professional Board for Psychology’s discursive practices can be found in its focus on the 
disciplining of its members, with ‘disciplining’ understood not as punishment but, rather, as 
members having to follow the rules and regulations as set out in law. Disciplining can also be 
extended to the understanding of epistemic obedience, as presented by Mignolo (2009), and as a 
formative part of an Africa(n)-centred perspective on professional training. These practices are 
determined in part by people’s relationship to power, and how this manifests particular 
subjectivities that hinder or promote change.  
The ways in which the course coordinators represent and speak to and about the HPCSA creates 
particular subject positions. These subject positions are linked to both the history of psychology in 
South Africa and psychology’s structure and form globally, which are influenced by 
Euroamerican-centric epistemologies (Nsamenang, 2007). In the following interview extract, 
Elretha, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the MU, was answering a question 
regarding the demographics of professional psychology:   
And that to me is a problem with psychology, because I think we’re a very passive bunch. 
I think psychology has, psychologists and psychology have a very bad history in this 
country. We never raised a voice when we should have raised a voice.  
Although Elretha was responding to a question regarding demographics, what she has to say may 
also be pertinent to how professional training institutions potentially position themselves with 
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regards to the HPCSA. Elretha states that “And that to me is a problem with psychology”, which 
may be her attempt to manage any criticism that may result from her evaluation of the profession, 
and particularly of psychologists. She goes on to say that “I think we’re a very passive bunch”, 
which may be her way of illustrating how psychologists tend to opt not to engage with socio-
political issues, but rather attempt to remain neutral. Elretha also uses “we’re” again so as to 
manage the stake that she has in the profession. That is, even though her initial statement, “problem 
with psychology”, describes psychology as distant from her, she uses ‘we’ so as to include herself 
and possibly evade any possible negative ramifications of her criticism.  
Elretha further states that “psychologists and psychology have a very bad history in this country. 
We never raised a voice when we should have raised a voice”. Her referencing of psychology’s 
bad history, during the apartheid-era, may serve to suggest a deep-seated problem that is 
entrenched in African psychology. I would also suggest this reference made by Elretha is 
suggestive of the role that psychologists played in the maintenance and perpetuation of apartheid 
in South Africa (Nicholas, 1990), particularly with regard to ideological positions such as 
‘scientific neutrality’ (see Biesheuvel, 1957). Scientific neutrality is an act of de-politicising 
discourses and turning issues that emerge from the political realm into the epistemological without 
the necessary consideration of the effects of these discourses on society. Through the practice of 
scientific neutrality, psychologists are able to mainatain subject positions that can be regarded as 
“passive” or, in other words, where forces outside of psychologists and their profession 
continuously act without their control.  
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The constitution of the Professional Board for Psychology stipulates that the board should be 
comprised mainly of people from the profession (DoH, 2008b). This was the case in most of the 
sites that were involved in this study, where the selection panel were currently on the board or who 
had been on the board recently. In the following interview extract, Menzi, the course coordinator 
of the HWESU2 programme, answered a follow-up question regarding the role of the HPCSA in 
the training at the HWESU2:  
So the Health Professions Council is the champion of the capitalist model. They’re the 
gatekeepers for that. And they’re conservative, they don’t know what’s happening at 
universities, cause they’re bean counters and bureaucrats that sit and constrain an academic 
product of which they have no concept… And I know the counter is that they are governed 
by people from the profession. Many of them are interested gatekeepers, frustrated 
bureaucrats that inhibit possibilities of real change and use the biomedical frame to think 
about the world. 
In stating that “the Health Professions Council is the champion of the capitalist model”, Menzi 
may be attempting to position the HPCSA as in opposition to the needs of the majority who may 
be left out of the capitalist model. Menzi continues that “they’re conservative, they don’t know 
what’s happening at universities”, which is perhaps his attempt to distance the training site from 
the actions of the HPCSA in preserving the capitalist model. This distancing of the training site 
from the HPCSA may also be an attempt to illustrate a frustration with the HPCSA, which is 
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further evidenced in his stating “they’re bean counters and bureaucrats that sit and constrain an 
academic product of which they have no concept…”. Menzi illustrates a slight hesitation before 
continuing to add that “I know the counter is that they are governed by people from the profession”, 
which may be his use of a disclaimer in anticipation of a rebuttal to his distancing of the HPCSA 
and the professional training sites.  
Menzi further adds that “many of them are interested gatekeepers, frustrated bureaucrats that 
inhibit possibilities of real change and use the biomedical frame to think about the world”. This 
statement shows how he may be switching to refer to only those people who have been members 
of the board as “interested gatekeepers”. Thus, in this statement, there is both a distancing of the 
profession from the board and a distancing from the others that may be deemed to participate in 
the perpetuation of the “capitalist model”. Gordon (2017) highlights, using Freud’s (1989/1930) 
conception of the ‘prosthetic God’, that the creating of governmental structures serves the same 
function as what a religious God serves; that is, to provide for the basic necessities of human life. 
This assertion by Gordon is, perhaps, important to illustrate how power, for course coordinators, 
is often viewed as concentrated within an institution such as the HPCSA (i.e. the prosthetic God). 
I would, however, propose that it may be helpful to think about power as diffuse rather than as 
concentrated within people, institutions, or the State (see Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008).  
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Stephanie, the course coordinator of the counselling programme at the MU, attested to the general 
feeling amongst the course coordinators that has been that the HPCSA disregards their input in 
many matters, but specifically regarding the scope of practice:  
This is why it becomes even more contentious. Because it seems, and please, this is my 
perception, but based on conversations I hear all the time, any feedback that is given, has 
been given to the Board, the Health Professions Council, over the last few years about the 
scope of practice debate and about what we recommend should be in, appears to have been 
totally disregarded and a scope of practice comes up which appears even more limiting. 
Stephanie states that “this is why it becomes even more contentious”, which may serve to preface 
what she is about to state regarding the HPCSA. Her use of the phrase “even more contentious” 
may further be used to highlight the severity of the issue. Stephanie continues to say: “and please, 
this is my perception, but based on conversations I hear all the time”, which may indicate her 
attempt to lessen the critique of what she is about to say because it is her “perception”. She then 
attempts to provide evidence of her critique of the HPCSA by stating “based on conversations”, 
which broadens her statement to include the opinion of other people and establishes the statements 
validity.  
Ultimately, Stephanie reveals the crux of her opinion when she says: “over the last few years about 
the scope of practice debate and about what we recommend should be in, appears to have been 
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totally disregarded”. The use of “the last few years” and “totally” as extreme case formulations 
(see Edwards, 2000) is important because it may indicate her attempt to establish how professional 
psychologists have tried to engage the HPCSA. Stephanie’s account may be seen as a rebuttal to 
Elretha’s statement of the passivity of professional psychologists and may also serve to show how 
little recourse professionals have against the Professional Board of Psychology. 
Psychology in the main has remained individually focused and has tended to shy away from 
political activity (Foster, 2008). However, the establishment of PIRSA is an example of how 
psychologists have actively organised to perpetuate and maintain apartheid practices (Long, 2014). 
Alternatively, the establishment of OASSA, of which psychologists were an important part, is an 
example of how psychologists have fought against this kind of regulation from within. The 
individual nature of psychology extends beyond its traditional one-to-one therapeutic encounter 
and forms part of the episteme of professional psychology. Leah, the course coordinator of the 
clinical programme at the HBU, in her response to a follow-up question related to the HPCSA’s 
accreditation process, made the following comment:  
[U]ltimately, I don’t have the energy to expend on fighting a board when I have a lot on 
my plate already. And I think my colleagues would probably share the same opinion. 
In using the word “ultimately”, Leah may be attempting to illustrate that she has made many 
attempts to engage the HPCSA in the past. Her statement that “I don’t have the energy to expend 
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on fighting a board when I have a lot on my plate already” may also show that she has other, more 
important things that she has to deal with. This makes the issues brought about by the HPCSA 
unimportant to the challenges faced by the professional training of psychologists. Leah further 
extends her feelings of the HPCSA in stating that “and I think my colleagues would probably share 
the same opinion”. This statement by Leah may serve to justify her point that she is not the only 
one who takes a passive position with regard to the HPCSA.  
Discourses of power and subjectivity, as presented in this chapter, illustrate that the participating 
course coordinators have positioned themselves as having little power with regard to the decisions 
made by the HPCSA. This is a general misrepresentation of power, as Gordon (2017, p. 39) notes 
that “power need not be exclusively coercive”, as such, responsibility need not be conceded to a 
prosthetic God – the HPCSA. Rather I would suggest that power can be understood as the ability 
to achieve goals, and in this way as being diffused across professional psychology. The 
implications of how power is understood by the course coordinators, and to some extend the intern 
psychologists, is such that there are a number of related discourses that influence the training of 
psychologists. In the next chapter I will explicate the role of power, as understood through the 
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Chapter 8: Governance and Relevance  
“I always tell my students that I want you to leave here being able to work in a government hospital 
setting.” (Patience, course coordinator clinical programme, HWASU) 
8.1 Introduction 
In attempting to engage the question of how to (re)centre Africa in the training of counselling and 
clinical psychologists, it is important to consider the discursive field that is created by the 
Professional Board for Psychology (referred to throughout this chapter interchangeably as the 
HPCSA) through its governance and surveillance duties of professional training sites. To frame 
the question as to what end trainees are trained within the discursive field of the HPCSA is, 
however, to raise the ways in which multiple role players influence the professional training of 
psychologists. Gloria Dall’Alba (2009) notes that professional training programmes are central 
places for the induction of new members. I have also previously argued that the professional 
training of psychologists is the epicentre at which Africa(n)-centred change can occur within 
professional psychology and, as such, requires careful consideration.  
Referring to the conceptualisation of the EPD (Maton, 2013), I recognise that the field of 
recontextualisation is constituted by a number of actors, including university administrators, 
course coordinators, and the HPCSA. In the field of recontexualisation, issues of power and how 
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it operates are privileged, so as to make visible the ways in which power operates to either reinforce 
or de-structively engage with the Euroamerican-centric versions of psychology. In an Africa(n)-
centred perspective the reconfiguration of power dynamics, and the de-centralisation of power 
relations is part of the continued hierarchical relations of coloniality, are an integral part of 
constructing more situated forms of professional training.  
The current chapter places the issue of relevance, as noted by Whabie Long (2016a) and other 
(earlier) authors (see Macleod, 2004), within the discursive field of the Professional Board for 
Psychology. The issue of relevance presented in this chapter deals primarily with how the 
Professional Board for Psychology has become a central point for how course coordinators and 
intern psychologists come to understand relevant practice of psychology. Generally, discourses of 
relevance have focussed on the practice of psychologists (see Long & Foster, 2013) and 
psychology research (see Macleod, 2004), and have expanded to include other factors such as 
market and social relevance (see Long, 2013). All of these components have an impact on the 
professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists, and simultaneously can be seen to 
be impacted by professional training.  
8.2 The scope of professional practice as relevance 
One of the foremost debates that has gripped professional psychology in recent years has been the 
scope of practice debates (Bantjes et al., 2016; HPCSA, 2018b; Young & Saville Young, 2019), 
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which have impacted, in some ways, the professional training of psychologists. The relevance 
discourse pertaining to the scope of practice raises fundamental questions regarding the epistemic 
project upon which professional training is based rather than the simple attainment of skills. In 
democratic South Africa, since 2011, there has been increasing controversy surrounding the 
distinction that can be made between the two categories (Young, 2013). This controversy has 
largely focussed on the perceived domination of clinical psychologists (Young, 2013). As part of 
dispensing with its statutory power, the Professional Board for Psychology, in 2018, published the 
Regulations Defining the Scope of the Profession of Psychology, through the Minister of Health, 
for public comment (DoH, 2018). On 13 September 2019 – backdated to the 5th of September 2019 
– the Minister of Health published a reversal that aligned back to the regulations that had been 
instituted in September of 2008 (DoH, 2019). The contestation over the scope of practice for 
psychologists of 2011, limited here to counselling and clinical psychologists, can be categorised 
as the fight for hegemonic control of the EPD. This contestation filters through to the professional 
training of psychologists.  
Historically, the development of counselling and clinical psychology has paralleled one another 
and has been argued to have come from two hegemonic traditions, namely from traditionally 
English-speaking and traditionally Afrikaans-speaking universities (Leach et al., 2003). 
Responding to a question regarding the degree to which the counselling and clinical programmes 
are separate, Stephanie, the course coordinator of counselling programme at the MU, stated:  
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[A]s psychologists, almost irrespective of what category you’re going to end up in, you 
actually need a foundational level of skill. There is a basic skillset which all psychologists 
actually need. And then just diversity on top of that in terms of what category you’re 
actually training for. 
In stating that “as psychologists, almost irrespective of what category you’re going to end up in”, 
Stephanie may be using totalising language so as to make clear her position that the differences 
being sought between categories may not exist in the M1 year. She adds that “there is a basic 
skillset which all psychologists actually need”, which may serve to emphasise the point of 
counselling and clinical psychologists being similar, rather than different. Young and Saville 
Young (2019) also emphasise this point about the practice of counselling and clinical psychologists 
being more similar than different based on the practice patterns of the two categories. This may 
indicate that the discursive field that largely constitutes the epistemological foundations of 
professional psychology cuts across the registration categorisation of counselling and clinical 
psychology. It is important to note that according to Watkins (1983), discussions regarding the 
differences between counselling and clinical psychology have had a long history in the US and 
other Western countries. I would propose that the debates that have ensued in South Africa over 
the differences between registration categories since 2011 are in part due to its mimicry of Western 
psychology. Stephanie continues by stating “then just diversity on top of that in terms of what 
category you’re actually training for”, which may have to do with the additional skillsets that the 
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different registration categories may need. However, she does not elaborate on what she means by 
“diversity”.  
The relevance discourse, as understood through the Professional Board for Psychology’s 
governance and surveillance, influences the expectations of candidates who are applying for 
professional training. In the following extract, Patience, the course coordinator of the clinical 
programme at the HWASU, speaks to the expectations of candidates when applying for the 
professional programmes at the HWASU:  
They want students who know which category of psychology they wanna specialise in. 
They don’t want someone [...] They would rather have students who know I want to apply 
for clinical and I’m gonna apply for clinical or I want to apply for research and I’m gonna 
apply for research. It mustn’t be people who now didn’t get into another Masters 
programme and now is gonna apply for research. 
Patience uses the phrase “they” throughout this extract, which may imply the university and/or the 
HPCSA; in both instances, this usage presents distancing language, which suggests that she may 
not be in agreement with the requirements. She further states that “they want students who know 
which category of psychology they wanna specialise in”. This statement may suggest that students 
who are applying to the programme must be familiar with the differences of the registration 
categories with respect to not only training, but practice. Patience then notes that “they don’t want 
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someone...”, in which she pauses slightly and switches to framing these requirements from a 
negative to a more positive way, “they would rather have students who know I want to apply for 
clinical”. The move from a negative framing to a positive one may be in anticipation of how the 
training site at the HWASU may be perceived as rejecting students who do not meet this criterion.  
The prominence of needing students to be able to differentiate between different registration 
categories has become part of the tapestry of the contestations in the scope of practice. Students, 
much like course coordinators, may be required to show their commitment to the current ways of 
understanding clinical and counselling psychology. Yet, the course coordinators who took part in 
this study, themselves, do not appear to agree on the degree of separation between the two 
registration categories. Despite this lack of agreement, the incoming professionals are still required 
to illustrate their knowledge of these differences.  
One of the more pointed criticisms of the 2011 scope of practice has been that it has created a 
hierarchy within the profession, with clinical psychologists at the top and the other registration 
categories falling underneath (Bantjes et al., 2016; Young, 2013; Young & Saville Young, 2019). 
What is even more poignant about this hierarchy is how intern psychologists, at the outset of their 
careers, have also interpreted the ways in which the discipline has engaged with the differentiation 
of counselling and clinical psychology. For instance, Jessica, an intern clinical psychologist from 
the HBU, noted that her choosing to do clinical psychology was based on: 
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[H]onestly, because its research. I think in terms of the scope of practice in South Africa 
you get more leeway when you do clinical work. Then you can always choose to do some 
sort of counselling work as well and research. 
In beginning by saying “honestly”, Jessica may be showing that her choice was potentially an 
uncomfortable decision that may be seen as contentious by others. She goes on to say that “I think 
in terms of the scope of practice in South Africa you get more leeway when you do clinical work”, 
which suggests that even for interns, perceptions of the registration categories has become 
entrenched in how the potential psychologists choose their careers. This perceived “leeway” in 
clinical psychology could explain the results found by Pillay et al. (2008), namely that South 
African students wanted to apply for clinical psychology far more than any other category. Jessica 
further explains that “then you can always choose to do some sort of counselling work as well and 
research”. This explanation offers the idea of choice possibly being an important part of how 
students make decisions regarding their careers.  
It is important to note that the main contestation has been with regard to the broader scope of 
practice for clinical psychologists over other categories. This broadening, which has occurred since 
2011, has left a number of counselling psychologists in limbo in respect to their future in the 
profession (see Bantjes et al., 2016; Young & Saville Young, 2019). Moreover, the relevance 
discourse has affected the ways in which intern psychologists from either the counselling or the 
clinical streams view their professional training. In the following interview extract, I was ending 
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my interview with Thobeka, an intern counselling psychologist from the HWESU2, where she was 
responding to a final question regarding whether or not her counselling class was combined with 
the clinical stream:   
[S]o we had Clins who were upstairs, because hierarchy; and then we Counselling and Ed 
who were downstairs on the second floor. 
Thobeka’s comment, “because hierarchy”, may serve to suggest that she believes that the clinical 
psychology class was either treated as superior, or behaved as though they were superior; however, 
she did not offer an explanation of what she meant. Her statement may highlight how, even minor 
things such as the floor level on which students find themselves, can be interpreted as a creation 
of hierarchies. Thobeka’s statement may also point to the importance of thinking about the 
hierarchies that have been created through the debates on the scope of practice, and how these 
extend to issues of relevance. The absence of a discussion on relevance that looks at the debates 
regarding the scope of practice may limit the discursive possibilities of the professional training 
and practice of psychologists.  
8.3 The curriculum as cultural relevance 
In the context of professional psychology, one of the scathing critiques of the discipline has 
remained its Euroamerican-centric epistemologies (Ratele, 2019), which has continued to be a key 
driver of exclusion (Kiguwa & Segalo, 2018). In large part, the discipline as whole has remained 
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rooted within knowledges derived from the West; thereby struggling to unburden itself from the 
shackles of its colonial ancestry (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004; Carolissen et al., 2015). Importantly, the 
discipline suffers from a problem that can be located within what Mignolo (2007) calls the ‘locus 
of enunciation’. The locus of enunciation denotes the epistemological foundations of psychology, 
as being fundamentally located within the (white) Euroamerican-centric notions of professional 
psychology. What has remained a pertinent issue for higher education has been undoing of the 
colonial legacy and apartheid’s racialised legacy of exclusion and subjugation (Naicker, 2016). 
The curriculum, mostly focussing on content, has often been the main point of contention with 
regard to how psychology has reproduced Euroamericanised forms of knowledge (Carolissen et 
al., 2015).   
In the following interview extract, Menzi, the course coordinator at the HWESU2, was responding 
to a question related to the content of the curriculum. I asked about where the material that is used 
in the professional training comes from, to which he responded:  
So where do we think from? [...] You have to think from your location and then you have 
to see the intersections and the similarities and struggles with similar communities in other 
parts of the world. ’Cause also, to be parochially-contextual located is a problem if it 
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Menzi’s question “So where do we think from?” is perhaps pertinent in how the structure of 
training sites locates itself within either Europe or the US, rather than as it being situated within 
Africa. Menzi may be using this particular question to demonstrate that he is aware of the locus of 
enunciation of the professional training programme, not only for himself, as evidenced in his use 
of “we”. Menzi further adds that “you have to think from your location; and then you have to see 
the intersections and the similarities and struggles with similar communities in other parts of the 
world”, which may be his attempt to illustrate what he means by being aware of from where people 
think. Menzi also uses externalising language (i.e. “you”), which is perhaps strange given that he 
began by stating “we”. However, his use of “you” should not be interpreted to mean a distancing 
from the statement. Menzi adds that “to be parochially-contextual located is a problem if it doesn’t 
see the potential solidarities and the ways in which knowledge is not exclusively geographically 
located”, which may be a disclaimer in anticipation of critique that he is speaking about knowledge 
that is relative to the context; that is, the provincialisation of knowledge.  
I would perhaps add that Menzi locates his argument regarding the curriculum in the fundamental 
tenets of an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of psychologists. These tenets can be 
understood as taking the enunciation point as a central way in which professional training can take 
place as endogenous rather than indigenous practice. The move towards Africa(n)-centred 
perspectives of the curriculum does not mean that the training of psychologists ought to turn 
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Grace Musila (2017) addresses epistemic disarticulation that results from the imposition of 
Euroamerican-centric structures of knowing onto a context wherein different kinds of knowledges 
are often viewed as legitimate. A similar kind of problem may be experienced in professional 
training, particularly by Black people, whose lifeworlds may not necessarily be reflected in the 
curriculum. In short, the problems of Euroamerican-centrism within professional training often 
means that there is epistemic disarticulation. In answering a question regarding the curriculum of 
the MU and its utility in context, Mbali, an intern counselling psychologist from the MU, 
highlighted her following experience of the curriculum: 
I don’t wanna say paralyse, but it can bring a level of confusion especially if now that you 
have to, challenge what you feel like is normal or have known to be normal and then ufike 
ufunde (you just learn) all of this, and you left with (inaudible) normal what you perceive 
as okay; and that can be quite a degrading experience, that cannot be explained, and I 
thinking that’s why a lot of Black student end up in a depressing state or high levels of 
anxiety. 
Estrangement and alienation, as Fanon (1967/2008) argues, is one of the hallmarks of colonialism. 
Alienation and estrangement are premised on the distraction of selfhood that is connected to 
cultural artefacts that are not European in origin. Mbali’s statement that, as a Black student, she 
felt that the training sites challenge was on “what you feel like is normal or have known to be 
normal” supports Fanon’s (1967/2008, p. 111) argument that “[A Black] child, having grown up 
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within a normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact with the white world”. Thus, 
Fanon’s (1967/2008) assertion lends itself well to understanding the condition of alienation and 
estrangement that Mbali is referencing here. The curriculum, therefore, acts as force through which 
standards of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ reverberate. I would argue that, because the Black student is 
rendered abnormal through their ‘slightest contact with the White world’, feelings that the training 
can be a “degrading experience” become an unavoidable inevitability.  
Leah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HBU, was responding to a question 
regarding whether or not there are differences in the ways training is conducted when there are 
people who come from backgrounds that have been previously excluded:  
For particular students, yes. Particularly for black African students who have come from 
communities that have particular histories, who have come from disadvantaged township 
settings, for example. They come with a very distinct history, where they have experienced 
psychology as something that has been stigmatised and mental illness is understood 
differently. And for them, trying to fit the conceptual model of what we provide, which can 
be Eurocentric at times, with their understanding and trying to reconcile these two 
positions, we’ve seen that during the course. 
Here, Leah may be using the apartheid race categorisation of “black African” to speak about 
particular racialised experiences. Leah continues that “they come with a very distinct history, 
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where they have experienced psychology as something that has been stigmatised and mental illness 
is understood differently”, which may be her attempt to highlight the epistemic disarticulation that 
results from the locus of enunciation being located within Euroamericanised notions of how 
psychology can, and should, be practiced. She references “a very distinct history” which may be 
in reference to cultural differences, although she does not offer further clarity on what she means. 
Leah also appears to use the notion of stigma amongst Black communities as a defining factor for 
the differences in epistemic grounding for people from majority Black communities. This 
reference to stigma may be seen as reinforcing negative stereotypes of Black students not being 
able to understand the practice of psychology. Moreover, I would suggest that Leah’s singling out 
of so-called “black African” students means that those students who have been racialised as 
coloured or Indian may not have the same experiences. However, it may be important to take note 
of what Leah is perhaps gesturing towards when she states “and for them, trying to fit the 
conceptual model of what we provide, which can be Eurocentric at times, with their understanding 
and trying to reconcile these two positions”, which is the epistemic disarticulation that occurs in 
professional training.  
Apart from the disarticulation that occurs with the students there appears to be a further 
misalignment between the Professional Board for Psychology and the training sites. Lucy, the 
course coordinator of the counselling programme at the HWASU, elaborated on the tensions 
between the training sites and the regulatory body. When answering a question related to 
curriculated material, Lucy stated:  
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[O]ur teaching, the curriculum is basically constrained by board requirements. So we have 
to meet those requirements. So we look at the professional board requirements for the 
teaching. 
Sharon Stein (2019, p. 143) notes that there is an emergent paradox in the calls for change within 
higher education that “[o]n the one hand, the epistemic and material conditions of the present have 
narrowed the purposes and possibilities of higher education… on the other hand the continuation 
of our present institutions… is also unlikely”. Lucy’s use of the term “constrained” may be an 
attempt to show how she feels about the Professional Board for Psychology’s apparent limitation 
on the possibilities of professional training. In stating that “our teaching, the curriculum is basically 
constrained by board requirements”, she is perhaps extending this limitation beyond the material 
to encompass the pace of teaching and other curriculum related activities. The paradox that Stein 
(2019) referred to in the given excerpt is, perhaps, visible in Lucy’s statement against the 
constraints of the HPCSA, namely that “we look at the professional board requirements for the 
teaching”. The paradox is such that Lucy argues that the HPCSA constrains new possibilities of 
the curriculum; yet, the training site “look[s] at the professional board requirements for the 
teaching”. The reliance of training sites on the HPCSA for requirements produces limited teaching 
environments; however, the HPCSA remains the source of direction for professional training. 
Hontoundji (1986), argued that one of the greatest problems that emanates out of the ‘sciences’ in 
ex-colonised nations is that Africa is turned into a site of ‘extraverted knowledge’. This extraverted 
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knowledge focusses on developing knowledge repositories in the West by using Africa as a site of 
application, whilst Europe and the US remain the sites of knowledge generation (Hontoundji, 
1986). Extraverted knowledge means that legitimate knowledge only acquires its disciplinary 
status – legitimacy – when it comes from the West, where this ‘coming from the West’ also means 
the production of Western-centric knowledges within the geographical borders of Africa (see 
Ratele, 2016). I have argued previously in this thesis that it is important to think of Africa, the US, 
and Europe not only as geographical areas, but also as epistemologies. In understanding the US 
and Europe as being both geographical and epistemological, it may be possible to see how much 
of professional psychology takes on the character of extraverted knowledge, relying, as it does, on 
research, models of training, and, indeed, techniques for practice that are (and have been) 
developed in the West.  
In the following extract, Stephanie, the course coordinator in the counselling programmes at the 
MU, was answering a question regarding from where the material that her training site uses for the 
professional training comes:  
Oh. Moved from an overseas text to a South African book. It just to me makes so much 
more sense. And also, I don’t know, I’ve got a bigger thing about the economy that, buy 
local if you can. Because then the money comes back to us, we’re not sending it overseas. 
But also, in terms of the knowledge. The textbooks, you get some that are very generic. I 
suppose those are more undergrad things. So they say a similar thing. But I find particularly 
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in modules like the child development, which is at the Masters level, what’s said is children 
develop, there’s milestones of development. So, whether the text is an overseas text or a 
local text, it’s gonna say the same thing. But why I like the South African text is because 
then when it comes to a broader picture, we’re getting more insight into things.  
In using the example “but I find particularly in modules like the child development, which is at the 
Masters level, what’s said is children develop, there’s milestones of development”, Stephanie 
maybe to pre-emptively positioning her statement as true; thereby reducing anticipated rejection. 
She continues by stating the crux of her argument: “so whether the text is an overseas text or a 
local text it’s gonna say the same thing”, which is, perhaps, to say that textbooks are not different, 
regardless of whether they are locally or internationally produced. However, she adds: “but why I 
like the South African text is because then when it comes to a broader picture, we’re getting more 
insight into things”. This statement may be her attempt to manage a contradiction between her 
earlier statement that she “moved from an overseas text to a South African book” and her statement 
on the sameness of textbooks.  
I would also suggest that this interview extract also reveals that relevance in the South African 
curriculum has only produced localised versions of those curricula found in Europe and the US. 
Such localisation continues to maintain the centrality of those (Western) places as producers of 
knowledge. In one sense, the trend of sameness that Stephanie indicated also illustrates how 
psychological knowledge is still extraverted; how, even as knowledge is produced in (South) 
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Africa, it still bares the ideological and social markers of Europe and the US (see Hountondji, 
1986).  
In the following interview extract, Nomagugu, an intern clinical psychologist from the HWESU, 
was answering a question as to whether or not she felt her M1 training would be useful in the 
context in which she wanted to work: 
I just went into psychology, hlompe (maybe), but I just did not like the psychology when I 
was doing it now. I started to not like it M1 and that was just what made it more difficult. 
I really, I had questions. I would say, do I really wanna become psychologist? So I 
constantly go through those phases. All right, okay, manje (now) I might be feeling that I 
like it or something. But I feel ukhuthi ipsychology angi fundiswa yona e[university] (the 
psychology I was taught at [university name], even though with my background, but still I 
don’t feel irrelevant kwi context (its relevant to the context) yase (in) South Africa. 
Nomagugu begins her response to the question by stating that “I just went into psychology. 
hlompe”, which may indicate that the problem is with her and not necessarily with the training. 
She, thus, positions herself as a person who did not take proper consideration of the profession 
into which she is going. She continues to state that “I constantly go through those phases”, perhaps 
to illustrate how her uncertainty of the profession played itself out between her M1 and internship 
years. Nomagugu also states “But I feel ukhuthi ipsychology angi fundiswa yona e[university] (the 
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psychology I was taught at [university name], even though with my background, but still I don’t 
feel irrelevant kwi (to) context”. This statement may show her evaluation of the training curriculum 
as not being reflective of South African society. However, she adds a disclaimer by saying “even 
though with my background”, which may refer to her previous working experience.  
Her response here is significant in the sense that the issue of the cultural relevance of the 
curriculum can act to make trainee psychologists feel out of place within professional psychology. 
I would, thus, argue for a better understanding of the cultural relevance of the curriculum not in 
the ways that Long (2013) has come to understand it, but rather in terms of an Africa(n)-centred 
approach. In particular this understanding should revolve around “the importance of understanding 
disciplines and curriculum as discourse which serves particular functions, including policing and 
regulating the boundaries of entry into the profession” (Carolissen et al., 2015, p. 16). 
In the discourses of cultural relevance are also linked to where the training of psychologists is 
oriented towards. In short, the cultural relevance of the curriculum is linked to the other discourses 
of relevance including market and social relevance. In the next sections I look at the market and 
social relevance in reference to the governing structure of the professional training of counselling 
and clinical psychologists.  
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8.4 Social and market relevance 
It is possible to see how the hegemony of (White) Euroamerican-centric notions of professional 
clinical and counselling psychology can become exclusionary within the selection of candidates. 
Menzi, the course coordinator if the HWESU2, in expanding on the question of the selection of 
candidates, foregrounds the challenge of Africa entangled with Euroamerican-centric ideals:  
So it’s difficult, because we’re looking for a person who has two split interests, which are 
sometimes contradicted […] So some people, and I’ve had this experience, are really great 
social justice advocates, which is one of the things we want, but they struggle with 
embodying an identity of a therapist who can also work intro-psychically, who also has an 
interest in that. So it’s rare to find them very closely aligned. 
Young (2013) illustrates how, for most counselling psychologists, the choice is between an 
entrepreneurial approach and a more altruistic approach. Menzi argues that being a “really great 
social justice advocate” does not necessarily correlate with “embodying an identity of a therapist”, 
which may suggest the complicated nature of the selection process. The two positions, whether 
thought of in line with the way that Menzi has stated them (i.e. that of “social justice advocate” 
versus “therapist”), or as Young (2013) argues (i.e. the entrepreneurial approach versus altruism), 
speak to the role of psychologists in relation to those who have been oppressed. By indicating that 
candidates must have “two split interests that are sometimes contradictory”, Menzi may be 
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attempting to illustrate the different aspects of psychological training and practice. I would submit 
that while it may seem that the practice of psychologists, is either oriented towards the White, 
middle, and upper-classes (i.e. therapist), or towards the Black, poor, and working-classes (i.e. 
social justice advocacy) are at odds with one another, this should not be the case. Instead, I propose 
that it should not be a choice of either of these positions, but of looking at selection processes that 
place value on each characteristic as crucial for being a psychologist in the South African context.  
In an attempt to make the distinctions clearer, I address market relevance and social relevance in 
the following subsections.   
8.3.1 Market relevance. According to Long (2016b), the psy-disciplines thrive under 
neoliberal conditions, as the individual, their psyche, emotional wellbeing, and self-attainment are 
of paramount importance. This penchant towards the neoliberal may be evidenced by the 
increasing number of psychologists in private practice since the adoption of such policies in South 
Africa (Cooper & Nicholas, 2012). However, due to the cost of private practice, most South 
Africans have not been able to access psychological services (see HPCSA, 2017b). Furthermore, 
Painter and van Ommen (2008) have noted how psychology has increasingly become packaged 
for a particular consumer, namely (predominantly) those who are middle-class, English-speaking, 
and White. This packaging, I would propose, has occurred at the level of training, and has been 
influenced by the Professional Board for Psychology’s policies.  
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In the following interview extract, Menzi, the course coordinator at the HWESU2, was responding 
to a question that I had asked related to the reason why the majority of the programmes at the 
HWESU2 are individual and intra-psychically focussed, even though the university is positioned 
as having an alternative focus to that of mainstream psychology:  
Many students complain that the community element has no marketability, no ready work, 
you have to make it for yourself. Create an NGO, join an NGO, do advocacy work, write 
proposals for funding to do community interventions. Whereas in the psychotherapy world 
you need an office. So it’s a ready-manufactured kind of [...] It has a market in society. 
Everyone knows that at some point in their lives they need to see a therapist, especially if 
they’re middle class or if their issues are not dealt with. So it’s like seeing a dentist, it’s a 
ready market. 
Menzi appears to compare the differences between traditional professional psychology and the 
forms of psychology that are on offered at the HWESU2 and with which the university would like 
students to engage when he states that “the community element has no marketability, no ready 
work, you have to make it for yourself… Whereas in the psychotherapy world you need an office”. 
He further elaborates that “…it’s a ready-manufactured kind of [...] It has a market in society. 
Everyone knows that at some point in their lives they need to see a therapist, especially if they’re 
middle-class or if their issues are not dealt with”. In this elaboration, Menzi may be attempting to 
make clear the entrenched nature of Euroamerican-centric psychological practice within the 
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offered programmes. Similar to the arguments by Painter and van Ommen (2008), where they note 
that a programme is ready-manufactured, Menzi perhaps underscores the focus on psychotherapy 
as an articulation of this ready-made position of the professional training of psychologists. 
In the following extract, Leah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HBU, was 
responding to a follow-up question regarding whether or not the HBU engages students as to where 
they may end up working:   
And at the end of the day what we’re faced with is that people have to make a living and 
that often takes precedence over meeting the needs of the larger community. That they need 
to feed their own, they need to pay their own bills, they need to look after their family. And 
sometimes the only way to earn a decent income is to go into those lucrative private 
practices as opposed to going out there where you will earn much less, but you’ll make a 
greater impact. But to what extent are we prepared to make those sacrifices? 
Leah’s use of the expression “at the end of the day” may be to illustrate that for her there is very 
little that can be done by the university in terms of where people end up working beyond the 
training. She goes on to state that “people have to make a living and that often takes precedence 
over meeting the needs of the larger community”, which is in line with Young’s (2013) argument 
on the entrepreneurial versus the altruistic. Leah continues to use a list of threes by noting “that 
they need to feed their own, they need to pay their own bills, they need to look after their family”. 
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This listing is most likely her attempt to illustrate the extent of the problems faced by students. 
Leah adds “to go into those lucrative private practices as opposed to going out there where you 
will earn much less, but you’ll make a greater impact. But to what extent are we prepared to make 
those sacrifices?” In this statement, Leah may be reinforcing her argument that the challenge facing 
trainees who become psychologists is such that they can only find work within private practice 
settings, which is often a trade-off against more socially oriented work.  
Elretha, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the MU, places, as central, the role of 
medical aids in fuelling the issues experienced by counselling psychologists in particular. In the 
following interview extract, I asked Elretha about the role of the HPCSA in shaping training 
curriculum. As part of her response, she stated:   
If you look at what the counselling people are able to do in terms of that promulgation, 
their hands are so badly tied that I think the original issue with the medical aids, which 
started two years ago, is gonna come right back and whack them. Because again, they 
discriminate. I think they discriminate against counselling psychologists. 
Elretha, in referring to “that promulgation”, may have been speaking to the scope of practice 
published for commentary on the 10th of October 2018 (see DoH, 2018), which, up to the point of 
writing, had still not been promulgated. She further adds that “their hands are so badly tied”, which 
may be in reference to how counselling psychologists are left unable to work, as suggested in her 
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use of the phrase “badly tied”. This statement by Elretha is in line with the suggestion made by a 
number of authors, including Young (2013), years prior to the scope of practice to which Elretha 
alludes. Elretha further says that “I think the original issue with the medical aids, which started 
two years ago, is gonna come right back and whack them”. Her statement here may suggest that 
the issue began with medical aids not paying counselling psychologists for services. The use of 
“whack them in the head” may also be her attempt to highlight the severity of the situation. The 
issue with medical aids has had certain implications, as the role and place of counselling 
psychology relating to the marketability of their skills has become precarious. In thinking about 
the available manifestations that the structure of professional training can possibly take, these 
issues are becoming increasingly more important to address, as the market relevance of counselling 
psychologists is coming under pressure. 
Historically, the distinction between counselling and clinical psychology has been at the level of 
either working at a psychiatric hospital (clinical) or working in non-psychiatric settings 
(counselling) (Young & Saville Young, 2019). The call for increasing the separation of training 
has resulted in the reinforcement of these psychiatric versus non-psychiatric settings. Referring to 
the structure of the clinical programme and the attempt to increase the market relevance, Sarah, 
the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HWESU, argued that clinical psychology 
is differentiated by:  
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[E]mphasising working with more severe psychopathology in a tertiary setting, in a 
psychiatric hospital setting. So we’ve brought in more about case management related 
stuff, working in a multidisciplinary team. We’ve tried to emphasise more on psycho-
diagnostics, more on clinical assessment requirements. 
The statement “emphasising working with more severe psychopathology in a tertiary setting” can 
be seen to be a response to the increasing differentiation between the registration categories. Sarah 
continues to say “so we’ve brought in more about case management related stuff, working in a 
multidisciplinary team”, where she may be using systematic vagueness (see Edwards & Potter, 
1993) to avoid a rebuttal of her statement. Her statements may also draw from the idea of making 
clinical training more relevant to the demands of the marketplace, whilst also being in response to 
the issues of the scope of practice. In listing that “we’ve tried to emphasise more on psycho-
diagnostics, more on clinical assessment requirements”, Sarah may further be attempting to 
illustrate the ways in which current training attempts to respond to the demands of the market.  
The market forces present within the training of psychologists becomes even clearer to trainees in 
those moments where they move from the M1 year into their internships. This is particularly true 
for when students become aware of when the training either restricts them or allows them to work 
effectively. In the following extract, Anna, an intern clinical psychologist from the HBU, speaks 
to the preparation for the marketplace in professional training: 
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I don’t know if they focussed on preventative. I think that it was promoted. But I think the 
field of psychology is very curative, and I think they also had to prepare us in line with 
that, otherwise I would have never been able to work in a psychiatric hospital, if that makes 
sense. So, there was a mind-set of preventative, but the training obviously still has to fit 
into what we see in the workplace now, otherwise there’s no point in, you know… 
Anna’s response that “I don’t know if they focused on preventative” may be an attempt to show a 
juxtaposition between the focus of professional psychology and a desire to prevent mental illness . 
She later adds that “I think the field of psychology is very curative”, which may be her way of 
evaluating psychology’s current role in society, and she prefaces her evaluation of the professional 
psychology by stating “I think”. Additionally, by using the term “very”, she may be using an 
extreme case formulation (see Edwards, 2000) to justify the evaluation of professional psychology. 
Moreover, by stating that “…the training obviously still has to fit into what we see in the workplace 
now, otherwise there’s no point in, you know”, Anna may be indicating that, primarily, training 
should equip trainees with the ability to work in settings such as psychiatric hospitals. She may 
also be using the phrase “you know” so as to gain confirmation of her statement of being prepared 
for the “workplace now”. This extract from Anna also illustrates the importance of market 
relevance that is in line with the current dominant ways of practicing psychology.  
8.3.2 Social relevance. There appears to be two paths towards social relevance in the 
professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists. The first is the idea of public 
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service, which is juxtaposed against private practice. The second is community psychology, which 
is often also compared to private practice, but with a more systemic focus – I address community 
psychology in the next section. Social relevance can be understood as important, particularly in 
light of the impending NHI, which aims to increase access to health care –including psychological 
care – in South Africa (DoH, 2017). It is worth noting that there was no direct mention of the NHI 
by any of the participants during this study’s interview process; however, public service was a 
theme that came up in the interviews, especially when interviewing the course coordinators.  
According to Bantjes et al. (2016), a larger proportion of clinical rather than counselling 
psychologists are employed by the State (see also HPCSA, 2017b). It is possible, thus, to see how, 
for clinical psychologists more so than for counselling psychologists, public service may be linked 
to the availability of jobs in the public sector. Patience, the course coordinator of the clinical 
programme at the HWASU, responded to my question of what the training site wanted to students 
to know when they complete their M1 year by stating:  
That’s a difficult one, because for me, I always tell my students that I want you to leave 
here being able to work in a government hospital setting. So I want to be able to teach you 
how to behave professionally, your professional decorum. I want you to be able to make a 
diagnosis using the DSM, because that’s what we use, we use the DSM. 
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Patience’s use of “because for me” and “my” in her response suggests that she is making an 
evaluation, which may be different from someone else’s opinion on the question. There is, 
therefore, a sense that she may be anticipating rejection from others, most likely from within the 
HWASU training site. She begins this particular statement by noting “that’s a difficult one”, which 
may suggest that either the answer to this question is something that she may have not yet clearly 
formulated, or that others in the professional training site may disagree with regard to the answer 
that she provides. Patience also states that “I always tell my students that I want you to leave here 
being able to work in a government hospital setting”, which may be an indication as to her position 
regarding working with the greater South African public.  
Her use of the word “government” may be in comparison to private hospitals or private practice 
in general, which may be related to working with a minority elite versus a majority disadvantaged. 
She continues with a reference to “professional decorum”, which she does not explain what she 
means. Patience’s addition of “I want you to be able to make a diagnosis using the DSM, because 
that’s what we use, we use the DSM” is important, since it may be linked to the importance of 
sticking to the traditional notions of professional practice in psychology. I would propose that even 
though Patience places an emphasis on working with the traditionally excluded majority 
population, her reverting back to the Euroamerican-centric notions of psychological practice 
indicates a difficulty in thinking beyond the hegemonic disciplinary boundaries. Patience may be 
suggesting that through working in “government hospital settings”, trainees may become more 
socially relevant. I would suggest, however, that although this is an important part of the 
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unshackling of exclusionary practices, what is also necessary is to engage in the Euroamerican-
centric epistemological foundations that render, for instance, the use of the DSM as perpetually 
applicable to all people.  
Through the discourse on social relevance, the participating course coordinators suggested that 
there is a way in which to reorient the professional training of psychologists. In the following 
extract, Sarah, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HWESU, was responding 
to a question regarding the philosophy of the training programme: 
And I think historically, there was a view that a good training case is a middle class, 
English-speaking adult or child who’ll come to every session and things are quite 
uncomplicated and you can just focus on the individual’s problem. And increasingly [...] 
And so, then when the case wasn’t like that it was sometimes labelled, this is not a good 
training case, it’s too messy. And we’ve really I think challenged that around arguing that 
a good training case is a messy case, where there are transport difficulties in accessing the 
service or there’s inequality or various aspects, and language might not necessarily be 
matched between the psychologist and the client. 
Sarah’s response that “I think historically there was a view that a good training case is a middle-
class, English-speaking adult or child who’ll come to every session” may suggest that training 
used to focus, predominantly, on the more typical cases for psychologists. In continuing to state, 
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after a slight pause, that “so then when the case wasn’t like that it was sometimes labelled, this is 
not a good training case, it’s too messy”, Sarah may be attempting to emphasise the differences in 
what consisted of a ‘socially relevant’ case for training. She does not state as clearly what the other 
case may be by, for instance, saying that a Black, poor, and working-class adult or child cannot 
afford to attend every session.  
Additionally, Sarah begins the second part of her evaluation of a good training case by using the 
expression “we’ve”, which suggests a distancing from the “historical way of viewing a good 
training case”. She is, perhaps, simultaneously drawing herself closer to the notion that the 
programme has “challenged that around arguing that a good training case is a messy case where 
there are transport difficulties in accessing the service or there’s inequality”. I would suggest that 
Sarah is drawing on social and community relevance of professional training that recognises the 
structural inequalities of society as a hindrance to the accessing of psychological services. She may 
also be attempting to illustrate that professional training is turning towards reality, in the way that 
Gordon (2014) suggests, as a remedy for disciplinary decadence so as to make the training more 
socially relevant.  
Anna, an intern clinical psychologist from the HBU, was responding to a follow-up question 
related to what she felt she got out of the training: 
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Yes, this is the person and these are the symptoms, this is the diagnosis. Screw where the 
person comes from, screw their circumstances, screw their socio-economic status, screw 
their political history and their social. It’s like none of that matters. As long as you can 
diagnose the patient and work out the treatment plan, psychiatry can give medication and 
that’s all. That’s all that matters… 
Anna begins by stating that “this is the person, and these are the symptoms, this is the diagnosis”, 
which may show that the performance of professional psychology is in some sense scripted (see 
Edwards, 1994) in particular ways. This script, which uses a common discursive device in the form 
of the list of threes, namely person, symptoms, and then diagnosis, may also serve to accentuate a 
disregard for other issues that may be important in doing the work of a psychologist. Anna 
continues by listing the following: “screw where the person comes from, screw their 
circumstances, screw their socio-economic status, screw their political history and their social”. 
She may have included this list to possibly indicate how her training may have offered her little 
escape from Euroamerican-centric professional practices. I would suggest that Anna is exhibiting 
frustration with, to borrow a phrase from Michel Foucault (2005), ‘the order of things’, into which 
she has now been cast and which she is required to navigate. Anna ends by stating “that’s all that 
matters”, which may indicate an extreme case formulation of the condition of the professional 
psychological practice and her feeling of being trapped within these practices.  
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These hegemonic practices may be the wielding of the tools of psychology rather than the 
understandings of people’s lifeworlds and, in particular, the lifeworlds of Black people. I would 
suggest that what Anna is referring to is a type of disciplinary decadence (see Gordon, 2014) in 
which those who come to have access to disciplinary discourses appear to be limited by those very 
disciplinary discourses. Disciplinary decadence has enormous effects on how psychology may be 
situated within Africa, as well as in how Africa could be (re)centred within psychology, in that the 
focus on current disciplinary methods can lead to epistemic closure. Moreover, the altruistic 
discourse appears to be mitigated by the hegemonic neoliberal focus of psychology.   
The second path to social relevance, as presented by participants in this study, appeared to be 
community psychology. This second path seems to be concerned with how community psychology 
has been used as form of socially just practices of professional training. In 1988, in the last days 
of apartheid in South Africa, a group of trainee psychologists published an article titled Community 
Psychology: Panic or Panacea (Seedat et al., 1988). Decades later, community psychology has 
become a well-established sub-discipline within the practice, teaching, and research in South 
African psychology (Seedat & Lazarus, 2011). The tenets of this sub-discipline have come to 
represent an alternative to the hegemonic one-to-one model of psychology (Yin, 2008). 
Community psychology is well ensconced within the traditions of critical psychology, but also 
enjoys reciprocal recognition within the very institutions it seeks to dismantle (Seedat & Lazarus, 
2011). This seemingly paradoxical position of community psychology makes it worth revisiting 
the problem in a different format than what was advanced by Seedat et al. (1988), namely as to 
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whether or not community psychology has been a panacea in the professional training of 
psychologists. 
In the following interview extract, Jessica, an intern clinical psychologist from the HBU, was 
responding to follow-up question that I had asked regarding her answer to the place of community 
psychology in her training. After explaining that community psychology is not as central as it is 
often made to look, she added: 
No. The sense that I got is external pressures. So, in order to become a clinical psychologist, 
HPCSA wants graduates to have mastered these specific skills. And so there is a focus on 
the medical model and diagnostics and all of that, which I understand. It is an important 
component of the profession and there is a need for that in the community, but it is a little 
bit ironic for me that a post-apartheid HPCSA should be still so focussed on such a 
Westernised approach. And from the changes, even the changes they’re making, I don’t 
see a shift in that happening. If anything, it looks to me like they’re becoming more 
focussed towards a medical model and a Westernised model. 
Jessica’s referencing that “so in order to become a clinical psychologist, HPCSA wants graduates 
to have mastered these specific skills” may speak to the influence of the structure of the training 
being vested in the HPCSA. Prior to stating what the HPCSA requires, Jessica refers to the 
regulatory body as exerting “external pressure”, which may indicate the HPCSA as being outside 
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of the training. She further adds that for the HPCSA, “there is a focus on the medical model and 
diagnostics and all of that”. This statement may serve to show that the requirements of the HPCSA 
are antithetical to what she believes the focus of the training ought to be; however, she does not 
state an alternative to this medical model. Jessica does, however, continue by including what may 
be understood as a qualifier for the criticism that she has of the HPCSA by immediately stating 
that “I understand”.  
The softening of her criticism may also be evident in her stating that “it is an important component 
of the profession and there is a need for that in the community”, with her use of “community” 
likely referring to Black, poor, and working-class communities, which has become a common use 
of the term community (see Ngonyama ka Sigogo & Modipa, 2004). In further stating that “it is a 
little bit ironic for me that a post-apartheid HPCSA should be still so focussed on such a 
Westernised approach”, Jessica may be pointing to how the Professional Board for Psychology in 
democratic South Africa resembles the boards of apartheid psychology. However, it is important 
to note how Jessica uses the same discursive practice of power as the course coordinators to make 
sense of transformation. The discourses of power in relation to the HPCSA as a vanguard of the 
Westernised forms of professional psychology illustrate the ways in which institutionalised 
discourses are reproduced within the profession. 
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In the following extract, Thobeka, an intern counselling psychologist from the HWESU2, was 
responding to a question that I had posed to all the intern psychologists with regard to whether or 
not they felt that their training allowed them to work in different contexts:   
I wanted to be a psychologist that can work in different contexts, if that meant corporate, 
if that meant NGOs, if that meant a university context. But at the end of the day I think that 
when we finish this programme there isn’t a job labelled community-based counselling 
psychologist. 
In beginning her statement with “I wanted to be a psychologist that can work in different contexts”, 
Thobeka may have made an attempt to manage the stake that she may have in the particular training 
that she received. In stating that “if that meant corporate, if that meant NGOs, if that meant a 
university context”, she uses the common discursive device of a list of threes, which seeks to 
establish the totality of her intentions. In stating “but at the end of the day I think that when we 
finish this programme there isn’t a job labelled community-based counselling psychologist”, 
Thobeka may be attempting to clearly illustrate the ways in which there are fixed realities over 
which she has no control. Thobeka also appears to be indicating how current registration categories 
are limited, with her training expanding beyond the existing categories. I would suggest that the 
limitations of the registration categories, in turn, limit training possibilities, as trainee 
psychologists make considerations of where they could work based on their training options.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
9.1 What might an Africa(n)-centred professional training of psychologists 
entail? 
The main aim of the thesis was to investigate the question; how to (re)centre Africa in the training 
of counselling and clinical psychologists. The primary objectives that emerged from the research 
question were focused on the curriculum, the selection of candidates and the subsequent training 
of the candidates in the first year of the Masters programme. The study emanated in large part 
because the Masters training remains the epicentre for the induction of new members of the 
professional class of psychologists. Due to its centrality, the first year of Masters training, I argued, 
becomes the point at which Euroamerican-centric epistemologies are continuously reproduced. 
I elaborated on an Africa(n)-centred perspective on the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists. This Africa(n)-centred perspective, which I argued is an endogenous approach, 
accepting of the pluriversal nature of human life in Africa, and focusing on the African not as the 
excluded Other, but rather as the Subject at the centre their lifeworld. This perspective was 
informed by the works of Kopano Ratele (2016, 2017) in developing an African Psychology, 
further using decolonial scholarship that emanated mostly from Latin America, and other critical 
currents. An Africa(n)-centred perspective to the training of psychologists was central in reading 
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and engaging with the history of psychology, professional development, and the interviews with 
the course coordinators and intern psychologists. In order to elucidate the talk of course 
coordinators and intern psychologists on the training programmes, I employed what I termed an 
(Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse analysis. An (Africa(n)-centred) critical discourse analysis 
further elaborated on the imbrication of discursive psychology with an Africa(n)-centred 
perspective.  
I argued that South African psychology has been extraverted, white-dominated, and Euroamerican-
centric in content, form and structure, owing in large part to its historical roots in Europe and the 
US. Illustrating the genealogical development of the discipline of psychology as whole, I attempted 
to illustrate that the history of psychology in South Africa has been dominated by the exclusion 
and subjugation of Black lifeworlds. The subjugation and exclusion of Black lifeworlds occurred 
from the inception of “insane asylums” (see Swartz, 2008) to the professionalisation of the 
discipline in 1974 (HPCSA, 1974).  
To make clear the some of the limitations and further recommendations of the study based on the 
analysis I discuss what an Africa(n)-centred professional training of clinical and counselling 
psychologists might entail. This discussion relies on the interviews that I had with the 23 
participants in the study, and is intended to be descriptive, rather than prescriptive. However, much 
of human life – such as the discourses these participants raised – does not bubble up from nowhere 
but is historically constituted and thus gives rise to entangled histories. Taking into consideration 
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these histories of entanglement and oppression that become the tapestry for the contemporary 
enactments of professional training, it is possible gesture towards more Africa(n)-centred training 
programmes.  
Using a similar style as Chapter 2 in order to answer the question what an Africa(n)-centred 
professional training of clinical and counselling psychologists might entail? I answer 3 
fundamental questions relating to Masters selection, training, and the curriculum. The first 
question is who is considered the right kind of (knower) practitioner? This point includes the issues 
of meritocracy and diversity relating to race, language, gender, and class as part of what 
professional training considers the right kind of practitioner. The second question is related to the 
curriculum of the Masters programmes and seeks to answer what might a situated curriculum 
entail? The final question is; what is the role of the Professional Board for Psychology in the 
training? This question raises the issue of subjectivities created as a result of people’s relationship 
to power and how this promotes or hinders situated practices. I also engage on the issue of the 
relevance of the professional psychologists, which was also raised largely in relation to the 
Professional Board of Psychology.  
9.2 Who is considered the right kind of (knower) practitioner?  
More than simply give characteristics of who is being trained, in this thesis I lifted the associated 
discursive practices that are at play when considering the recruitment, application, selection, and 
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subsequent training of Masters clinical and counselling psychologists. Prior research (see Bantjes 
et al., 2016; HPCSA, 2017b) has suggested that most people being trained are white females, 
cutting across the different institutional categories – HBU, HWASU, HWESU, and MU. The 
continued dominance of white females suggests the continued displacement and rendering as un-
belonging of Black lifeworlds within professional training programmes.  
I highlighted at the start of the the thesis that there is what can be understood as a semantic slippage 
in the use of the word Black, which continues within the professional training sites. The sementatic 
slippage I am referring to is one that sees race, rather than racialisation, still remaining the master 
signifier. It is worth noting that it is not only the training programmes that are caught in the paradox 
of race, rather it is a systemic failure to find alternative ways in which to monitor equality, therefore 
the use of racial categorisation in research and social life will continue to be relied upon (see 
Erasmus, 2012). However, it remains the case that in a country such as South Africa, the issue of 
participation is wrought with issues of race and racialisation, that demographic change within 
many sectors of society including professional psychology is yet still unresolved (see Bantjes et 
al., 2016). I have attempted to lift a number of discourses that relate to race and racialisation within 
the professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists, including meritocracy, 
diversity, and multiculturalism. I have also attempted to illustrate associated discourses of gender 
and class as inter-related with the history of race and racialisation that has remained a large part of 
the fabric of South African society. 
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9.2.1 The fallacy of meritocracy. Discourses of merit as Christian et al. (2002) state in 
their reflections of being Black trainees in professional psychology programmes bring about a 
sense of ambiguity of being regarded as a Black trainee and being selected based on merit. Similar 
experiences have been raised by intern psychologists in this study that the discourse of merit 
remains hedged against Black trainees. The term meritocracy, as originally theorised by Michael 
Young (1958), remains a fallacy only insofar as there is an attempt to ignore how people have been 
racialised within South Africa as part of the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. Further, I have 
attempted to demonstrate how meritocracy acts to guise the ways in which entry into professional 
psychology is not a matter of talent only. While for some of the Black interns’ merit is antithetical 
to corrective race-inclusive selection, it may be important to establish that both being a Black 
trainee and being selected on ‘merit’ are not mutually exclusive. 
White intern psychologists also engage with the discourses of merit in particular ways that 
reinforce their sense of belonging within the professional training programmes, including the 
HBU. Although I did not ask for the perceptions of white trainees regarding race-based inclusive 
practices within professional programmes, this may have served to elucidate even further their 
subject positions with regards to race and racialisation. However, studies such as those conducted 
by Traub et al. (2013), indicate a lack of understanding of how race remains an important part of 
the transformative efforts within psychology. In this study, I used the example of Nancy, an intern 
clinical psychologist from the HWASU, who recounts her experience at the HWESU in which she 
was regarded as a senior psychologist, and her Black supervisor was rendered as her junior. There 
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is a sense that the white candidates lack proper engagement with regards to their own positioning 
and what it meant for them, for instance, to be considered legitimate knowers in comparison to a 
person responsible for their training.  
Inherent in using apartheid-based racial categories in order to address the injustices of the past, 
there is a simultaneous reinforcement of race as something that exists. Numerous arguments about 
race as a biological construct have been made, showing that the early 20th century eugenics work 
was racist and biased against any person who was not white (Black, 2003). Efforts to prove that 
merit could be linked to race have been further proven to have the same white-centric biases and 
were used to maintain unjust social systems in South Africa (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). Race, 
however, still has material effects on the lives of those racialised as the undesirable Other. Race, 
understood as both a non-existent biological construct and yet as materially visible in the form of 
racialisation, thus has the character of both being nowhere and everywhere, simultaneously. In the 
training of counselling and clinical psychologists, there needs to be a recognition of the ways in 
which race continues to have material effects in denying people access to the profession.  
The training sites all indicated that they have been attempting to change the demographics of 
professional training. However, they all relied on similar types of selection procedures as those 
that were used during apartheid. The continuous use of selection procedures from apartheid speaks 
to the statement by the Black feminist scholar Audre Lorde that “the masters tools will never 
dismantle the masters house” (1984, p. 110). By employing the same measures to select candidates 
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as apartheid training programmes, contemporary sites may be reproducing the standards of the 
good-enough candidate as the same in contemporary South Africa, as it was in apartheid South 
Africa.  
The statement by Lorde was to highlight the problems of feminist discourses that used the same 
white-centric measures to understand the lives of Black, lesbian, and poor women. In the same 
way, the analysis of the selection criteria and procedures that gave rise to the deficit discourse 
shares in the sentiments made by Lorde. I proposed that following the epistemic form of apartheid 
psychology training for contemporary training institutions “means that only the most-narrow 
parameters of change are possible and allowable” (Lorde, 1984, p. 111). The possibilities of 
change in the demographics of counselling and clinical psychologists are limited by the lack of 
interrogating different forms of selection procedures. Further, it means that professional training 
continuously relies on the same epistemological foundations that marked professional clinical and 
counselling psychology’s early years. 
 9.2.2 Situating diversity. As is often the case, discourses of merit bring about discourses 
of racial diversity (see Kessi & Cornell, 2015). In these discourses of racial diversity, the 
experiences of students became a central focus, as Black students have to deal with feelings of 
inadequacy, due to the way they have been racialised. The racial diversity discourse was also a 
prominent feature of the talk of the course coordinators as they attempted to illustrate their 
awareness of the imperative for transformation. Moreover, the prominence of the diversity 
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discourse may have also been used to indicate the fairness of the selection and training. Racial 
diversity is a conundrum as the very need to think of racial diversity – understood as the inclusion 
of Black people – reveals the normativity of whites within professional training. 
The course coordinators reflected on how change has often been possible when the demographics 
of both the course coordinators and trainee psychologists have also changed. The discourses of 
racial diversity elevated how diversity remains a pivotal discursive practice, on which the training 
sites continue to rely. There is nothing necessarily wrong with the idea of diversity, yet it is a 
limited view in that diversity when it is about putting Black and white bodies together and hoping 
that change will occur, as one of the course coordinators noted, as if “automatically”. Zimitri 
Erasmus (2012) notes that racial diversity is an attempt to situate the apartheid practices that 
excluded Black people from full participation in higher education institutions. However, racial 
diversity appears to serve not only the function of correcting past racial injustices, but also serves 
to mask the ways in which professional training remains (white) Euroamerican-centric. 
Redressing the imbalances of professional training through racial diversification to some extent 
requires that race be understood with regards to how people look whilst simultaneously resisting 
its negative effects. Race traps those who make selection decisions for professional training, even 
when they may be attempting to transform the profession. The intractable paradox of race is such 
that racial redress requires racial identification, whilst attempting to do away with the ‘strangeness’ 
of Blackness as opposed to the normativity of ‘whiteness’. Using racial diversity as a strategy to 
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redress the history of the profession of psychology seems to derive from colonialism that positions 
Black people as necessarily an exception to the white norm. Simultaneously, the discourse to 
prioritise (Black) diversity candidates points to a necessity to think more about the normativity of 
(white) Euroamerican-centrism of the professional training.  
9.2.3 Gendered professional training. Historically, women have been excluded from 
participating equally in higher education, and as such, there is still gender unequal nature of women 
participating in most professional settings (Bunting, 2006). In professional psychology, this does 
not appear to be the case, as most practitioners who are clinical and counselling psychologists are 
females (Bantjes et al., 2016). It is also imperative to note that the participation of females in 
professional psychology has not been extended to all women, with the Black female interns in this 
study speaking about their experiences in more racialised forms than gendered ones. Moreover, 
nuances that occur within various spheres of professional psychology are often missed when 
considering issues of gender alone, rather than understanding them with racialised lines. 
It is an imperative that understandings around who is applying, and thus who is accepted into 
training programmes relating to the various ways in which racialised masculinities and femininities 
can bar access for (Black) men and Black women. The most interesting of these subjectivities is 
that of the white female subject that is considered soft, subordinate, and asexual (Ratele, 2009). 
Using this of idea racialised gendered subjectivities, it is possible to account for the standards 
within psychology as white female. This is not to say that all white female subjects embody this 
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type of subjectivity, but that rather, much like how race ought not to be limited to the epidermal, 
femininities cannot also be limited to a person’s sex. In doing so, there are associated histories, 
constructed through the continued colonial encounter that came to bear on the selection rooms of 
various training sites. These histories position those racialised as white and gendered as female as 
the eminently selectable subjects for professional counselling and clinical psychology, whilst 
Others – males and Black women – are expected to reflect this standard.  
Patience, the course coordinator of the clinical programme at the HWASU, spoke about the 
participation of all men, however, when one considers gender in relation to race, a different picture 
emerges, where Black men make up the lowest number of practitioners in psychology (see Bantjes 
et al., 2016). Menzi, the course coordinator at the HWESU2, comments on the reason why there 
are fewer men selected into the professional programmes, noting that this may illustrate the ways 
in which gender can come to be exclusionary. Although none of the male intern psychologists 
reflected on their gendered identities, gender may also play a role in the selection of candidates. 
The necessity does not merely concern stereotypes but moves into the realm standards of the 
professional training institutions that, for instance, define what it means to have the “emotional 
readiness” for professional training. 
9.2.4 Language as Africa(n)-centred practice. Taking into consideration Ahmed and 
Pillay’s (2004) notation that language remained a factor that was not being adequately considered 
within the selection and training of (counselling) and clinical psychologists. I placed as central in 
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the interviews with the course coordinators and intern psychologists the role of language in the 
professional training of psychologists. What emerged from the questions were discourses of 
access, exclusion, and privilege both within the university training sites and larger South African 
society. 
The majority (70%) of psychologists who participated in the HPCSA (2017b) survey reported that 
they were home language speakers of English, followed by Afrikaans speakers, with a high number 
of psychologists being practice proficient in English – 68% – and Afrikaans – 44%. It appears that 
English remains a central component of not only the practice of psychologists but also their 
professional training. As Lucas, the course coordinator of the counselling programme at the 
HWESU, attested that English is the lingua franca of professional psychology, however in 
acquiring its status English has also been the marginalisation of other languages. Moreover, the 
normativity of English gestures towards the centrality of white lifeworlds in professional training, 
and by extension, in the practice of professional psychologists.  
There is a disconnection between the centrality of English in universities with the ‘requirements’ 
of society where English is not the primary language of communication (StatsSA, 2016b). Further, 
in an Africa(n)-centred perspective, language does not only denote the ability to communicate in 
effective ways with people, but also carries with it the lifeworlds of people (Habermus, 1984). To 
have practitioners that are situated within the conditions of Africa that can work with the 
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pluriversal lifeworlds that exist in this context, issues around language should be considered more 
carefully. 
English as the lingua franca can shape the ways in which Black students experience the training 
and selection. Some of the Black intern psychologists reflected on the discourses of access in both 
the university training site and the larger South African society. These interns reflected on how 
English is the primary language of access to the university, however it does not hold the same 
status in larger South African society. Some white interns also reflected how they may not be able 
to effectively work in contexts where English is not the primary language of communication. 
Black interns also reflected on language as playing a role in their exclusion from full access to the 
training programmes, as they felt trainers assessed their ability to write in English, rather than the 
nature of their work. This form of engagement between training sites and trainees can be rather 
damaging to the attainment of other important components of the training such that students appear 
to feel that it is their language that is under supervision, rather than their ability to be effective 
practitioners. 
In order to situate the training of psychologists, I would suggest that the training sites should be 
placing the needs of the South African population ahead of the requirements of the university. This 
may require epistemic disobedience that changes the university policies specifically related to the 
training sites that place as central the need for English mastery by Masters students. Another way 
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forward is to institute criteria that speak to multilingualism as an important part of being selected 
for Masters training courses, rather than leaving this to be ad hoc. To be clear, this multilingualism 
should entail the ability to speak more than Afrikaans and English, prioritising proficiency in South 
African languages that have been historically rendered as the Other.  
9.2.5 Racialised classed disparities. Class appears to account for yet another paradoxical 
position with regards to demographic transformation. In all the interviews, the issue of class 
appeared to pose a challenge as the tension between the university and the larger South African 
context becomes more visible. In the main, the universities did not regard class as an important 
component to demographic transformation, with Lucas, the course coordinator of the counselling 
programme at the HWESU, noting that class, unlike race, is not, for the most part, visible. Class, 
however, accounts for a large proportion of people’s lifeworlds, and also moves beyond the issue 
of pigmentation, into how people are racialised. Class is thus a crucial component of how 
Euroamericanised notions of psychology can be reproduced within psychology, and as such, can 
act to situate the training of psychologists. 
In the professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists, the consideration, or lack 
thereof, of aspects such as class, has consequences for the discipline with regards to the type of 
candidates it recruits. Safe bet recruiting becomes likely under conditions were class has not been 
considered. It may be evident in the discourses of capital that the Black candidates who are selected 
carry the necessary capital through middle-class backgrounds, and through induction into the 
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university’s institutional culture. The induction into the university culture along with the middle-
class status was reflected by interns at the HWESU and HWESU2, as they noted what Booi et al. 
(2017, p. 8) termed, “academic inbreeding”. The practice of inbreeding limits the available 
candidates to those in the university, or who come from universities with similar institutional 
cultures. This practice furthers the reproduction of Euroamerican-centrism in professional 
psychology through the types of candidates who are selected into professional training 
programmes.  
Africa(n)-centred practices in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists may have to 
consider the role of class within the training programmes. Discourses of capital evidenced in talk, 
or the lack thereof, around the issues of class, which remain marginalised as institutions engage in 
transformative discursive practices (see Dlamini, 2019). The marginalised status that class holds 
within the selection of candidates has a ripple effect, even during the training, as students become 
either classed out of the university, or classed out of communities. The position that class holds 
within the training of counselling and clinical psychologists can be summarised as being due to 
the discursive practice of race, as colonial-apartheid racial categories, still being the most 
prominent form of understanding redress.  
In an Africa(n)-centred perspective, dealing with class means confronting structurally embedded 
issues. Class, as opposed to race, presents an opportunity to engage with issues that move beyond 
the epidermal, but which expose the structural conditions that candidates, and to a great extent the 
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population they would serve, have to live through. A qualifier is necessary here, where I am not 
proposing that race ought to be abandoned in the quest for class consciousness. Rather, the 
argument rests on raising what critical race theorists have pointed to in terms of the role of class 
in the ways that people are racialised (Soudien, 2008). Situated practices may have to take 
cognisance of how class is evoked and the simultaneous recognition of the issues of racialisation, 
and in turn cannot engage with racialisation without the necessary classed undertaking. 
9.3 What might a situated curriculum entail?  
A large part of the investigation I undertook into the training of counselling and clinical 
psychologists concerned the curriculum. I argued that the basis for such an undertaking was on 
how the curriculum remains a legitimation tool for the universalising of Euroamerican-centrism in 
professional training. The curriculum, as I came to explain it in this thesis, was not only limited to 
the content – the material – but also included practices that are commonly described as pedagogy. 
An important consideration in defining the curriculum as broader than content is also the limitation 
of the methodology employed in this study, which focuses on the field of recontextualisation (see 
Maton, 2013). The field of recontextualisation is where decisions about the curriculum are made, 
and thus can act to limit the view of the training of psychologists, to content alone, yet the training 
also involves other practices, such as supervision. To mitigate against this apparent limitation, the 
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The course coordinators relied on discourses of multiculturalism in the curriculum in the ways that 
Carolissen et al. (2015) had warned against, with the addition of multiculturalism into the 
curriculum. The course coordinators reflected on how they attempted to ‘incorporate’ and ‘insert’ 
multicultural practices within the curriculum of the professional training programmes. I argued 
that multiculturalism in the same way as racial diversity continues the marginalisation of Black 
lifeworlds in the curriculum. I suggest that this type of curriculation was reformist in nature, based 
on keeping the core of the professional training programmes oriented towards and reliant on 
Euroamerican-centric epistemologies. This continuous reliance on Euroamerican-centric 
epistemologies may also be understood as the continuation of extraverted knowledge practices 
within Africa, wherein the West is still regarded as a site of ‘real’ knowledge production 
(Hountondji, 1986).  
Lewis Gordon’s (2014) argument that the decolonisation of knowledge requires, in part, taking 
seriously the shift in the geography of reason, which is not to rely on the West for knowledge 
development. It became evident that the locus of enunciation of the professional training 
programmes remained Euroamerican-centric in nature. The change in locus of enunciation of the 
curriculum is often regarded to be partially due to the unavailability of material from, about, and 
for Africa(ns), which means that only parts of the curriculum can be situated within Africa. This 
temporal situatedness is linked in part to how relevance has been understood within the psychology 
as a whole, which I have argued is also temporal, and which can shift, given who is in control of 
powerful discourses (see also Long, 2016). Menzi, the course coordinator at the HWESU2, does 
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explicate the importance of the locus of enunciation, when he poses the question “so where do you 
think from?” The simple answer to this question is that currently the bodies remain in Africa, 
whilst the minds are firmly ensconced in Europe and the US.  
It is unclear as to whether there is indeed a lack of material available that is for, about, from, and 
places Africa as the centre, or whether the intransigence of Euroamerican-centric epistemologies 
renders this knowledge unviable. I would suggest that it may be important to answer this question 
as it may also offer an important way forward for how changes within the content of the curriculum 
can occur. In practical terms, the situating of the curriculum may involve the use of material that 
is from, about, and for Africa(ns). This extends beyond the geographic boundaries of Africa but in 
the ways that I have attempted to illustrate in the development of an Africa(n)-centred perspective, 
drawing from multiple geographical regions with a critical current in their utility.  
The consequence of Euroamerican-centrism in the curriculum of professional training programmes 
is such that it may possibly lead to epistemic disarticulation, especially with regards to Black 
trainee psychologists. In the discourses of relevance, particularly cultural relevance, which was 
related to the curriculum of the professional training programmes, epistemic disarticulation 
became evident. Some Black intern psychologists expressed feelings of alienation, estrangement, 
and misrecognition as they continued through their training. These experiences of alienation from 
the curriculum illustrated how the Euroamerican-centric curriculum acts as an important 
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mechanism determinant who belongs in the training. Further to this, it is important to highlight 
how for some Black interns the curriculum is experienced as pathologising to their own lifeworlds.  
Community Psychology has increased its status within South African psychology, since its 
formalised appearance in the 1980s, as one form of critical praxis (see Seedat & Lazarus, 2011). 
However, Community Psychology appears to have been relegated to the margins of the 
professional training of counselling and clinical psychologists. This is attested to by some of the 
course coordinators and some of the intern psychologists, who both noted the limited time spent 
on Community Psychology in comparison to other modules. Due to the way in which Community 
Psychology has been largely taken up in South Africa as focusing on Black, poor, and working-
class people, its marginalisation may also illustrate the marginalisation of those lifeworlds.  
Community Psychology may serve an important function in the situating of practices within the 
professional training of psychologists, as it often overtly positions itself against the dominant 
(white) Euroamerican-centric epistemologies (see Yen, 2008). Community Psychology should not 
be understood as a panacea for the challenges that are faced psychological practice and training. It 
remains important that de-structive practices of Euroamerican-centrism be understood not only as 
the addition of community, but to remain vigilant of the ways that Community Psychology can 
become coopted by dominant systems (see Fryer & Laing, 2008).  
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In asking what clinical and counselling psychologists are trained to do, I sought to ‘make visible’ 
the contested nature of the training, relying on Maton’s (2013) conceptualisation of the EPD. These 
contestations are limited, in the same way that Louw (1988) recognised that professions often do, 
to the disciplinary vestiges rather than new imaginaries of psychology that affect and/or influence 
larger society. Specifically, these new imaginaries of the discipline have yet to include the 
relationship that psychology has with Africa(ns), or in the language of this thesis, how to (re)centre 
Africa in professional psychology.  
9.4 What is the role of the Professional Board for Psychology in the training of 
psychologists?  
One of the most surprising aspects of the interviews with both course coordinators and intern 
psychologists was the continuous referencing to the Professional Board for Psychology’s role in 
the structure of the training programmes. Although I did not directly speak to the professional 
board representatives as this fell outside the scope of the current study, The Professional Board for 
Psychology remained a key entity in the discursive practices of the professional training sites. The 
positioning of the board as the most important factor for the structure of the training programmes 
renders change within the training of psychologists as limited. Stein (2019) argues similarly, with 
regards to higher education, that it creates a paradox wherein the current discursive field of higher 
education is the basis for which change is conceptualised, but that this very higher education 
system is rendered unsustainable in the current climate.  
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9.4.1 Subjectivity. In making visible the ways in which the governing of training sites 
occurs, several issues arise, least of which has to do with the types of subject positions that are 
summarised as “passive” in the statement by Elretha, the course coordinator of the clinical 
programme at the MU. Situated forms of professional training are being limited by the subject 
positions that emanate as a result of the relationship between professional training sites and the 
governing body of the profession.  
One of the objectives of this study was to investigate to what end psychologists are being trained. 
It is possible to see that discourses of power understood through the HPCSA have produced 
contested meanings of professional training. The discourses of power on the role of the HPCSA 
raise an interesting conundrum about the separation of the board and the profession at the level of 
professional training. Historically, psychologists have either actively participated in politically 
oppressive practices, or have attempted to remain neutral on societal issues (Biesheuvel, 1957; 
Nicholas, 1990). This subject positioning by the course coordinators creates a ‘prosthetic God’, in 
which the board is omnipresent in the talk of course coordinators, which may illustrate a need to 
reconfigure the structure of the board. It may be necessary for the constitution of the board (DoH, 
2008b) to be reevaluated, and to involve training sites, as, for instance, a sub-committee. This 
reconfiguration may serve to maintain the interests and developments that are occurring in the 
higher education sector as an important epicentre for the practice of psychologists.  
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Discourses that limit the form and function of power to external agents become part of the episteme 
of a discipline by being passed through to new entrants of professional psychology. Specifically, 
it is not only that the distancing and positioning of the HPCSA as an external self-governing agent 
of professional psychology is amongst the full members of the discipline but becomes embedded 
within the discipline when new members join and begin to hold similar views. Considering this 
reproduction of discursive practices, it is possible to see in Mignolo’s (2009) concept of epistemic 
obedience that new members of a professional class begin to rely on discourses that have come to 
dominate the field. Although epistemic obedience is recognisable throughout most of the 
interviews with the intern psychologists, it is particularly clearly visible in discourses on the 
Professional Board for Psychology. 
9.4.2 Relevance. One of the most important ways in which the talk of the course 
coordinators – and to some extent the intern psychologists – was limited, concerns the absence of 
the NHI in speaking about social relevance (see Long & Foster, 2013). Discourses of relevance as 
social relevance could possibly be linked to the forthcoming NHI (DoH, 2017). The NHI has the 
potential to serve as an important starting point in negotiations about the curriculum of the 
professional training sites. By coupling the curriculum with the role that psychologists ought to 
play in the healthcare system, this further requires clarity on what psychologists can do within the 
national health system. 
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The relevance discourse, as related to the board, makes available certain discourses on the structure 
of the training, which can serve to amplify Euroamericanised practices of the discipline, or move 
towards more African(n)-centred practices of professional training. One of the most glaring of 
these has been the distinction made between counselling and clinical psychology. This need to 
distinguish between counselling and clinical psychology creates discursive fields that maintain 
epistemic closure of the profession, limiting the possibilities of the professional training. This 
limitation is prominent in the structure of the HWESU2, which purports to be attempting to create 
an alternative form of practice that is located within community psychology however remains 
practically similar to other training programmes.  
A related discourse that arose out of the discussions about the board was that of the market 
relevance of professional training for clinical and counselling psychologists. The issue of the scope 
of practice has consumed much of the disciplinary discourses for the past decade. It has remained 
a central point of contestation but has also remained a mechanism that training sites use to retain 
an apolitical position. Market relevance appeared to be affected by how the course coordinators 
and some intern psychologists viewed the board to have attempted to differentiate between clinical 
and counselling. The limited discursive field was created by the understandings of the policies of 
the Professional Board for Psychology, including the promulgation of the 2011 regulations 
governing the scope of practice of psychologists (DoH, 2011) and the regulations of training sites. 
The continued uncertainty regarding the scope of practice affects the training sites in terms of how 
to structure training and how to curriculate. At present, the issue of market relevance appears to 
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be affecting private practice, however it may soon become an issue across all spheres of work, 
including opportunities in the public sector. This would have detrimental effects on the profession 
as a whole, wherein, universities begin to employ clinical psychologists at rapid rates, and 
government institutions rely on clinical psychologists at all levels of healthcare. This reliance on 
clinical psychology may render the other categories as obsolete and given the current low number 
of psychologists (see Bantjes et al., 2016) the marginalisation of other categories will continue to 
negatively affect the provision of mental health services.   
The issues surrounding the scope of practice have illustrated the various subjectivities that are 
available to those within the discipline, which can act as catalysts for change, or neutralise the 
professions emancipatory capabilities. Whilst for the clinical psychology trainers, the possibilities 
for how to structure the professional training appear to point towards increasing accessibility, the 
opposite appears to be the case for counselling. The concern for disciplinary demarcating of 
registration categories foregrounds the limited ways in which the discipline has engaged with the 
issue of relevance.  
By way of concluding, (re)centring Africa in the training of counselling and clinical psychologists 
may require practices that are not yet imagined in psychology. It requires the opening of 
professional training to new possibilities that involve the Professional Board for Psychology, the 
training sites, and the university administrators. What I am gesturing towards is not merely the 
addition of liberal multiculturalism into the curriculum, diversity as the re-inscription of the four 
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apartheid races, or even mere class consciousness. I am suggesting that the (re)centring of Africa 
in professional training requires interrogation of the things that are taken for granted, which include 
selection, recruitment, and training practices that continue to render Black lifeworlds as not 
belonging. The requirement here is not of inclusive practice, rather it is Africa(n)-centred as it 
takes seriously the inherited structures of apartheid and colonialism in South Africa. This 
Africa(n)-centred practice, I would add, moves beyond relevance discourses that a devoid of how 
coloniality continues to legitimate white, European, US, and middle-class knowledge as the only 




371 | P a g e  
 
References 
Abdi, A. (2011). African Philosophies of Education: Deconstructing the Colonial and 
Reconstructing the Indigenous. In G. J. S Dei (Ed.), Indigenous Philosophies and Critical 
Education: A Reader (Vol. 379, pp. 80-91). Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang. 
Ahmed, R., & Pillay, A. L. (2004). Reviewing Clinical Psychology Training in the Post-aparthied 
Period: Have we Made any Progress? South African Journal of Psychology, 34(4), 630-
656. 
Albertyn, J. R. (1932). Carnegie Study: Into the Poor White Problem in South Africa. New York, 
NY: Carnegie Coperation. 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. New York, NY: Perseus Books Publishers. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders. BMC Medicine, 17, 133-137.  
Andreotti, V. (2011). Actionable Postcolonial Theory in Education. New York, NY: Springer. 
372 
 
372 | P a g e  
 
Anonymous. (1986). Some Thoughts on a More Relevant or Indigenous Counselling Psychology 
in South Africa: Discovering the Socio-Political Context of the Oppressed. Psychology in 
Society, 5, 81-89. 
Appel, S. W. (1989). "Outstanding Individuals Do not Arise from Ancestrally Poor Stock": Racial 
Science and the Education of Black South Africans, The Journal of Negro Education, 
58(4), 544-557. 
Arribas-Ayllon, M., & Walkerdine, V. (2008). Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. In C. Willig & 
W. S. Rogers (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology (pp. 91-
108). United Kingdom: Sage Publishers. 
Asante, M. K. (1988/2009). Afrocentricity. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press. 
Asante, M. K. (1991). The Afrocentric Idea in Education. The Journal of Negro Education, 60(2), 
170-180. 
Atkinson, M. (1984). The Language and Body Language of Politics: Our Masters Voices. New 
York, NY: Methuen & Company Ltd. 
Augoustinos, M., & Tileagă, C. (2012). Twenty-Five-Years of Discursive Psychology. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 51(3), 405-412.  
373 
 
373 | P a g e  
 
Baloyi, M. C., & Naidoo, G. (2016). Higher Education Mergers in South Africa: A Means Towards 
an End. African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(3).  
Bantjes, J., Kagee, A., & Young, C. (2016). Counselling Psychology in South Africa. Counselling 
Psychology Quarterly, 29(2), 171-183.  
Baumeister, A. T. (2003). Habermas: Discourse and Cultural Diversity. Political Studies, 51(4), 
740-758. 
Beck, J., & Young, M. F. (2005). The Assault on the Professions and the Restructuring of 
Academic and Professional Identities: A Bernsteinian Analysis. British Journal of 
Sociology of Education, 26(2), 183-197.  
Bentley, K., & Habib, A. (2008). Racial Redress, National Identity and Citizenship in Post-
apartheid South Africa. In K. Bentley & A. Habib (Eds.), Racial Redress and Citizenship 
in South Africa (pp. 3-32). Pretoria: HSRC Press. 
Bernstein, B. (1996). Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique. 
Bristol, PA: Taylor & Francis. 
Bhabha, H. K. (2012). The Location of Culture. New York, NY: Routledge. 
374 
 
374 | P a g e  
 
Biesheuvel, S. (1957). The Influence Of Social Circumstances on the Attitudes of Educated 
Africans. South African Journal of Science, 53(12), 309-314. 
Biko, S. (1978/2005). I Write What I Like: A Selection of his Writings. Johannesburg: Heinemann 
Publishers. 
Black, E. (2003). War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master 
Race. New York, NY: Four Walls Eight Windows.  
Bledstein, B. (1976). The Culture of Professionalism. The Middle Class and the Development of 
Higher Education in America. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Bohmke, W., & Tlali, T. (2008). Bodies and Behaviour: Science, Psychology and Politics in South 
Africa. In C. van Ommen & D. Painter (Eds.), Interiors: A History of Psychology in 
Southern Africa (pp. 125-151). Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
Boidin, C., Cohen, J., & Grosfoguel, R. (2012). Introduction: From University to Pluriversity: A 
Decolonial Approach to the Present Crisis of Western Universities, Human Architecture: 
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 10(1), 1-7. 




375 | P a g e  
 
Booi, M., Vincent, L., & Liccardo, S. (2017). ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’: Challenges Facing 
Institutional Transformation of Historically White South African Universities. African 
Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie, 21(1), 2-19.  
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.). Handbook of Theory and 
Research for Sociology of Education (pp. 241-258). New York, NY: Greenwood. 
Bozalek, V., & Boughey, C. (2012). (Mis)framing Higher Education in South Africa, Social Policy 
& Administration, 46(6), 688-703.  
Bozatzis, N., & Dragonas, T. (2014). Introduction. In N. Bozatis, & T. Dragonas (Eds.), The 
Discursive Turn in Social Psychology, (pp. 15-24). Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute 
Publications.  
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. 




376 | P a g e  
 
Bulhan, H. A. (1993). Imperialism in Studies of the Psyche: A Critique of African psychological 
Research. In L. Nicholas (Ed.), Psychology and Oppression: Critiques and Proposals (pp. 
1-34). Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers. 
Burman, E. (1998). Deconstructing Feminist Psychology. In E. Burman. (Ed.). Deconstructing 
Feminist Psychology, (pp. 1-29). London: Sage. 
Cakata, Z., & Segalo, P. (2017). Obstacles to Post-apartheid Language Policy Implementation:
 Insights from Language Policy Experts, Southern African Linguistics and Applied
 Language Studies, 35(4), 321-329. 
Carolissen, R. (2006). Teaching Community Psychology into Obscurity: A Reflection on 
Community Psychology in South Africa. Journal of Psychology in Africa, 16(2), 177-182.  
Carolissen, R., Rohleder, P., Bozalek, V., Swartz, L., & Leibowitz, B. (2010). “Community 
Psychology is for Poor, Black People”: Pedagogy and Teaching of Community Psychology 
in South Africa. Equity & Excellence in Education, 43(4), 495-510. 
Carolissen, R., Shefer, T., & Smit, E. (2015). A Critical Review of Practices of Inclusion and 




377 | P a g e  
 
Césaire, A. (1972). Discourse on Colonialism. New York, NY: NYU Press. 
Chitindingu, E. (2012). Students Views on the inclusion of Multicultural Perspectives into the 
Psychology Curriculum at Two South African Universities: An Afrocentric 
analysis (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.  
Christian, R., Mokutu, M., & Rankoe, M. (2002). Black Students' Experiences of Training at a 
'White' Institution. In L. Swartz, K. Gibson, L. Richter & T. Gelman, (Eds.). Reflective 
Practice: Psychodynamic Ideas in the Community (pp. 33-44). Pretoria: HSRC Press.  
Ciofalo, N. (Ed.). (2019). Indigenous Psychologies: A Contestation for Epistemic Justice. 
In Indigenous Psychologies in an Era of Decolonization (pp. 1-38). Switzerland: Springer 
Nature. 
Cloete, N., & Pillay, S. (1988). Professional neutrality: In the Service of the Clients and/or the 
Professionals. Psychology in Society, 9, 44-65. 
Clycq, N., Ward Nouwen, M. A., & Vandenbroucke, A. (2014). Meritocracy, Deficit Thinking 
and the Invisibility of the System: Discourses on Educational Success and Failure. British 
Educational Research Journal, 40(5), 796-819. 
378 
 
378 | P a g e  
 
Coates, T. (2015). Between the World and Me. United States, US: Spiegal & Grau. 
Cooper, S., & Nicholas, L. (2012). An Overview of South African Psychology, International 
Journal of Psychology, 47(2), 89-101.  
Cooper, S. (2014). A Synopsis of South African Psychology from Apartheid to Democracy. 
American Psychologist, 69(8),837-847. 
Cooper S., Ratele K. (2018). The Black Consciousness Psychology of Steve Biko. In S. 
Fernando & R. Moodley (Eds.), Global Psychologies (pp. 245-262). London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Coimbra, J. L., Duckett, P., Fryer, D., Makkawi, I., Menezes, I., Seedat, M., & Walker, C. (2012). 
Rethinking Community Psychology: Critical Insights. The Australian Community 
Psychologist, 24(2), 135-142. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. (1996). Bill of rights. Retrieved from:  
https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf 
Couve, C. (1986). Psychology and Politics in Manganyi’s Work: A Materialist Critique, 
Psychology in Society, 5, 90-130. 
379 
 
379 | P a g e  
 
Cross, M. (1999). Imagery of Identity in South African Education 1880-1990. North Carolina, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Cross, M. (1985). Reply to Hountondji. Psychology in Society, 3, 49-50. 
Cross, M. (2004). Institutionalising Campus Diversity in South African Higher Education: Review 
of Diversity Scholarship and Diversity Education. Higher Education, 47(4), 387-410. 
Council on Higher Education. (2004). South African Higher Education in the First Decade of 
Democracy. Pretoria: The Council on Higher Education. Retrieved from: 
https://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/SA_HE_10years_Nov2004.pdf 
Council on Higher Education. (2019). VitalStats Public Higher Education 2017. Pretoria: The 
Council on Higher Education. Retrieved from: 
https://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/VitalStats%20%20Public%20Highe
r%20Education%202017.pdf 
Curtis, M. J., Grier, J. E. C., & Hunley, S. A. (2004). The Changing Face of School Psychology: 
Trends in Data and Projections for the Future. School Psychology Review, 33(1), 49-66. 
380 
 
380 | P a g e  
 
Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research. 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
Danziger, K. (1994). Does the History of Psychology Have a Future? Theory & Psychology, 4(4), 
467-484. 
Danziger, K. (2006). Universalism and Indigenization in the History of Modern Psychology.  In 
A. C. Brock (Ed.), Internationalizing the History of Psychology (pp.208-225). New York, 
NY: New York University Press. 
Dawes, A. (1986). The Notion of Relevance Psychology with Particular Reference to Africanist 
Pragmatic Initiatives. Psychology in Society, 5, 28-58. 
Dawes, A. (1998). Africanisation of Psychology: Identities and Continents. Psychology in Society, 
23, 4-16. 
Deane, T. (2017). A Survey of the Professional Identity of Clinical Psychologists in South Africa 
(Unpublished Masters Dissertation). Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa. 
Department of Health. (2008). Regulations Defining the Scope of the Profession of Psychology. 
Health Professions Act, No.56, of 1974. Pretoria: Health Professions Council of South 
Africa. Retrieved from   
381 
 




Department of Health. (2011). Regulations Defining the Scope of the Profession of Psychology: 
Amendment Health Professions Act No. 56 of 1974. Pretoria: Health Professions Council 
of South Africa. Retrieved from  
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/34581rg9582gon704.pdf 
Department of Health. (2018). Regulations Defining the Scope of The Profession of Psychology. 
Health Professions Act, No. 56 of 1974. Pretoria: Health Professions Council of South 
Africa. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201809/41900bn101.pdf 
Department of Health. (2008b). Regulations Relating to the Constitution of the Professional Board 
for Psychology. Health Professions Act, No. 56 of 1974. Pretoria: Health Professions 
Council of South Africa. Retrieved from 
https://isystems.hpcsa.co.za/Uploads/editor/UserFiles/downloads/rules_reg_constitution/
psychology_constitution.pdf 
Department of Health. (2015). National Health Act No. 61 of 2003: The White Paper on the 
National Health Insurance. Government Gazette. (No. 39506).   Retrieved from 
382 
 
382 | P a g e  
 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201512/39506gon1230.pdf 
Department of Health. (2019). Notice not to Proceed with the Proposed Regulations Defining the 




de la Rey, C., & Ipser, J. (2004). The Call for Relevance: South African Psychology Ten Years 
into Democracy. South African Journal of Psychology, 34(4), 544-552. 
de la Rey, C. (2001). Racism and the History of University Education in South Africa. In N. 
Duncan, A. van Niekerk, C. de la Rey & M. Seedat. (Eds.). Race, Racism, Knowledge 
Production and Psychology in South Africa (pp. 7-15). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science 
Publishers. 
Dixon, J., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2005). Beyond the Optimal Contact Strategy: A Reality 
Check for the Contact Hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60(7), 697-711. 
Dladla, N. (2017). Here is a Table: A Philosophical Essay on the History of Race in South 
Africa. Pretoria: EARS Publishing. 
383 
 
383 | P a g e  
 
Dlamini, S. (2019). # FeesMustFall: Lessons from the Post-colonial Global South. Journal of 
Student Affairs in Africa, 7(1), 47-60. 
de Sousa Santos, B. (2015). Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
du Bois, W. E. B. (1903/2003). Souls of Black Folk. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Durrheim, K., & Mokeki, S. (1997). Race and Relevance: A Content Analysis of the South African 
Journal of Psychology. South African Journal of Psychology, 27(4), 206-213. 
Eagle, G. (2005). "Cultured Clinicians”: The Rhetoric of Culture in Clinical Psychology 
Training. Psychology in Society, 32, 41-64 
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1993). Language and Causation: A Discursive Action Model of 
Description and Attribution. Psychological Review, 100(1), 23. 
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992).  Discursive Psychology. Newbury Park, California, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Edwards, D. (1994). Script formulations: An Analysis of Event Descriptions in 
Conversation. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 13(3), 211-247.  
384 
 
384 | P a g e  
 
Edwards, D. (2000). Extreme Case Formulations: Softeners, Investment, and Doing 
Nonliteral. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 33(4), 347-373. 
Edwards, D. (2005). Discursive Psychology. In K.L. Fitch & R.E. Sanders (Eds.), Handbook of 
Language and Social Interaction, (1st edition, pp. 257-273). New Jersey, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 
Edwards, D. (2012). Discursive and Scientific Psychology. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 51(3), 425-435.  
Elliott, G., Fullager, C., Levy, S., Moll, I., Turton, R., Tyghe, A., Bhana, A., Hampson, M., & 
Hayes, G. (1983). Editorial: Psychology in Society, l. Psychology in Society, 1, 1-20. 
Ellenberger, H. F. (1970). The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of 
Dynamic Psychiatry. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Erasmus, Z. (2012). Apartheid Race Categories: Daring to Question their Continued 
Use. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 79(1), 1-11. 
Erasmus, Z. E. (2006). Living the future now: 'Race' and Challenges of Transformation in Higher 
Education. South African Journal of Higher Education, 20(3), 51-63. 
385 
 
385 | P a g e  
 
Erasmus, Z. (2017). Race Otherwise: Forging a new Humanism for South Africa. Johannesburg: 
Wits University Press. 
Fairclough, N. (2012). Critical discourse Analysis. In J. P., Gee, & M. Handford, (Eds.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis (pp. 9-20). London: Routledge. 
Fanon, F. (1963/2004). The Wretched of the Earth. New York, NY: Grove Press.  
Fanon, F. (1967/2008). Black Skin, White Masks. New York, NY: Grove Press. 
Fick, M. L. (1929). Intelligence Test Results of Poor White, Native (Zulu), Coloured and Indian 
School Children and the Educational and Social Implications. South African Journal of 
Science, 26(12), 904-920. 
Finchilescu, G., Tredoux, C., Mynhardt, J., Pillay, J., & Muianga, L. (2007). Accounting for Lack 
of Interracial Mixing Amongst South African University Students. South African Journal 
of Psychology, 37(4), 720-737. 
Fleish, B. (1995). Social Scientists as Policy Makers: E.G Malherbe and the National Bureau for 




386 | P a g e  
 
Foley, A. (2004). Language Policy for Higher Education in South Africa: Implications and 
Complications - Perspectives on Higher Education. South African Journal of Higher 
Education, 18(1), 57-71. 
Foster, D. (2008). Critical Psychology: A Historical Overview. In C. van Ommen & D. Painter, 
Interiors: A History of Psychology in Southern Africa, (pp. 92-122). Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
Foster, D. (1991). ‘Race’ and racism in South African psychology. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 21(4), 203-210. 
Foucault, M. (1977/1995). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage. 
Foucault, M. (1973). The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. United 
States: Tavistock Publications Limited.Foucault, M. (2005). The Order of Things. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Foxcroft, C., & Roodt, G. (Eds.) (2009). Introduction to Psychological Assessment in the South 
African Context. (3rd Edition). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
Fryer, D., & Laing, A. (2008). Community Psychologies: What are they? What could they be? 
Why does it matter? A Critical Community Psychology Approach. The Australian 
Community Psychologist, 20(2), 7-15. 
387 
 
387 | P a g e  
 
Goduka, I. N. (1999). Affirming Unity in Diversity in Education: Healing with Ubuntu. Cape 
Town: Juta. 
Gokani, R., & Walsh, R. T. (2017). On the Historical and Conceptual Foundations of a Community 
Psychology of Social Transformation. American Journal of Community 
Psychology, 59(34), 284-294. 
Gordon, L. R. (2007a). Problematic People and Epistemic Decolonization: Toward the 
Postcolonial in Africana Political Thought. In N. Persram (Ed.). Postcolonialism and 
Political Theory (pp. 121-141). London: Lexington Books. 
Gordon, L. R. (2007b). Through the Hellish Zone of Nonbeing: Thinking through Fanon, Disaster, 
and the Damned of the Earth. Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self 
Knowledge, 5(3), 3.  
Gordon, L., R. (2011). Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity. Not to Become Slaves of the Knowledge 
of Others. Trans-pasando Fronteras, 1, 1-5. 
Gordon, L. (2012, May 12). Of Illicit Appearance: The L.A. Riots/Rebellion as Portent of Things 
to Come. Retrieved from  
388 
 




Gordon, L., R. (2013). Africana Philosophy and Philosophy in Black. The Black Scholar, 43(4),
 41-56. 
Gordon, L. R. (2014). Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonisation of Knowledge. Africa 
Development, 39(1), 81-92.  
Gordon, L. (2015a). Race and Justice in Higher Education: Some Global Challenges with 
Attention to the South African Context. In P. Tabensky & S. Matthews (Eds). Being at 
Home: Race, Institutional Culture and Transformation at South African Higher 
Education Institutions (pp. 157-183). Durban: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. 
Gordon, L. R. (2015b). What Fanon said: A Philosophical Introduction to his Life and Thought. 
Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press. 
Gordon, L. R.  (2017). When Justice is not Enough: Toward the Decolonization of Normative Life. 
In F. F.  Bragato & L. R. Gordon (Eds.), Geopolitics and Decolonization: Perspectives 
from the Global South (pp. 39-48). London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield International. 
389 
 
389 | P a g e  
 
Gouldner, A. W. (1979). The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. New York, 
NY: Palgrave.  
Habermas, J. (1985). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, (Vol. 2). Boston: Beacon Press. 
Hall, M., Symes, A., & Luescher, T. (2004). The Governance of Merger in South African Higher 
Education. Pretoria: Council on Higher Education. Retrieved from 
https://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/Governance_of_Merger_HE_Aug_
004_0.pdf 
Harvey, W. B. (1961). The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective. Michigan Law Review, 59(4), 
487-500. 
Hayes, G. (2014). The Story of Sociality: PINS (Psychology in Society) at 30. Psychology in 
Society, 46, 15-20. 
Hayes, G. (2016a). Chabani Manganyi: Black Intellectual and Psychologist. Psychology in 
Society, 52, 73-79. 
Hayes, G. (2016b). Editorial: Chabani Manganyi's Memoir. Psychology in Society, 52, 71-72. 
390 
 
390 | P a g e  
 
Health Professions Act No. 56 of 1974. (1974). Pretoria: Health Professions Council of South 
Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.adsa.org.za/Portals/14/Documents/CPD/HealthProfessionsAct.pdf  
Health Professions Amendment Act No. 29 of 2007. (2007).  Government Gazette. (Vol. 511, No. 
30674). Retrieved from  
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a29-07.pdf 
Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2010). Handbook for the Training of Intern 
Psychologists and Accredited Institutions. Retrieved from 
https://www.ufs.ac.za/docs/librariesprovider25/cpd-documents/cpd-handbook-intern-
psychologists-1016-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=0 
Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2014). List of Classified and Certified Psychological 
Tests. Retrieved from  
https://www.gov.za/documents/health-professions-act-list-classified-and-certified-
psychological-tests 
Health Professions Council of South Africa (2017a). List of Accredited Universities in South 
Africa. Retrieved from 
391 
 




Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2017b). National Survey of all Registered 
Psychology Practitioners. Retrieved from  
https://www.hpcsa.co.za/Uploads/editor/UserFiles/downloads/psych/HPCSA_Psycholog
y_Survey_Report_FIN_3%20Feb%202017.pdf 
Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2018a). Examination Policy for Psychologists, 
Registered Counsellors and Psychometrists. Retrieved from  
https://hpcsa.co.za/Uploads/PSB_2019/Form%20255%20%20Examination%20Policy%2
0-%20Nov%202018%20Update.pdf 
Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2018b). Report of the Working Group on 
Promulgation of Regulations. Retrieved from  
http://www.hpcsa.co.za/Uploads/editor/UserFiles/downloads/psych/Promulgation_of_Re
gulations_Exco_2018_04_13_Final.pdf 
Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2019a). Minimum Standards for the Training of 
Clinical Psychology. Retrieved from 
392 
 




Health Professions Council of South Africa. (2019b). Minimum Standards for the Training of 
Counselling Psychology. Retrieved from  
https://www.hpcsa.co.za/Uploads/PSB_2019/Policy%20and%20Guidelines/SGB%20CO
UNS%20-%20Revised%20October%202019.pdf 
Hendricks, L., Kramer, S., & Ratele, K. (2019). Research Shouldn’t be a Dirty Thought, but Race 
is a Problematic Construct. South African Journal of Psychology, 49(3), 308-311. 
Higgins, J. (2007). Institutional Culture as Keyword. In Council of Higher Education, Review of 
Higher Education in South Africa: Selected themes, (pp. 97-114). Pretoria: Council of 
Higher Education. 
Higher Education Act No.101 of 1997. (1997). Government Gazette. (Vol. 390, No. 18515). 
Retrieved from  
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a101-97.pdf  
Hinton, D. E., & Lewis-Fernández, R. (2010). Idioms of Distress Among Trauma Survivors: 
Subtypes and Clinical Utility. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 34(2), 209-218. 
393 
 
393 | P a g e  
 
Hira, T. (2012). Constructing Gender: Postgraduate Psychology Students’ Gendered Accounts of 
their Future Profession (Unpublished Masters Dissertation). University of Pretoria, 
Tshwane.  
Hlatshwayo, M. (2019). I want them to be confident, to build an argument: An Exploration of the 
Structure of Knowledge and Knowers in Political Studies (Unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertation). Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa.  
Hlengwa, A. (2015). Employing safe bets: Reflections on Attracting, Developing and Retaining 
the next Generation of Academics. In P. Tabensky & S. Matthews (Eds). Being at home: 
Race, Institutional Culture and Transformation at South African Higher Education 
Institutions (pp. 147-154). Durban: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.  
 Hook, D. (2004). Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, ‘Psychopolitics’, and Critical Psychology. In D. Hook 
(Ed.), Critical Psychology (pp. 84-114). South Africa: Juta and Company Ltd.  
Hook, D. (2007). Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power. Switzerland: Springer. 
hooks, b. (1991). Theory as liberatory practice. Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 4 (1), 1-13 
Hountondji, P. J. (1986). On the universality of science and technology. In L. Burket (Ed.), Technik 
und sozialer wandel: Verhandlungen des 23 (pp. 382-389). Hamburg: Frankfurt am Main. 
394 
 
394 | P a g e  
 
Huniche, L., & Sørensen, E. (2019). Psychology's Epistemic Projects. Theory & Psychology, 
29(4), 441-448. 
Jamison, D. F. (2018). Key Concepts, Theories, and Issues in African/Black Psychology: A View 
from the Bridge. Journal of Black Psychology, 44(8), 722-746. 
Jones, A., & Mtshali, K. (2013). Editorial: Race, Power and Indigenous Knowledge Systems. 
Alternation, 20 (1), 1-8. 
Johnston, E. (2015). South African clinical psychology's response to cultural diversity, 
globalisation and multiculturalism: A Review. South African Journal of Psychology, 45(3), 
374-385. 
Johnston, E., R. (2019). South African Clinical Psychologists’ Multicultural Clinical and 
Supervisory Experience. South African Journal of Psychology, 49(2), 253-269.  
Karodia, A. M., Shaikh, A., & Soni, D. (2015). The South African Universities Post–Merger Mess: 
Problems and Challenges of Transformation. Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences, 6(31), 326.  
395 
 
395 | P a g e  
 
Kelley, R. D. (2017). Over the rainbow: Third World studies against the neoliberal turn. In A. 
Choudry & S. Vally (Eds.). Reflections on Knowledge, Learning and Social Movements: 
History's Schools (pp. 205-222). London: Routledge. 
Kessi, S., & Cornell, J. (2015). Coming to UCT: Black students, Transformation and Discourses 
of Race. Journal of Student Affairs in Africa, 3(2), 1-16. 
Kramer, S. (2019). The Power of Critical Discourse Analysis: Investigating Female-Perpetrated 
Sex Abuse Victim Discourses. In S. Laher, A. Flynn, & S. Kramer. Transforming Research 
Methods in the Social Sciences: Case studies from South Africa, (pp. 236-250). 
Johannesburg: Wits Press. 
Kiguwa, P., & Segalo, P. (2018). Decolonising Psychology in residential and Open Distance e-
learning Institutions: Critical Reflections. South African Journal of Psychology, 48(3), 
310-318. 
Kleintjes, S., & Swartz, L. (1996). Black Clinical Psychology Trainees at a "White" South African 
University, The Clinical Supervisor, 14(1), 87-109.  
Kontopodis, M., & Jackowska, M. (2019). De-centring the Psychology Curriculum: Diversity, 
Social Justice, and Psychological Knowledge. Theory & Psychology, 29(4), 506-520. 
396 
 
396 | P a g e  
 
Lazarus, S. (1988). The Role of the Psychologist in South African Society: In Search of an 
Appropriate Community Psychology (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). University of 
Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa. 
Leach, M. M., Akhurst, J., & Basson, C. (2003). Counseling Psychology in South Africa: Current 
Political and Professional Challenges and Future Promise. The Counseling 
Psychologist, 31(5), 619-640. 
Le Cordeur, M. L. A. (2013). Afrikaans as Medium of Instruction within a Transformed Higher 
Education System in South Africa with Special Reference to Stellenbosch University. In 
C. C. Wolhuter (Ed.). SAERA Conference: Educational Research in South Africa: 
Practices and Perspectives. (pp. 55-76), Klein-Kariba Resort, 25-30 Januarie 2013.  
Legassick, M., & Wolpe, H. (1976). The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South 
Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 3(7), 87-107.  
Lemma, A. (2015). Introduction to the Practice of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. West Sussex, 
UK: John Wiley &Sons. 
Letsekha, T. (2013). Revisiting the Debate on the Africanisation of Higher Education: An Appeal 
for a Conceptual Shift. The Independent Journal of Teaching and Learning, 8(1), 5-18. 
397 
 
397 | P a g e  
 
Lewis, D. (2005). Against the Grain: Black Women and Sexuality. Agenda, 19(63), 11-24.   
Long, W. (2013). A History of ‘Relevance’: South African Psychology in Focus (Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation). University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa. 
Long, W., & Foster, D. (2013). The Changing Face of "Relevance" in South African Psychology, 
Psychology in Society, 45, 3-16. 
Long, W. (2016a). A History of "Relevance" in Psychology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Long, W. (2016b). On the Africanization of Psychology. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 46(4), 429–431.  
Long, W. (2016c). Psychology in South Africa and the End of History. History of 
psychology, 19(3), 220-228.  
Long, W. (2017). Essence or Experience? A New Direction for African psychology. Theory & 
Psychology, 27(3), 293-312. 
Lorde, A. (2003). The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House. Feminist 
Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, 25, 27. 
398 
 
398 | P a g e  
 
Loram, C. T. (1917). The Education of the South African Native. London, UK: Longmans, Green, 
and Company. 
Louw, J. (1986). White Poverty and Psychology in South Africa: The Poor White Investigation of 
the Carnegie Commission, Psychology in Society, 6, 47-62. 
Louw, J. (1988). Professionalisation as a Moral Concern. Psychology in Society, 9, 66-80. 
Louw, J. (1997a). Regulating Professional Conduct Part I: Codes of Ethics of National Psychology 
Associations in South Africa. South African Journal of Psychology, 27(3), 183-188.  
Louw, J. (1997b). Regulating Professional Conduct Part II: The Professional Board for Psychology 
in South Africa. South African Journal of Psychology, 27(3), 189-195.  
Louw, J. (1997c). Social Context and Psychological Testing in South Africa, 1918-1939. Theory 
& Psychology, 7(2), 235-256. 
Louw, J., & van Hoorn, W. (1997). Psychology, Conflict, and Peace in South Africa: Historical 
Notes. Journal of Peace Psychology,3(3), 233-243. 
Louw, J., & Machemedze, T. (2015). Psychology in the 2011 South African Census. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 45(2), 223-233.  
399 
 
399 | P a g e  
 
Lunt, I. (1999). The Professionalization of Psychology in Europe. European Psychologist, 4(4), 
240-247.  
Maart, R. (2014). Philosophy Born of Massacres. Marikana, the Theatre of Cruelty: The Killing 
of the ‘Kaffir’, Acta Academica, 46(4), 1-28 
Macleod, C. (2004). South African Psychology and 'Relevance': Continuing Challenges. South 
African Journal of Psychology, 4(34), 613-629. 
Madlingozi, T. (2018). Mayibuye iAfrika?: Disjunctive Inclusions and Black Strivings for 
Constitution and Belonging in 'South Africa' (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation), 
University of London, Birkbeck.  
Makhubela, M. (2016). "From Psychology in Africa to African Psychology": Going Nowhere 
Slowly. Psychology in Society, 52, 1-18.  
Maldonado-Torres, N. (2007). On the coloniality of being: Contributions to the development of a 
concept. Cultural Studies, 21(2-3), 240-270. 
Malherbe, N. (2019). Articulating liberation psychologies of culture. Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology. Advance online publication.   https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000126 
400 
 
400 | P a g e  
 
Malinga, M., & Ratele, K. (2016). "It's Cultivated, Grown, Packaged and Sold with a Price Tag": 
Young Black Men's Consumption of Media Images of Love, Happiness and Constructions 
of Masculinity. Culture, Society and Masculinities, 8(2), 100-117. 
Mama, A. (1995). Beyond the Masks: Race, Gender and Subjectivity. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Manganyi, N. C. (2013). On Becoming a Psychologist in Apartheid South Africa. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 43(3), 278-288. 
Manganyi, N. C. (2016). Apartheid and the Making of a Black psychologist. Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press. 
Manganyi, N. C. (1973/2019). Being Black in the World. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. 
Martin-Baro, I. (1994). Writings for a Liberation Psychology. Boston : Harverd University Press. 
Maton, K. (2004). The Wrong Kind of Knower: Education, Expansion and the Epistemic 
Device. In J. Muller, B. Davies, & A. Morais (Eds.), Reading Bernstein, Researching 
Bernstein, (pp. 218-231). London: Routledge-Falmer. 
401 
 
401 | P a g e  
 
Maton, K. (2009). Cumulative and Segmented Learning: Exploring the Role of Curriculum 
Structures in Knowledge‐Building. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 30(1), 43-
57. 
Maton, K. (2013). Knowledge and Knowers: Towards a Realist Sociology of Education. London: 
Routledge. 
Matthews, Z. (1959). The Crisis in University in South Africa. Retrieved from uir.unisa.ac.za: 
www.uir.unisa.ac.za 
Mayekiso, T., Strydom, F., Jithoo, V., & Katz, L. A. (2004). Creating New Capacity Through 
Postgraduate Selection. South African Journal of Psychology, 34(4), 657-671.  
Mbembe, J., A. (2016). Decolonizing the University: New Directions. Arts and Humanities in 
Higher Education, 15(1), 29-45.  
Mhambi, R. (2012). An Exploration into the Subjective Emotional Experiences of the Msc1 
Clinical Psychology Trainees at the University of Limpopo (Medunsa Campus) During 
their First Block of Training (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation), University of Limpopo, 
Pretoria, South Africa.  
402 
 
402 | P a g e  
 
Michalski, D. S., Cope, C., & Fowler, G. A. (2017). Graduate Study in Psychology 2018: Summary 
Report: Admissions, Applications, and Acceptances. Retrieved from 
 https://www.apa.org/education/grad/survey-data/2018admissionsapplications.pdf 
Mignolo, W. D. (1993). Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse: Cultural Critique or Academic 
Colonialism? Latin American Research Review, 28(3), 120-134. 
Mignolo, W. D. (2009). Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial 
Freedom. Theory, Culture & Society, 26(7-8), 159-181. 
Ministry of Higher Education. (2002). Language Policy for Higher Education., Pretoria: Ministry 
of Education. Retrieved from  
http://www.dhet.gov.za/Management%20Support/Language%20Policy%20for%20Highe
r%20Education.pdf 
Moll, I. (2002). African Psychology: Myth and Reality. South African Journal of
 Psychology, 32(1), 9-16.  
Morrison. T. (2017). The Origin of Others. London: Harvard University Press. 
403 
 
403 | P a g e  
 
Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of
 Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Munley, P. H., Duncan, L. E., Mcdonnell, K. A., & Sauer, E. M. (2004). Counseling Psychology
 in the United States of America. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 17(3), 247-271. 
Musila, G. A. (2017). Navigating Epistemic disarticulations. African Affairs, 116(465), 692-704.  
Naicker, C. (2016). From Marikana to #FeesMustFall: The Praxis of Popular Politics in South
 Africa. Urbanisation, 1(1), 53-61. 
Naidoo, A. V. (1996). Challenging the Hegemony of Eurocentric Psychology. Journal of 
Community and Health Sciences, 2(2), 9-16. 
Nair, S. (2008). Psychologists and Race: Exploring the Identities of South African Trainee Clinical 
Psychologists with Reference to Working in Multiracial Contexts. (Unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertation). University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
Nell, V. (1990). One World, One Psychology: 'Relevance' and Ethnopsychology. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 20(3), 129-140. 
404 
 
404 | P a g e  
 
Ndlozi, M. Q. (2017). Permanent Juniority: Black youth politics in the Vaal under late 
colonisation (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, S. J. (2015). Decoloniality as the future of Africa. History 
Compass, 13(10),485-496. 
Nicholas, L. (2014). A History of South African (SA) Psychology. Universitas Psychologica, 
13(5). 1983-1991. 
Nicholas, L. (2001). The History of Racism in Professional South African Psychology. In N. 
Duncan, A. van Niekerk, C. da la Rey, & M. Seedat (Eds.), Race, Racism, Knowledge 
Production and Psychology in South Africa, (pp. 17-26). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science 
Publishers. 
Nicholas, L. (1990). The Response of South African Professional Psychology Associations to 
Apartheid. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 26, 58-63. 
Nicholas, L. (1993). (Ed). Psychology and Oppression: Critiques and Proposals. United 
Kingdom: Skotaville Publishers. 
405 
 
405 | P a g e  
 
Nieuwoudt, S., Dickie, K. E., Coetsee, C., Engelbrecht, L., & Terblanche, E. (2019). Retracted
 article: Age- and Education-related Effects on Cognitive Functioning in Colored South
 African women. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition. (Advance online publication). 
Nijjar, J. K. (2019). Mutated Masculinities: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the New Lad and the 
New Man in Sons of Anarchy and Ray Donovan. The Journal of Men’s Studies, 27(1), 24-
44. 
Ngonyama ka Sigogo, T. N., Hooper, M., Long, C., Lykes, M. B., Wilson, K., & Zietkiewicz, E. 
(2004). Chasing Rainbow Notions: Enacting Community Psychology in the Classroom and 
Beyond in post-1994 South Africa. American Journal of Community Psychology, 33(1-2), 
77-89. 
Ngonyama Ka Sigogo, T., & Modipa, O. T. (2004). Critical reflections on Community and 
Psychology in South Africa. In D. Hook, N. Mkhize, P. Kiguwa, A. Collins, E. Burman, & 
I. Parker (Eds.), Critical Psychology (pp. 316-334). Landsdowne: UCT Press. 
Nobles, W. W. (2013). Fundamental Task and Challenge of Black Psychology. Journal of Black 
Psychology, 39(3), 292-299.  
406 
 
406 | P a g e  
 
Nsamenang, A. B. (1995). Factors Influencing the Development of Psychology in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. International Journal of Psychology, 30(6), 729-739. 
Nsamenang, A. B. (2007). Origins and Development of Scientific Psychology in Afrique Noire. 
In M. J. Stevens & D. Wedding (Eds.), Psychology: IUPsyS Global Resource (pp 1-45). 
London: Psychology Press. Retrieved from  
http://www.psypress.com/iupsys/contents.asp   
Nsamenang, B. (1999). Eurocentric Image of Childhood in the Context of the World’s 
Cultures. Human Development, 42(3), 159-168. 
Nwoye, A. (2010). A Psycho‐cultural History of Psychotherapy in Africa. Psychotherapy and 
Politics International, 8(1), 26-43.  
Nwoye, A. (2015). What is African Psychology the Psychology of? Theory & Psychology, 25(1), 
96-116.  
Nwoye, A. (2017). A Postcolonial Theory of African Psychology: A reply to Kopano 
Ratele. Theory & Psychology, 27(3), 328-336. 
407 
 
407 | P a g e  
 
Nye Jr., J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94-109. 
Nzimande, B. (1984). Industrial Psychology and the Study of Black Workers in South Africa: A 
Review and Critique. Psychology in Society, 2, 54-91. 
Ormston, R., Spencer, L., Barnard, M., & Snape, D. (2013). The Foundations of Qualitative 
Research. In J., Ritchie, J., Lewis, C. M., Nicholls & R. Ormston (Eds.), Qualitative 
Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (pp. 1-26). 
London: Sage Publications Ltd.  
Ostertag, P. A., & McNamara, J. R. (1991). “Feminization” of Psychology: The Changing Sex 
Ratio and its Implications for the Profession, Psychology of Women Quarterly, 15, 349-
369. 
Painter, D., & van Ommen, C. (2008). Abbreviated Histories: Some Concluding Remarks. In C. 
van Ommen, & D. Painter (Eds.), Interiors: A history of Psychology in Southern Africa. 
Pretoria: Unisa Press. 




408 | P a g e  
 
Parker, I. (2004). Discourse Analysis. In U. Flick, E. von Kardoff, & I Steinke (Eds.). A 
Companion to Qualitative Research (pp. 309-312). Berlin: Sage. 
Parker, I. (2015). Discourse: Definitions and contradictions. In I. Parker (Ed.), Critical Discursive 
Psychology (pp. 148-164). London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Pillay, A. L. (2016). Psychology's Health and Future in South Africa. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 46(2), 149-154. 
Pillay, A. L., Bundhoo, H. Y., & Ngcobo, H. S. B. (2008). Mauritian and South African Students' 
Views on Studying Psychology. Journal of Psychology in Africa, 18(2), 355-360. 
Pillay, A. L., & Siyothula, E. T. B. (2008). The Training Institutions of black African Clinical 
Psychologists Registered with the HPCSA in 2006. South African Journal of Psychology, 
38(4), 725-735. 
Pillay, A. L., & Kramers, A. L. (2003). South African Clinical Psychology, Employment  
(In)equity and the “Brain Drain”. South African Journal of Psychology, 33(1), 52-60. 
Pillay, A. L., & Kramers-Olen, A. L. (2014). The changing face of clinical psychology intern 
training: A 30-year Analysis of a Programme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. South 
African Journal of Psychology, 44(3), 364-374. 
409 
 
409 | P a g e  
 
Pillay, J. (2003). "Community Psychology is all Theory and no Practice": Training Educational 
Psychologists in Community Practice within the South African Context. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 33(4), 261-268. 
Pillay, S. R. (2016). Silence is Violence: (Critical) Psychology in an Era of Rhodes Must Fall and 
Fees Must Fall. South African Journal of Psychology, 46(2), 155-159. 
Pillay, A. L., Ahmed, R., & Bawa, U. (2013). Clinical Psychology Training in South Africa: A 
Call to Action. South African Journal of Psychology, 43(1), 46-58. 
Plaatjie, S. T. (1916). Native Life in South Africa: Before and Since the European War andthe 
Boer Rebellion. London: PS King & Son. 
Plaut, V. C., Thomas, K. M., Hurd, K., & Romano, C. A. (2018). Do Color Blindness and 
Multiculturalism Remedy or Foster Discrimination and Racism? Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 27(3), 200-206. 
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and 
Behaviour. London: Sage Publications. 
Potter, J., (2003). Discursive Psychology: Between Method and Paradigm. Discourse and Society, 
14(6), 783-794.  
410 
 
410 | P a g e  
 
Potter, J., & Edwards, D. (1999). Social Representations and Discursive Psychology: From 
Cognition to Action. Culture & Psychology, 5(4), 447-458.  
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2008). Discursive Construction-ism. In J. A. Holstein, & J. F. Gubrium 
(Eds). Handbook of Constructionist Research (pp. 275 – 293). New York: Guilford Press. 
Potter, J., Wetherell, M., Gill, R., & Edwards, D. (2015). Discourse: Noun, Verb or Social 
Practice? In I. Parker (Ed.), Critical Discursive Psychology (pp. 165-175). London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Pretorius, G. (2012). Reflections on the Scope of Practice in the South African Profession of 
Psychology: A Moral Plea for Relevance and a Future Vision. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 42(4), 509-521. 
Quijano, A. (2000). Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America. International 
Sociology, 15(2), 215-232. 
Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality. Cultural studies, 21(2-3), 168-178. 
Rabionet, S. E. (2011). How I Learned to Design and Conduct Semi-Structured Interviews: An 
Ongoing and Continuous Journey. Qualitative Report, 16(2), 563-566. 
411 
 
411 | P a g e  
 
Ratele, K. (2009). Sexuality as Constitutive of Whiteness in South Africa. NORA—Nordic Journal 
of Feminist and Gender Research, 17(3), 158-174. 
Ratele, K. (2016). Four (African) Psychologies. Theory & Psychology, 27(3), 313-327. 
Ratele, K. (2017). Frequently Asked Questions About African psychology. South African Journal 
of Psychology.  
Ratele, K. (2019). The World Looks Like This from Here: Thoughts on African Psychology. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press. 
Ratele, K., Cornell, J., Dlamini, S., Helman, R., Malherbe, N., & Titi, N. (2018). Some Basic 
Questions about (a) Decolonizing Africa(n)-centred Psychology considered. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 48(3), 331-342. 
Richter, L., & Dawes, A. (2008). South African Child Development: A History of Bias and 
Neglect. In C. van Ommen, & D. Painter (Eds.), Interiors: A History of Psychology in 
Southern Africa, (pp. 287-323). Pretoria: Unisa Press. 




412 | P a g e  
 
Said, E. W. (2004). Freud and the Non-European. London: Verso. 
Saldaña, J. (2009). The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. London: Sage Publications 
Ltd.  
Seedat, M., Cloete, N., & Shochet, I. (1988). Community Psychology: Panic or Panacea. 
Psychology in Society, 11, 39-54. 
Seedat, M. (1997). The Quest for a Liberatory Psychology. South African Journal of Psychology, 
27(4), 261. 
Seedat, M. (1998). A Characterisation of South African Psychology (1948–1988): The Impact of 
Exclusionary Ideology. South African Journal of Psychology, 28(2), 74-84. 
Seedat, M., & Lazarus, S. (2011). Community Psychology in South Africa: Origins, 
Developments, and Manifestations. Journal of Community Psychology, 39(3), 241-257. 
Seedat, M., & Mackenzie, S. (2008). The Triangulated Development of South African Psychology: 
Race, Scientific Racism and Professionalisation. In C. van Ommen, & D. Painter (Eds.), 
Interiors: A History of Psychology in Southern Africa, (pp. 63–91). Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
413 
 
413 | P a g e  
 
Seekings, J. (2008). ‘The Continuing Salience of Race: Discrimination and Diversity in South 
Africa’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26(1), 1-25. 
Seidman, I. (2006). Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education 
and the Social Sciences. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Serequeberhan, T.  (1997). The Critique of Eurocentrism and the Practice of African Philosophy. 
In E. C. Eze (Ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (pp. 141-161). 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Serequeberhan, T. (2009). African philosophy as the Practice of Resistance. Journal of 
Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry, 4(9), 44-52. 
Schrieff, L., Tredoux, C., Dixon, J., & Finchilescu, G. (2005). Patterns of Racial Segregation in 
University Residence Dining-halls. South African Journal of Psychology, 35(3), 433-443. 
Singh, V. (2015). Pedagogical Practices of Lecturers in Pharmacy Education (Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation). University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Durban. 
Skinner, K., & Louw, J. (2009). The Feminization of Psychology: Data from South Africa. 
International Journal of Psychology, 44(2), 81-92. 
414 
 
414 | P a g e  
 
Sono, T. (1988). Afrocentrism in South African Social Sciences: What Has Been Done, How Useful 
Has it Been. Retrieved from 
https://www.academia.edu/36456831/4_Afrocentrism_in_South_African_social_science_
What_has_been_done_how_useful_has_it_been 
Stake, R. E. (2013). Multiple Case Study Analysis. New York: Guilford Press.  
Statistics South Africa. (2016a). Community Survey 2016: In Brief. Retrieved from                                
http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/CS-in-brief-14-07-2017-with
 cover_1.pdf 
Statistics South Africa. (2016b). Community Survey 2016: Statistical Release. Retrieved from   
http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016-RELEASE-
forCS-2016-_Statistical-releas_1-July-2016.pdf 
Statistics South Africa. (2017a). Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-02-11-02/Report-02-11-022017.pdf 
Statistics South Africa. (2017b). Whither a Demographic Dividend South Africa: The Overton 




415 | P a g e  
 
Stein, S. (2019). Beyond Higher Education as We Know it: Gesturing Towards Decolonial 
Horizons of Possibility. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 38(2), 143-161. 
Stevens, G. (2003). Academic Representations of ‘Race’ and Racism in Psychology: Knowledge 
Production, Historical Context and Dialectics in Transitional South Africa. International 
Journal of intercultural relations, 27(2), 189-207. 
Stevens, G. (2015). Black psychology: Resistance, Reclamation, and Redefinition. In I. Parker
 (Ed.). Handbook for Critical Psychology, (pp. 182-190). London & New York: Routledge.  
Stevens, G. (2001). Racism and Cultural Imperialism in the training of Black Clinical
 Psychologists in South Africa: Identity, Ambiguity and Dilemmas of Praxis. In N.
 Duncan, A. van Niekerk, C. de la Rey, & M. Seedat (Eds.), 'Race', Racism, Knowledge
 Production and Psychology in South Africa (pp. 45–59). New York: Nova Science
 Publishers. 
Stevens, G., Bell, D., Sonn, C. C., Canham, H., & Clennon, O. (2017). Transnational Perspectives 
on Black Subjectivity. South African Journal of Psychology, 47(4), 459-469. 
416 
 
416 | P a g e  
 
Soudien, C. (2004). Constituting the class’: An Analysis of the Process of ‘Integration’ in South 
African Schools. In L. Chisholm (Ed.). Changing Class: Education and Social Change in 
Post-apartheid South Africa (pp. 89-114). Pretoria: HSRC Press. 
Soudien, C. (2008). The Intersection of Race and Class in the South African University: Student 
Experiences. South African Journal of Higher Education, 22(3), 662-678.  
Smit, R. (2012). Towards a Clearer Understanding of Student Disadvantage in Higher Education: 
Problematising Deficit Thinking. Higher Education Research & Development, 31(3), 369-
380. 
Sue, D., W., & Sue, D. (2008). Counseling the Culturally Diverse: Theory and Practice (5th ed.). 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Suffla, S., Stevens, G., & Seedat, M. (2001). Mirror Reflections: The Evolution of Organized 
Professional Psychology in South Africa. In N. Duncan, A. van Niekerk, C. de la Rey, & 
M. Seedat (Eds.), 'Race', Racism, Knowledge Production and Psychology in South 
Africa (pp. 27-36). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.  
Sundararajan, L. (2019). Whither indigenous psychology?. Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology, 39(2), 81-89 
417 
 
417 | P a g e  
 
Swartz, S. (1995). The black insane in the Cape, 1891–1920. Journal of Southern African Studies, 
21(3), 399-415.  
Swartz, S. (2008). Fools and Ships: Psychopathology and Colonial Experience in South Africa, 
1818-1930. In C. van Ommen, & D. Painter (Eds.), Interiors: A History of Psychology in 
Southern Africa, (pp. 261-285). Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. 
Swartz, S., Dowdall, T., & Swartz, L. (1986). Clinical Psychology and the 1985 Crisis In Cape 
Town, Psychology in Society, 5, 131-138. 
Teo, T. (2008). From Speculation to Epistemological Violence in Psychology: A Critical 
Hermeneutic Reconstruction. Theory & Psychology, 18(1), 47-67.  
Teo, T. (2014). Epistemological Violence. In T. Teo. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology 
(pp. 593-596). New York, NY: Springer.  
Te Molder, H. (2015). Discursive Psychology. In K. Tracy, C. Ilie, & T. Sandel (Eds.), The 
International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction, (pp. 1-11). Boston: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Taylor, J. G. (1945). How Black sees White. Trek, 9(15), 11. 
418 
 
418 | P a g e  
 
Taylor, J. G. (1946). The “Inferiority” of Women. Trek, 11(12), 13. 
Traub, C. M., & Swartz, L. (2013). White Clinical Psychology Trainees' Views on Racial Equity 
within Programme Selection in South Africa. Teaching in Higher Education, 18(8), 846-
858. 
The Bantu Education Act, 1953 Act No. 47. (1953). Union of South Africa. Retrieved from 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/bantu-education-act-act-no-47-1953 
The Extension of University Education Act No. 45. (1959). Union of South Africa. Retrieved from  
https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archivefiles2/leg19590619.028.020.045.df 
The Group Areas Act No. 41. (1950). Union of South Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1812/AD1812-Em3-1-
2011-jpeg.pdf 
The Native Administration Act No. 38. (1927). Union of South Africa. Retrieved from 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/6648/ZKM_C3_69.pdf?sequence=1 
The Suppression of Communism Act No 44. (1950). Union of South Africa. Retrieved from 
419 
 
419 | P a g e  
 
https://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/leg19500717.028.020.044.pdf 
Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical discourse analysis. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tanned & H.E. Hamilton 
(Eds.), The handbook of Discourse Analysis (pp. 349-371). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd.  
Van Dijk, T. A. (2014). Discourse, Cognition, Society. In J. Angermuller, D. Maingueneau, & R. 
Wodak (Eds.), The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, (pp.
 388-389). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
van der Westhuyzen, T. B., & Plug, C. (1987). The Training of South African Psychologists: 
Summary of findings of the PASA Council Committee for Training. South African Journal 
of Psychology, 17(4), 165-169.  
van Niekerk, T., & Boonzaier, F. (2019). The Life History Approach as a Decolonial Feminist 
Method? Contextualising Intimate Partner Violence in South Africa. In F. Boonzaier & T. 
van Niekerk (Eds), Decolonial Feminist Community Psychology (pp. 43-57). Switzerland, 
Cham: Springer. Vice, S. (2010). How Do I live in this Strange Place? Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 41(3), 323-342. 
420 
 
420 | P a g e  
 
Vincent, L., & Hlatshwayo, M. (2018). Ties that bind: The Ambiguous Role Played by Social 
Capital in Black Working Class First-generation South African Students’ Negotiation of 
University life. South African Journal of Higher Education, 32(3), 118-138. 
wa Thiong'o, N. O. (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. 
Kenya: East African Publishers. 
Watkins, Jr., C. E. (1983). Counseling Psychology versus Clinical Psychology: Further 
Explorations on a Theme or Once More Around the "Identity" Maypole with Gusto. The 
Counseling Psychologist, 11(4), 76-92.  
Weatherall, A. (2012). Discursive Psychology and Feminism. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 51(3), 463-470. 
Westbrook, D., Kennerley, H., & Kirk, J. (2011). An Introduction to Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy: Skills and Applications. London: Sage. 
World Health Organisation. (1994). The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf 
421 
 
421 | P a g e  
 
Yen, J. (2008). A history of Community Psychology in South Africa. In C. van Ommen & D. 
Painter (Eds.), Interiors: A History of Psychology in Southern Africa (pp. 385-412). 
Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
Yin, R. (2003). Case Study Research Design and Methods. USA: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Young, C. (2013). South African Counselling Psychology at a Crossroads: Lessons to be Learned 
from Around the World. South African Journal of Psychology, 43(4), 422-433. 
Young, C., & Saville Young, L. (2019). Comparing Clinical and Counselling Psychologists’
 Practitioner Demographics, Key Activities, Theoretical Orientations, Values, and Career
 Satisfaction: A Contribution to the Scopes of Practice Debate. South African Journal of
 Psychology, 49(4), 505–517. 
Young, J. A., & Braziel, J. E. (Eds.). (2006). Race and the Foundations of Knowledge: Cultural 
Amnesia in the Academy. Illinios: University of Illinois Press. 





422 | P a g e  
 
Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet  
Date 
Title: (Re)-centring Africa in the training of masters counselling and clinical psychologists 
in South Africa 
Dear  
My name is Sipho Dlamini and I am doing research with Kopano Ratele a professor in the 
Institute for Social and Health Sciences towards a Philosophical Doctorate (PhD) in 
Psychology at the University of South Africa. We have funding from the College of 
Graduate Studies for the completion of the PhD. We are inviting you to participate in a 
study entitled: (Re)-centring Africa in the training of masters counselling and clinical 
psychologists in South Africa. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
This study is expected to collect important information that could assist in rethinking 
pedagogical practices and selection procedures of trainee counselling and clinical 
psychologists within training institutions to reflect the pluriversal psychological 
experiences of people within South Africa.  
WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
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You have been chosen to participate in the study as you are the former course coordinator 
of the clinical psychology masters programme at your university. Your details were 
acquired from the head of department at your university. As the former course coordinator 
you are one of seven participants who hold or have held a similar position at other 
universities that have been requested to participate.  
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY? 
The study involves audio taping of in-depth one hour and thirty minutes face-to-face 
interview with you at your university. The focus of the interview will primarily be on the 
selection of trainee psychologists and curriculum for the clinical training programme.   
CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED TO 
PARTICIPATE? 
Participating in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent to 
participation.  If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep 
and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason.  
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
The study uses a case study approach to the collection of data of five South African 
universities that train counselling and/or clinical psychologists. As such it allows for an 
intra- and inter-university analysis of the data that is to be collected. In this way there are 
benefits to your training site to be able to contrast both at a micro-level and macro-level 
pedagogical practices and selection procedures. The study also is of value to the greater 
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psychology community as it may have application for other university sites that are not 
included in this study.   
ARE THEIR ANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ME IF I PARTICIPATE IN THE 
RESEARCH PROJECT? 
There is risk to the reputation of the university should there be a negative view particularly 
with regards to race. However this is mitigated by the coding of the data using a generic 
labelling of the university and pseudonyms for all participants.  
WILL THE INFORMATION THAT I CONVEY TO THE RESEARCHER AND MY 
IDENTITY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
Your name will not be recorded anywhere and no one will be able to connect you to the 
answers you give. Your answers will be given a code number or a pseudonym and you 
will be referred to in this way in the data, any publications, or other research reporting 
methods such as conference proceedings. The study will be made available to the public 
through the University of South Africa’s library, whilst parts of the study may also be used 
for conferences and article/book publication, there will be no identifying information. 
Your answers may be reviewed by people responsible for making sure that research is 
done properly, including the transcriber, external coder, and members of the Research 
Ethics Review Committee. Otherwise, records that identify you will be available only to 
people working on the study, unless you give permission for other people to see the 
records. 
HOW WILL THE RESEARCHER(S) PROTECT THE SECURITY OF DATA? 
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Hard copies of your answers will be stored by the researcher for a period of five years in 
a locked cupboard/filing cabinet at the Institute for Social and Health Sciences for future 
research or academic purposes; electronic information will be stored on a password 
protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research 
Ethics Review and approval if applicable. Hard copies will be shredded and electronic 
copies will be permanently deleted from the hard drive of the computer through the use 
of a relevant software programme. 
WILL I RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS 
STUDY? 
The study does not provide for any incentive or payment for your participation. 
HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICS APPROVAL 
This study has received written approval from the Research Ethics Review Committee of 
the College of Human Sciences, Unisa. A copy of the approval letter can be obtained 
from the researcher if you so wish. 
HOW WILL I BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS/RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH? 
If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Sipho Dlamini 
on 021 938 0472 or email sipho.dlamini@mrc.ac.za.  The findings are accessible for three 
years. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about 
any aspect of this study, please contact Sipho Dlamini on this email address 
sipho.dlamini@mrc.ac.za or by phone on 012 938 0472. 
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Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you 
may contact Professor Kopano Ratele on this email address kopano.ratele@mrc.ac.za 
or on this number 021 938 0536. Alternatively, contact the research ethics chairperson of 
the Unisa College of Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee, Professor 
Azwihangwisi Mavhandi-Mudzusi on mmudza@unisa.ac.za or 012 429 2055  
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study. 
_________________ 
Sipho Dlamini 
PhD candidate  
Researcher 
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Appendix B: Consent to Participate in this Study 
 
I, __________________ (participant name), confirm that the person asking my consent 
to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits 
and anticipated inconvenience of participation.  
I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the 
information sheet.   
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the 
study.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without penalty (if applicable). 
I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal 
publications and/or conference proceedings, but that my participation will be kept 
confidential unless otherwise specified.  
I agree to the recording of the <insert specific data collection method>.  
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
Participant Name & Surname………………………………………… (please print) 
Participant Signature……………………………………………..Date………………… 
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Appendix C: Interview Schedules  
Course Coordinators 
Selection 
 What is the selection procedure for student psychologists? 
 How are the candidates chosen for selection week? 
 Before selection week begins what decisions do you make about what kind of 
candidates you are looking for? 
 What role does race play in the candidates that you choose? 
 The issue of language: What role if any does language play in the selection of 
candidates? 
 Does the class background of the candidates matter as an indicator for selection? 
Why? Or why not?  
 In general South African (counselling/clinical) psychologist demographics have not 
changed according to the latest data. What do you think is the reason for this 
apparent stagnation in demographic changes? 
 Have the demographics in your programme changed? 
 How is your programme different from the other programmes in South Africa? 
 What do you want your trainees to be able to do when they leave? 
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Community Based 
 What lead to the decision to have a community-based programme? (For the 
community-based training site) 
 In comparison to other programmes that are not community based how do 
candidates differ? (For the community-based training site) 
 
 On the application process there is a survey that students must complete, tell me 
a bit about the survey. 
Curriculum: Recontextualisation 
 What does the training focus on?  
 How do you choose what the training focuses on? 
 How do you choose what to include in the curriculum? 
 What influences the design of the curriculum? 
 Do the lectures in the programme follow a similar style/philosophy with regards to 
what is being taught? 
 Does the curriculum follow trends from other countries? If so which countries do 
you look to for guidance? If not, why?  
 What do you want your trainees to know when they leave? 
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 Is the training changing with regards to the curriculum? – needs to be clearer?  
 How much of a role does the community psychology play in how the curriculum is 
oriented? 
Curriculum: Reproduction 
 What is the philosophy on the assessment of students? 
 How are students assessed in the course? 
 What influences (internal and external) the choice in the curriculum? 
 How clear is the criteria on the assessment of students? 
Intern psychologists 
Selection 
 What made you choose psychology?  
 What were you doing before you were accepted into the programme? 
 How did you experience the selection process at this particular university? 
 Do you think that the selection process is fair/equitable? 
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Curriculum: Recontextualisation 
 Do you think that the curriculum is relevant to your context? 
 Do you think that with the training you got you will be able to work in different 
contexts? 
 Do you feel that the curriculum is useful for where you want to work? In what ways? 
 What do you feel was the focus of the curriculum? 
 What do you feel you got out of the training? 
Curriculum: Recontextualisation  
 The assessment process during your M1 year, do you feel that the process was 
fair? 
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Appendix D: Course Coordinator Permission Letter 
Request for permission to conduct research at [Name of University], Department 
of Psychology 
“(Re)-centring Africa in the training of masters counselling and clinical psychologists.”  
Date 
Sipho Dlamini  
Building G  
South African Medical Research Council/Violence and Injury Prevention Unit  
021 938 0472/ sipho.dlamini@mrc.ac.za  
Re: Access to psychology course coordinators for participation in PhD study 
Dear 
I, Sipho Dlamini, am doing research with Kopano Ratele a professor in the Institute for Social and 
Health Sciences towards a PhD in Psychology at the University of South Africa. We have funding 
from the College of Graduate Studies for the completion of the PhD. We are inviting you to 
participate in a study entitled “(Re)-centring Africa in the training of masters counselling and 
clinical psychologists.”    
The aim of the study is to focus on the training of counselling and clinical psychologists at five 
universities in relation to issues of selection and pedagogical practices. 
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The study will entail in-depth interviews with course coordinators and intern psychologists of the 
counselling and clinical psychology programmes at your university. Additional data will be sort 
from the course outlines of the programme(s). The current request is for permission to conduct 
study with course coordinators of the counselling and clinical psychology training programmes. 
Permission has been sort from the registrar of [Name of University] to interview intern 
psychologists. 
The benefits of this study are that it allows for an intra- and inter-university analysis of the data 
that is to be collected. In this way there are benefits to your training site to be able to contrast both 
at a micro-level and macro-level pedagogical practices and selection procedures. The study also is 
of value to the greater psychology community as it may have application for other university sites 
that are not included in this study.   
Due to the nature of the study issues of race arising from questions about selection procedures and 
pedagogical practices may pose potential risks to the reputation of the university. However, this is 
mitigated by the coding of the data using generic labeling of the university and pseudonyms for all 
participants. 
If the university wishes to have direct feedback about the study, the researcher can be contacted 
on sipho.dlamini@mrc.ac.za.  
Yours sincerely 
_______________________ 
Signature of researcher 
_______________________ 
Researcher Name  
-------------------- 
PhD candidate/ Researcher 
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Appendix E: Intern Psychologists Permission Letter 
Request for permission to conduct research at Rhodes University, Department of 
Psychology 
“(Re)-centring Africa in the training of masters counselling and clinical psychologists.”  
Date 
Sipho Dlamini  
Building G  
South African Medical Research Council/Violence and Injury Prevention Unit  
021 938 0472/ sipho.dlamini@mrc.ac.za  
Re: Access to intern psychologists for participation in PhD study 
Dear  
I, Sipho Dlamini, am doing research with Kopano Ratele a professor in the Institute for Social and 
Health Sciences towards a PhD in Psychology at the University of South Africa. We have funding 
from the College of Graduate Studies for the completion of the PhD. We are inviting you to 
participate in a study entitled “(Re)-centring Africa in the training of masters counselling and 
clinical psychologists.”    
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The aim of the study is to focus on the training of counselling and clinical psychologists at five 
universities in relation to issues of selection and pedagogical practices.  
The study will entail in-depth interviews with course coordinators and intern psychologists of the 
counselling and clinical psychology programmes at your university. Additional data will be sort 
from the course outlines of the programme(s). The current request is for permission to conduct 
study with intern psychologists who were registered for their first year (M1) at [university].   
The benefits of this study are that it allows for an intra- and inter-university analysis of the data 
that is to be collected. In this way there are benefits to your training site to be able to contrast both 
at a micro-level and macro-level pedagogical practices and selection procedures. The study also is 
of value to the greater psychology community as it may have application for other university sites 
that are not included in this study.   
Due to the nature of the study issues of race arising from questions about selection procedures and 
pedagogical practices may pose potential risks to the reputation of the university. However, this is 
mitigated by the coding of the data using generic labelling of the university and pseudonyms for 
all participants. 
If the university wishes to have direct feedback about the study, the researcher can be contacted 
on sipho.dlamini@mrc.ac.za.  
Yours sincerely 
_______________________ 
Signature of researcher 
______________________ 
Researcher Name  
------- 
PhD candidate  
Researcher 
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